Puteri, Ariestya Alfianti and Dr. Dra. Erwin Saraswati,, M.Acc (2021) Pengaruh Struktur Corporate Governance Dan Kualitas Audit Terhadap Kualitas Laba. Sarjana thesis, Universitas Brawijaya.
Abstract
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan pengaruh struktur corporate governance dan kualitas audit terhadap kualitas laba. Penelitian ini menggunakan 74 perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2011-2019 dengan teknik purposive sampling. Data penelitian dikumpulkan dari laporan tahunan periode 2011-2019. Metode analisis data yang digunakan adalah regresi linier berganda. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa komisaris independen dan jumlah rapat komite audit dapat meningkatkan kualitas laba, terutama pada perusahaan besar. Hal ini karena komisaris independen dan komite audit dinilai aktif dalam melakukan fungsi pengawasan pelaporan keuangan serta menjamin bahwa mekanisme GCG diterapkan dengan baik di perusahaan. Sebaliknya, pada perusahaan menengah, komisaris independen dan jumlah rapat komite audit tidak berpengaruh terhadap kualitas laba, karena jumlah komisaris independen dan rapat komite audit perusahaan dinilai sebatas untuk memenuhi ketentuan formal, serta efektivitas pengawasan tidak dapat diukur melalui jumlah rapat saja. Selain itu, pada perusahaan manufktur di Indonesia, kepemilikan institusional tidak berpengaruh terhadap kualitas laba, karena pemilik saham institusional cenderung berfokus pada laba jangka pendek. Kualitas audit yang dicerminkan oleh ukuran KAP tidak memiliki pengaruh terhadap kualitas laba karena kurangnya independensi auditor di Indonesia, serta tujuan auditor hanya untuk meningkatkan kredibilitas laporan keuangan dan bukan kualitas laba perusahaan
English Abstract
This study aims to explain the effect of corporate governance structure and audit quality on earnings quality. This study used 74 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2011-2019 with a purposive sampling technique. The research data were collected from the annual reports for the period 2011-2019. The data analysis method used is multiple linear regression. The results showed that independent commissioners and the number of audit committee meetings can improve earnings quality, especially in large companies. This is because the independent commissioners and audit committee are considered active in carrying out the function of monitoring financial reporting and ensuring that the GCG mechanism is properly implemented in the company. On the other hand, in medium-sized companies, independent commissioners and the number of audit committee meetings have no effect on earnings quality, because the number of independent commissioners and company audit committee meetings is considered only to meet formal requirements, and the effectiveness of supervision cannot be measured by the number of meetings alone. In addition, in manufacturing companies in Indonesia, institutional ownership has no effect on earnings quality, because institutional shareholders tend to focus on short-term earnings. Audit quality which is reflected by the size of auditor has no effect on earnings quality due to the lack of independence of auditors in Indonesia, and the objective of auditors is only to increase the credibility of financial statements and not the quality of company earnings
Other obstract
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Item Type: | Thesis (Sarjana) |
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Identification Number: | 0521020109 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | good corporate governance, kualitas audit, kualitas laba, manajemen laba, ukuran KAP, good corporate governance, audit quality, earnings quality, earnings management, auditor size. |
Subjects: | 600 Technology (Applied sciences) > 657 Accounting |
Divisions: | Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis > Akuntansi |
Depositing User: | Nur Cholis |
Date Deposited: | 05 Jan 2022 02:56 |
Last Modified: | 24 Feb 2022 03:15 |
URI: | http://repository.ub.ac.id/id/eprint/187841 |
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