

PERPUSTAKAAN PUSAT
UNIVERSITAS BRAWIJAYA

CODE

No. REG.

9903946

TGL

21-9-99

JUMLAH:

ABSTRACT

Author : Faisal Ismail

Title : Islam in Indonesian Politics: A Study of Muslim Response to and acceptance of the Pancasila

Department : Islamic Studies, McGill University

Degree : Ph.D.

The main objective of this study is to analyze three major Indonesian Muslim responses to the Pancasila, the state ideology of Indonesia. The first Muslim response occurred when the Secular Nationalists proposed, shortly before Indonesia's independence in 1945 and again later in the Constituent Assembly debates (1956-1959), that the Pancasila be the basis of state. The second Muslim response to the Pancasila took place in 1978 when the New Order government proposed that the P 4 (Guidelines for Understanding and Practicing the Pancasila) be legalized. The Muslims at first objected to both the proposal of the Pancasila as the foundation of the state and that of the P 4, but finally acquiesced. Each stage in this process was marked by debate over the role of Islam in Indonesian society and politics, which often led to antagonism between the government and the Muslim community. When the government proposed in 1982 that the Pancasila serve as the sole basis for all political and mass organizations, the third Muslim response occurred. The Muslims' acceptance of this policy marked the end of the government's application of severe policies towards them and has resulted in the former being allowed to play an even greater role in Indonesian politics than had previously been the case.

PERPUSTAKAAN PUSAT
UNIVERSITAS BRAWIJAYA MALANGDES
297.272 095 98
ISM
i
1995
k.1

MILIK



RESUME

Auteur : Faisal Ismail

Titre : L'Islam et la politique indonésienne : Une analyse de la réplique musulmane et de l'acceptation du Pancasila

Département : Institut des Études Islamiques, Université McGill.

Diplôme : Doctorat

L'objectif de cette étude est d'analyser trois importantes répliques de la part des musulmans indonésiens envers le Pancasila, l'idéologie nationale de l'Indonésie. La première réplique des musulmans a eu lieu peu de temps avant l'indépendance de l'Indonésie en 1945 et plus tard lors des débats de l'assemblée constituante (1956 - 1959) lorsque les nationalistes séculiers ont proposé que le Pancasila devienne le fondement de l'état. La seconde réplique des musulmans envers le Pancasila a eu lieu en 1978 lorsque le gouvernement de l'Ordre Nouveau a proposé la légalisation du P 4 (Guide pour la compréhension et la pratique du Pancasila). Les musulmans ont d'abord fait objection au Pancasila ainsi qu'au P 4 en tant que base de l'état pour finalement approuver les deux propositions. Chaque étape de ce processus fut marquée par le débat concernant le rôle de l'Islam au sein de la politique et de la société indonésienne, ce qui provoquera à plusieurs reprises des conflits entre le gouvernement et la communauté musulmane. Lorsque le gouvernement a proposé en 1982 que le Pancasila soit appliqué comme unique fondation pour toute organisation politique et sociale, la troisième réplique s'est produite. L'acceptation du Pancasila par les musulmans marquera la fin de l'application par le gouvernement de politiques sévères à leur égard et ultimement les musulmans seront autorisés à jouer un rôle beaucoup plus important que celui qui leur avait été auparavant alloué.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. A. Uner Turgay, my academic advisor and supervisor, who helped me in determining the ultimate direction and scope of this dissertation. I wish to express my deepest gratitude for his valuable advice and his endless patience. I would also like to express my appreciation to Dr. Howard M. Federspiel and Dr. Nurcholish Madjid, whose lectures and seminars on Modern Indonesian Islam during the 1991 - 1992 academic year enriched my understanding of the subject greatly. Thanks also go to Dr. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, who taught at the Institute of Islamic Studies as a visiting professor in the 1993 - 1994 academic year, for his encouragement and his readiness to read and make comments on the first draft of my thesis proposal.

I would like to express my deep thanks to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for providing me a fellowship to study at McGill University, and to the OTO Bappenas (Overseas Training Office of the National Development Board) of the Republic of Indonesia for its financial support for part of my studies at McGill. Thanks are also due to the directors of the McGill - Indonesia IAIN Development Project (Dr. Charles J. Adams, Dr. Issa J. Boullata and Dr. Howard M. Federspiel, respectively) and its staff both in Jakarta and Montreal for the facilities they provided to support the completion of my studies. My gratitude also goes to the Islamic Studies Library staff who assisted me in locating materials. I would also like to express my gratitude to Richard McGregor and Stephen Millier who edited my work.

My gratitude must also be expressed to H. Munawir Sjadzali, M. A. and Dr. Tarmizi Taher, the former and present Ministers of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, respectively, who gave me the chance to pursue my studies at the



Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University; Prof. H. A. Mu'in Umar and Dr. Simuh, the former and present Rectors of the IAIN Sunan Kalijaga of Yogyakarta, who gave me permission to leave my duties at the IAIN; Thoha Hamim and Achmad Jainuri, who contributed ideas which were valuable to the development of my analysis; Didin Syafruddin, who contributed valuable ideas and materials relating to the HMI; and to my uncle, M. Hasan Baidai, and my young colleague, Hamdan Daulay, who assisted me in finding and collecting materials. To those who are not mentioned by name, I wish to express my thanks for all their contributions. Without such help and cooperation, this dissertation could hardly have been completed.

Lastly, I am indebted to my lovely wife, Farida Herawati, who has always patiently given me moral support, and to my daughters, Mila, Fitri and Yuyun, who with love, encouraged me to complete this dissertation.

Montreal, December 1995

F I



SPELLING AND transliteration

In transliteration of the Arabic names and terms in this dissertation I have used the transliteration scheme employed at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University.

Indonesian terms in this dissertation are written according to the latest Indonesian spelling (1972); for Indonesian names the spelling is retained which the persons themselves used or use. The only differences between the old and the new systems of spelling are that ch, dj, oe, tj become kh, j, u, c.

The main differences in transliteration from Arabic to English and Indonesian are :

Arabic	English	Indonesian	Arabic	English	Indonesian
--------	---------	------------	--------	---------	------------

ث

th

ts

ض

d

dl

ح

h

h

ط

t

th

خ

kh

ch/kh

ظ

z

dh

ذ

dh

dz

ء

ش

sh

sy

و

w

u/w

ص

s

sh

Foreign words and phrases are italicized generally only the first time they appear in the text.



GLOSSARY

abangan	= nominal Muslim
ABRI	= Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
AKUI	= Aksi Kemenangan Umat Islam (Action for Muslim Victory)
aliran kepercayaan	= Javanese spiritualism
ASEAN	= Association of South East Asian Nations
Babinsa	= Bintara pembina desa (Non-commissioned officers for the supervision of villages)
Bakin	= Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Coordinating Body)
BP 7	= Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Committee for Supervising and Perfecting the Implementation of the Guidelines for Understanding and Practicing the Pancasila)
BPUPKI	= Badan Penyelidik Usaha - Usaha Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence)
DDII	= Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council)
DGI	= Dewan Gereja Indonesia (Council of Indonesian [Protestant] Churches)
DPR	= Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Council, Parliament)
DPRD	= Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional Peoples' Representative Council)
dwifungsi	= dual function
GBHN	= Garis - Garis Besar Haluan Negara (Broad Outlines of State Policies)
Gestapu/PKI	= Gerakan 30 September/PKI (Movement of the 30th of September of the Indonesian Communist Party)
Gestok	= Gerakan Satu Oktober (Movement of the first of October)



Golkar	= Golongan Karya (Functional Group)
GPPS	= Gerakan Pendukung Pantja Sila (Movement to Support the Pancasila)
GUPPI	= Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam (Association for the Improvement of Islamic Education)
HMI	= Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Association of Muslim University Students)
IAIN	= Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute of Islamic Studies)
ICMI	= Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
IPKI	= Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Association of Supporters of Indonesian Independence)
jilbab	= a piece of clothing covering the head
KAMI	= Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (Action Front of Indonesian University Students)
KAP Gestapu/PKI	= Kesatuan Aksi Penggajangan Gestapu/PKI (Action Front for Destroying the Gestapu/PKI)
KAPPI	= Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia (Action Front of Indonesian Youths and Students)
KNIP	= Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Indonesian National Central Committee)
Kodam	= Komando Daerah Militer (Military District Command)
Komando Jihad	= Holy War Command
Korpri	= Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Corps of Government Workers of the Republic of Indonesia)
Kostrad	= Komando Strategi Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command)
Kyai	= honorific title given to a Muslim leader who is religiously and socially respected by Muslims, especially in the circle of the Traditionalist Muslims. The word "kyai" is often written "kiai", but the meaning is the same.
Mahmilub	= Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa (Special Military Court)
Masyumi	= Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims)

MAWI	= Majelis Agung Wali Gereja Indonesia (Great Council of Indonesian [Catholic] Churches)
MDI	= Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah (Council of Islamic Propagation)
MI	= Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslims)
MPO	= Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi (Council to Save the Organization)
MPR	= Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Council)
MPRS	= Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (Provisional People's Consultative Council)
MUI	= Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Indonesian 'Ulamā')
Nasakom	= Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis (Nationalists, Religious groups, and Communists)
NU	= Nahdlatul Ulama (Renaissance of the 'Ulamā')
nuzulul Qur'an	= celebration of the occasion of the revelation of the Qur'ān
Opsus	= Operasi Khusus (Special Operation Body)
P 4	= Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guidelines for Understanding and Practicing the Pancasila)
P 7	= Penasehat Presiden tentang Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Advisors to the President on the Implementation of the Guidelines for Understanding and Practicing the Pancasila)
Parkindo	= Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party)
Parmusi	= Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party)
Partai Buruh	= Labour Party (established on December 25, 1949).
Partai Katholik	= Catholic Party
Partai Murba	= Murba Party. Murba literally means the lower class people.
PDI	= Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PDIH	= Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party)
PDRI	= Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia (Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia)



Permesta	= Perjuangan Semesta Alam (Inclusive Struggle)
Persahi	= Persatuan Sarjana Hukum Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Lawyers)
Persis	= Persatuan Islam (Islamic Association)
Pertamina	= Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Nasional (National Oil Company)
Perti	= Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Educational Movement)
pesantren	= traditional Islamic educational institution. Usually, this institution is operated by the Traditionalist Muslims (chiefly the NU) and is located in rural areas.
PGI	= Persekutuan Gereja - Gereja Indonesia (Alliance of Indonesian [Protestant] Churches)
PHDP	= Parisadha Hindu Dharma Pusat (Representative Council of Indonesian Hindus)
PII	= Partai Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Party)
PII	= Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students)
PKI	= Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PMII	= Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim University Student Movement)
PMP	= Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (Pancasila Moralty Education)
PNI	= Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party)
PPKI	= Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Committee for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence)
PPP	= Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PPPRI	= Persatuan Pegawai Polisi Republik Indonesia (Association of Police of the Republic of Indonesia)
PPTI	= Partai Persatuan Tharikat Islam (United Islamic Tharikat Party)
Pramuka	= Praja Muda Karana (Girl Guides and Boy Scouts)
PRRI	= Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)



PSI	= Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party); established on February 12, 1948 by Sutan Sjahrir, Subadio Sastrosatomo and Djohan Sjahrusah.
PSII	= Partai Sarekat [Syarikat] Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Union Party)
PTDI	= Perguruan Tinggi Dakwah Islam (College for Islamic Propagation)
Rapim ABRI	= Rapat Pimpinan ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces Commanders Meeting)
Repelita	= Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five - Year Development Plan)
RIS	= Republik Indonesia Serikat (Republic of the United States of Indonesia)
rupiah	= Indonesian currency. It is abbreviated as Rp. in Indonesian. In April 1995, approximately Rp. 2, 200 were equal to one US dollar.
ṣalat tarāwīḥ	= recommended prayers performed by Muslims during the night of the month of Ramaḍān
ṣalat istikhārah	= a night prayer performed by Muslims to seek direct guidance and blessing from God
santri	= devout Muslim. The word "santri" is also used for one who studies at the pesantren.
SDSB	= Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah (Social Contribution with Reward)
Sekber Golkar	= Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya (Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups)
SI	= Syarikat Islam (Islamic Union)
tritura	= tiga tuntutan hatinurani rakyat (three demands of people's conscience)
Walubi	= Perwalian Umat Budha Indonesia (Representative Council of Indonesian Buddhists)
YAMP	= Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila (Foundation for the Dedication of Pancasilaist Muslims)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ii

RÉSUMÉ iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv

SPELLING AND TRANSLITERATION vi

GLOSSARY vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS xii

INTRODUCTION I

Chapter One :

MUSLIM RESPONSE TO AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE PANCASILA AS THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS AND IDEOLOGY OF THE STATE

A. The Proposed Pancasila 18

B. Muslim Response to the Pancasila (May - August 1945) 40

C. Muslim Response to the Pancasila (1956 - 1959) 69

Chapter Two :

MUSLIM RESPONSE TO AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE GUIDELINES FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PRACTICING THE PANCASILA

A. The Rise and Development of the New Order Government and its Policies towards Muslims 109

B. The Government Policy of Applying the P 4 (Guidelines for Understanding and Practicing the Pancasila 142

C. Muslim Response to and Acceptance of the P 4 160

Chapter Three :

MUSLIM RESPONSE TO AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE PANCASILA AS THE SOLE BASIS FOR ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS

A. The Government Policy of Stipulating the Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Political Parties and Mass Organizations 199

B. Muslim Response to the Government Policy of Stipulating the Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Political Parties 216

C. Muslim Response to the Government Policy of Applying the Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Mass Organizations 238

D. Government Policies Towards Muslims after their Acceptance of the Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Political Parties and Mass Organizations..... 281

Chapter Four :

CONCLUSION 311



BIBLIOGRAPHY 315





Chapter One

MUSLIM RESPONSE TO AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE PANCASILA AS THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS AND IDEOLOGY OF THE STATE



Chapter Two

MUSLIM RESPONSE TO AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE GUIDELINES FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PRACTICING THE PANCASILA



BACKGROUND

What we call Indonesia¹ today, with its present geographical boundaries, consists basically of the former territories colonized by the Dutch in the seventeenth century and administered by them until the middle of the twentieth.² Under Dutch colonialism, Indonesia was called the Dutch East Indies. After defeating the Allies in the Pacific War in 1941, the Japanese seized power from the Dutch and established an oppressive military rule in Indonesia which was to last from 1942 until 1945.³ The Indonesian people enthusiastically proclaimed their independence on August 17, 1945, two days after the defeat of the Japanese by the Allies in the Pacific War. From a positive perspective, one of the most important colonial legacies was the determination

¹ According to Soekarno, the first president of the Republic of Indonesia, "the word 'Indonesia' comes from a German ethnologist named Jordan who was a scholar in Holland. His special study was our island chain. Due to the archipelago's proximity to India, he labeled it 'the island of the Indies'. *Nesos* being Greek for islands, it came out *Indusnesos* -- which eventually became Indonesia." See Soekarno, *Sukarno : An Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams* (New York : The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), 63. Indonesia consists of 13,667 islands, 6,044 of which are named and the rest (7,623) not. Only 931 of all the islands (less than seven percent) are inhabited. The islands are scattered on both sides of the equator between east longitude 94°15' and 141°105' and extends from 6°08' north latitude to 11°15' south latitude. The greatest distance from west to east is 5,110 kilometers and 1,888 kilometers from south to north. The total land area of the Indonesian archipelago is about 1,904,569 square kilometers (735,381 square miles). See *Statistik Indonesia* (Jakarta : Biro Pusat Statistik, 1975), 3.

² The Dutch occupation for three and a half centuries affected a number of parts of Indonesia, particularly Java. The complete Dutch occupation of Aceh, for example, lasted only 33 years, starting from the defeat of the Acehnese at the end of the Aceh War in 1912 (begun in 1872) and ending with the proclamation of Indonesia's independence in 1945.

³ Accounts of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia can be read, for example, in M. A. Aziz, *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1955); Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun : Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942 - 1945* (The Hague : W. van Hoeve, 1960); George Sanford Kanabele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence," (Ph. D. diss., Cornell University, 1967).



of the geographical boundaries of the future nation once foreign domination came to an end. Without Dutch colonialism it seems impossible to imagine the existence of the Indonesian state within its present limits.

Indonesia is probably one of the most ethnically and culturally heterogeneous of the world's larger nations. Hildred Geertz describes the diversity of Indonesian society as follows :

There are over three hundred different ethnic groups in Indonesia, each with its own cultural identity, and more than two hundred and fifty distinct languages are spoken ... nearly all the important world religions are represented, in addition to a wide range of indigenous ones.⁴

To portray the plurality of Indonesian society and culture, the founding fathers of the Republic promulgated in 1945 a national motto which reads *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity). This national motto was derived from a motto formulated by Empu Tantular, a brilliant thinker and court poet who lived during the golden age of the Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit (1293 - 1478). The rulers of this kingdom, which emerged as the greatest Hindu kingdom in pre-Islamic Indonesia, employed the motto with the political objective of maintaining the unity of all peoples and of preserving the integrity of all the territories of the kingdom.⁵ The revival by the founding fathers of the Republic of Indonesia of the national motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* reflected their political dream of cultivating the national unity, integrity and stability of the state of Indonesia.

⁴ Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., *Indonesia* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1963), 24.

⁵ See Muhammad Yamin, *Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia* (Jakarta : Yayasan Prapanca, n. d.), 439 and 445.

The new nation required, however, more than just a motto; it required an ideology. Thus, shortly before the proclamation of Indonesia's independence in 1945, the representatives of the Muslim Nationalists and the leaders of the Secular Nationalists became involved in a dispute over whether Islam or the *Pancasila* was to be used as the ideological basis of the Indonesian state. After a long and tense debate, the two factions agreed that the Pancasila be used for this purpose. Today the Pancasila is very well known to all segments of Indonesian society. It functions as the philosophical basis and national ideology of the state as well as a way of life for Indonesian society.

Literally, the word Pancasila means five principles (from a Sanskrit word : *panca*, five, and *sila*, principle). In fact, the term Pancasila was used by Empu Prapanca in his well-known book entitled *Negarakertagama*, and likewise by Empu Tantular in his famous work entitled *Sutasoma*. These two writers were great thinkers and poets who lived under the Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit during the reign of Hayam Wuruk.⁶ At that time, the Pancasila functioned as five ethical principles counselling the rulers and their subjects not to engage in violence, steal, hold a grudge, lie, or drink to intoxication.⁷ According to Zainal Abidin Ahmad, these five moral principles are close to those of Buddhist ethics, which consist of the following :

- (1) *Panatipata veramani sikkhapadam samadiyami* (We promise not to kill)
- (2) *Adinnadana veramani sikkhapadam samadiyami* (We promise not to steal)
- (3) *Kamesu miccharaca veramni sikkhapadam samadiyami* (We promise not to commit adultery)
- (4) *Mussavada veramani sikkhapadam samadiyami* (We promise not to lie),
and

⁶ Ibid., 437.

⁷ Darji Darmodiharjo, *Pancasila : Suatu Orientasi Singkat*, 12th ed. (Jakarta : Aries Lima, 1984), 23.



(5) *Sura meraya majja pamadatthana veramani sikkhapadam samadiyani* (We promise not to drink to intoxication).⁸

Thus, the term Pancasila, whose five principles originally served as a moral and ethical code, was transformed into a political concept within the context of modern Indonesian political thinking. The officially acknowledged formulation of the Pancasila reads as follows :

Belief in the One and Only God
Just and civilized humanity
The Unity of Indonesia
Democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom in unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives
Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.⁹

Before any extensive discussion may be undertaken regarding the establishment of the Pancasila, it will be necessary to begin with a survey of the major players in this process. Of these, two in particular already mentioned above, namely the Secular Nationalists and the Muslim Nationalists,¹⁰ need to be introduced, since they will often be referred to, particularly in the first chapter. What I mean by "Secular Nationalists"

⁸ See *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*, vol. 1 (Bandung : Konstituante Republik Indonesia, 1958), 361. See also Prawoto Mangkusasmito, *Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara dan Sebuah Refleksi* (Jakarta : Hudaya, 1970), 12 - 13.

⁹ Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik Indonesia, *Undang-Undang Dasar, Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila dan Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara* (Jakarta : Sekretariat Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik Indonesia, 1981), 1.

¹⁰ Saifuddin Anshari uses these two terms in his "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945 : A Gentlemen's Agreement between the Islamic and the Secular Nationalists in Modern Indonesia," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1976). Deliar Noer uses the term "the Muslim Nationalists" and "the Religiously Neutral Nationalists," while Bernhard Dahm employs the term "the Moslems" and "the 'Secular' Nationalists" whose meanings are basically the same as Anshari's. See Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1940 - 1942* (Singapore : Oxford University Press, 1973), 216 - 295; Bernhard Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence*, trans. by F. Somers Heidhues (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1969), 262.

is a group of Indonesian political leaders -- Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Hindus or others -- who firmly rejected religion as the basis of the state, even though they were not personally secularists, nor lacking in religious sentiments, tendencies and affiliations. They simply chose not to use religion as a political ideology or as a political system, but rather restricted it to their personal lives. In contrast, what I mean by "Muslim Nationalists" is that group of Muslim leaders who, deeply committed to their faith, believed that Islam should be used as the basis of the state. They believed that religion and state cannot be separated since there is no separation of worldly matters and other-worldly affairs in the teachings of Islam.

According to the 1980 national census, Indonesian Muslims constitute 87 percent of the Indonesian population (which totals about 170 million), while Christians make up nine percent, Hindus two percent and Buddhists one percent.¹¹ In terms of politics however, the political aspirations of Indonesian Muslims are not vested in any one Islamic political party; rather their political orientations, from the very beginning until the early 1980s, have been varied and divided among many "secular" political parties. If we use the results of the general elections held in Indonesia between the years 1955 and 1984 as an indication of the real Islamic political forces, we see that the Islamic parties did not enjoy anything approaching universal popularity. At present, for instance, Muslim political aspirations are divided amongst the *Golkar* (*Golongan Karya*, or Functional Group), the PDI (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*, or Indonesian Democratic Party) and the PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, or United Development Party).

¹¹ See Graeme J. Hugo et al., *The Demographic Dimension in Indonesian Development* (Singapore : Oxford University Press, 1987), 24.

In terms of religious outlook, Indonesian Muslims can be divided into two groups : Modernist Muslims and Traditionalist Muslims. Modernist Muslims were, and continue to be, those Muslims who have adopted modernist ideas preached by modernist Muslim thinkers such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839 - 1897) and Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849 - 1905). They do not practice *taqlīd* or *ijmā‘*, but rather stress the importance of the use of *ijtihād* in the face of social changes in the Muslim community. This group includes, among others, the *Syarikat Islam*¹² (Islamic Union) founded in Surakarta in 1912, the *Muhammadiyah*¹³ (established in Yogyakarta in 1912), the *Persis*¹⁴ (*Persatuan Islam*, or Islamic Association) set up in Bandung in

¹² The origins of the *Syarikat Islam* can be traced back to the *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (Islamic Commercial Union) which had been founded by H. Samanhudi in Surakarta in 1911 and was transformed later into the *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Union) party in 1912. In its early development, the party played an important role in the Indonesian independence movement. In 1930 it was transformed again into the *PSII* (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia*, or Indonesian Islamic Union Party). For more details about this party, see Noer, *The Modernist*. Timur Jaylani analyzed the *Sarekat's* contribution to Indonesian nationalism in his "The *Sarekat Islam* Movement : Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1959).

¹³ Many studies have been written on the *Muhammadiyah*. See, for instance, ‘Abdul Mu‘tī ‘Alī, "The *Muhammadiyah* Movement," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1957); James Peacock, *Purifying the Faith : The Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesia* (California : The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, 1978); Alfian, *Muhammadiyah : The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism* (Yogyakarta : Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989); Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree : A Study of the Muhammadiyah in a Central Javanese Town* (Yogyakarta : Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983).

¹⁴ A comprehensive study of the *Persatuan Islam* was made by Howard M. Federspiel in his *Persatuan Islam : Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia* (Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970).

1923 and the *Masyumi*¹⁵ (*Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia*, or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) established in Yogyakarta in 1945.

As for Traditionalist Muslims, they are Muslims who follow and tend to be satisfied with the thoughts and opinions formulated by the *‘ulamā’* of the medieval period. They practice *taqlīd* and emphasize the importance of *ijmā‘* rather than rational and independent thinking (*ijtihād*). Because of these practices, the Traditionalist Muslims have often been sharply attacked by the Modernist Muslims for their stagnant thinking in response to the challenge and demands of modernity. However, it should be noted that according to Clifford Geertz, who draws upon Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje's opinion, traditional Islam in Indonesia, which was in fact heavily influenced by the opinions of the *‘ulamā’* of the medieval period, changed in fundamental ways in response to modernity. As he puts it :

... Indonesian Islam, which seemed so static, so sunk in a torpid medievalism, was actually changing in fundamental ways, but these changes were so gradual, so subtle, so concentrated in remote and, to non-Islamic minds, unlikely places, that "although they take place before our very eyes, they are hidden from those who do not make a careful study of the subject."¹⁶

¹⁵ A comprehensive study of the Masyumi was undertaken by Deliar Noer. See his "Masyumi : Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia," (M. A. thesis, Cornell University, 1960). See also Harun Nasution, "The Islamic State in Indonesia : The Rise of the Ideology, the Movement for its Creation and the Theory of the Masyumi," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1965); Asyari M., "The Rise of the Masyumi Party in Indonesia and the Role of the *‘Ulamā’* in its Early Development (1942 - 52)," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1976).

¹⁶ Clifford Geertz, "Modernization in a Moslem Society : The Indonesian Case," *Quest*, no. 39 (Autumn 1963), 16. C. Snouck Hurgronje's opinion to which Geertz referred can be read in *The Achehnese*, trans. by A. W. S. O'Sullivan (Leiden : E. J. Brill, 1906), 280.

Furthermore, H. A. R. Gibb has also argued that, from the thirteenth century to the nineteenth century, no single school of philosophy or religion became stagnant.¹⁷

Based on these arguments, it can be stated that in fact traditional Islam in Indonesia has continued to develop with its own vigor, vitality and dynamics. The NU¹⁸ (*Nahdlatul Ulama*, or Renaissance of the 'Ulamā'), created in Surabaya in 1926, and the *Perti*¹⁹ (*Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah*, or Islamic Educational Movement), established in Bukittinggi in 1930, are among other Traditionalist Muslim groups.

In the Javanese cultural context, Muslims, as categorized by Clifford Geertz in his book, *The Religion of Java*, can be divided into the *santris* (devout Muslims) and *abangans* (less devout or nominal Muslims).²⁰ Generally speaking, most Javanese Muslim political leaders who identified themselves with the Secular Nationalists in the 1940s and in the 1950s represented the abangan tradition, while the Javanese Muslim political leaders, both Modernists and Traditionalists, who belonged to the Muslim Nationalist camp, represented the santri culture. However, due to educational development and social transformation in the Indonesian Muslim community, which has been characterized by a continuous increase in religious consciousness, the gap between Traditionalists and Modernists, as between *santris* and *abangans*, has

¹⁷ H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (New York : Octagon Book, 1981), 1 - 2.

¹⁸ Several studies of the NU have been produced by many writers. See, for example, Ahmad Farichin Chumaidy, "The Jam'iyah Nahdlatul 'Ulamā' : Its Rise and Early Development (1926 - 45)" (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1976); Mochtar Naim, "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party (1952 - 1955) : An Inquiry into the Origin of Its Electoral Success," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1960); Mahrus Irsyam, "Nahdlatul Ulama 1945 - 1952," (Drs. thesis, FISIP Universitas Indonesia, 1974).

¹⁹ The history of the establishment of the Perti and its early development can be read, for example, in Noer, *The Modernist*.

²⁰ Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1976).

gradually been eliminated. Dr. Ahmad Syafii Maarif (b. 1935) sees a new trend emerging in the immediate future in which the "abangan socio-cultural complexities will merge gradually but steadily into the santri culture."²¹

In addition to the abangan and santri categories, Geertz mentions another which he terms the *priyayis* (aristocrats). Geertz's three categories of Javanese, namely the santris, the abangans and the priyayis, have been criticized by many scholars because of the fact that he mixes religious and social concepts. The subdivisions of abangans and santris are religious concepts, while the subdivision of priyayis is a social concept which in fact should be opposed to *wong cilik* (common people).²² Commenting on *The Religion of Java*, Marshall G. Hodgson states that Geertz is mistaken in his study of the life of Muslims in Java. As he puts it :

Unfortunately, its general high excellence is marred by a major systematic error : influenced by the polemics of a certain school of modern *sharī'a* -minded Muslims, Geertz identifies 'Islam' only with what that school of modernists happens to approve, and ascribes everything else to an aboriginal or a Hindu-Buddhist background, gratuitously labeling much of the Muslim religious life in Java 'Hindu.' He identifies a long series of phenomena, virtually universal to Islam and sometimes found even in the Qur'ān itself, as un-Islamic; and hence his interpretation of the Islamic reactions is highly misleading ... For one who knows Islam, his comprehensive data -- despite his intention -- show very little has survived from the Hindu past even in inner Java and raise the question why the triumph of Islam was so complete.²³

²¹ Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State : A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia," (Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago, 1983), 4.

²² For a further critique of Geertz's theory, see, for example, Harsya W. Bachtiar, "The Religion of Java : A Commentary," in Ahmad Ibrahim et al., eds., *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia* (Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 279 - 285. See also Zamakhsyari Dhofier, "Santri-Abangan dalam Kehidupan Orang Jawa : Teropong dari Pesantren," in *Agama dan Tantangan Zaman : Pilihan Artikel Prisma 1975 - 1984*, Seri II (Jakarta : LP3ES, 1985), 179 - 194.

²³ Marshall G. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 2, "The Expansion of Islam in the Middle East" (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1977), 551 (see footnote).

Indonesian Muslims of every political persuasion continued to encounter, as they had in 1945 and in the 1950s under the Soekarno era (1945 - 1966), a range of ideological issues respecting the Pancasila under the Soeharto administration. In 1978, the New Order government under Soeharto instituted the P 4 (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, or Guidelines for Understanding and Practicing the Pancasila) as an official elaboration of the Pancasila for the Indonesian people. What is more, in 1985 the New Order government implemented a new policy, that of applying the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties and for all mass organizations. These two policies provoked widespread and strong responses among the Muslim community.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE PANCASILA AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY

It is true that many scholars have written studies on the Pancasila. However, their studies have not covered three major points which I intend to examine here : the Muslim response to the Secular Nationalists' proposal of the Pancasila as the basis of the state; the Muslim reaction to the New Order government policy of implementing the P 4; and the Muslim response to the New Order government policy of applying the Pancasila as the sole foundation for political parties and social organizations. For example, Saifuddin Anshari's thesis, "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945 : A History of the Gentleman's Agreement between the Islamic and the Secular Nationalists,"²⁴ partially discusses the debates between the Muslim Nationalists and the Secular Nationalists as to whether Islam or the Pancasila was to be used as the foundation of the state. Since Anshari wrote his work in 1976, he did not include in it the Muslim

²⁴ Anshari, "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945" (see footnote 10).

response to the application of the P 4 or the Muslim reaction to the stipulation of the Pancasila as the sole basis.

Likewise, Ahmad Syafii Maarif's work, "Islam as the Basis of State : A Study of Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia,"²⁵ a Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the University of Chicago in 1983, fails to explore the Muslim response to the P 4 and to the Pancasila as the sole foundation. Like Anshari, Maarif limits the scope of his dissertation to the debates between the Muslim Nationalists and the Secular Nationalists as to whether Islam or the Pancasila should be employed as the basis of the state. However, many of Maarif's points still need to be expanded upon or reconsidered.

Furthermore, Einar Martahan Sitompul in his book, *NU dan Pancasila*²⁶ (The Nahdlatul Ulama and the Pancasila), places a great deal of emphasis on the discussion of the acceptance by the Nahdlatul Ulama of the Pancasila as its sole basis, but does not deal with other points which I intend to cover. For his part, Deliar Noer (b. 1926), in his compilation of writings, *Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal*²⁷ (Islam, the Pancasila and the Sole Foundation) deals partly with the discussions on the Pancasila as the basis of the state, the P 4 and the Pancasila as the sole foundation, but at the same time leaves many details unexplored. It is understandable that Deliar Noer

²⁵ Ahmad Syafii Maarif expanded and developed his dissertation and published it in Indonesian under the title *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan : Studi Tentang Percaturan Dalam Konstituante* (Jakarta : LP3ES, 1985).

²⁶ See Einar Martahan Sitompul, *NU dan Pancasila* (Jakarta : Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1989).

²⁷ Deliar Noer, *Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal* (Jakarta : Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984).

did not cover these three points in a comprehensive way since his book is actually only a compilation of previously published articles.

Other studies on the Pancasila have been done by Eka Darmaputera, Susan Selden Purdy and Douglas Edward Ramage. While Darmaputera discusses the Pancasila in relation to the question of Indonesians' search for identity and modernity through the development of Indonesian society,²⁸ Purdy analyzes the Pancasila as a political power and a civil "religion" used to legitimate power and authority in Indonesia's pluralistic society.²⁹ As for Ramage, he examines the Pancasila in relation to ideological discourse and the beliefs of the elite under the New Order government during the period 1985 - 1993.³⁰

OBJECTIVE OF THIS STUDY

As stated above, the present study is an attempt to explore the three major Muslim responses to the Pancasila, i.e., the Pancasila as the basis of the state, the P 4 as an official elaboration of the Pancasila and the Pancasila as the sole foundation for political and social organizations. I intend to analyze and then compare these three responses, interpreting them within the context of the various Muslim political orientations such as they existed when each of these responses was made. In doing so, we will come to understand the differences and similarities between the three

²⁸ See Eka Darmaputera, *Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society* (Leiden : E. J. Brill, 1988).

²⁹ See Susan Selden Purdy, "Legitimation of Power and Authority in a Pluralistic State : Pancasila and Civil Religion in Indonesia," (Ph. D. diss., Columbia University, 1984).

³⁰ See Douglas Edward Ramage, "Ideological Discourse in the Indonesian New Order : State Ideology and Beliefs of an Elite, 1985 - 1993," (Ph. D. diss., University of South Carolina, 1993).

phases of the Muslim responses and acceptance of the Pancasila. This study will attempt to answer the following questions : What were the religious motivations which prompted the Muslims to respond and react to the political issues relating to the Pancasila? What were the religious considerations and justifications behind the Muslim response to, and acceptance of, the Pancasila? I believe these vital questions should be pursued since religious considerations were always prominent for the Indonesian Muslims of that period whenever they confronted major national political issues.

SURVEY OF SOURCES

The primary sources which will be consulted for this dissertation include those which express first hand the proposal of the Pancasila as the basis of the state, the implementation of the P 4 and the application of the Pancasila as the sole basis. Soekarno's works, such as *Lahirnya Pancasila*³¹ (The Birth of the Pancasila) and those of Yamin, such as *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*³² (Document Prepared for 1945 Constitution), *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*³³ (Concerning the Debates on the Basis of the State of the Republic of Indonesia in the Constituent Assembly) and *Risalah Perundingan*³⁴ (The Minutes of

³¹ *Lahirnya Pancasila* was Soekarno's speech before the BPUPKI session on June 1, 1945 and has appeared in various publications. See, for example, Muhammad Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1 (Jakarta : Yayasan Prapanca, 1959), 61 - 81; Panitia Lima, *Uraian Pancasila* (Jakarta : Mutiara, 1984), 105 - 131.

³² Muhammad Yamin, ed., *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, 3 vols. (Jakarta : Yayasan Prapanca, 1959/1960).

³³ *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*, 3 vols. (Bandung : Konstituante Republik Indonesia, 1958).

³⁴ *Risalah Perundingan*, vols. 1, 2 and 7 comp. by Konstituante Republik Indonesia (Bandung : Masa Baru, 1958).

the Deliberations) are of primary importance for the discussion on the proposal of the Pancasila as the basis of the state. In addition to Yamin's *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* and *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*, there are two other fundamental works dealing with the Muslim response to the proposal of the Pancasila as the basis of the state, i.e., Ki Bagus Hadikusumo's work, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara dan Akhlak Pemimpin*³⁵ (Islam as the Basis of State and Moral Foundation of Leadership), which originated as a speech delivered to one of the sessions of the Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, or BPUPKI) in 1945, and Mohammad Natsir's *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara*³⁶ (Islam as the Basis of State), which also was based on an address made before one of the sessions of the Constituent Assembly in 1957, in which he forcefully proposed Islam as the basis of the state.

As for the primary sources for the discussion of the implementation of the P 4, these include, among others, *Ketetapan MPR No. III/1978 tentang Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*³⁷ (The MPR Enactment No. II/1978 on the Guidelines for Understanding and Practicing the Pancasila), *Pandangan Presiden Soeharto Tentang Pancasila*³⁸ (President Soeharto's Views on the Pancasila) and other government documents such as *Bahan Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan*

³⁵ Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara dan Akhlak Pemimpin* (Yogyakarta : Pustaka Rahayu, n. d.).

³⁶ Mohamad Natsir, *Islam sebagai dasar Negara* (Bandung : Fraksi Masyumi dalam Konstituante, 1957).

³⁷ Team Pembinaan Penatar, *Undang-Undang Dasar* (see footnote 9).

³⁸ Krissantono, ed., *Pandangan Presiden Soeharto Tentang Pancasila* (Jakarta : CSIS, 1976).

*Pengamalan Pancasila, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 dan Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara*³⁹ (Course Materials for Guidelines for Understanding and Practicing the Pancasila, 1945 Constitution and Broad Outlines of State Policies). The sources to be consulted for the Muslim responses to this issue are, among others, Deliar Noer's book, *Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal*,⁴⁰ Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara's *Pembinaan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia*⁴¹ (The Development of Religious Life in Indonesia) and *Pedoman Pelaksanaan P 4 Bagi Umat Islam*⁴² (The Guide to Implementing the P 4 for Muslims) produced by the Department of Religious Affairs.

As for the primary sources for the discussion of the Pancasila as the sole foundation for political parties and mass organizations, I have consulted, among others, *Undang-Undang No. 3/1985 tentang Partai Politik dan Golongan Karya* (Law No. 3/1985 on Political Parties and Functional Group) and *Undang-Undang No. 8/1985 tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan* (Mass Organizations Law No. 8/1985).

The sources for our discussion of the Muslim responses to this issue are, among others, *Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Tahun 1973, 1977, 1984 dan 1987*⁴³ (The PPP's Constitutions of

³⁹ Team Pembinaan Penatar, *Bahan Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 dan Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara* (Jakarta : Sekretariat Team Pembinaan Penatar, 1981).

⁴⁰ See footnote 27.

⁴¹ Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, *Pembinaan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia*, ed. by Hafizh Dasuki (Jakarta : Departemen Agama RI, 1981).

⁴² *Pedoman Pelaksanaan P 4 Bagi Umat Islam* (Jakarta : Proyek Bimbingan Pelaksanaan P 4 Bagi Umat Beragama, Departemen Agama RI, 1982).

⁴³ DPP PPP, *Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga PPP* (Jakarta : Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1973, 1977, 1984 and 1987).

1973, 1977, 1984 and of 1987), *Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali ke Khittah 1926*⁴⁴ (The Return of the Nahdlatul Ulama to the Principle of 1926), a document produced by the Nahdlatul Ulama, *Pandangan Kritis terhadap RUU Keormasan*⁴⁵ (A Critical View of the Mass Organizations Bill) produced by the HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, or Association of Muslim University Students), Lukman Harun's work, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas Pancasila*⁴⁶ (The Muhammadiyah and the Basis of the Pancasila), Sjafruddin Prawiranegara's *Perihal Pancasila Sebagai Azas Tunggal*⁴⁷ (Concerning the Pancasila as the Sole Foundation), Deliar Noer's *Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal*, Abdul Qadir Djaelani's *Azas Tunggal Islam*⁴⁸ (Islam as the Sole Basis) and Andi Mapetawang Fatwa's *Azas Islam Hingga Titik Darah Terakhir*⁴⁹ (The Basis of Islam until the Last Drop of Blood). Other documents issued by the government, the Islamic political parties and Islamic mass organizations will also serve as primary sources in this study.

STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

Structurally, this dissertation will consist of an introduction (outlining the background of study as given above) and four chapters. The first chapter will

⁴⁴ *Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali Ke Khittah 1926* (Bandung : Risalah, 1985).

⁴⁵ Pengurus Besar Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, *Pandangan Kritis terhadap RUU Keormasan* (Jakarta : n. p., 1984).

⁴⁶ Lukman Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas Pancasila* (Jakarta : Pustaka Panjimas, 1986).

⁴⁷ Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, *Perihal Pancasila Sebagai Azas Tunggal* (Jakarta : DDII Pusat, 1983).

⁴⁸ Abdul Qadir Djaelani, *Azas Tunggal Islam* (Bogor : n. p., 1403/1983).

⁴⁹ A. M. Fatwa, *Azas Islam Hingga Titik Darah Terakhir* (Pegangsaan Timur, Jakarta: Panitia Pelaksana Hari-Hari Besar Islam, 1403/1983).

concentrate on the ideological debates between the Secular Nationalists and the Muslim Nationalists as to whether Islam or the Pancasila should be used as the basis of the state. Their debates fall into two phases : the first shortly before the proclamation of Indonesia's independence in 1945 and the second between the years 1956 and 1959 following the first general election held in 1955. The second chapter will analyze the Muslim response to the New Order government policy of applying the P 4 as an official elaboration of the Pancasila. The third chapter will deal with the Muslim reaction to the government policy of stipulating the Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties and mass organizations. Finally, the fourth chapter will present conclusions drawn from the preceding discussions.



A. THE PROPOSED PANCASILA

THE QUESTION OF THE BASIS OF THE STATE

Ideology, which is defined by A .S. Hornby as "a set of ideas that form the basis of an economic or political theory or that are held by a particular group or person,"¹ is very significant, indeed vital, for the survival of a nation because it gives it a distinct national identity, pride and strength that can inspire it to achieve its social and political goals. Thus, in politics, a political ideology becomes a dynamic prime mover in the life of a political organization or institution, as well as in the political life of a state or nation because it functions "to unite people in political organization for effective political action." Furthermore, "the goal of ideology is to arouse feelings and incite action, and the power of an ideology derives from its capacity to capture the human imagination and mobilize and unleash human energies."²

Like the founding fathers of other states, those of the Republic of Indonesia realized that a national ideology is indispensable in determining the social and political development of a state. With the approach of independence in 1945, the Indonesian people needed a national ideology that could unite, motivate and mobilize them to work together to achieve the goals which independence would bring within their grasp. They were challenged to introduce into an independent Indonesia social, economic and political development programs which would allow the country to survive as one of the world's modern nations. Within this context, a national ideology was truly needed

¹ A. S. Hornby, *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, 4th ed. (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1989), 616.

² Reo M. Christenson et al., *Ideologies and Modern Politics* (New York : Dodd, Mead & Company, 1975), 6.

because it would provide a focus to the nation of Indonesia in the face of the challenge of the future.

Shortly before Indonesian independence, which came on August 17, 1945, the representatives of the Muslim Nationalists and the leaders of the Secular Nationalists were confronted with several major ideological questions: What was the philosophical basis needed for a free state of Indonesia to satisfy the aspirations of its multi-religious groups and all the political trends existing within it? What kind of a national ideology was to be employed to maintain national unity, integrity and stability in an independent Indonesia? Secular nationalist ideology? Islamic ideology? Was Islam acceptable to the Secular Nationalist group and could it be used as a basis of the state? Was Secular Nationalism acceptable to the Islamic faction and could it be employed as a national ideology? Was there any other alternative acceptable to both?

These ideological concerns were discussed in the sessions of the Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence which had been founded under Japanese sponsorship as a realization of their promise to give independence to the Indonesian people. This promise had been made by the Japanese colonial rulers in an attempt to gain support from the Indonesian people, because they were in trouble, militarily, with the Allies in the Pacific War. The Japanese in Indonesia explored every avenue in their effort to win the war against the Allies, one of which was to mobilize Indonesian Muslims to take part in military training in line with what Harry J. Benda called "Nippon's Islamic grass-roots policy."³ However, the Japanese were finally defeated by the Allies on August 15, 1945, without involving Indonesian Muslims in the war.

³ Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun : Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation* (The Hague : W. van Hoeve, 1960), 134.



The establishment of the Investigating Body took place on April 29, 1945 and coincided with the birthday of the Japanese Emperor, Tenno Heika.⁴ The declaration of the Japanese intention to grant independence to the Indonesian people had been made by Japanese Premier Kuniaki Koiso, successor to Premier Tojo, before the Japanese parliament on September 7, 1944.⁵ Installed on May 28, 1945 by the Japanese Military Commander in Java, the Investigating Body held its sessions in two phases. The first ran from May 29 until June 1, 1945, and the second from July 10 until July 16, 1945.⁶ The Investigating Body consisted of 62 members in all. Later, six men were added so that the members of the Investigating Body numbered 68, most of whom were Javanese. There was however a Japanese member named Ichibangase who served as its junior chairman and extraordinary member as well. The Investigating Body sessions, which took place in the Pejambon Building, Jakarta, discussed all important matters relating to the establishment of a free state of Indonesia, for example, the form of the future state, its boundaries, its constitution, and its philosophical or ideological basis. As far as the present study is concerned, the latter will be given special attention, without neglecting other relevant historical events.

Let us take a close look at the composition of the membership of the Investigating Body. According to Prawoto Mangkusasmito's account, of its 68 members, only 15 (about 20 percent) were Muslim Nationalists who really voiced

⁴ Muhammad Yamin, *Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia* (Jakarta : Yayasan Prapanca, n. d.), 239.

⁵ Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto, eds., *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, vol. 6 (Jakarta : Departemen P & K, 1984), 66. See also Benda, *The Crescent*, 173.

⁶ Yamin, *Pembahasan*, 239.

Islamic political interests, while the majority (80 percent) were Secular Nationalists.⁷

This indicates that political power was not balanced between the Muslim Nationalists and the Secular Nationalists in the Investigating Body. The representatives of the Muslim Nationalists were, among others, K. H. Mas Mansur, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, K. H. Masjkur, K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, H. Agus Salim, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, K. H. A. Sanusi and K. H. Abdul Halim.⁸ Their educational backgrounds varied. Some, such as Agus Salim and Sukiman, were educated in the Western school system and belonged to the Modernist Muslims, while others, such as Wahid Hasjim and Masjkur, were educated in the *pesantren*⁹ and brought up in the circle of the Traditionalist Muslims. As for the representatives of the Secular Nationalists, these included Radjiman Wediodiningrat, Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, Professor Soepomo, Wongsonegoro, Sartono, R. P. Soeroso, Dr. Buntaran Martoatmodjo and Muhammad Yamin.¹⁰ All of the latter had received a Western education. The chairman and vice-chairman of the Investigating Body were Radjiman Wediodiningrat and R. P. Soeroso, a fact which shows that the leadership of the Body was no doubt in the hands of the Secular Nationalists.

⁷ See Prawoto Mangkusasmito, *Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara dan Sebuah Refleksi* (Jakarta : Hudaya, 1970), 12.

⁸ Muhammad Yamin, ed., *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1 (Jakarta : Yayasan Prapanca, 1959), 60 - 61.

⁹ The *pesantren* is a traditional Islamic educational institution which uses books written by the 'ulamā' of the medieval period. The *pesantrens* are huge in number and scattered in many areas of Indonesian villages, especially in Java. For a discussion of the *pesantren* tradition, see Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren : Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai* (Jakarta : LP3ES, 1982). This book is a translation of his Ph. D. dissertation submitted to the Australian National University in 1980.

¹⁰ Yamin, ed., *Naskah*, vol. 1 : 60 - 61.

The political discussions between the Muslims and Secular Nationalists regarding all matters relating to the establishment of a free state proceeded well enough, except for the debate on the philosophical basis and ideology of the state. On the form of government, for example, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir tells us that about 53 members voted for a republic, while seven voted for a kingdom.¹¹ Once the issue of the philosophical basis and ideology of the state was addressed, however, the ideological clash between the two groups became sharp and heated, especially between the Muslim Nationalist faction and the Christian Nationalist group, since it inevitably involved religious sentiments. The representatives of the Traditionalist and Modernist Muslims were firmly united against the Secular Nationalists in the political debates in the Investigating Body sessions. We will delay our discussion of the ideological conflict between the two factions since our intention here is to focus on how the Pancasila originally came to be proposed as the basis of the state. This examination is indispensable as a starting point for further comprehensive discussions.

THE PANCASILA'S REAL CREATOR : SOEKARNO OR YAMIN?

In his capacity as the chairman of the Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence, Radjiman Wediodiningrat put a vital question to its members : What was the philosophical basis to be used for a free Indonesia? In response to this issue, two leading Secular Nationalists set forth their opinions. On the first day of the meeting of the Investigating Body held on May 29, 1945, Muhammad Yamin (1903 - 1962) gave a speech, in which he is supposed to have been the first to offer the following five principles to be used as the basis of the future independent state :

¹¹ *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*, vol. 3 (Bandung : Konstituante Republik Indonesia, 1958), 36.

Nationalism
Humanitarianism
Belief in God
Democracy, and
Social Welfare.¹²

On June 1, 1945, Soekarno¹³ delivered a speech in the session of the Investigating Body, in which he also proposed five principles, albeit slightly different ones :

Nationalism
Internationalism or Humanitarianism
Deliberation or Democracy
Social Welfare, and
Belief in God.¹⁴

The similarities between the two sets of five principles mentioned above, the one offered by Yamin and the other by Soekarno, later created difficulty in determining the real creator of the five principles which were eventually to be known as the Pancasila.

¹² Yamin, ed. *Naskah*, vol. I : 87 - 107.

¹³ Soekarno was born on June 6, 1906 in Surabaya, East Java. His father was R. Soekemi Sosrodihardjo, a Javanese, and his mother Idayu Nyoman Ray, a Balinese. From his childhood Soekarno had exhibited his diligence and intelligence. When he was a student in Surabaya, he established a politically oriented organization called Trikoro Darmo which attracted many students. His stay in Surabaya with H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto (1883 - 1934), a Muslim intellectual and then leader of the Sarekat Islam, heavily influenced his future political career. In 1921 Soekarno graduated from the Institute of Technics of Bandung as an engineer. He then plunged himself into political activities by founding in 1927 a political party called the PNI (Indonesian National Party) with the main aim of struggling for Indonesian independence. Due to his political activities, he was imprisoned by the Dutch at Sukamiskin and then banished to Endeh and sent into exile at Bengkulu in 1939. Together with Mohammad Hatta, he was known as the proclaimer of Indonesian independence of August 17, 1945. In 1948, following their second military action, the Dutch arrested Soekarno and sent him into exile at Berastagi. Soekarno served as the first president of Indonesia from 1945 until his fall in 1966. He died in Jakarta in 1970 and was buried in Blitar (East Java). For detailed accounts of Soekarno, see Sukarno, *Sukarno : An Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams* (New York : The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965); Bernhard Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence*, trans. from the German by Mary F. Somers Heidhues (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1969); Solichin Salam, *Bung Karno : Putra Fajar* (Jakarta : Gunung Agung, 1982).

¹⁴ Yamin, ed., *Naskah*, vol. I : 61 - 81.

This became a controversial issue among Indonesian historians after Soekarno's downfall in 1966 and especially after his death in 1970. This historical controversy did not however rise to the surface while Soekarno was still in power.

Many Indonesian writers¹⁵ on the Pancasila and instructors¹⁶ assigned to the P 4 course given by the New Order government argued that both Yamin and Soekarno (in company with Soepomo,¹⁷ another speaker at the Investigating Body meeting) contributed to the creation of the Pancasila. In other words, in their view, the Pancasila was not created by a single person. However, a solution to the controversy is offered by Mohammad Hatta,¹⁸ one of the founding fathers of the Republic of Indonesia and former first vice-president, who actively participated in the Investigating Body sessions. As an eyewitness to this historical event, he says confidently in many of his writings and statements that it was Soekarno alone who first offered the well-

¹⁵ To mention just one example, see Dahlan Thaib, *Pancasila: Yuridis Ketatanegaraan* (Yogyakarta : UPP AMP YKPN, 1991), 13.

¹⁶ See, for example, Team Kerja Penyusunan Jawaban Pertanyaan-Pertanyaan yang Sifatnya Prinsipil dan atau Berulang pada setiap Penataran P 4, *Buku Himpunan Tanya Jawab P4 - UUD 1945 - GBHN* (Yogyakarta : Lukman Offset, 1983), 23 - 24.

¹⁷ In his speech Soepomo in fact did not offer a philosophical basis of the state. He just advanced some fundamental theories of state in which he advocated the idea of an integral state where state and society were united and transcended all groups of its people. See his speech in Yamin, ed., *Naskah*, vol. 1 : 109 - 121.

¹⁸ Born on August 12, 1902 in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, he studied at Prins Hendrik Hendels in Jakarta (1919 - 1921). He then continued his studies in the Netherlands (1921 - 1932) where he was also active at the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association). Returning to Indonesia, Hatta led the PNI-Baru (New-Indonesian National Education [Party]) which became involved in the independence movement. Due to his political activities he was arrested, detained and sent into exile at Digul and then at Banda Neira by the colonial military authorities. Together with Soekarno, he was known as the proclaimer of Indonesian independence of 1945. He served as vice-president (1945 - 1956) and prime minister of the Federal Republic of Indonesia (1949/1950). He passed away in Jakarta on March 14, 1980. For detailed accounts of Hatta, see Mavis Rose, *Indonesia Free : A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta* (Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1987); Deliar Noer, *Mohammad Hatta : Biografi Politik* (Jakarta : LP3ES, 1990).

known five principles (Pancasila) at the Investigating Body meeting of June 1, 1945, and who responded to the central question of the philosophical basis for a free Indonesia raised by Wediodiningrat. According to Hatta, the term Pancasila itself was also coined by Soekarno.¹⁹


Shortly before Hatta died in 1980, he wrote a *surat wasiat*²⁰ (letter of last will and testament), dated June 16, 1978, to Guntur Soekarno Putra, the eldest son of late President Soekarno, explaining this important matter so that the controversial issue of the real creator of the Pancasila could be clarified. It seems that Hatta felt a moral responsibility to resolve this matter, in the hope that historical truth could be preserved and understood accurately by the Indonesian people as a whole, particularly by succeeding Indonesian generations. In his *surat wasiat* he firmly testifies that :

Toward the end of May 1945, Radjiman Wediodiningrat, chairman of the Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence, opened its session and put forward a question to the audience : What was the basis of the state upon which we would establish a free Indonesia? Most of the members of the Investigating Body did not want to deal with this question for fear of raising a complicated philosophical issue. They directly discussed the question of the constitution. One of the members of the Investigating Body who responded to [Radjiman Wediodiningrat's] question was Bung Karno [Soekarno] who delivered his speech entitled the Pancasila, five principles, on June 1, 1945, which lasted for about one hour. His speech drew the attention of the members of the Investigating Body and was greeted with a strong applause by the audience. The Committee session then formed a Small Committee to reformulate the Pancasila proposed by Bung Karno [to be used as the basis of the state].²¹

¹⁹ Read Hatta's statement in "Notulen Sidang-Sidang Panitia Lima," in Panitia Lima, *Uraian Pancasila*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta : Mutiara, 1984), 59 - 60 and 84. "Notulen Sidang-Sidang Panitia Lima" was also published in Lembaga Soekarno-Hatta, *Sejarah Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 dan Pancasila* (Jakarta : Inti Idayu Press, 1986), 138 - 160.

²⁰ The full text of his surat wasiat can be read in Panitia Lima, *Uraian Pancasila*, 101 - 102; Lembaga Soekarno-Hatta, *Sejarah*, 161 - 162.

²¹ See "Surat Wasiat Bung Hatta Kepada Guntur" in Panitia Lima, *Uraian Pancasila*, 101; Lembaga Soekarno-Hatta, *Sejarah*, 161.



The historical controversy regarding the original creator of the Pancasila seems to have begun with a book called *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*²² (Document Prepared for the 1945 Constitution) to which many writers, scholars and historians have frequently referred. Edited by Muhammad Yamin, this book contains the speeches of three speakers, namely Soekarno, Soepomo and Yamin himself, delivered in the Investigating Body sessions. It is this book that reproduces the text of Yamin's speech in which he put forward his five principles. B. J. Boland, a Dutch scholar who worked in Indonesia between 1946 - 1959 as a pastor, has asserted that on account of Yamin's speech of May 29, it was said in the post-Soekarno period that the Pancasila was in fact Yamin's creation, not Soekarno's.²³ Hatta though, for his part, firmly states that he had never heard of Yamin offering five principles (Pancasila) in his speech before the Investigating Body session. Hatta remarks that if Yamin had ever offered such a set of five principles, he would have heard of it and taken note.²⁴ His explanation is that Yamin reformulated an account based on notes made in the Investigating Body session, included it in his *Naskah*, and then claimed it in his speech of May 29, 1945.

Besides, in what he called the "appendix" to his speech of May 29, Muhammad Yamin also formulated his "other" Pancasila, similar to the Pancasila formulated in the 1945 constitution :

²² See footnote 8.

²³ B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 17. Boland notes that among those who held the view that the Pancasila was Yamin's creation were Mohamad Roem and K. H. M. Isa Anshary. See Roem's articles published in *Parji Masyarakat*, nos. 11, 12, 13 (March - April 1967) and Anshary's book, *Mujahid Da'wah* (Bandung : CV Diponegoro, 1964), 156.

²⁴ Hatta's statement in "Notulen," in Lembaga Soekarno-Hatta, *Sejarah*, 151.



Belief in One God
National Unity of Indonesia
Sense of Just and Civilized Humanity
Democracy which is led by the wise policy of the mutual deliberations of a representative body, and
Social Justice for the whole of the Indonesian people.²⁵

Hatta believes that Yamin "fabricated" his Pancasila when he was later charged by a Small Committee of the Investigating Body with drafting a preamble to the 1945 constitution, in which he included his fabricated Pancasila. The Small Committee did not accept Yamin's draft, since it was too long to be used as a preamble. Later when Yamin edited his *Naskah*, he included that draft and claimed it to be an "appendix" to his speech of May 29, 1945, delivered in the Investigating Body session.²⁶ Based on these facts, Hatta twice labels Yamin as unfair (*licik*), and accuses him of distorting historical fact.²⁷ Supporting Hatta's claim, A. G. Pringgodigdo, a member of the Committee of Five (*Panitia Lima*), also charged Yamin with manipulating (*pinter nyulap*) historical fact.²⁸ Given these circumstances, one might conclude that Hatta's eyewitness account and his argument that Soekarno was the real creator of the Pancasila have a solid basis in fact.

Yamin himself, in his *Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia* (The Analysis of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia), repeatedly states that the Pancasila was Soekarno's creation, making such statements as "the term Pancasila, which now has become the term of law, was initially created (*ditempa*) and used by

²⁵ Yamin, ed., *Naskah*, vol.1 : 721.

²⁶ Lembaga Soekarno-Hatta, *Sejarah*, 150 - 151.

²⁷ *Ibid*; 151.

²⁸ *Ibid*.

Bung Karno in his speech of June 1, 1945 to refer to his five principles"²⁹ and "these five principles were called Pancasila by Bung Karno in his speech delivered on June 1, 1945 before the Investigating Body in a historic room at the Pejambon Building in Jakarta."³⁰ Despite the accusation of dishonesty directed towards him, one has to admit Yamin's interest and seriousness in the 1950s in documenting the three speakers' speeches delivered in the Investigating Body sessions, and in laboriously producing other works on the basis of official documents, works of which many scholars, historians and writers, including myself, have made frequent use.

Like Hatta, Mohamad Roem (1908 - 1983) testifies that "if there is something we should accept as coming from Soekarno himself, it is the name of those Five Principles, that is, the Pancasila."³¹ In addition to Roem, many leading Indonesian figures who were involved in the Investigating Body sessions, such as Wediodiningrat,³² R. P. Soeroso,³³ Sartono, K. H. Masjkur, Maria Ulfah and Ir. Rooseno,³⁴ have testified that the Pancasila originated from Soekarno's speech delivered in the Investigating Body session of June 1, 1945. This statement does not necessarily mean that Soekarno had never consulted his friends or other scholars to find a name for the five principles which he intended to propose as the basis of an independent state of Indonesia. As a zealous political activist in the Indonesian

²⁹ Yamin, *Pembahasan*, 437.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 438.

³¹ Mohamad Roem, "Lahirnya Pancasila 1945," in his *Tiga Peristiwa Bersejarah* (Jakarta : Sinar Hudaya, 1972), 26.

³² See Roeslan Abdulgani, *Pengembangan Pancasila di Indonesia* (Jakarta : Idayu Press, 1977), 23.

³³ See Lembaga Soekarno-Hatta, *Sejarah*, 108.

³⁴ *Sekitar Tanggal dan Penggalinya* (Jakarta : Yayasan Idayu, 1981), 119.

independence movement and as a brilliant thinker, Soekarno was motivated to implement his political beliefs and satisfy his intellectual curiosity. As he acknowledges: "The name is not *Panca Darma* [Five Duties]; rather I named it on the suggestion of a linguist friend of ours: *Pancasila*. *Sila* means a basis or principle, and upon those five principles we shall establish free Indonesia, survival and long life."³⁵

An important document entitled *Uraian Pancasila*³⁶ (An Elaboration of the Pancasila) produced by the Committee of Five, under the chairmanship of Hatta, states quite clearly that June 1, 1945, the day on which Soekarno delivered his speech in the Investigating Body session, was exactly the birth date of the Pancasila; Soekarno's Pancasila was the only concept which it was agreed should be reformulated for use as the philosophical basis of the state. As indicated by its name, the Committee of Five consisted of five leading Indonesian figures, namely Hatta, Ahmad Subardjo Djojoadisurjo, A. A. Maramis, Sunario and A. G. Pringgodigdo, all of whom closely followed and participated in the Investigating Body sessions. With the exception of Pringgodigdo and Sunario, the remaining three were former signatories of the Jakarta Charter of June 22, 1945, and participated in the process of reformulating Soekarno's Pancasila so that it might be used as the philosophical basis of the state. Unlike the Committee of Five, however, some Indonesian writers such as Darji Darmodiharjo³⁷

³⁵ Sukarno, "Lahirnya Pancasila," in his *Pancasila Sebagai Dasar Negara* (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press - Yayasan Pendidikan Soekarno, 1986), 154. In 1966, Soekarno admitted that he had obtained the word *sila* (principle) from Muhammad Yamin, while the word *panca* was his own. See *Sekitar Tanggal*, 118.

³⁶ First published by Mutiara, Jakarta, 1977 (see footnote 19).

³⁷ Darji Darmodiharjo, *Pancasila: Suatu Orientasi Singkat*, 12th ed. (Jakarta: Aries Lima, 1984), 23.

and A. G. Pringgodigdo³⁸ hold an opposing view. They argue that the date of June 1, 1945, on which Soekarno presented his Pancasila, was not the birth of the Pancasila as the basis of the state, but simply the birth of the term Pancasila. Their argument leads them to conclude that the birth of the Pancasila occurred on August 18, 1945, when it was reformulated.

Before going further, it is interesting to note what may be referred to as "the Pringgodigdo phenomenon." Initially, Pringgodigdo, as mentioned above, was a member of the Committee of Five and held the same view as this Committee that the Pancasila was born on June 1, 1945. This is indicated by the fact that he joined the Committee in producing the document mentioned above, and in signing other documents issued by the Committee. However, later Pringgodigdo completely changed his mind by saying that the date of June 1, 1945 was simply the birth of the term Pancasila. Furthermore, Pringgodigdo argues that the Pancasila had existed and had been rooted for centuries in the life of the Indonesian people, so that it is impossible now to determine the hour of its birth. He then firmly states that it is no longer necessary to commemorate the birth of the Pancasila on June 1.³⁹ It is worth mentioning here that although under Soekarno the date of June 1 was officially commemorated as the birth of the Pancasila, nevertheless the New Order government stopped this convention in 1970. Pringgodigdo's attitude aroused strong reaction from his friends on the Committee of Five. Sunario, on behalf of the Committee, sent

³⁸ A. G. Pringgodigdo "Perjuangan Bangsa Indonesia Menegakkan Pancasila dalam Masa Penjajahan/Pendudukan Jepang," in Darji Darmodiharjo et al., *Santiaji Pancasila*, 10th ed. (Surabaya : Usaha Nasional, 1991), 128.

³⁹ A. G. Pringgodigdo, *Proses Perumusan Pancasila Dasar Negara* (Jakarta : Balai Pustaka, 1981), 62. See idem, "Perjuangan Bangsa," 128.

a letter questioning his changed view. Pringgodigdo, however, did not respond to Sunario's letter.⁴⁰

Pringgodigdo and Darmodiharjo's argument that the date of June 1, 1945 was simply the birth date of the term Pancasila, amounts, in my opinion, to saying that Soekarno contributed nothing but the term itself. I strongly disagree with Darmodiharjo and Pringgodigdo on this point because they tend to minimize, if not ignore, the significance of Soekarno's contribution. In what follows, I intend to show that Soekarno, with his concept of the Pancasila, contributed "great ideas" to the foundation of the national unity and integrity of his nation. Before embarking on this task, however, I wish to emphasize here that Soekarno's role as the creator of the Pancasila should be placed in its proper context within Indonesian history. Had his 21 years of rule not been in consistent with, or even against, the spirit of the Pancasila and its implementation, as many have noted, we would be assessing him on the basis of other related historical facts.

Another point that should be made is that as far as the "official" Pancasila is concerned, we should refer to the formulation in the preamble of the 1945 constitution, whose essence was basically derived from Soekarno's version. By doing so, we remain fair and avoid the pitfalls of distorting historical fact. The fact that June 1 is no longer celebrated in commemoration of the birth of the Pancasila is a different matter.

I assume that Pringgodigdo and those with similar views changed their minds in relation to the birth of the Pancasila because the New Order government had ended the old regime's policy of commemorating the birth of the Pancasila on June 1.

⁴⁰ See "Surat Prof. Mr. Sunario Kepada Prof. A. G. Pringgodigdo" in Lembaga Soekarno-Hatta, *Sejarah*, 167-169.

SOEKARNO'S IDEAS ON THE PANCASILA

In his speech in the Investigating Body session of June 1, 1945, Soekarno said that during the previous sessions he had not heard any speaker respond convincingly to chairman Wediodiningrat's question concerning which principles should be used as the basis for the nation. Soekarno went on to say that what the chairman of the Investigating Body needed was a *Weltanschauung* or what was called in Dutch a *philosophische grondslag* (philosophical basis) for free Indonesia. He explained that this philosophical basis was the fundamental foundation, the philosophy, the underlying reason, the strong spirit and the deepest desire, upon which the structure of free Indonesia should be established.⁴¹ In his response to Wediodiningrat's question, Soekarno showed his intelligence, intellectual capacity and sharp vision respecting the fundamental matter of the future life of the nation. The solution that he offered was to propose the Pancasila as the basis of the state, displaying ideas that Dr. Alfian (1940 - 1992), one of Indonesia's leading political scientists, has characterized as "new, thoughtful and original."⁴²

If we take a critical look at the order of the principles of Soekarno's Pancasila, we will find that he put the principle of Nationalism first. Soekarno defined nationalism not only as the conviction or the consciousness of a people that they are united in one group, one nation, but also as the unity between a people and its homeland.⁴³ It was certainly not accidental that he placed Nationalism as the first of the principles of his Pancasila; rather it was intentional, on the grounds that Nationalism

⁴¹ Sukarno, *Pancasila*, 133.

⁴² Alfian, *Politik, Kebudayaan dan Manusia Indonesia* (Jakarta : LP3ES, 1980), 10 and 80 - 81.

⁴³ Sukarno, *Pancasila*, 144 - 145.

would become the backbone of Indonesian unity and integrity. To understand his ideas and his way of thinking, it should be noted that the Pancasila itself consists of two fundamental bases : the first, political and the second, ethical.⁴¹ The principle of Nationalism functions as a political basis for the Pancasila, whereas the principle of Belief in God serves as its ethical basis. For Soekarno, the political foundation of the state should come first and the ethical later. He put the principle of Nationalism at the head of his Pancasila in the belief that Nationalism would be the foundation of the state encompassing all the islands of Indonesia. At the same time, he placed the principle of Belief in God fifth and last in the order, believing that it would provide a spiritual and moral basis for the nation. When Soekarno spoke of faith in God, he did not refer clearly to any particular religion, and the principle of Belief in God in his Pancasila seems to have been intended to serve as a common umbrella under which all religions might receive recognition.

The principle of Internationalism or Humanitarianism was placed by Soekarno second in the order of his principles of the Pancasila. Again, this was a conscious decision, reflecting his deep concern over the matter. Soekarno placed his principle of Nationalism within the context of the inter-relationships, friendship and brotherhood with all nations of the world. This he termed Internationalism. He emphasized this position in view of the fact that Indonesia is only one of many nations in the world. Soekarno also, as we can see from his concept of the Pancasila, equated the notion of Internationalism with that of Humanitarianism. In other words, Soekarno rejected all forms of chauvinistic nationalism and narrow-minded exclusivism which arose from sheer national arrogance, such as that of the Germans' claim of *Deutschland über*

⁴¹ Lembaga Soekarno-Hatta, *Sejarah*, 64.

Alles,⁴⁵ which led them to espouse anti-Semitism and to persecute the Jews; more than this, it led them to launch an effort at world conquest.

In formulating his ideas of Nationalism and Internationalism, Soekarno acknowledged that he was partly influenced by Adolf Baars, a Dutch Socialist thinker, and by Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the founder of the Republic of China. In 1917 Baars taught Soekarno not to believe in nationalism, but to fight for the common cause of humanity throughout the world.⁴⁶ In the following year, Soekarno read Sun Yat Sen's work, *San Min Chu I* (The Three People's Principles),⁴⁷ in which he learned about three principles, namely *Mintsu*, *Minchuan*, and *Min Sheng* (Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism) which awakened in him a different sense of nationalism, one which was more open or generous.⁴⁸ Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy, as quoted by Soekarno, "For me, my love of my country is part of my love for all mankind. I am a patriot because I am a human being, and act as a human being. I do not exclude anyone,"⁴⁹ also contributed to the shaping of Soekarno's beliefs in nationalism and humanitarianism.

In making the principle of Democracy the third principle of his Pancasila, Soekarno hoped to show that the establishment of a free Indonesian state was intended for all Indonesian people. He states, "We wished to establish a state 'all for all,' ...

⁴⁵ Sukarno, *Pancasila*, 148.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 147.

⁴⁷ This book was translated into Indonesian by Anizar Ibrahim under the title *San Min Chu I : Tiga Asas Pokok Rakyat* (Jakarta : Balai Pustaka, 1961).

⁴⁸ Sukarno, *Pancasila*, 147.

⁴⁹ The above quotation can be read in Soekarno, *Nationalism, Islam and Marxism*, trans. by Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon (Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), 40.

not just for one group; neither for aristocrats nor for the wealthy."⁵⁰ He later adds, "... we would found a state which all of us supported. All for all. Not the Christian group for Indonesia, not the Muslim group for Indonesia, ... but an Indonesia for all Indonesians."⁵¹ It is obvious that unity and democracy were among the main themes of Soekarno's political thought. He also states with confidence, "I believe that the vital condition for the strength of the state of Indonesia lies in deliberation and representation."⁵² Soekarno, therefore, believed in democracy, and this meant that he rejected dictatorship in any form in his political thinking. He did not propose, for example, such antiquated systems as autocracy, oligarchy, monarchy, or others which, in his opinion, were not suitable for a free and modern Indonesia. In short, Soekarno believed in the people's sovereignty upon which the democratic system should be based.

As for the principle of Social Welfare, which he ranked fourth in the order of his Pancasila, Soekarno expressed his reasons for its inclusion by saying that "there shall be no poverty in a free Indonesia."⁵³ This statement reflected Soekarno's deep concern about the social welfare of the people at large, since their social, economic and educational conditions had drastically deteriorated under the unjust and inhuman Dutch and Japanese colonialism. Soekarno seems to have believed that Indonesian freedom meant not only freedom from colonial power and suppression, but also freedom from poverty and the pursuit of prosperity.

⁵⁰ Sukarno, *Pancasila*, 142 and 143.

⁵¹ Ibid., 155.

⁵² Ibid., 149.

⁵³ Ibid., 151.

The fifth and last principle of his Pancasila, Belief in God, was formulated by Soekarno in recognition of the reality that the Indonesian people were religious, no matter to which religion they belonged. This principle seems to have been intended by Soekarno as an acknowledgment of all the religions existing in the country. Apparently, he thought that all religious groups could cooperate and that religious tolerance could be achieved so that national unity and integrity would flourish in the atmosphere of an independent state. This principle, however, evoked different interpretations from scholars. Van Nieuwenhuijze, for instance, remarked that the notion of *Ketuhanan* (Belief in God) had basically a Muslim background, though it was not necessarily unacceptable to non-Muslims.⁵⁴ However, the Muslim Nationalists, as we shall see later, strongly objected to this principle. Of the five principles that Soekarno offered in his conception of the Pancasila, we shall see later that the fifth was the one most opposed by the Muslim Nationalists.

Having offered his five principles and having elaborated each of them according to his way of thinking, Soekarno then introduced a "theory of compression" by which he squeezed his five principles into three (*trisila*) : Socio-nationalism (embracing Nationalism and Internationalism), Socio-democracy (consisting of the principles of Democracy and Social Welfare) and Belief in God.⁵⁵ Soekarno went on to compress these three principles into one (*ekasila*) which he termed *Gotong Royong* (Mutual Cooperation).⁵⁶

⁵⁴ See B. R. O. Anderson, *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under Japanese Occupation 144 - 1945* (Ithaca : Cornell University, 1961), 210.

⁵⁵ Sukarno, *Pancasila*, 154.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 155.

While Soekarno was in fact immediately recognized for his five principles, the Pancasila, of which he was often called the "digger" (*penggali*), it was not until 1947 that his speech on the Pancasila was published for the first time in the form of a booklet under the title *Lahirnya Pancasila* (The Birth of the Pancasila). Recognizing the great ideas expressed in his Pancasila, Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta conferred upon Soekarno the degree of Doctor of Laws honoris causa in September 1951. Dr. Alfian was of the opinion that it is "unquestionable that Soekarno's ideas on the Pancasila constituted his greatest contribution to his nation."⁵⁷ They proved to be a basis on which all Indonesian people could be united. Commenting further on Soekarno's personality, intellectual ability and achievement, Alfian says:

The main concern that dominates Soekarno's mind is how to unite various trends of thought with their various values into a common concept of way of life without abolishing the healthy dynamics contained in each of them. From that point, he builds his new frame of ideas by unifying the basic values of various trends of thought flourishing in his community into a coherent entity. Since the structure of his ideas reflects a living reality in his community, then it is thoughtful. Soekarno's ability to unify his community's basic values into a common, new way of life makes his ideas original. The crystallization of his ideas is expressed in his historic speech of June 1, 1945 on the Pancasila.⁵⁸

According to Alfian, Soekarno was an intelligent thinker who had a critical and sharp vision, and who appreciated freedom of thought since he was against textbook thinking and dogmatism.⁵⁹ His combination of dialectical and syncretic thinking enabled him to emerge as a brilliant synthesizer and socio-political theoretician. He was not prejudiced against ideas from any source, but he did not accept an idea without a process of profound contemplation and dialectical thinking.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Alfian, *Politik*, 88.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 9 - 10.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Alfian notes that there were three major elements of thought that influenced Soekarno's mind. First, the school of thought arising from the fundamental values of his nation's culture, especially Javanese culture. Second, the trend of thought developed by Western Socialist thinkers, including Karl Marx (1818 - 1883) and, the third, the current of thought formulated by the thinkers of Islamic modernism⁶¹ such as Muḥammad 'Abduh and Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī. Soekarno believed that these three streams of thought had their own strengths which could become a tidal wave of socio-political force if they could be unified in the struggle against colonialism. This belief led him to say, "there is nothing to prevent Nationalists from working together with Moslems and Marxists" and "no fundamental barrier to friendship [existing] between Moslems and Marxists."⁶²

The result of his synthesizing of ideas can be seen, for example, in his long article entitled "Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme"⁶³ in which he states that "these three 'waves' can work together to form a single, gigantic and irresistible tidal wave" because "it is only this unity which will bring us to the realization of our dream: a Free Indonesia."⁶⁴ Thus, the idea of unity was one of the major themes of the political thought of Soekarno, and he was convinced that only with national unity could the goal of Indonesia's independence be achieved. His advocacy of unity was

⁶¹ Ibid., 79 - 80.

⁶² Soekarno, *Nationalism*, 41 and 50.

⁶³ This article first appeared in 1926 in a magazine entitled *Suluh Indonesia Muda* (The Torch of Young Indonesia). Later, this article was included in his compilation of writings entitled *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, vol. 1 (Jakarta : Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1958), 1 - 23. Soekarno's article was translated into English by Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon under the title "Nationalism, Islam and Marxism" (see footnote 49).

⁶⁴ Soekarno, *Nationalism*, 36.

demonstrated by his statement : "I am not a Communist, I favour no side! I only favour Unity -- Indonesian Unity -- and friendship between all our different movements."⁶⁵

Soekarno, in his long intellectual journey, also met, and to some extent absorbed, the secularist ideas of Mustafa Kemal Attatürk (1881 - 1936), the founder of modern Turkey who was responsible for separating religion from the state. In Soekarno's mind, however, religion and state could be united, although the official constitution distinguished between the two. As he puts it :

We should accept [the idea of] the separation of state and religion, but we have to develop the life of the people with the quality of the teachings of Islam. Thus, [with the achievement of this religious quality] the membership of the House of Representatives will be filled with many Muslims, and its decisions will be based on Islam.

If you really have a people with this quality, then you might say that their religion is a living, fertile and dynamic Islam, not a passive and stagnant Islam, which can only flourish under the protection and guardianship of the state. I like people who accept the challenge of modern democracy more than those who always lament, 'Do not separate Islam from the state.' People who are brave enough to face this [modern democracy] will be able to carry out the ideals of Islam through their own struggle, with their own aspirations, and with their own hard work. ...

Keep in mind my remarks! Indeed, this is my conviction regarding the real meaning of Islamic ideals : 'state is united with religion.' State can be united with religion, although its constitutional basis separates the two.⁶⁶

From the above remarks of Soekarno, it can be understood that he basically did not promote a radical separation between state and religion since religion, according to his view of politics, still had a role in the state.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 58.

⁶⁶ Soekarno, "Apa Sebab Turki Memisahkan Agama dari Negara" in his *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, vol. 1, 3rd ed. (Jakarta : Gunung Agung, 1964), 453.

Soekarno in fact urged Muslims to play a pivotal role in achieving their political aspirations and goals through a representative body of democratic deliberation. Thus, in Soekarno's conception of a free state of Indonesia, Islamic political aspirations would still have room, and Soekarno himself encouraged Muslims to fill the seats in the representative body to the greatest degree possible, as he likewise encouraged the Christians.⁶⁷ Soekarno addressed his appeal and encouragement directly to the Muslim representatives in the Investigating Body when offering his Pancasila as a basis for the state. He says :

For the Muslim faction, this is the best place to uphold religion. ... What does not satisfy us we will discuss in deliberations. This Representative Body [we shall establish] is a place for us to promote Islamic demands. Here we propose to the people's representatives what we need for improvements. If we are a real Muslim people, let us work hard in order that the majority of the seats of the Representative Body be occupied by Muslim representatives. ... Should this Representative Body have 100 members, let us work hard in order that 60, 70, 80 or 90 representatives in that Body are Muslims. Thus, automatically, laws coming from the Representative Body are also Islamic.⁶⁸

B. MUSLIM RESPONSE TO THE PANCASILA (MAY - AUGUST 1945)

In order to present more clearly the political ideas of Indonesian Muslims and their relation to the foundation of an Islam-based state in free Indonesia, it is necessary to provide a brief discussion of the theories advanced by Muslim scholars. Generally speaking, modern Muslim political thought on the relation between religion and state can be classified into three major theories. The first maintains that the state and religion should not be separated, since Islam, as an integral and comprehensive religion, covers both worldly and other-worldly life. No aspect of Muslim daily activities, including the running of the state, according to this view, can be separated

⁶⁷ Sukarno, *Pancasila*, 150.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 149 - 150.



from religion. The constitution of the state should therefore be officially based on Islam. This theory is advocated by, among others, Abūl A'la Mawdūdī⁶⁹ (1903 - 1979) of Pakistan who led the Jamaat-i Islami,⁷⁰ as well as Hasan al-Banna⁷¹ (1906 - 1949), Sayyid Quṭb⁷² (1906 - 1966) and other ideologues of the Ikhwān al-Muslimūn⁷³ of Egypt. Both the Jamaat-i Islami and Ikhwān al-Muslimūn are known as fundamentalist movements. Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan can be seen as examples of this type of Islamic state. Their advocacy of the unity of state and religion is manifested in the political expression that Islam is "*al-dīn wa al-dawlah*" (religion and state).

⁶⁹ S. A. A. Maududi, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, 10th ed., trans. by Khurshid Ahmad (Lahor : Islamic Publications, 1990), 203. He was famous as a prolific writer on Islam. Among of his works are *First Principles of the Islamic State*, *The Nature and Contents of Islamic Constitutions*, *Fundamentals of Islam and Rights of Non-Muslims in the Islamic State*. The original works were written in Urdu and translated into English by Khurshid Ahmad. Due to his political activities vis-à-vis the regime, he was in 1953 sentenced to death on a charge of sedition. However, the sentence was later commuted because of pressure on the Pakistani government from leaders of the Muslim World.

⁷⁰ On the Jamaat-i Islami movement see, for example, Kalim Bahadur, *The Jamat-i-Islami of Pakistan : Political Thought and Action* (New Delhi : Chetana Publication, 1977).

⁷¹ Hasan al-Banna, the architect of the Muslim Brotherhood, was murdered in 1949 as the Brotherhood's involvement in terrorism and counterterrorism increased. Al-Banna's important writings were translated into English and compiled by Charles Wendell under the title *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906 - 49)* (Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1978).

⁷² Together with many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Quṭb was arrested and executed in 1966 following Nasser's discovery of a plot by the Brotherhood to overthrow the regime. Quṭb wrote many works, some of his books are *Nahwa Mujtama' Islāmī* (Beirut : Dār al-Shuruq, 1975); *Khaṣā'is al-Taṣawwūr al-Islāmī wa Muqawwamatuhu* (Cairo : Issā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī wa-Shurakā'uhu, 1962)); *Hādthā al-Dīn* (Cairo : Dār al-Qalam, 1962).

⁷³ On the Ikhwān al-Muslimūn see, for example, Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1969); Husaini Ishak Musa, *The Muslim Brethren : The Greatest Modern Islamic Movement* (Beirut : Khayat's Book Cooperative, 1956).

According to the second theory, state and religion should be separated, and religion confined to private affairs. There should be no interference by religion in affairs of the state. The constitution of the state should not be based on Islam, but on secular ideals. One example is the case of modern Turkey. The third theory proposes a formal separation between religion and state wherein the state's constitution is not officially based on Islam, but the state still pays attention to or tackles religious issues. In other words, the state is involved in religious affairs existing within its boundaries. These three possible relations between religion and the state represent the options which may determine all the characteristics of the social and political structure of a Muslim state, and how the state should operate in the face of the rapid demands and challenges of modernity.

The above-mentioned first theory, in particular, strongly coloured the political thinking of the Indonesian Muslim leaders of the 1940s and the 1950s. Thus, in both sessions of the Investigating Body in 1945 and in those of the Constituent Assembly (1956 - 1959), the Muslim Nationalist faction advocated that Islam be used as the basis of the state. In this connection, it should be noted that there is no indication that Indonesian Muslim Nationalist political thinking in the 1940s and 1950s was influenced by the secularist ideas of Kemal Attatürk.⁷⁴ There is also no indication that Indonesian Muslim Nationalist political thinking at that time was affected by the secular tendency of 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq (1888 - 1966) who maintained that the caliphate, including the Rightly Guided Caliphs, was not in effect a religious regime,

⁷⁴ Following the rise of Kemalism, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 1924 decided to abolish the caliphate, and then transformed Turkey into a modern secular state where religion has played no role in political affairs of the state. Since then, Islam, which had been in operation for centuries in the state affairs of the Ottoman Sultanate, has been restricted to the personal sphere, like in the West. For a discussion of the development of secularism in Turkey, see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal : McGill University Press, 1964).

but a worldly regime without any foundation in religion.⁷⁵ 'Abd al-Rāziq argued that in spite of their claims to power, the caliphs could not possibly have been successors to the Prophet since the Prophet, in his view, was never a king, and never attempted to build a government or a state; he was simply a messenger sent by God, and was not a political leader.⁷⁶

In 'Abd al-Rāziq's opinion, the caliphate had no basis either in the Qur'an or in the *Sunna*, since no specific mention of the matter was made in these sources. Furthermore, according to him, there was clearly no precedent in either the Qur'an or the *Sunna* for the Muslims to follow in establishing a political system, since such a system is a temporal concern and not a religious one.⁷⁷ With this argument, 'Abd al-Rāziq in fact wanted to emphasize that "... Islam did not determine a specific regime, nor did it impose on the Muslims a particular system according to the requirements of which they must be governed; rather it has allowed us absolute freedom to organize the state in accordance with the intellectual, social and economic conditions in which we are found, taking into consideration our social development and the requirements of the times."⁷⁸

⁷⁵ See Muḥammad 'Imārah, *al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-ḥukm li 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq*, 2nd ed. (Beirut : al-Mu'assasah al-'Arabiyyah li al-Dirāsāt wa al-Nashr, 1988), 184, 92.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 170, 171 and 184.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 192.

⁷⁸ 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq's statement expressing the main point of his book as told to the *Bourse Egyptienne's* reporter who interviewed him after his dismissal from his position as a judge by the Council of the Greatest 'Ulamā', which considered his opinion on the relation between state and religion as "controversial". Cited by Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1988), 131. See also 'Imarah, *al-Islām*, 91. 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq's ideas aroused strong criticism from Muslim scholars. See, for example, Muḥammad Diyā al-Dīn al-Rayis, *al-Islām wa al-Khilāfah fī al-'Asr al-Ḥadīth : Naqd Kitāb al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm* (Jeddah : 1973).

With these factors in mind, the ideological conflict between the Secularists and Islamic Nationalists in the Investigating Body sessions could have been predicted from the very beginning. On May 31, 1945, Soepomo remarked that it was the intention of the Muslim Nationalists to establish an Islam-based state, whereas the Secular Nationalists, encouraged by Mohammad Hatta, proposed the shaping of Indonesia as a national unitary state which would separate the state from religious affairs.⁷⁹ Soepomo supported Hatta's idea that a national unitary state be established in Indonesia, arguing that,

Creating an Islamic state in Indonesia would mean that we are not creating a unitary state. Creating an Islamic state in Indonesia would mean setting up a state that is going to link itself to the largest group, the Islamic group. If an Islamic state is created in Indonesia, then certainly the problem of minorities will arise, the problem of small religious groups, of Christians and others. Although an Islamic state will safeguard the interests of other groups as well as possible, these smaller religious groups will certainly not be able to feel involved in the state. Therefore the ideals of an Islamic state do not agree with the ideals of a unitary state which we all have so passionately looked forward too ...⁸⁰

He nevertheless went on to emphasize that "a national unitary state does not mean a state with an a-religious character. No. This national unitary state ...will have a lofty moral base, such as is also advocated by Islam."⁸¹ The Muslim Nationalists strongly opposed the idea of the Secular Nationalists to establish a free Indonesia where religion and state would be separated.

A question then arose : Why did the Islamists have so strong a desire to found an Islam-based state in free Indonesia? One answer to this was their intention to implement the shari'a effectively throughout the country. Mohammad Natsir, a

⁷⁹ Yamin, ed., *Naskah*, vol. 1 : 115.

⁸⁰ Quoted in B. J. Boland, *Struggle of Islam*, 20.

⁸¹ Ibid., 21.

prominent Muslim thinker and the future leader of the Masyumi party, claimed that Indonesian independence constituted one of the ideals of the Islamic struggle. This claim led to the further argument that the achievement of Indonesian freedom was an integral part of the Islamic struggle freely to apply Islamic teachings and the shari'a. This claim seems to have been inspired by the fact that the Indonesian Muslims as a majority group had a great, if not the greatest, part in the struggle for independence in which, according to Isa Anshary, "their names and *jihads* formed the red thread in the embroidery of the history of our fatherland."⁸²

To bolster their argument, Indonesian Muslims frequently pointed to the names of Muslim warriors who had fought for Indonesia's independence, such as Sultan Babullah of Ternate, Sultan Hasanuddin of Makassar, Pangeran Diponegoro (the leader of the Diponegoro War, 1925 - 1930), Imam Bonjol (the leader of the Padri War, 1921 - 1937), and Teuku Umar, Tjut Nya' Dhien and Tengku Tjhik di Tiro (the leaders of the Aceh War, 1872 - 1912), who took up arms and waged *jihad* against the Dutch in their struggle to expel the latter from the Indonesian archipelago. This Muslim resistance was viewed by Natsir as a struggle not only for the independence of Indonesia, but also for that of the Indonesian Muslim community, and for the freedom of the religion of Islam itself in order that Islamic rules and regulations might be realized in a free state of Indonesia.⁸³

⁸² See *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*, vol. 2 (Bandung : Konstituante Republik Indonesia, 1958), 179.

⁸³ Mohammad Natsir, "Indonesisch Nationalisme," *Pembela Islam*, no. 36 (October 1931), 14 - 17.

Ki Bagus Hadikusumo⁸⁴ was one of the most outspoken representatives of the Muslim Nationalists in the Investigating Body who advocated Islam as the basis of the state. In rejecting the idea of the Secular Nationalists, who would have separated state from religion, and in promoting Islam as its basis, Hadikusumo advanced his argument by saying :

Honorable gentlemen! If you wish to establish a just and wise government in our state based on noble moral conduct and democratic deliberations and tolerance without any compulsion in religion, then establish a government based on Islam, because Islam provides all of this.⁸⁵

He then firmly emphasized the point by stating that

... in order that Indonesia become a strong and stable state, I propose that the establishment of a free state of Indonesia be based on Islam, because this will be in conformity with the fundamental aspiration of the majority of people [who are Muslim]. ... Do not neglect the aspiration of 90 percent of the people [who are Muslim].⁸⁶

In Hadikusumo's view, the foundation of an Islam-based state in Indonesia would enable the Muslim community to implement the shari'a fully and freely since Indonesian independence would also mean the freedom to realize the shari'a, something that the Muslim community had not been able to do under foreign colonialism. He stated :

Very often we have heard voices stating that the shari'a is an old fashioned injunction, incompatible with the present. This is proved by the fact that the shari'a cannot function, despite the majority of Indonesian people being Muslims. It is true, but you must also remember the barriers which blocked the shari'a from functioning fully in Indonesia. The major constraint of this

⁸⁴ On the life, career and thought of Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, see the work of his son Djarnawi Hadikusuma, *Derita Seorang Pemimpin : Riwayat Hidup, Perjuangan dan Buah Pikiran Ki Bagus Hadikusuma* (Yogyakarta : Persatuan, 1979).

⁸⁵ Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara dan Akhlak Pemimpin* (Yogyakarta : Pustaka Rahayu, n.d.), 13.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 21 - 22.



was nothing but a deceitful trick imposed by the Dutch East Indies government which had colonized our country, and always attempted to uproot the Islamic religion from its colony since it knew that as long as the Indonesian nation firmly subscribed to the religion of Islam, it would not gain any advantage over its colony. Therefore, the *shari'a*, which had been in operation in Indonesia, was gradually abolished and substituted with other regulations that the Dutch government liked.⁸⁷

Hadikusumo then supported this argument by pointing to the Dutch policy which attempted gradually to abolish the Islamic inheritance law in 1922, a policy which became more apparent in 1934 with its attempt to replace Islamic inheritance law with the *adat* (customary) inheritance law, a move which had been opposed by Muslims. Muslim opposition to the customary law was based on the fact that it contradicted Islamic doctrine. Dutch colonial rule also imposed the same policy upon the Islamic marriage law, which had operated for many centuries among Indonesian Muslims, by trying to replace it with a civil marriage law which was contrary to Islamic doctrine. Thanks to vigorous Muslim reaction, the Dutch colonial government did not implement either of these two policies.⁸⁸

With the end of Dutch colonialism, Hadikusumo saw no barriers to the realization of the *shari'a* in an independent Indonesia. He supported the argument of K. H. Ahmad Sanusi, which stated that the Qur'an provided injunctions dealing not only with other-worldly but also with worldly affairs, injunctions by which both state and religion should be organized. He pointed out that only about 600 out of the approximately 6000 Qur'anic verses deal with other-worldly duties, while the majority are concerned with political and worldly matters.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Ibid., 17.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 18 - 19.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 15.

The Secular Nationalists, on the other hand, repudiated the Muslim Nationalist call for the establishment of an Islam-based state in Indonesia. Soepomo, as mentioned above, firmly rejected the idea of the establishment of an Islamic state in free Indonesia, though he admitted the comprehensiveness of Islamic teachings. He argued that Indonesia was a country which was not the same as Islam-based states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Iran since the former had special characteristics in terms of population, cultures, traditions, historical experiences and geographical conditions.⁹⁰ In addition, this leading representative of the Secular Nationalists, who was an expert in law, doubted whether the *shari'a* could meet the demands and challenges of a modern nation.⁹¹

Reflecting on Soepomo's argument, Ahmad Syafii Maarif states in his 1983 dissertation that Soepomo might have had a point in questioning the compatibility of the contents of the *shari'a* with the demands of modern life, since many of its formulations came from the thought and opinions produced by Islamic jurists of the medieval period. To apply the *shari'a* in the twentieth century, Maarif continues, it would need to be reformulated and interpreted in a new and systematic way based on the true spirit of the teachings of the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna* of the Prophet. In other words, it needs modification in the light of modern society. In this way the *shari'a* could become relevant to the rapid waves of change and modernity in contemporary life. Without serious efforts to reformulate and to reinterpret the legacy of the contents

⁹⁰ Yamin, ed., *Naskah*, vol. 1 : 116.

⁹¹ Ibid.

of the shari'a, says Maarif, any attempt to implement it would raise doubts about its relevance and compatibility with modern life.⁹²

Influenced by this unfavourable estimate of the adaptability of Islamic law of the medieval period to modern life, Soepomo came to reject Islam and its shari'a as the basis of the state. However, to apply a totally secular political system to the life of Indonesian Muslims, argues Maarif, would not work at all and would create a continuous political battle in the life of the nation.⁹³ Therefore, a political compromise on the basis of the state, with which both the Secular group and the Muslim faction could feel satisfied, would, in Maarif's eyes, be ideal.

IDEOLOGICAL COMPROMISE : THE JAKARTA CHARTER

The ideological conflict between the Secular and the Islamic Nationalists regarding the philosophical basis of the state remained tense and was not resolved until Soekarno delivered his speech of June 1, 1945, in which he offered his ideas on the Pancasila. In the eyes of Muslim Nationalists, the Pancasila was nothing but a collection of five virtues. To the ears of Muslim Nationalists, Soekarno's theory of compressing his five principles into three and then into one principle, that is, Gotong Royong (Mutual Cooperation), was strange, peculiar and "ridiculous."⁹⁴ Once he compressed his Pancasila into one principle, an important question arose : Where did he put the principle "Belief in God"? This principle certainly vanished into that of

⁹² Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State : A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debate in Indonesia," (Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago, 1983), 166.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 162.

Mutual Cooperation.⁹⁵ For this very reason, the Muslim Nationalist faction insisted on the modification of the Pancasila if it was intended to be employed as the basis of the state.

Following Soekarno's historic speech, a Small Committee (also known as the Committee of Nine) was established whose membership consisted of nine leaders : Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, Ahmad Soebardjo, A. A. Maramis and Muhammad Yamin who represented the Secular Nationalists on the one hand, and Abdul Kahar Muzakir, H. Agus Salim, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and Abdul Wahid Hasjim who belonged to the Muslim Nationalists on the other. It is worth mentioning here that A. A. Maramis was the only Christian in the Secular Nationalist group, while the others were Muslim. The representatives of the two groups, after a long and tense debate, reached a historic political compromise, or a gentleman's agreement, in the form of what Yamin called the Jakarta Charter.⁹⁶ In this Charter Soekarno's Pancasila was reformulated to read as follows :

Belief in God with the obligation to practice the *shari'ah* for its adherents,
Just and civilized Humanity,
The Unity of Indonesia,
Democracy which is guided by inner wisdom in unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives, and
Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.⁹⁷

Signed on June 22, 1945 by the nine leaders mentioned above, the Jakarta Charter was intended as a draft of the preamble to the constitution of the new state. From this

⁹⁵ Isa Anshary in *Dasar Negara*, vol. 2 : 190; see also Maarif, "Islam," 162.

⁹⁶ The full text of the Jakarta Charter can be read in Yamin, ed., *Naskah*, vol. 1 : 709 - 710. For a detailed discussion, see Saifuddin Anshari, "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945 : A History of the Gentleman's Agreement between the Islamic and Secular Nationalists in Modern Indonesia," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1976).

⁹⁷ Yamin, ed., *Naskah*, vol. 1 : 154.

formulation, it is clear that the order of the principles of the newly modified Pancasila had changed. The influence of the representatives of the Muslim faction in the Committee was obvious.⁹⁸ This can be seen from the fact that its reformulation reflected the core of the spirit of Islamic doctrine. This newly formulated Pancasila certainly satisfied the Muslim Nationalists since the principle of Belief in God was placed first and was extended by a clause which read "with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents." With this Islamic clause, the Indonesian Muslims gained a strategic position which would enable them to implement the shari'a for their community in an independent Indonesia, even though they had to accept the Pancasila rather than Islam as the basis and ideology of the state.

In the view of the Muslim Nationalists, the place of Islam in a free Indonesia should receive a clear constitutional basis in conformity with Muslim political and religious aspirations, since the Muslims constituted 90 percent of the Indonesian population in 1945. Nevertheless, the sentence "with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents," from the Muslim point of view, would apply only to Indonesian Muslims, and not to other religious groups in the country. They felt this sentence was logical since it would not offend or violate the rights of non-Muslim groups in the country. In other words, the Muslims, in their view, still practiced, or acted within the limit of, religious tolerance toward other religious groups in the country by not imposing their faith and practices on them. This position was also in conformity with the Qur'anic verse which reads: "There is no compulsion in religion; truly the right way has become clearly distinct from error..."⁹⁹ The position of

⁹⁸ Eka Darmaputera, *Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 152.

⁹⁹ Sūra II: 256.

Indonesian Muslims at that time might be regarded as similar to that of the Prophet Muhammad (570 - 632) when he established the Muslim community in Medina in 1 A. H./622 C. E. There the Muslims tolerated all other religious groups, such as the Jews and the non-Muslim Arabs of the city under the Constitution of Medina to which they all had agreed.

The expression "with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents" was still an ideal for the Muslims, since rules on how to implement it fully in their lives were not yet established. At that time, the Muslim Nationalists seemed to place primary importance on the inclusion of their ideals, while regulations concerning the implementation of these ideals could be formulated later. Whatever the case may have been, for the expression "with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents" soon attracted rigorous objections, especially from the Christian side. On July 11, 1945, Latuharhary, a staunch Protestant and member of the Investigating Body, expressed his objection to that phrase saying that the consequence of the Islamic sentence would probably be great, notably in relation to other religions, and that it could result in difficulties in connection with customary law.¹⁰⁰ In response to Latuharhary's objection, Agus Salim stated that the opinions about the differences between religious law and customary law were not a new phenomenon in the Indonesian context. This problem however had been solved already, since, according to Salim, the security of other religious groups did not depend on the power of the state, but rather on the tolerance and the *adat* (tradition) of the Muslim community.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Yamin, ed. *Naskah*, vol. 1 : 259.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

Furthermore, Wongsonegoro was firmly of the opinion, as was Hoesein Djajadiningrat, that the clause would probably create "religious fanaticism", since it seemed to force the adherents of Islam to observe the shari'a.¹⁰² In reaction to their objection, Abdul Wahid Hasjim raised his voice and reminded them that this sentence, achieved through difficult deliberations, might be too hard for some people, but not go far enough for others.¹⁰³ In his capacity as chairman of the Small Committee, Soekarno reminded all its members that the Jakarta Charter was the result of a political compromise or gentleman's agreement between the Nationalist and Islamic groups. Therefore, if the Islamic sentence were excluded from the Charter, it would not be accepted by the Islamic faction.¹⁰⁴ He also appealed "as if in tears" to the Christian circle, such as Latuharhary and Maramis to sacrifice their objections, for the sake of the unity of the nation, by accepting the Jakarta Charter. On July 16, 1945, the Charter was unanimously approved by the Secular and Muslim Nationalists to be used as a draft of the preamble of the constitution, along with a draft of the body of the latter which had been designed by another Committee made up of the following members: Soepomo, Wongsonegoro, Soebardjo, Maramis and Sukiman. It is worth mentioning here that the clause "with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents" was also recorded in article 29 of the draft of the body of the constitution.

THE OMISSION OF THE ISLAMIC CLAUSE AND MUSLIM REACTION

The Japanese promise to give independence to the Indonesian people did not become a reality until the latter freed themselves. Soekarno and Hatta, on behalf of all

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

the people of Indonesia, declared Indonesia's independence on August 17, 1945.

Following this historic event, the PPKI (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, or Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence),¹⁰⁵ established on August 7, 1945 and headed by Soekarno and Hatta, chairman and vice-chairman respectively, was to begin its task. Shortly before the opening of its first formal meeting on August 18, 1945, Hatta proposed changes to the draft of the preamble of the constitution and its body, since he had received strenuous objections to the phrase "with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents" from the Catholics and Protestants living in the eastern parts of Indonesia. While the Catholics and Protestants admitted that such a clause applied exclusively to the Muslim community, they considered it discriminatory against all minority groups. They threatened to remain outside the Republic of Indonesia if the Islamic clause remained. In the face of this serious matter, Hatta took the initiative to invite

Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Wahid Hasjim, Kasman Singodimedjo and Teuku Hasan from Sumatra to attend an introductory meeting to discuss the above-mentioned problem. In order that we as a nation not be divided, we agree to remove the part of the sentence which hurt the feelings of the Christian faction and replace it with '*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*' (Belief in the One and Only God).¹⁰⁶

Their agreement resulted in the removal of the Islamic phrase as well as all Islamic sentences in both the preamble of the constitution and in its body. Fundamental changes in the body of the constitution were made. Article 6 now became "the president of the Republic of Indonesia should be a native-born Indonesian," without the requirement that he or she be "an adherent of Islam" as had been previously

¹⁰⁵ The Committee had 21 members, including its chairman and vice-chairman, and later six other members were added. See Yamin, ed, *Naskah*, vol. 1 : 399.

¹⁰⁶ Mohammad Hatta, *Sekitar Proklamasi* (Jakarta : Tintamas, 1982), 60.

agreed, and article 29 came to read "the State based on belief in the One and Only God" from which the previously agreed words "with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents" were removed.¹⁰⁷ Even the word *mukaddimah* (an Indonesian word derived from Arabic) in the preamble was substituted with the word *pembukaan* (an original Indonesian word), both of which in fact mean preamble. This too came as a result of pressure from the Secular Nationalists, who could not understand why an Arabic word should be used in this context when a perfectly good Indonesian word already existed. In commenting on this matter Deliar Noer remarks, regretfully, "as if references to what was regarded as Islamic were contrary to national aspirations."¹⁰⁸ In line with his comment, Noer has in fact argued that "nationalism in Indonesia started with Muslim nationalism" and that therefore it can be said that "Islam was then identical with nationality."¹⁰⁹ In this connection, George McTurnan Kahin also acknowledges the important contribution of Islam to the growth of Indonesian nationalism. He writes :

One of the most important factors contributing to the growth of an integrated nationalism was the high degree of religious homogeneity that prevailed in Indonesia, over 90 percent of the population being Mohammedan (Muslims). As the nationalist movement spread out from its original and principal base on Java to the outer islands of the Dutch-controlled portion of the archipelago, the parochial tendencies that might otherwise have become strong among their communities tended to be counteracted because of the solidarity induced by a common religion.¹¹⁰

Those who would follow Noer's way of thinking would insist that an Arabic or Islamic word such as *mukaddimah* be maintained in the preamble of the constitution,

¹⁰⁷ Yamin, ed., *Naskah*, vol. 1 : 400 - 410.

¹⁰⁸ Deliar Noer, *Administration of Islam in Indonesia* (Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1978), 12.

¹⁰⁹ Noer, *The Modernist*, 7.

¹¹⁰ George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1952), 38.

since Islam, in the view of Muslims, greatly contributed to the formation of important elements of Indonesian culture and identity, elements which have become identified with Indonesian nationality. However, we may ask, why did the Secular Nationalists of the time become so antipathetic to Islamic words that these had to be removed from the draft of the constitution? The answer to this question may be seen in the context of the political conflict which was characterized by mutual suspicion and even mistrust between the two groups. These Islamic or Arabic words became the focus of what was a much deeper rift in Indonesian society of that period, a rift that translated itself into Indonesian political life, which was itself characterized by multi-religious and ethnic rivalries.

This modified constitution was finally approved and was henceforth known as the 1945 constitution. Thus, the new version of the first principle of the Pancasila read "Belief in the One and Only God" instead of "Belief in God with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents." This change was also different from Soekarno's concept which simply ran, "Belief in God." The key words or vital attribute "the One and Only" used for God are in conformity with the beliefs of Muslims and reflect the basic view of *tawhid*. The Muslim representatives accepted these changes since, in their view, they were not contrary to the doctrine of Islam. Nevertheless, the abrogation of the Islamic clause in the preamble of the 1945 constitution and all purely Islamic references in its body was regarded as a political defeat for the Muslim Nationalists.

Later, this omission stirred strong reactions among Muslim leaders. In 1970 Prawoto Mangkusasmito, a former leader of the defunct Masyumi party, questioned why Agus Salim, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and Kahar Muzakkir, the three Muslim signatories of the Jakarta Charter in addition to Wahid Hasjim, and the three signatories of the Secular Nationalists in addition to Hatta and Soekarno, were not

invited to the Preparatory Committee meeting. Mangkusasmito could not see how a meeting which lasted such a short time¹¹¹ could have succeeded in achieving an agreement leading to the withdrawal of all Islamic sentences from both the preamble of the 1945 constitution and its body.

Long before Mangkusasmito raised his objection, however, Isa Anshary in the 1957 Constituent Assembly had already attacked the outcome of the August 18, 1945 meeting, in which all Islamic references were deleted, as an unfair action carried out through "dishonest politics."¹¹² The Muslims of Mangkusasmito's time renewed their accusation against the Secular Nationalists of having imposed this unfair situation upon them, which they had to accept in the name of tolerance. Hatta attempted to mollify the Muslim Nationalists by stating that "the spirit of the Jakarta Charter was not abolished by deleting the words 'Belief in God with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents' and by substituting for it 'Belief in the One and Only God'.¹¹³ Mangkusasmito, however, was not satisfied with Hatta's argument and countered it by saying that the omission of the Islamic references created the seeds of never ending conflict and harmed both the nation and the state.¹¹⁴ Thus, we can see that the deletion of the Islamic references was viewed in different ways by the two factions : on the one hand, the Muslim Nationalists felt betrayed by the Secular Nationalists, whereas the Secular Nationalists, on the other, regarded themselves as having acted in the best interests of the unity and integrity of the nation.

¹¹¹ According to Hatta's account, the meeting lasted only for fifteen minutes. See Hatta, *Sekitar Proklamasi*, 60.

¹¹² *Dasar Negara*, vol. 2 : 186.

¹¹³ Hatta, *Sekitar Proklamasi*, 60.

¹¹⁴ Mangkusasmito, *Pertumbuhan*, 28.

The Pancasila was then implemented as the basis of the state, for which reason Indonesia has become known as a national unitary state based on the Pancasila. The Pancasila however was to undergo various modifications with each new version of the Indonesian constitutions. In the preamble of the 1945 constitution, which was in effect from August 18, 1945 until December 27, 1949, the Pancasila retained the five principles discussed above. In the preamble of the constitution of the RIS (*Republik Indonesia Serikat*, or Republic of the United States of Indonesia) of 1949, in effect from December 27, 1949 until August 17, 1950, the Pancasila as a whole was modified to a shorter and different formulation which read:

Belief in the One and Only God
Humanity
Nationalism
Democracy, and
Social Justice.¹¹⁵

The RIS consisted of 16 states, the most important of which -- in addition to the Republic of Indonesia which governed only some parts of Java and Sumatra, with Yogyakarta as its capital -- were the states of East Sumatra, South Sumatra, Pasundan and East Indonesia. The new constitution, which instituted a parliamentary cabinet rather than a presidential one, came about as a result of negotiation between Indonesian and Dutch representatives attending the Round Table Conference held in The Hague from August 23 until November 2, 1949.¹¹⁶ The Dutch employed a political tactic which assumed that the establishment of the RIS would lead to Indonesia's quick break up. This political tactic, however, did not produce the desired results.

¹¹⁵ See A. K. Pringgodigdo, *Tiga Undang-Undang Dasar* (Jakarta : Pembangunan, 1981), 19.

¹¹⁶ Mangkusasmito, *Pertumbuhan*, 41 - 42.

In the preamble to the provisional constitution of 1950, in effect from August 17, 1950 until July 5, 1959, the formulation of the Pancasila was maintained as it had been in the preamble to the constitution of the RIS.¹¹⁷ Under the provisional constitution of 1950, the RIS was transformed into a national unitary state based on the parliamentary cabinet model of Western liberal democracies. The national unitary state of Indonesia came into being after the Dutch formally recognized Indonesian sovereignty on December 27, 1949. This national unitary state was established on the basis of an agreement between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the government of the RIS reached on May 19, 1950.¹¹⁸

As we shall see later, on July 5, 1959, the 1950 constitution was replaced by the re-application of the 1945 constitution which has been permanently employed up to the present. This fact implies that the Pancasila as it appears in the 1945 constitution has been acknowledged by the government as the only official formulation,¹¹⁹ whereas the two formulations of the Pancasila in the preambles to the RIS constitution and to the provisional constitution of 1950, are not recognized, though both of them were also official formulations in their time.

¹¹⁷ See Pringgodigdo, *Tiga Undang-Undang*, 20.

¹¹⁸ Mangkusamito, *Pertumbuhan*, 45. See also Poesponegoro and Notosusanto, eds., *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, vol. 6, 205.

¹¹⁹ President Soeharto issued on April 13, 1968 letter of instruction no. 12 confirming the official formulation of the Pancasila and the order of its principles according to the preamble of the 1945 constitution. The instruction was intended by the president to abrogate various versions of the formulation and order of the Pancasila circulating among the Indonesian people which were not in agreement with those of the preamble of the 1945 constitution.

DARUL ISLAM'S CHALLENGE TO THE PANCASILA STATE

Late in 1949 the Pancasila-based state of Indonesia was threatened by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo¹²⁰ and his *Darul Islam* military movement. Calling his army "the Indonesian Islamic Army," Kartosuwirjo took up arms and led a violent revolt in West Java against the central government. On August 7, 1949, he formally proclaimed the foundation of what he called the Islamic State of Indonesia, of which he proclaimed himself to be *Imam*. Later Kartosuwirjo's revolt was joined by Kahar Muzakkar (1921 - 1965) in 1952 in South Sulawesi, where he also proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic state under Kartosuwirjo's command. Moreover, a similar revolt broke out in Aceh in 1953 under the leadership of Daud Beureueh (d. 1987) which also posed trouble for the central government. All these movements contributed to the spread of disturbances in those areas where the rebellions began. The central government's armed forces, in their attempts to persuade the rebels to rejoin peacefully the Republic of Indonesia, did not suppress them quickly. The sporadic military rebellion of the Darul Islam lasted for thirteen years and only ended in 1962 when the

¹²⁰ Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo was born on February 7, 1905 at Cepu (Central Java). Having completed a preparatory course in medicine in Surabaya, he continued to study medicine in 1926 at a Dutch school in the same city, but one year later he was expelled from the school because of his political activities. During his stay in Surabaya he made the acquaintance of H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, then the chairman of the PSII, and served as his private secretary. When Kartosuwirjo moved to Malangbong, a place close to Garut (West Java), he became active in the PSII. At the age of 26, he was appointed secretary general of the PSII, and after the death of Tjokroaminoto (1934) he was elected vice-president of the party. In a further development, he was discharged from the party by his associates because of his radical attitude toward the Dutch. On April 24, 1940, he established a rival PSII at Malangbong, and almost at the same time he founded the Suffah Institute serving as a training center for political and religious leadership. This Institute was dissolved by the Japanese when they took power from the Dutch. Later, Kartosuwirjo revived his Institute and transformed it into a military training center for military units such as the Hizbullah and the Sabilillah. Under his leadership these groups were mobilized in West Java to resist the Dutch, who came to re-colonize Indonesia. Those same groups later rebelled against the Republic.

central government, after the limit of its patience had been reached, took military action and quelled the movement, capturing and executing Kartosuwirjo in September 1962.¹²¹

At the beginning, Kartosuwirjo and his army sided with the Republic in their resistance against the Dutch aggressor. However, when the Renville Agreement between the Indonesian government and the Dutch was ratified in 1948, according to which Republican troops had to be evacuated from the Dutch territories, Kartosuwirjo strongly opposed it. He and his troops refused to abandon West Java, which was considered Dutch territory according to the agreement. Consequently, conflicts broke out between him and the Indonesian government as well as the Masyumi, which had recognized the agreement. Kartosuwirjo eventually broke with the Masyumi and operated independently with his Darul Islam movement. It was in this year (1948) that Kartosuwirjo proposed establishing an Islamic state in West Java if the Indonesian central government in Yogyakarta were to be captured by the Dutch or if the Dutch were to establish a state in the region.¹²²

Indeed, the Indonesian central government in Yogyakarta surrendered to the Dutch following military action in December 1948. In the face of this situation, Kartosuwirjo established an Islamic state in West Java in the belief that his action was not a rebellion against the Republic, but rather a continuation of the struggle in support

¹²¹ For detailed accounts of Kartosuwirjo and his Darul Islam movement, see C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia* (The Hague : W. Van Hoeve, 1958); C. van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam : The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo* (Jakarta : Aryaguna, 1964).

¹²² Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945 - 1965* (Jakarta : Grafitipers, 1987), 181.

of the proclamation of free Indonesia made on August 17, 1945.¹²³ When the Republican armed forces issued a command for the evacuated troops to return to West Java following the Dutch violation of the Renville Agreement (by capturing the Indonesian central government in Yogyakarta), Kartosuwirjo opposed their return and saw it as aggression directed against his Islamic state. As a result, a triangular war erupted between the Darul Islam's troops, those of the Republic, and those of the Dutch (who still occupied the region).¹²⁴

Following Kartosuwirjo's defeat, Kahar Muzakkar's movement faced a critical situation. Nevertheless, he too eluded capture for many years until he was finally killed in Southeast Sulawesi by the Indonesian national army in February 1965, and his revolt suppressed.¹²⁵ Like Kartosuwirjo and Kahar Muzakkar, Daud Beureueh vigorously struggled to defend the Islamic state which he had proclaimed in Aceh. He issued a political statement to the effect that the inclusion of the principle of Belief in One God in the Pancasila was only a political maneuver designed by some Indonesian leaders to lead Muslims down the wrong path :

In the name of Allah we the people of Aceh have made new history, for we wish to set up an Islamic State here on our native soil. ... For many long years we have been hoping and yearning for a state based on Islam, but ... it has become increasingly evident ... that some Indonesian leaders are trying to steer us onto the wrong path. ... The basic principles of the Republican state do not guarantee freedom of religion, freedom to have a religion in the real sense of the word. ... [T]he Islamic religion which makes the life of society complete cannot be split up. For us, the mention of principle of Belief in One God [in the Pancasila] is nothing more than a political manoeuvre. Belief in the One God is for us the very source of social life, and every single one of its directives must apply here on Indonesian soil. It is not possible for only some

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ van Dijk, *Rebellion*, 90 - 91.

¹²⁵ A comprehensive account of Kahar Muzakkar's revolt is given by Barbara S. Harvey in her "Tradition, Islam and Rebellion : South Sulawesi 1950 - 1965," (Ph. D. diss., Cornell University, 1974). See also van Dijk, *Rebellion*.

of these directives to apply while others do not, be this in criminal or civil affairs, in the question of religious worship, or in matters of everyday life. If the Law of God does not apply (in its entirety), this means we are deviating from belief in the One God.¹²⁶

Due to the strong pressure exerted the central government's armed forces, Daud Beureueh and his followers finally called a halt to their insurrection in May 1959.¹²⁷ The failure of the Darul Islam's rebellion resulted in the destruction of the so-called Islamic state which had been proclaimed. Anthony H. Johns notes that Daud Beureueh's revolt and those launched by Kartosuwirjo and Kahar Muzakkar

give some idea of the strength of Muslim aspirations in Indonesia that were frustrated by the abandonment of the Jakarta Charter. ... These very serious uprisings, which threatened the integrity, not to say existence, of the state, were in the last resort put down by Muslim soldiers under a Muslim president who rejected the concept of a Muslim state. The experience of these rebellions and this bitterness, however, was sufficient to show the secular nationalists that the security and stability of the state required an understanding of the sensitivities of Muslim political ideologues.¹²⁸

Throughout this period, however, the Darul Islam rebellion, with its Indonesian Islamic Army, was frequently used as a political weapon by many non-Islamic political leaders, especially the Communists, who used their example to label Muslims as "right-wing extremists" who posed a threat to the state. According to Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara (b. 1925), they drew an analogy between the Darul Islam and Islam itself; since the Darul Islam was anti-Pancasila, thus, Islam was also anti-Pancasila.

¹²⁶ Quoted and translated by H. Feith and L. Castles, eds., *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945 - 65* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1970), 211.

¹²⁷ For detailed accounts of Daud Beureueh's revolt, see M. Nur El-Ibrahmy, *Teungku Muhammad Daud Beureueh : Peranannya dalam Pergolakan di Aceh* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1986); Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *The Republican Revolt : A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion* (Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985); see also van Dijk, *Rebellion*.

¹²⁸ Anthony H. Johns, "Indonesia : Islam and Cultural Pluralism," in John L. Esposito, *Islam in Asia : Religion, Politics and Society* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1987), 212.

This analogy, Perwiranegara said, was inaccurate since the Darul Islam movement was suppressed by ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, or Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), 90 percent of which was Muslim, and which was popularly supported by Muslims.¹²⁹ This kind of label damaged the image of Islam and Muslims as a whole, especially that of the militant Masyumi leaders who became the Communists' political rivals and opposed them in ideological battles both in the Constituent Assembly sessions and beyond.

As far as the Darul Islam was concerned, however, it should be kept in mind that its ideal of establishing an Islam-based state "by force of arms" simply reflected the political will of a minority group of Muslims in the circle of the Darul Islam itself, and did not represent the entire spectrum of Muslim political aspirations in Indonesia. Prime Minister Natsir (who served from September 1950 until March 1951 and was himself the outstanding leader of the Islamic Masyumi party) was charged with the task of acting as a mediator to intervene in the Darul Islam affair so that a political solution between its leader and the Republic could be reached. In his speech on November 14, 1950, in which he called the rebels "the warriors for independence who had not yet returned to normal life," Prime Minister Natsir appealed to them to abandon their violent ways of guerrilla war and invited them to devote themselves to building the new state of Indonesia. By doing so, Natsir said, they would have many opportunities to advocate their ideals in a peaceful manner.¹³⁰ In the meantime, the Islamic political parties from the very beginning gave no political support to the Darul Islam movement. This fact gives clear evidence that the majority of Indonesian

¹²⁹ Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, "Prospek Pembangunan Umat Islam di Indonesia," *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 817 (February 1, 1995), 12.

¹³⁰ Mohammad Natsir, *Capita Selecta*, vol. 2, comp. by D.P. Sati Alimin (Jakarta: Pustaka Pendis, 1957), 8 - 10.

Muslims preferred to continue to struggle to found an Islam-based state through constitutional rather than violent means.

Following the 1955 general election, the crucial issue concerning the basis of the state once again became the focus of dispute between the Islamic faction and the Secular and non-Muslim groups, with the political battle still centering on whether the Pancasila or Islam was to be employed for this purpose. This issue came to the surface because the 1950 provisional constitution, then currently in effect, had, like the two previous constitutions (the 1945 constitution and the RIS constitution), been agreed upon by the Secular Nationalists and the Muslim Nationalists as being temporary. Logically, the Pancasila as the basis of the state was also regarded as temporary, and a new and permanent constitution was envisioned following the first general election in 1955. Before, however, discussing the ideological battle between the two factions, it is first necessary to investigate how the Indonesian Muslim political leaders reorganized their political struggle by establishing a new political party called the Masyumi, a federative political body.

GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1955 AND REAL ISLAMIC POLITICAL FORCE

The Masyumi party was set up as a result of the Muslim Congress held from November 7 - 8, 1945 in Yogyakarta, Central Java, and was unanimously agreed to be the only Islamic political party through which all Muslim political aspirations and goals should be channeled.¹³¹ According to its constitution, the Masyumi was open to all

¹³¹ Under the Japanese occupation, there had been an organization called the Masyumi established by Muslim leaders in October 1943 under Japanese sponsorship. The Japanese colonial rulers took this initiative in an attempt to appease and control the Muslims. However, at that time the Masyumi served as a consultative body rather than a political party, since under Japanese colonial rule all political parties had been dissolved.

Muslims and accepted both collective as well as individual membership. The main purpose of Masyumi's political struggle was to "implement the Islamic teachings and law in the life of Muslim individuals and community in the Indonesian state leading to the achievement of God's pleasure and acceptance."¹³² In the wake of this historic event, many Muslim organizations such as the Syarikat Islam, the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama, as well as Muslim individuals, enthusiastically joined the Masyumi. This political unity of Indonesian Muslims was short-lived, however, since the Syarikat Islam and the Nahdlatul Ulama split from the Masyumi because of their political disagreement with the Masyumi leaders; the former in July 1947, and the latter in April 1952. These two Islamic organizations declared themselves to be political parties separate from the Masyumi.

In the wake of this political divorce, six Islamic parties zealously competed in the first general election held on September 29, 1955, with the following results : the Masyumi gained 57 seats (20.9 percent of the vote), the NU 45 seats (18.4 percent), the PSII (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia*, or Indonesian Islamic Union Party) 8 seats (2.9 percent), the Perti 4 seats (1.3 percent), the PPTI (*Partai Persatuan Tharikat Islam*, or United Islamic Tharikat Party) 1 seat (0.2 percent) and the AKUI (*Aksi Kemenangan Umat Islam*, or Action for Muslim Victory) 1 seat (0.2 percent). The total number of seats gained by the six Islamic parties was 116 (45 percent) out of the 257 parliamentary seats contested.

¹³² Pimpinan Masyumi Bagian Keuangan, *Pedoman Perjuangan Masyumi* (Jakarta : PP Masyumi, 1955), 6, article 3.

The two large non-Islamic parties, making up the PNI¹³³ (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, or Indonesian National Party) won the same number of seats as the Masyumi, that is 57 seats (22.3 percent of the vote) whereas the PKI¹³⁴ (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, or Indonesian Communist Party) acquired 39 seats (16.4 percent). The *Parkindo* (*Partai Kristen Indonesia*, or Indonesian Christian Party) gained 8 seats (2.6 percent) and the *Partai Katholik* (Catholic Party) won 6 seats (2.0 percent), while many other small parties gained less than 6 seats each.¹³⁵ The average number of seats won by each party in the Constituent Assembly was doubled since there were twice as many seats to be acquired in the Assembly as in the parliament.

¹³³ The PNI was established by Soekarno on July 4, 1927, with the principal objective of struggling for Indonesian independence. Following the split and decline of the Sarekat Islam in the 1920s, the PNI took over the leadership of the nationalist movement for Indonesian independence. Due to the pressure of Dutch colonial rulers which resulted in numerous internal conflicts, the PNI was dissolved by its leader, Mr. Sartono, in 1930. This party was re-established in January 1946, and in the 1955 general election obtained a majority vote due to its wide appeal which was associated with Soekarno's popularity as the president of the Republic of Indonesia.

¹³⁴ The PKI was founded on May 23, 1920 and was a transformation of the ISDV (Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging, or Indies Social Democratic Association) which had been created in May 1914 in Semarang by Marxist oriented Dutch figures such as Adolf Baars and Hendrik Sneevliet. The PKI in 1926/1927 revolted against Dutch colonial rule in Banten and West Sumatra, which led the Dutch to suppress it. As a result of this, the PKI did not take part in the political debate regarding the basis of the state at the Investigating Body sessions. At the Constituent Assembly sessions held from 1956 - 1959 the PKI actively participated in the political debate. On the PKI read, for example, Michael C. William, *Sickle and Crescent : The Communist Revolt of 1926 in Banten* (Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1982); Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1965); Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951 - 1963* (Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1964).

¹³⁵ See Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), 58 - 59; see also Ali Sastroamidjojo, *Milestones on my Journey*, ed. by C.L.M. Penders (Queensland : University of Queensland Press, 1979), 320 - 321; Alfian, *Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (Jakarta : Leknas, 1971), 1.

The general election of 1955 was held under the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet of the Masyumi in which 43,104,464 had the right to vote out of a total population of 77,987,879. Of those eligible to vote, 37,875,299 (87.65 percent) cast a ballot.¹³⁶ Based on the results of the 1955 general election, there was no political party which won a majority. Thus, the results of the general election of 1955 did not satisfy any single political party. However, ideologically speaking, the major political trends in the country can be classified into three political mainstreams : Islam, Marxism/Socialism and Secular Nationalism,¹³⁷ the three main ideological powers which in fact had deep roots in pre-independence Indonesia.

As far as Islamic political fortunes were concerned, the results of the general election showed that Islam as a political force could not obtain half, let alone a majority, of the total number of parliamentary seats contested, even if the number of seats gained by the Masyumi, the NU, the PSII, the Perti, the PPTI and the AKUI were counted together. Viewed in the light of the results of the general election of 1955, it was clear that the Islamic political force in both the parliament and in the Constituent Assembly was far from dominant, let alone decisive. Therefore, it was impossible for the Muslim Nationalists to succeed in their constitutional struggle to promote Islam as the basis of the state. This setback however did not discourage the Muslims from vigorously pursuing their argument in the Constituent Assembly sessions that Islam be the basis and ideology of the state.

¹³⁶ Daniel Dhakidae, "Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia : Saksi Pasang Naik dan Surut Partai Politik," *Prisma*, no. 9 (September 1981), 17 - 40.

¹³⁷ For a brief survey of these three ideological streams, read Soedjatmoko, "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia," in Philip W. Thayer, ed., *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia* (Baltimore : The John Hopkins Press, 1956), 128 - 129.

C. MUSLIM RESPONSE TO THE PANCASILA (1956 - 1959)

Chaired by Wilopo of the PNI, the Constituent Assembly began its task on November 10, 1956 in Bandung, West Java, with the objective of drafting and legalizing a new and permanent constitution. The constitutional debates in the Assembly did not begin with discussions of a prepared draft of the constitution, but with a debate on fundamental issues, which later would be included in a draft of the constitution. This debate addressed issues such as the form of the government, the parliamentary system and the authority of the head of state. In fact, the Assembly was able to fulfill its role by completing many of its tasks. However, once the sensitive issue of the basis and ideology of the state was touched upon, a political compromise was too hard to achieve.

To accommodate the ideas and views brought forward by the spokesmen of different political parties, the Assembly formed a Committee for Drafting the Constitution. Based on proposals put before the Committee, all political factions in the Assembly agreed upon the criteria which would be used in formulating the basis and ideology of the state. According to these agreed criteria, the formulation of the basis of the Indonesian state was to :

- (1) be in agreement with the Indonesian personality;
- (2) be based on the spirit of the Indonesian revolution of August 17, 1945;
- (3) be based on deliberations in solving all matters of the state;
- (4) guarantee religious freedom and practice; and
- (5) guarantee the basic values of humanity, broad nationality and social justice.¹³⁸

¹³⁸ These criteria were frequently referred to by many speakers in the Constituent Assembly debates. See, for example, *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*, vol. 1 (Bandung : Konstituante Republik Indonesia, 1958), 1 - 2; *Dasar Negara*, vol. 2 : 9; *Dasar Negara*, vol. 3 : 166.

Despite this agreement, the opposing political groups in the Assembly were not able to achieve a political compromise regarding the basis of the state. It seemed easy to deal with the ideological criteria, but extremely difficult to apply those criteria in political practice. The supporters of Islam claimed that Islam met these five requirements, while the defenders of the Pancasila claimed that it was the Pancasila which fulfilled these criteria. The upholders of Social Economy claimed the same thing for their own agendas.

From these ongoing discussions, we can see that there were three state ideologies competing in the Constituent Assembly, namely Social Economy, the Pancasila and Islam. Unlike the Investigating Body in 1945, which had only discussed two proposals for the basis or ideology of the state, the Pancasila and Islam, the Assembly in 1957 was faced with an additional one, that of Social Economy. In the Assembly the proposal to adopt the Pancasila was advocated by the PNI (116 members), the PKI and the *Republik Proklamasi* faction (80), the Parkindo (16), the Partai Katholik (10), the PSI (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*, or Indonesian Socialist Party) (10), the IPKI (*Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, or Association of Supporters of Indonesian Independence) (8), and many other small parties, totalling 273 representatives. The option of Islam was defended by the Masyumi (112 members), the NU (91), the PSII (16), the Perti (7) and four other small Islamic parties, with a total of 230 representatives. As for the proposal of Social Economy, it was championed by nine members only, four of them belonging to the *Partai Murba* (Murba Party) and five to the *Partai Buruh* (Labour Party).¹³⁹ The representatives of each political group strongly advocated their own beliefs and inevitably attacked the

¹³⁹ See "Laporan Komisi Konstitusi tentang Dasar Negara," in JTC Simorangkir and B. Mang Reng Say, *Konstitusi dan Konstituante Indonesia* (Jakarta : Surungan, n.d.), 169 - 173.

proposals of others which, in their view, were not fit to be used as the basis and ideology of the state. Political arguments, coupled with strong rhetoric and religious sentiments, dominated the political debates in the Assembly. Very often Muslims and Christians as well as Hindus justified their ideological arguments by referring to their religious doctrines in defense of the ideology they proposed to the Assembly.

SOCIAL ECONOMY VERSUS ISLAM AND THE PANCASILA

As mentioned above, in the Constituent Assembly the Partai Murba (set up on November 7, 1949) advocated the principle of Social Economy to be used as the basis of the state. One of the leading spokespersons of this small party was Soedijono Djojoprajitno who defined Social Economy as a system upon which the social and economic life in the country should be based, developed and implemented with the main objective being that of achieving social justice, social welfare and prosperity for the entire Indonesian people. To achieve this goal, according to Djojoprajitno, the bases of all political, social and economic power should be in the hands of the people, rather than in the hands of capitalists and bourgeois groups.¹⁴⁰ Thus, the goal of the Partai Murba with its proposal of Social Economy was to establish and develop socialism within the Indonesian context. To this purpose, Djojoprajitno put forward the fundamental principles of his politics of Social Economy as follows :

- (1) Democracy which is based on deliberation conducted by the elected representatives in the representative body which constitutes the highest institution in the Republic of Indonesia;
- (2) Humanity which is based on the recognition of the right to life and on freedom for individuals to achieve welfare, civilization and peace;
- (3) Nationalism which is based on the recognition of the right of self determination characterized by anti-imperialism in any form; and

¹⁴⁰ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 391 - 392.



- (4) Social Welfare for the entire Indonesian people which is based on mutual cooperation in which vital sources of production should be in the hands of the people and should be dominated by the state.¹⁴¹

According to Djojoprajitno, the Indonesian national and social revolution would concord with the ideals of the proclamation of Indonesian independence of August 17, 1945, if it were to adopt the principles he outlined. He was sharply criticized by, among others, Suwirjo of the PNI, Ir. Sakirman of the PKI and Asmara Hadi of the GPPS (*Gerakan Pembela Pancasila*, or Movement to defend the Pancasila) for offering just four principles which seemed incomplete when compared with the five principles of the Pancasila.

After giving a brief outline of the basic principles of the party's proposal on the basis of Social Economy, Djojoprajitno said that he found the Pancasila a weak and "vague" ideology because it had already been "castrated" (*dikebiri*) at the Round Table Conference in The Hague at which the Indonesian representatives agreed to accept the foundation of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia in 1949.¹⁴² Djojoprajitno asked the supporters of the Pancasila which version they would use? The Pancasila as formulated in the 1945 constitution which reflected the goals of the Indonesian revolution, but which was incomplete? Or the Pancasila as formulated in the RIS constitution of 1949 which was "castrated" in The Hague? He attacked the "honorable" Suwirjo of the PNI and Sakirman of the PKI for championing the Pancasila as the basis of the state without what he termed "an analysis of the Indonesian revolution" which was anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist. Furthermore, he criticized the 1945 constitution and the RIS constitution of 1949 for manifesting an

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 392 - 393.

¹⁴² Ibid., 377 and 388.

ideology which, in his view, was reactionary in nature. Although this ideology was proposed under the cloak of the Pancasila, it continued to be reactionary, particularly if given a new ideological attribute, such as Islam.¹⁴³

While attacking the PNI and the PKI leaders for their continued defense of the Pancasila as the basis of the state, Djojoprajitno praised Mohammad Natsir of the Masyumi, Zaini of the NU and Sjamsijah Abbas of the Perti as "progressive Muslims" for rejecting what he called the "castrated" Pancasila. He seems to have made an effort to gain the support of the Muslim faction by turning down the Pancasila, but at the same time he, in fact, rejected the Pancasila as formulated in the Jakarta Charter. Siding with Natsir of the Masyumi in order not to prolong the ideological conflict between the Pancasila and Islam in the Constituent Assembly, Djojoprajitno then came to his political objective by promoting his own proposal of Social Economy as the basis of the state.

Djojoprajitno said that his party was not concerned with the discussion over the principle of Belief in God as one principle of the Pancasila; it was an issue to be resolved by the supporters of the Pancasila and those of Islam. This stance can be seen from the four principles outlined by Djojoprajitno above. However, he stated that he could not object if his proposal of Social Economy as the basis of the state were connected with belief in God in order to be more acceptable to other political groups.¹⁴⁴ What concerned his party was the issue of Indonesian Socialism which, he believed, should become the fundamental goal of the proclamation of Indonesia's independence, and was to be developed by the party according to the indigenous

¹⁴³ Ibid., 389.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 391.

culture and life of the Indonesian people, rather than be based on the Moscow and Beijing models.¹⁴⁵

In the course of his passionate speech, Djojoprajitno launched what he called a "confrontation" between himself and both the Pancasila and Islam. He opposed the Pancasila's being elevated as the philosophy of the state and opposed its being imposed upon his group. He declared that his party would continue to struggle to reject any attempt to make the Pancasila the philosophy and ideology of the state.¹⁴⁶ In the same breath, Djojoprajitno and his party also rejected the Muslim Nationalists' proposal of Islam as the basis of the state by virtue of the fact that Islam was only one part of the life of the Indonesian people. On the contrary, he believed that his party's proposal of Social Economy as the basis of the state, through which it sought to establish social justice, or Indonesian socialism as it were, could accommodate the entirety of the Indonesian people's aspirations and interests.¹⁴⁷

In Djojoprajitno's opinion, it was not an ideology that determined the form and the content of Social Economy, but rather Social Economy that determined the form and the content of an ideology. For that reason, he proposed Social Economy as the basis of the state, not as its ideology and philosophy.¹⁴⁸ He did not, however, elaborate clearly the difference between the two, except for pointing out that the long and bitter conflict between Islam and the Pancasila in the Constituent Assembly was caused by an ideological clash between the two factions. The solution to this endless

¹⁴⁵ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 3 : 443

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 444.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 443.

¹⁴⁸ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 389.

ideological battle, in his opinion, was to accept the principle of Social Economy as the basis of the state as his party advocated. Neither the supporters of Islam nor the defenders of the Pancasila accepted the Partai Murba's proposal. In fact, the Partai Murba's proposal of Social Economy as the basis of the state never gained as wide support in the Constituent Assembly as did the proposals of the Pancasila and Islam.

MUSLIMS VERSUS COMMUNISTS

The PKI, through its leaders such as Sakirman, K. H. Ahmad Dasuki Siradj, Njoto and Wikana, also championed the Pancasila as the philosophical basis and ideology of the state, rejecting both Islam and Social Economy for this purpose. In rejecting Social Economy, the Communists argued that the Pancasila covered all principles contained in it, and in repudiating Islam they argued that this religion did not represent all the political currents and socio-religious groups existing in Indonesia. The Communist party agreed to accept the Pancasila on the grounds that, in its view, the Pancasila functioned as a common ideological basis and as a point of agreement among all the political currents flourishing in the country. Ahmad Dasuki Siradj, himself a Muslim, a *kyai* (learned and respected Muslim leader) and a *hajji*, said that the Communist party could accept the Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state because it was in agreement with the historical development of the Indonesian struggle to achieve the goals of the revolution. Siradj even justified his party's acceptance of the Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state by saying that the Pancasila was in fact in line with religious doctrine.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 2 : 334.

The PKI actually urged that the principle of "Belief in One God" in the Pancasila be exchanged for that of "religious freedom."¹⁵⁰ However, it accepted the Pancasila in its present form without any change in order "to respect the monotheistic and polytheistic groups who believed in a single power [sic!] which transcends all powers."¹⁵¹ To the ears of the Muslims, this statement made it abundantly clear that the Communists did not believe in a single supernatural power, which was equivalent to declaring themselves to be atheists. This statement, voiced by Sakirman, raised many questions within the Muslim camp.

The Muslim faction thus suspected the PKI of pretending to accept the Pancasila for political purposes only, since Communism and Marxism traditionally rejected belief in God, or supernatural beings, and regarded religion as the opiate of society as well as something that had to be destroyed. In the view of Muslim political leaders, the Communists were in fact playing a game with the Pancasila because the basic nature of Communism did not allow for belief in One God. This was why M. Rusjad Nurdin of the Masyumi questioned whether the Communists accepted the Pancasila sincerely or with their tongues only. Nurdin pointed to chapter 3 of the Russian Communist Party's program stating that every member of Communist party had to reject any and all religious belief and had actively to take part in destroying it.¹⁵² In the view of Nurdin, it was impossible for the Indonesian Communists to accept the Pancasila wholeheartedly because the Communists did not believe in One God as taught by the doctrine of the Pancasila.¹⁵³ Like Rusjad Nurdin, Isa Anshary of the

¹⁵⁰ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 19.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 415.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

Masyumi party came to see that due to their respective natures Communism and the Pancasila could not coexist. Consequently, according to Anshary, Communist ideology should not have the right to exist in Indonesia at all since it was contrary to the teachings of every religion and to the nature of the religious and spiritual life of the Indonesian people.¹⁵⁴ The Communists, however, spiritedly denied this accusation.

Isa Anshary continued to attack the Communists by saying that they never openly expressed the nature of their ideology, waiting for a chance to take political power, through which they then would destroy the Pancasila. Anshary pointed to the fact that, in Marxist doctrine, the party was a tool with which the Communists would seize power by applying the theory of the class conflict; and as had already occurred in the Soviet Union, religion would be suppressed.¹⁵⁵ If this were to happen later in Indonesia, Anshary warned, the Nationalist and Socialist groups, as well as the Christians who advocated the Pancasila, would come to realize that their unity in defending the Pancasila and in rejecting Islam in the Assembly was simply a false unity.¹⁵⁶ This argument was put forward by Anshary in his attempt to convince the non-Islamic parties in the Assembly that Islam, not the Pancasila, should be used as the basis and ideology of the state since this religion with its teachings, in his view,

¹⁵⁴ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 2 : 236.

¹⁵⁵ On Soviet anti-religious policies, see, for example, Dimitry V. Pospelovsky, *A History of Marxist Leninist Atheism and Soviet Anti-Religious Policies* (London : Macmillan Press, 1987); idem, *Soviet Anti-Religious Campaigns and Persecutions* (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1988); David E. Powell, *Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union : A Study of Mass Persecutions* (Massachusetts : The MIT Press, 1975).

¹⁵⁶ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 2 : 237.

could serve as a stout bulwark against Communism and save the country from the Communist threat.¹⁵⁷

Kasman Singodimedjo (b. 1908) also objected to the Communist move to replace the first principle of the Pancasila (Belief in One God) with that of religious freedom. Singodimedjo accused the PKI of engaging in political tactics aimed at misleading the people, and at directing them into atheism which would result not only in the destruction of religion and belief in God, but also the destruction of the Pancasila.¹⁵⁸ In short, the Muslims, especially the Masyumi leaders, saw Communism in Indonesia as a threat to Islam and to Muslims, which should be confronted, since, according to Natsir :

The goal [of Communism] is to seize a power. This is the core of the doctrine of Communism - Marxism - Leninism. This power should be seized by means of dictatorship. Those who oppose it should be kicked out and, if necessary, killed. Communism is an ideology which is against the idea of democracy.¹⁵⁹

Njoto of the PKI responded to the attacks of Isa Anshary, Kasman Singodimedjo and Natsir by saying that the Communists accepted the Pancasila, not just as lip service, and not just as a political tactic in order to win power, but both in theory and in practice. Njoto said that many Islamic representatives in the Constituent Assembly expressed their surprise that the Communist party, as an atheist party, was prepared to accept the Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state. They would be more

¹⁵⁷ In his campaign against Communism, Anshary and his friends wrote a composition warning of the danger of Communism in Indonesia. See M. Isa Anshary et al., *Bahaya Merah di Indonesia* (Bandung : Front Anti-Komunisme, 1955).

¹⁵⁸ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 181.

¹⁵⁹ Mohammad Natsir, "Membela Nikmat yang Diberikan Demokrasi : Demokrasi Harus Ditebus dengan Perjuangan yang Besar," *Abadi*, March 4, 1957.

surprised, he went on to say, when the Communists followed through on their desire to accept Islam as the basis of the state.¹⁶⁰

According to Njoto, Muslim hostility toward the Communists and atheists was more political than theological or doctrinal.¹⁶¹ Njoto wondered why the Muslims were so anti-Communist and anti-atheist that they would launch an "Anti-Communist Movement", and why they did not show religious tolerance to the Communists. If the Muslims believed in democracy as their religion taught them -- and they often promoted it in the Assembly --, Njoto continued, they should be brave enough to compete with the Communists in a fair political game, not just in propagating anti-Communism and anti-atheism. By launching a campaign of anti-Communism, Njoto said, the Muslims actually showed their lack of confidence to compete freely with the Communists, thus showing also that their Islamic faith was weak. "I would really feel ashamed," he continued, "if I demanded that the Islamic party of Masyumi be disbanded, because by doing so I would not be acting as a democrat." But "their newspapers," he said further "were very proud of their campaign of demanding that the PKI be dissolved."¹⁶²

After directing his retaliation against the above-mentioned opponents, Njoto in turn attacked Natsir of the Masyumi by stating that the Pancasila was not neutral; rather it took the side of its defenders in the Assembly. Rejecting Natsir's view that the Pancasila did not have deep roots in the life of Indonesian society, Njoto stated that the Pancasila did indeed have such roots since it had already operated, though

¹⁶⁰ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 3 : 94.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 96

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 102.

temporarily, for twelve years, from 1945 until 1957. According to Njoto, the status of the Pancasila was also indicated by the fact that the parties supporting the Pancasila in the general election of 1955 had gained more than 50 percent of the vote compared with 45 percent of the vote acquired by the Islamic parties.¹⁶³ Njoto continued to attack Natsir by saying that Natsir's acceptance of the Pancasila in its twelve years of operation as the basis and ideology of the state was simply "lip service", since now in the Assembly he totally rejected the Pancasila and instead proposed Islam as the basis of the state. In launching his bitter attack on Natsir's attitude toward the Pancasila, Njoto referred to one of his opponent's articles :

In his writing entitled "Is the Pancasila Contrary to the Doctrine of the Qur'ān?," Natsir writes : "The Pancasila is a formulation of five ideals of virtues as the result of a consensus of our leaders at their stage of struggle nine years ago. As the formulation [of the five ideals of virtues], it is not contrary to the Qur'ān, except that it is filled with something contradictory to the Qur'ān." Natsir goes on to say : "In the eyes of a Muslim, the formulation of the Pancasila does not show something strange which is in disagreement with Qur'ānic teachings. ... The Pancasila, of course, contains Islamic ideals, but it is not identical with Islam itself."

Feeling inadequate with the above statements, Natsir then emphasizes : "The Pancasila is a manifestation of the intentions and ideals of goodness which we should make every effort to put into practice in our state and our environs."¹⁶⁴

According to Njoto, Natsir, who composed his article in 1373/1954 in the month of *Ramaḍān*, expressed in it his positive views of the Pancasila. Njoto said it was not the month of Ramaḍān, a month full of blessing according to Islamic faith, that inspired Natsir to write approvingly of the Pancasila, but rather his correct understanding of it. This was also indicated by the fact that in a speech, delivered

¹⁶³ Ibid., 90.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 92. Natsir's complete article entitled "Apakah Pancasila Bertentangan Dengan Ajaran al-Qur'an?" (Is the Pancasila Contrary to the Doctrine of the Qur'an?), to which Njoto referred, can be read in Natsir's book, *Capita Selecta*, vol. 2 : 144 - 150.

before the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs in 1952, Natsir expressed a positive view of the Pancasila by saying that it functioned as "the spiritual, moral and ethical basis of our nation and state."¹⁶⁵ After praising Natsir, Njoto attacked him by questioning why Natsir, now in 1957, in the sessions of the Assembly, took a "cruel" attitude toward the Pancasila by labeling it as neutral, baseless, empty and sterile and totally rejecting it as the basis of the state. Njoto then went on to question : Which Natsir should be followed and believed? Natsir in 1954 or Natsir in 1957? Or neither?¹⁶⁶

It seems that Njoto and those with similar views¹⁶⁷ in the Assembly failed to understand Natsir's position vis-à-vis the Pancasila. As a true democrat, Natsir had to accept the Pancasila as the basis of the state as it was used from 1945 until the coming of the ideological debates in the Constituent Assembly in 1957. Constitutionally, it was completely legal that Natsir in 1957, in the Assembly, should propose Islam as the basis of the state and re-examine the Pancasila according to his Islamic understanding. His views at this later time might be different from his previous views of 1954. Like other Indonesian citizens and political leaders, Natsir had the right to speak and propose his religion, not the Pancasila, as the basis of the state since this was the time when a new and permanent basis of the state was to be established by the Assembly. This moment was used by Natsir to gain maximum political results by

¹⁶⁵ Mohammad Natsir, *Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs* (Ithaca : Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, 1954), 1.

¹⁶⁶ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 3 : 93.

¹⁶⁷ See, for example, A. Bastari's criticisms of Natsir in *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 444 - 445. A. Bastari was a representative of the PPPRI (Association of Police of the Republic of Indonesia) in the Constituent Assembly.

strenuously promoting Islam as the foundation of the Indonesian state in the ideological fight against the supporters of the Pancasila in the Assembly.

Seen in this political context, it is safe to say that Natsir held a self-contradictory view of the Pancasila. Deliar Noer gives three reasons for this. First, the Constituent Assembly was an open forum for its members to put forward proposals for the state ideology which they believed to be the best and most suitable for Indonesia. Like the representatives of non-Islamic parties who promoted their own proposals, so Natsir advanced his own proposal of Islam as the basis of the state. Second, in the Assembly Natsir and his friends from the Islamic parties struggled to achieve the Muslim community's political aspirations; Natsir and his friends therefore took on the religious and political responsibility of promoting Islam as the basis of the state. Third, like the representatives of non-Islamic parties who argued the strength and superiority of their own proposals, so did Natsir and his friends argue their proposal that Islam be the basis of the state.¹⁶⁸

MUSLIMS VERSUS SECULAR NATIONALISTS

Through its leading figure, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, the PSI (established on February 12, 1948) basically accepted the Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state because it could serve to unify all groups in the country, and could save the state from disunity in a critical situation.¹⁶⁹ Before expressing his acceptance, however, Alisjahbana criticized the Pancasila since it was depicted by its supporters as a complete philosophy of state. One sometimes got the impression that the Pancasila

¹⁶⁸ Deliar Noer, *Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal* (Jakarta : Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984), 111. See also idem, *Partai Islam*, 366.

¹⁶⁹ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 2 : 40.

had been raised to the status of a holy religion which considered other people who were brave enough to doubt it as infidels and traitors.¹⁷⁰ According to Alisjahbana, it was an exaggeration to reckon the Pancasila, in its present form, as a philosophy of state since the principles contained in it were so diverse that they contradicted each other. In the Pancasila there was no unity or totality of logic; rather, it suffered from incoherence and disunity.¹⁷¹ Alisjahbana and his party, however, could accept the Pancasila, even though his party might have different views about it than other groups.¹⁷²

The Partai Katholik (founded in Surakarta on December 8, 1945), through its spokesmen such as V. B. da Costa and P. S. da Cunha, defended the Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state and strongly rejected the Muslim proposal that Islam be its foundation. P. S. da Cunha explained the reason for not accepting Islam by saying that it was not that his group did not love the Muslims (as Hamka of the Masyumi claimed), but because of their belief in the absolute truth of Catholicism. "It would be a big blunder for us," he said, "if we accepted Islam as the basis of the state, since it would mean that our religion was not absolute and not true anymore."¹⁷³ He rejected Mohammad Natsir's criticism of the Masyumi who regarded the Pancasila as secular by pointing to the expressions "Belief in the One and Only God" mentioned in the first principle of the Pancasila, "thanks to the Mercy of God" recorded in the preamble of the constitution, and "the state is based on the belief in God" stated in its body which, in his view, showed obvious indications that the Pancasila was not separated from the

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 39.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 40.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 3 : 127.

influence of religion.¹⁷⁴ From the very strict Islamic viewpoint, however, the Muslims rejected da Cunha's interpretation because, as Natsir argued, the *raison d'être* of the Pancasila itself, including the idea of God in its first principle, was neutral and relative and was not derived from religious revelation as taught by Islam.¹⁷⁵

In line with Natsir's argument, Sjamsijah Abbas of the Perti saw the ongoing prevalence of socio-political disturbances, unrest and instability in the Indonesia of her day as stemming from the weakness and emptiness of the Pancasila. For that reason, she considered the Pancasila as the primary source of disorder and turmoil in Indonesian society.¹⁷⁶ Unlike the Pancasila, Islam, according to Sjamsijah Abbas, had its own strength, values and meaning and was deeply rooted in the soul and life of the majority of Indonesian people. Therefore, in her view, the Islamic religion was suitable to serve as the basis and ideology of the state in order that Indonesia might become stable, strong, prosperous and advanced.

V. B. da Costa in return attacked Sjamsijah Abbas by pointing out that the same kinds of socio-political disorder, unrest and instability also occurred in Islam-based states such as Pakistan where Islamic values, in his assessment, did not work very well. Having given that example, he then expressed his rejection of Islam which, according to him, was advocated by Abbas and her group in order to "overthrow the Pancasila and replace it with Islam."¹⁷⁷ Political rhetoric was dominant in the ideological battle between the Muslim faction and the defenders of the Pancasila. This

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 129.

¹⁷⁵ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 128.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 235.

¹⁷⁷ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 2 : 88 - 89.

situation indicates that the ideological conflict between the two groups continued, and that a political compromise regarding the basis and ideology of the state remained hard to achieve.

Like the Partai Katholik, the Parkindo (established in Jakarta on December 18, 1945) firmly rejected Islam and championed the Pancasila as the basis of the state. One of its prominent leaders, J. B. Kawet, argued that the Pancasila had been operating as the basis and ideology of the state for twelve years, from 1945 until 1957, which proved that it had succeeded in the face of challenge and threats. He believed that if Islam were to be used as the basis of the state, national disunity and disintegration would occur because the Christians in North Sumatra, Kalimantan, Minahasa (Sulawesi), Sangie Talaud, Ambon, Timor, Flores, West Irian and other parts of Indonesia would not accept Islam as fulfilling this role.¹⁷⁸ He claimed that if Indonesia were to be based on Islam, Islam would then become an official religion, meaning that other traditions such as Catholicism, Protestantism and Hinduism would not be official religions. In his view, this kind of treatment would constitute discrimination against non-Muslims, and they would become second class citizens.¹⁷⁹ Kawet was correct when he said that Islam would become an official religion if it were used as a basis of the state. Yet, on the other hand, the Muslims felt obliged to promote Islam as the basis of the state and as an official religion because of their position as the majority group in the country, somewhat similar to the Pakistani case or the Malaysian case in which Islam was promoted and accepted as the national faith.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 13.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 13 - 14.

Hamka [Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah, 1908 - 1981] of the Masyumi party countered by pointing to the religious freedom and tolerance enjoyed by the Coptic Christians of Egypt where Islam constituted a majority religion. In addition, Hamka also gave the example of the Egyptian Muslim leader, Sa'd Zaghlul (1857 - 1927), who had a famous aide, the Coptic Christian Makram 'Ubayd, as proof that Muslims in Egypt were tolerant of Christians.¹⁸⁰ He then equated this Egyptian case with the Indonesian case in that President Soekarno, who was a Muslim, had appointed an aide, namely Arnold Mononutu, a Christian, to demonstrate that there would be no barrier to Muslims and Christians cooperating in running the state. This case was advanced by Hamka in an effort to convince the Christians not to worry about their exclusion by the Muslims from the government were Indonesia to be based on Islam. After putting forward this example, Hamka then pointed to the situation existing in the Philippines where the Muslims, being a minority group, suffered poor treatment and became second class citizens under the Christian government there.¹⁸¹ This, according to Hamka, had also happened to Indonesian Muslims under Dutch colonialism; whereas the Christians, though being a minority group, enjoyed special treatment from the colonial rulers as first class citizens, with the result that they were more advanced in education and scholarship than the Muslims.¹⁸²

In response to the threat made by the Christians to separate themselves from the state of Indonesia if it were based on Islam, Hamka said, "Do the Christians intend to leave us, while our task [of building the nation] is yet unfinished?" Furthermore, Hamka, on behalf of his Muslim group in the Assembly, repeatedly emphasized that in

¹⁸⁰ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 3 : 75.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 74.

an Islam-based state of Indonesia, other religious groups, including the Christians, would be respected and treated justly, and that there would be no discrimination against them. Finally, Hamka appealed to the Christians and other religious groups to accept Islam as the basis of the state, to maintain the unity and integrity of the nation, and to cooperate as a united nation to achieve the goal of Indonesia's independence.¹⁸³ However, Hamka's proposal of Islam as the basis of the state did not receive a positive response from the supporters of the Pancasila.

The PNI from the very beginning defended the Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state of Indonesia. Suwirjo, Chairman of the PNI, said that Social Economy and Islam were not bad options, but neither met some of the five ideological criteria mentioned above; therefore, both Social Economy and Islam were inadequate to serve as the basis of the state. Suwirjo saw Islam as not suiting two requirements, namely the Indonesian personality and the spirit of the Indonesian revolution of August 17, 1945.¹⁸⁴ In his opinion, the Pancasila was the only one of the proposed bases which met the five ideological criteria. Therefore, it should continue to be used as the basis and ideology of the state. He also argued that the Pancasila should continue to be advocated, completed and implemented as the basis and ideology of the state, since it had already worked for twelve years. "If the Pancasila were substituted with another basis," he stated further, "I am afraid it would result in disunity of the Indonesian nation, would lead to the breakup of the state of Indonesia."¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ Ibid., 72 - 73.

¹⁸⁴ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 3.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 8.

Isa Anshary of the Masyumi attacked Suwirjo by saying that Islam was not only in agreement with the spirit of the Indonesian revolution of 1945, but that it had also encouraged its followers to plunge themselves into the fire of revolution in defense of Indonesian independence and their faith. For that purpose, said Anshary, many Muslims had sacrificed themselves and died as martyrs for Islam and for the nation during the War for Independence: all this clearly proved that Islam could not be separated from the spirit of the Indonesian revolution of 1945.¹⁸⁶

As for the concept of the Indonesian personality raised by Suwirjo above, it is probably too abstract, complex and difficult to identify and formulate in any real sense. The Muslims like other ethnic and religious groups in the country could argue that their way of life was in accordance with the Indonesian personality which accepted Islam as the majority religion, and which also greatly contributed to the formation of Indonesian culture, identity and personality. Therefore, to label Islam as not fulfilling some ideological criterion, or as not suiting the Indonesian personality, was a superficial judgment in the view of Muslims. In this connection, the Muslims also argued that their proposal of Islam as the basis of the state was intended to maintain national unity and integrity since Islam, in their view, served as a major unifying force and a very cohesive factor in the whole process of the formation of national unity.

"Without Islam, this Republic [of Indonesia] would have broken up long ago," said Dr. Amien Rais (b. 1944).¹⁸⁷ Dr. Taufik Abdullah also came to the conclusion that "without Islam, Indonesia would not exist."¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 2 : 180 - 182.

¹⁸⁷ *Media Dakwah*, no. 241 (July 1994), 56.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 53

Echoing the arguments of Suwirjo, Dr. R. M. Soeripto of the PNI maintained that the Pancasila, as a moral agreement between the Muslim and Secular Nationalists, should be firmly obeyed and defended as the basis of the state. Otherwise, he said, socio-political turmoil would occur in the country, the impact of which would be widespread and dangerous to the life of the state and nation.¹⁸⁹ In reaction to Soeripto's statement, Kahar Muzakkir of the Masyumi said that it was the Secular Nationalists, not the Muslim Nationalist faction, who broke that moral agreement by taking the initiative of deleting the Islamic phrase "with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents" from the first principle of the Pancasila in the Jakarta Charter. Due to this omission, the Muslims felt betrayed by the Secular Nationalists and considered the current formulation of the Pancasila as having been spoiled, since its formulation was not the same as that of the Pancasila in the Jakarta Charter.¹⁹⁰

Learning from this previous experience and feeling uncomfortable with it, the Muslims in the sessions of the Constituent Assembly persisted in promoting Islam as the basis and ideology of the state, for, in their view, their struggle was constitutionally legal in a free and democratic state like Indonesia.

MUSLIM REJECTION OF THE PANCASILA

All Islamic parties, namely the Masyumi, the Perti, the NU, the PSII, the AKUI and the PPTI, were united in the Constituent Assembly in promoting Islam as the basis of the state. The Masyumi on the one hand and the NU and the PSII on the other, seemed to forget their political divorce of 1947 and 1952, and stood together in this ideological fight. In rejecting the Pancasila, the representatives of the Islamic parties

¹⁸⁹ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 295.

¹⁹⁰ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 3 : 38 - 39.

referred either to the Pancasila created by Soekarno or to the Pancasila officially modified in the constitutions, rather than to the Pancasila formulated in the Jakarta Charter.

The representatives of the Muslim Nationalists justified their struggle for the establishment of an Islam-based state in Indonesia by referring to the Qur'ānic verses :

"... whoever does not judge by what Allah revealed, those are they that are the unbelievers," and "... whoever does not judge by what Allah revealed, those are they that are the unjust," and "... whoever does not judge by what Allah revealed, those are they that are the transgressors."¹⁹¹ The Muslims saw the Islam-based state which they wished to establish in Indonesia as similar to the Saba state mentioned in the Qur'ān, which was, "a good Land and a Forgiving Lord!"¹⁹²

Ahmad Zaini of the NU attacked the Pancasila by saying that it was "only a slogan that is hard to prove in a concrete reality."¹⁹³ In other words, in the view of Ahmad Zaini, the Pancasila was an empty slogan that did not give full meaning and strength to the nation, and therefore was not adequate to serve as the basis and ideology of the state. K. H. Masjkur, also from the traditionalist NU circle, attacked the Pancasila from a theological perspective :

The Pancasila is an empty formula which still needs content. If "Belief in One God," the first principle of the Pancasila, is filled in by people who consider a

¹⁹¹ Sūra V : 44, 45 and 47. Sjamsijah Abbas was among the Muslim representatives in the Assembly who quoted verse 44. See *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 239. Isa Anshary also referred to those three verses. See *Dasar Negara*, vol. 2 : 175.

¹⁹² Sūra XXXIV : 15. Among the Muslim representatives who referred to this *sūra* in the Constituent Assembly debates was Sjamsijah Abbas of the Perti. See *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 242.

¹⁹³ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 276.

stone as God, the Lordship in the Pancasila then will be filled in with a stone. If it is filled in by tree worshippers, it will be filled in with a tree.¹⁹⁴

In the same tone as Masjkur, Saifuddin Zuhri of the NU also criticized the Pancasila for not offering convincing principles to the Muslims. He gave an example, saying that the first principle of the Pancasila, namely Belief in One God, could raise a theological controversy. In Zuhri's opinion, it could be interpreted differently according to the precept of Islam which teaches the Oneness of God (*tawhīd*), or according to that of Christianity which recognizes the doctrine of the Trinity, or according to the precepts of other religions.¹⁹⁵ Zuhri's doubts found additional evidence in a claim by Arnold Mononutu of the PNI (himself a Christian) who interpreted the Pancasila as a reflection and emanation of Christian values stemming from the doctrines of the Bible. In the view of Christianity, according to Mononutu, the principle of "Belief in One God" in the Pancasila was the main pillar and source of other principles; therefore, it was acceptable to the Christians that it be used as the basis of the state. Mononutu regarded the Pancasila as a point of agreement among all groups who believe in One God, regardless of the prophets in whom they believe.¹⁹⁶

Zuhri also found similar evidence in a statement by Nengah Malaya of the PNI (himself a Balinese Hindu) who was of the opinion that every religious group in Indonesia should be given the freedom to search for God in accordance with their own capacity and intelligence, regardless of their conception of God. Quoting Radhakrisnan, a well-known Indian philosopher, who wrote : "Hinduism does not distinguish ideas of God as true and false", Malaya then emphasized that this idea was

¹⁹⁴ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 3 : 46.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 141 - 142.

¹⁹⁶ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 2 : 342 - 343.

in agreement with the basic spirit of the Pancasila.¹⁹⁷ "For the sake of Balinese spiritual tranquillity," he said, "I defended the Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state." He firmly believed that the Pancasila "was most in conformity with the religious spirit and practices of the Balinese."¹⁹⁸

Thus, Zuhri, as a Muslim, became more confident that the concept of monotheism in the Pancasila was not clear, since every religious group could interpret it according to their own doctrine. This argument led Zuhri to state that the supporters of the Pancasila did not give cogent explanations and interpretations that could convince Muslims to accept it as the basis and ideology of the state. Zuhri underlined Sjahbana's criticism of the Pancasila which said that the Pancasila was only a collection of various ideas presented to calm diverse groups in meetings, and that it was an exaggeration to consider the Pancasila as a philosophy of state.¹⁹⁹ After criticizing the Pancasila, Zuhri then put forward his own proposal that there should be no alternative except Islam to be used as the basis of the state on the grounds that Islam with its comprehensiveness of spiritual and worldly teachings offers clear, complete and convincing principles that are in agreement with the Indonesian personality.²⁰⁰

In addition, Osman Raliby of the Masyumi also questioned and assessed the principle of "Belief in God" in Soekarno's Pancasila to which he had applied his typical theory of compression :

God in the Pancasila is a dead God who does not have any influence on the other four principles. He does not make any judgment at all. If the Pancasila

¹⁹⁷ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 340.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 3 : 136 and 137.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 142 - 143.

is compressed, God himself is subject to compression and He then disappears in the principle of Mutual Cooperation, the *Ekasila*, that is, the main compression of the Pancasila.²⁰¹

The implication of Raliby's assessment was that, unlike God in the Pancasila who was obscure and "dead", God in Islam is a living God whose rules and laws coming from His revelation guide man's conduct and behaviour in both worldly and other-worldly affairs. If Raliby's view is to be followed, the Islamic belief in God has an impact on man's behavior, and it is He who makes judgments on man's actions according to His Law.

In the words of Muhammad Tahir Abubakar of the PSII, the Pancasila now no longer fulfilled its function as a national political consensus since the Islamic sentence "with the obligation to practice the *shari'a* for its adherents" was already omitted from it. Thus, Abubakar concluded, the Pancasila now became an empty formula used by its supporters simply as political agitation and propaganda to attract people to support it.²⁰² In the eyes of Isa Anshary, the Pancasila was also unclear and vague since its defenders did not offer convincing explanations or interpretations of it. Anshary's criticism of the Pancasila also sounded severe when he said that it was a groundless principle which offered nothing but emptiness. Therefore, in his view, unlike Islam, which offered a comprehensive doctrine and was based on a divine source, the Pancasila was baseless, and therefore was inadequate as the basis of the state. He set forth his criticism of the Pancasila in the form of a poem which reads as follows :

Pancasila, ya Pancasila
At the bottom it did not have roots
On the top it did not have buds

²⁰¹ *Risalah Perundangan*, vol. 7, comp. by Konstituante Republik Indonesia (Bandung : Masa Baru, 1958), 230.

²⁰² *Dasar Negara*, vol. 3 : 295.

Going to the hill it did not find the wind
Going to the valley it did not find water.²⁰³

Furthermore, Ahjak Sosrosugondo of the NU attacked the Pancasila by saying that the Pancasila in itself fostered antagonism in the sense that it tolerated an anti-God oriented ideology (Communism). The Pancasila, which was now used as the basis and ideology of the state, taught every Indonesian citizen to believe in God and practice his/her religion according to his/her own beliefs. However, in reality, Sosrosugondo said further, the Pancasila allowed Communist ideology, which was anti-religious and anti-God in nature, to prosper and spread on the soil of Indonesia. This happened because, according to Sosrosugondo, the principles in the Pancasila contradicted each other and because of the shortcomings contained within it.²⁰⁴ In the view of Kasman Singodimedjo of the Masyumi, the five principles of the Pancasila, which were created by man, could also be found in Islam, which came from God's revelation.²⁰⁵

The representatives of the Islamic parties in the Constituent Assembly made every effort to show what they considered to be the "weaknesses" and "shortcomings" of the Pancasila, and then came up with their own arguments to demonstrate what they considered to be the "strength" and "superiority" of Islam over the Pancasila, in order for Islam to be accepted as the basis and ideology of the state. However, the Muslims failed to convince the representatives of the non-Islamic parties in the Constituent Assembly as to the comprehensiveness, completeness, strength and superiority of Islam in a modern state. In the twentieth century, there was no Islamic state or Islam-

²⁰³ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 2 : 242.

²⁰⁴ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 1 : 30.

²⁰⁵ *Dasar Negara*, vol. 3 : 216.

stressed that the Assembly would be democratic only if freedom of expression and freedom of speech existed and were guaranteed without political pressure in any form.²⁰⁷

Starting from that point, Natsir began to assess the Pancasila and was of the opinion that the Pancasila was vague and obscure. In fact, Natsir acknowledged that there were good ideas contained in the Pancasila, but that the explanations and arguments put forward by its supporters were insufficient to convince him and his Muslim friends in the Constituent Assembly to accept it as the basis of the state :

Of course, nobody denies that there are good ideas in the Pancasila. Yet the arguments given by its supporters demonstrate that they themselves cannot explain what are its true contents, its proper sequence, its source, its nucleus, and the inter-dependence of its components. Because these are not clear, the difficulties then gradually arise. Since the foundation of our state needs to be clear and distinct so as not to confuse the nation, it is difficult for our group to accept something which is vague.²⁰⁸

In a tone similar to this assessment, Natsir also stated that this vague Pancasila had nothing to say to the souls of Muslims; therefore, it was baseless and inadequate to serve as the basis and ideology of the state. The acceptance by Muslims of the Pancasila for this purpose would constitute, according to Natsir, a leap into the dark. As he puts it :

For us, the Pancasila as a state philosophy is obscure and has nothing to say to the souls of the Muslim community which already possesses a definite, clear, and complete ideology, one which burns in the hearts of the Indonesian people as a living inspiration and source of strength, namely Islam. To exchange the Islamic ideology for the Pancasila is, for Muslims, like leaping from solid into empty space, into a vacuum.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Mohammad Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara* (Bandung : Pimpinan Fraksi Masyumi dalam Konstituante, 1957), 5.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 26.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

Natsir then compared the Pancasila with Islam, and came to the conclusion that the former was a neutral, abstract and secular (*lā dīniyyah*) concept.²¹⁰ Prior to coming to this conclusion, he outlined what he called the differences between religion (Islam) and secularism. According to Natsir, religion was a belief and practice which had the following fundamental elements:

- Belief in God as the source of rules and values of life;
- Belief in God's revelation transmitted to His Messenger;
- Belief in the relation between God and man/individual;
- Belief that this relation can influence his daily life;
- Belief that with one's death, his/her soul does not end;
- Belief in religious practices as a means of establishing relations with God;
- Belief in God as the sources of norms and codes of life;
- Belief in God's acceptance as a goal of life in this world.²¹¹

In the view of Natsir, the above-mentioned elements together demonstrated the superiority of religion over secularism, which he defined as a way of life based on an ideology, goal and attitude that restricts life to worldly affairs only.²¹² A true and strict secularist, said Natsir, does not believe in divine revelation as a source of religious faith and regards moral values as the product of social changes and developments. In the eyes of Natsir, the Pancasila was secular in the sense that it had nothing to do with God's revelation or with other religious beliefs and practices mentioned above. In other words, the source and background of the Pancasila were not based on a revelation given by God, but on sociological thought and secular philosophical ideas. From the Islamic point of view, Natsir questioned whether each of the five principles of the Pancasila had its own source or if those five principles had the same source. This question was in fact advanced by Natsir simply to confirm his opinion that the

²¹⁰ Ibid., 24.

²¹¹ Ibid., 22 - 23.

²¹² Ibid., 12.

Pancasila was vague, empty, vacuous, sterile and secular in nature. In the assessment of Natsir, this secular Pancasila had nothing to say to the souls of Muslims since it did not have roots in their hearts and did not reflect their basic spiritual values which were guided by God's revelation.²¹³

Roeslan Abdulgani of the PNI criticized Natsir's opinion of secularism in relation to the Pancasila. In launching his attack on Natsir, this Nationalist thinker quoted the opinion of George McTurnan Kahin, an American historian who specialized in Indonesian studies, saying that the Pancasila was a synthesis which included Islamic modernism, modern democracy, Marxism and people's deliberation which was rooted in the Indonesian village tradition. Therefore, in his opinion, the Pancasila was a mature social philosophy which had a great impact on the course of the Indonesian revolution.²¹⁴ He said further that the existence of the Department of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, established in 1946, proved that the state of Indonesia and its basis, the Pancasila, were not secular.

Furthermore, in support of his argument Abdulgani relied on the view of Kemal A. Faruki, a Pakistani scholar, who was of the opinion that the word secular has two different meanings. First, the word secular means paying attention to worldly affairs, and in this sense Islam was a secular religion. Second, as a Western political concept, the word secular means separating spiritual matters from temporal ones and considering the latter superior to the former. Abdulgani then concluded that the first meaning of the word secular can be accepted by Islam, whereas the second should be

²¹³ Ibid., 26.

²¹⁴ *Risalah Perundingan*, vol. 7 : 432.

rejected.²¹⁵ Having explained these two meanings of the word secular, Abdulgani, in rejecting Natsir's opinion, argued that the principle of "Belief in One God" in the Pancasila could not be equated with secularism. In fact, according to this Nationalist thinker, secularism was a political term used for the concept of a secular state, as opposed to a theocratic state.

Unlike Abdulgani, Natsir was of the opinion that secularism, as mentioned above, was an ideology or a way of life which was not based on God's revelation and which separated worldly matters from other-worldly affairs. Since the essence of the Pancasila, according to Natsir, was not based on God's revelation, it was no doubt secular, and for that reason he rejected it as the basis and ideology of the Indonesian state. In this case, it is clear that Natsir was not in agreement with Faruki's first understanding of the word secular, to which Abdulgani referred, even though this outstanding thinker and leader of the Masyumi also deeply believed that Islam pays full attention to worldly matters. In other words, despite the attention Islam pays to temporal affairs, in the mind of Natsir, it should not be understood as a secular religion. Natsir and other spokesmen of the Islamic parties in the Assembly preferred to use the term "complete" or "comprehensive" religion for the religion of Islam, in the sense that Islam encompasses all aspects of life both spiritual and temporal. And it was due to their belief in the comprehensiveness of the doctrine of Islam that the Indonesian Muslims proposed that Islam be used as the basis and ideology of the state.

Natsir continued to assess what he called a fundamental weakness of the Pancasila by pointing to the fact that the Communists claimed to accept it, even though they truly did not believe in the existence of One God. A philosophical basis or

²¹⁵ Ibid; 436. It can also be seen in Kemal A. Faruki's original book, *Islamic Constitution* (Karachi : Khokhropar Gateway Publication, 1952), 85.

ideology of the state like the Pancasila should be totally and completely understood, internalized, obeyed, believed and practiced by its supporters in their everyday life. Natsir seems to have been accusing the Communists of being hypocrites, since they acknowledged the Pancasila on one hand, but, on the other did not believe and practice its first principle, that is, Belief in One God. In other words, the Communists, in Natsir's mind, accepted the Pancasila in words only, but this in fact did not reflect their true way of life nor their true world view. This happened because the Pancasila itself was relative and neutral, and could be pointed in any direction by its supporters in accordance with their political orientations and religious beliefs. "Here lies the tragedy of a neutral Pancasila,"²¹⁶ attacked Natsir.

The neutrality of the Pancasila, according to Mohammad Natsir, was caused by the fact that it was an abstract concept, an empty and vacuous formula, not a living reality in a positive sense. The *raison d'être* of the Pancasila itself, Natsir continued, was neutral; thus it did not have a substantial basis and could not be identified with any particular ideology, such as Islam or Communism. If it took the side of a certain ideological stream, its *raison d'être* would no longer exist, and therefore it would not be called the Pancasila anymore.²¹⁷

Since the Pancasila, according to Natsir, was secular, then the Pancasila-based state of Indonesia was also secular. He argued that a state which was based on Islam was neither a theocratic nor a secular state :

Is an Islam-based state a theocratic state? Theocracy is a system of state in which its government is ruled and dominated by the priests with their religious hierarchy, and in running a state they claim themselves to be the vicegerents of God. There is no priesthood system in Islam. Therefore, an Islamic based

²¹⁶ Natsir, *Islam*, 27.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

state is not a theocratic state. It is a democratic state. It is not a secular state. It is an Islamic democratic state. Mr. Chairman, if someone wants to call it a popular name, it can be named a Theistic Democracy.²¹⁸

As a true democrat, Natsir was very concerned with the principle of *shūrā* or deliberation mentioned in the Qur'ān as the core of polity. However, Natsir did not elaborate on Theistic Democracy. He did not show how it could effectively operate in a modern state or in a pluralistic nation like Indonesia. He explained only how to apply the principle of *shūrā* in the political life of the state, that is, by developing it through the Muslims' political thinking and practices in accordance with space and time, since Islam does not establish its system in a rigid and fixed manner. One thing that can be understood about Natsir's thinking is that Theistic Democracy was in fact another term used for an Islamic democracy which should operate basically in the spirit of *shūrā*, and in the light of Qur'ānic ethics.

In line with this idea, Natsir, like Mawdūdī, emphasized the significance of the Sovereignty of God as law-giver. For this very reason, Natsir came to the conclusion that God's Sovereignty should be the vital source and essential foundation for formulation of the basis of the state. He said with confidence: "The philosophy or the basis of the state, if not based on the nucleus of the Absolute Sovereignty of God, would constitute only particles of barren sand which contain no strength."²¹⁹ Natsir concluded that the Islamic belief in God and in His Sovereignty should be used to establish the basis of the state in order to make it strong and acceptable to the Muslims as the majority group in Indonesia. Unlike Mawdūdī, however, Natsir never held the

²¹⁸ Ibid., 30.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 39.

view that modern democracy was some sort of *shirk*²²⁰ which, of course, in the view of the former, was contrary to Islamic doctrine.

In demonstrating the importance of the Islamic doctrine of *shūrā* Natsir referred to the Qur'ānic verse : "... and their rule is to take counsel among themselves..."²²¹ This Masyumi party leader then elaborated upon the verse by saying that the ruler should receive political approval, from the ruled through representative deliberation, in order to deal with matters of state related to the people's interests. This argument was set forth by Natsir in an attempt to convince the supporters of the Pancasila that in an Islam-based state, for which he and his friends were struggling, the basic spirit of deliberation and democracy would be upheld in a proper manner and implemented in a real and full sense.²²² The argument was in fact a reflection of Natsir's personality as a true democrat; he was in fact of the opinion that "... as far as the Muslims are concerned, democracy comes first, because Islam can prosper only in a democratic system."²²³

In addition to the principle of deliberation or democracy, Natsir also mentioned the principle of religious tolerance. Like his Muslim colleagues in the Constituent Assembly, Natsir also quoted the Qur'ānic verse which runs "no compulsion in religion" to confirm that Islam was very concerned with this important matter.

²²⁰ See Fazlur Rahman, "A Recent Controversy over the Interpretation of *Shūrā*," *History of Religions : An International Journal for Comparative Historical Studies*, vol. 20, no. 4 (June 1981), 296.

²²¹ Sūra XLII : 38.

²²² Natsir, *Islam*, 31.

²²³ Cited by George McTurnan Kahin, "Mohammad Natsir," in Yusuf Abdullah Puar, ed., *Muhammad Natsir 70 Tahun : Kenang-Kenangan dan Perjuangan* (Jakarta : Pustaka Antara, 1978), 333.

According to Natsir, religious freedom taught by the Qur'ān was not freedom in a narrow sense, but freedom in a wide, broad and real sense in which all religious groups could carry out their religious faith and practices in accordance with their own religious doctrines.²²⁴ Natsir pointed to the historical precedent of the Prophet Muḥammad who tolerated other religious groups in Medina when he became head of state.

In showing the concern of Islam for religious freedom and tolerance toward other religious groups, Natsir quoted a Qur'ānic verse saying : "... I am commanded to do justice between you : Allah is our Lord and your Lord; we shall have our deeds and you shall have your deeds; no plea need there be (now) between us and you : Allah will gather us together, and to Him is the return."²²⁵ This doctrine, according to Natsir, was deeply rooted in the souls of Muslims and was much more capable of maintaining religious tolerance in Indonesia than the simple concept of "Belief in One God" mentioned in the Pancasila, which was felt by Muslims to be a sterile and empty formula.²²⁶

After advancing all his Islamic arguments, Natsir made an appeal to the defenders of the Pancasila and the supporters of Social Economy in the Constituent Assembly to accept Islam as the basis and ideology of the state :

The [five] principles that you wish also exist in Islam, not as sterile concepts but as living values which have clear and concrete substance. By accepting Islam as the philosophy of the state, the defenders of the Pancasila will not lose anything at all. Both the advocates of the Pancasila and the followers of religion will have a living philosophy with a distinct, firm and strong power. Not one of the five principles formulated in the Pancasila will be neglected or

²²⁴ Natsir, *Islam*, 36.

²²⁵ Sūra XLII : 15.

²²⁶ Natsir, *Islam*, 35 - 37.

lost, if you accept Islam as the basis of the state. Certain norms are found in Islam in which the purely conceptual five principles have real substance and motivating spirit. To the supporters of Social Economy I also appeal that you will find in Islam the progressive concept of Social Economy.²²⁷

However, his proposal, like those of his Muslim friends in the Constituent Assembly, was turned down by the advocates of the Pancasila and by the upholders of Social Economy. The defenders of the Pancasila and the supporters of Social Economy were not convinced by the Islamic arguments put forward by Natsir and other Muslim representatives.

THE RE-APPLICATION OF THE PANCASILA AS THE BASIS AND IDEOLOGY OF THE STATE

The tense and heated ideological battle between the representatives of the Islamic political parties and those of the non-Islamic political parties in the Constituent Assembly did not produce a political compromise since both sides were adamant in promoting their own proposals. Because of this critical situation, President Soekarno, in consultation with his cabinet and strongly encouraged and supported by the Indonesian army under the leadership of General Abdul Haris Nasution, took the initiative of promoting his proposed return to the 1945 constitution as formulated on August 18, 1945, in an attempt to break the political deadlock that had seized the Assembly. Three times the Constituent Assembly voted on the president's proposal to return to the 1945 constitution, on May 30, June 1 and June 2, with the following results : 269, 264 and 263 in favour of the proposal and 199, 204 and 203 (mostly votes cast by the Muslim Nationalist faction) against, respectively.²²⁸

²²⁷ Ibid., 28.

²²⁸ Muhammad Yamin, ed., *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 3 (Jakarta : Prapanca, 1960), 618.

The Muslim Nationalists voted against the proposal because they felt the Islamic clause of the Jakarta Charter (with the obligation to practice the shari'ah for its adherents) had to be included in the 1945 constitution. Neither the defenders of the Pancasila nor the supporters of Islam won the required two-thirds of the vote, that is, 312 out of the total membership of the Assembly.²²⁹ Soekarno saw this situation as a danger to national unity and therefore issued a presidential decree on July 5, 1959, proclaiming a return to the 1945 constitution.²³⁰ Since the issuance of this decree, the Pancasila has been permanently and effectively applied as the basis and ideology of the state up to the present. To appease the injured feelings of the Muslims, Soekarno said that the Jakarta Charter of June 22, 1945 was the soul of the 1945 constitution. It gave life to the 1945 constitution and could not be separated from it.²³¹

President Soekarno then dissolved the Constituent Assembly and later established the MPRS (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara*, or Provisional People's Consultative Council) in its place. Along with dissolving the Constituent Assembly, Soekarno implemented what he called "Guided Democracy"²³² (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*), which he defined, among other things, as "familial democracy (*demokrasi*

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ The full text of the presidential decree can be read in Yamin, ed., *Naskah*, vol. 3: 661. On the following page (662 - 663) Yamin gives the English translation of that decree.

²³¹ Ibid. See also *Piagan Jakarta Menjiwai Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* (Jakarta: Departemen Agama, 1963).

²³² For further discussions of Soekarno's Guided Democracy, see, for example, Dahm, *History of Indonesia*, chapter VII, "The Era of Guided Democracy, 1957 - 65," 180 - 223; Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957 - 1959* (Ithaca: Cornell University-Modern Indonesia Project, 1965).

kekeluargaan) without liberalism's anarchy, without dictatorship's autocracy."²³³

According to Soekarno, familial democracy was a democracy basing its governmental system on mutual consultation and agreement led by one central authority in the hands of an old and respected person, an elder man who does not dictate, but leads and protects.²³⁴

Soekarno implemented his Guided Democracy with the spirit of *Nasakom*²³⁵ in an attempt to strengthen his ambitious political position. His policy of Guided Democracy aroused severe reaction from many political leaders since there was much more guidance on his part than there was democracy. Soekarno, who was called the Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution, and who became the Highest Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, was an authoritarian ruler who could do anything in the name of revolution and *Nasakom*. Mohammad Hatta, for example, who used to cooperate with him as vice-president, criticized Soekarno's Guided Democracy and *Nasakom* as being against the principle of democracy mentioned in the Pancasila, a principle Soekarno himself had created and formulated. Hatta even states that many critics accused Soekarno of burying the Pancasila that he had "dug up."²³⁶ Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, a prominent Socialist thinker and politician, also severely attacked Soekarno's system of Guided Democracy and his *Nasakom* project by saying that,

²³³ Soekarno, *Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi*, vol. 2 (Jakarta : Panitia Penerbit di Bawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), 376.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Soekarno explained that "*Nasakom* is the title encompassing the three forces on which our country is balanced : *Nas* meaning the non-Communist Nationalists, *A* for *Agama* meaning the anti-Communist religionists, and *Kom* meaning the Communist Party." See Sukarno, *Autobiography*, 294.

²³⁶ Mohammad Hatta, *Menuju Negara Hukum* (Jakarta : Idayu Press, 1980), 16.

Sukarno's position as president and as the Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution, who holds in his hands the power of the executive, legislative and the judiciary, is little different from those of absolute kings of the past, who claimed to be the incarnation of God or God's representative in the world.²³⁷

Wielding great power, Soekarno in 1960 issued a command that the leaders of the Masyumi disband their organization.²³⁸ He took this political action on the grounds that many Masyumi leaders were involved in the PRRI²³⁹ (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*, or Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) revolt which broke out in 1958 in which "several thousand soldiers" were killed.²⁴⁰ In addition to the Masyumi, Soekarno also dissolved the PSI because he disliked many of the party's leaders, such as Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo, who were also involved in the PRRI and *Permesta*²⁴¹ (*Perjuangan Semesta Alam*, or Inclusive

²³⁷ S. Takdir Alisjahbana, *Indonesia : Social and Cultural Revolution*, trans. by Benedict R. Anderson (Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press, 1966), 173.

²³⁸ The official government directive to dissolve the Masyumi was confirmed in the presidential decree no. 200 of August 19, 1960. This decree also applied to the dissolution of the PSI.

²³⁹ A counter government led by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (of the Masyumi) as its prime minister, the PRRI was proclaimed in Padang, West Sumatra, on February 15, 1958. This revolt demanded regional autonomy, the restoration of the Duumvirate of Soekarno and Hatta, the formation of a Senate, the replacement of Army Chief of Staff General Nasution and his staff, and restriction of Communist activities. The Permesta (see below) joined the PRRI rebellion. The PRRI/Permesta upheaval was later quelled by government armed forces. See Adnan Buyung Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia : A Socio-legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956 - 1959* (Jakarta : Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992), 550 (Glossary).

²⁴⁰ Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1988), 260.

²⁴¹ Led by H. N. V. Sumual, the Permesta was proclaimed on March 2, 1957 in Makassar (now called Ujung Pandang), South Sulawesi. The Permesta revolt struggled for decentralized government, redistribution of income, restoration of the Duumvirate of Soekarno and Hatta, re-formation of the National Council into a pre-Senate, and the replacement of Army Chief of Staff General Nasution and his staff. For details, see Barbara S. Harvey, *Permesta : Half a Rebellion* (Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1977).

Struggle) regional insurrections against the Soekarno regime. The dissolution by the Soekarno regime of the Masyumi was accompanied by the detention without trial of many of its leaders such as Mohammad Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap.

Soekarno's implementation of Guided Democracy under the Nasakom formula benefited the PKI which later, on September 30, 1965, launched a bloody *coup d'état* in a failed attempt to seize power in Indonesia. This Communist coup was commonly known in Indonesian history as the Gestapu/PKI or G30S/PKI (*Gerakan Tiga Puluh September/PKI*, or Movement of the 30th of September of the Indonesian Communist Party) affair. This was their second coup, following their first failed revolt in 1948 known as the Madiun Affair. Following the failure of the PKI coup, Soekarno in turn fell from power,²⁴² giving strategic momentum to the emergence of the New Order government of 1966 in Indonesia.

²⁴² For further accounts of Soekarno's fall from power, see, for example, Dahm, *History of Indonesia*, chapter VIII, "The End of Sukarno's Reign," 224 - 252; John Hughes, *The End of Sukarno* (London : Angus & Robertson, 1968).

A. THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT AND ITS POLICIES TOWARDS MUSLIMS

THE FALL OF THE OLD REGIME

The year 1966 in Indonesia witnessed the rise of the New Order government under Soeharto.¹ This rise must be seen in light of the political events that preceded it, particularly those of the last six years under the Old Order regime. The Old Order government, led by Soekarno with his Guided Democracy and Nasakom project, was shaken by political antagonism, social disorder and an economic crisis in the life of the Indonesian people as a whole. As H. W. Arndt explains it :

From 1950 until 1958, successive governments struggled to promote economic development in conditions of chronic inflation, balance-of-payments difficulties and increasing political instability. From 1958 until 1965 under Guided Democracy, as orderly processes of government, including the capacity to tax, gradually disintegrated and inflation turned into hyper inflation, as ever-changing and multiplying regulations superimposed new direct controls on unenforceable older ones, as output nationalized estates and industrial plants declined and smuggling further dissipated the country's dwindling foreign exchange earnings, as Sukarno's diminishing capacity to raise further foreign credits prompted him to tell the world to 'go to hell' with its foreign aid, economic activity continued despite rather than because of the government.²

¹ Soeharto, who began his career in the military service, was born on June 8, 1921 at Kemusu, Argomulyo, Yogyakarta (Central Java). In 1940 he completed his studies at the Military Cadres School KNIL (*Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indische Leger*, or Royal Netherland's East Indies Army). During the War for Independence (1945 - 1949), as a lieutenant colonel he led a battalion operating in Central Java resisting the Dutch "Police Actions." His career in the military service continued to progress as indicated by the fact that on May 1, 1963 he was promoted as commander of the Jakarta-based Army Strategic Reserve Command (*Kostrad*). Following the Communist revolt of 1965, he was charged by President Soekarno with the implementation of the March 11 Order (*Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret* or commonly known as *Supersemar*) to restore order and security. His remarkable success led him to be promoted to (four star) general of the army on July 1, 1966. Through the decrees of the MPRS, he was appointed acting president on February 22, 1967 and president on March 27, 1968. For more information on Soeharto's career, see O. G. Roeder and Mahidin Mahmud, *Who's Who in Indonesia* (Singapore : Gunung Agung, 1980), 1 - 4.

² H. W. Arndt, "Development of Equality : The Indonesian Case," *World Development*, no. 3 (1975), 85.

Of the Old Order's economic collapse, Dr. Mochtar Mas'oeed has noted that inflation rose drastically (between 1958 - 1966 the money circulation increased by 701 percent), prices of goods soared 635 percent, food and other supplies were very difficult to find, and commercial relations with foreign countries worsened.³

Meanwhile, the PKI clearly dominated the political stage, and with its well-organized institutions appeared to be "a state within the state" as accurately depicted by Boland.⁴ It continuously launched political propaganda and agitation campaigns labeling Muslims and those who opposed the PKI as reactionary forces and foes of the Pancasila and the revolution. According to Howard M. Federspiel, to counterbalance the rapid growth of the PKI's political power, the army, under General Abdul Haris Nasution, continued to maintain a good relationship with the Muslims, who undeniably constituted a potent force in the face of the Communist party's threat. Nasution also propagated religious doctrine among the armed forces' personnel as a means of assuring a common moral guide and standard of behavior.⁵ Very often the Communists caused political controversy by warning people, for example, of the re-emergence of what they called "right-wing extremists," such as the instigators of the Darul Islam rebellion. Political rivalry between the Communists and the Muslims in particular intensified during this period.

This explosive domestic situation was worsened by the ambitious foreign policies of Soekarno, a man who claimed to be one of the leading figures of what he

³ Mochtar Mas'oeed, *Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966 - 1971* (Jakarta : LP3ES, 1989), 47 - 50.

⁴ B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 135.

⁵ Howard M. Federspiel, "The Military and Islam in Sukarno's Indonesia," in Ahmad Ibrahim et al., eds., *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia* (Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 153.

called the "New Emerging Forces" (Nefos) of Asia and Africa, as opposed to what he called the "Old Established Forces" (Oldefos) of the West. An example of this is the military campaign which Soekarno launched against Malaysia in 1963, on the grounds that this neighboring country, in Soekarno's view, was a neo-imperialist agent of the British and posed a threat to Indonesia.⁶ This military confrontation was inevitably a drain on the state budget, thus contributing to the virtual economic collapse of the country.

Calling the United Nations a camp of Western neo-imperialist and neo-colonialist powers, the Soekarno regime withdrew Indonesia's membership from this international body in favour of establishing a close relationship with Communist China.⁷ This policy is an indication that Soekarno's foreign policy was heavily influenced by the PKI's global political strategy of bringing Indonesia closer to Beijing and the Communist Bloc on the one hand, and of moving it further away from the capitalist Western Bloc on the other. Labeling America and the United Kingdom as neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist powers, Soekarno took strong action against these two super-powers' interests, including a refusal to accept American aid.⁸ "Go to hell with your aid," Soekarno told the world. This situation continued to worsen and contributed to political instability, social chaos and economic collapse, which reached its climax with the abortive Communist rebellion in Jakarta on September 30, 1965, known as the Gestapu/PKI (G30S/PKI) affair.⁹

⁶ For further discussion, see, for example, Jan Pluvier, *Confrontations : A Study in Indonesian Politics* (Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press, 1965).

⁷ See Nawaz B. Mody, *Indonesia Under Suharto* (New York : Apt Book, 1987), 2. Indonesia became the sixtieth member of the United Nations shortly after the Dutch recognized Indonesian sovereignty on December 27, 1949.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ For details, see Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesia : the Gestapu Affair* (New York : American Asian Educational Exchange, 1969).

THE RISE AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT

In their bloody revolt, the Communists assassinated six high ranking army officers, namely Generals Ahmad Yani, Suprpto, Harjono, S. Parman, Sutojo Siswomihardjo and Panjaitan.¹⁰ In an effort to hide its actions, the PKI spread a rumor that a group of army generals, which it referred to as the Council of Generals, had already seized power and that for this reason the PKI-established Revolutionary Council had already taken action against them to save the state and nation.¹¹ Following the Gestapu/PKI rebellion, the recently formed New Order forces under Soeharto,¹² who served as the commander of the *Kostrad* (*Komando Cadangan*

¹⁰ Bernhard Dahm, *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century*, trans. by P. S. Falla (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1971), 228; see also Mody, *Indonesia*, 2. General Nasution, whom the PKI would also assassinate, was safe for a time because he escaped the kidnappers when they entered his house. One of his legs was sprained when he jumped a fence on his property in an attempt to save himself. His daughter, Irma Suryani Nasution, and his adjutant, Pierre Tendean, were murdered by the kidnappers.

¹¹ I base this story on the New Order government's version. The New Order believes not only that the PKI was involved in the coup, but that it was also its architect. See, for example, Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, *The Coup Attempt of 30 September Movement in Indonesia* (Jakarta : Pembimbing Masa, 1968). Another hypothesis was given by B. R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey in their *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia* (Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), known as the "Cornell Thesis". In it they argued that the PKI played no role in the planning of the coup. It was an internal affair of the army in which "progressive" army officers aimed at getting rid of high-living and corrupt generals in order to save the country. The PKI expressed its agreement with this action and therefore was drawn in. With regards to this theory, Harold Crouch commented that "later the testimony of the PKI leaders at the *Mahmiluh* ([*Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa*] Special Military Court) trials as well as the opinions expressed by the PKI emigré groups in Europe and elsewhere made the "Cornell Thesis" very difficult to defend in its original form. While it appears clear that the PKI was indeed involved, the circumstances and extent of its involvement are still unclear." See Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1988), 101.

¹² For detailed accounts of Soeharto, see O. G. Roeder, *The Smiling General : President Suharto of Indonesia* (Jakarta : Gunung Agung, 1970); Suharto : *My Thoughts, Words and Deeds : An Autobiography as Told to G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K. H.* (Jakarta : PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989).

Strategi Angkatan Darat, or Army Strategic Reserve Command) at that time, consolidated their power and gradually succeeded in controlling the situation, finally taking power from the Old Order government in 1966. In 1967 Soeharto was named acting president, and one year later was appointed the second president of the Republic of Indonesia, holding his position until the present.

The New Order government in general and the army in particular established good relations with the Muslims and all New Order forces who were loyal to the state ideology of the Pancasila, and helped to suppress the Gestapu/PKI rebellion. This era witnessed the rise of such groups as KAMI¹³ (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*, or Action Front of Indonesian University Students), KAPPI (*Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia*, or Action Front of Indonesian Youths and Students) and KAP Gestapu/PKI (*Kesatuan Aksi Pengganyangan Gestapu/PKI*, or Action Front for Destroying the Gestapu/PKI). These movements included a large number of Muslim students, university students, Muslim youth and other Muslim groups. These elements were vigorously opposed to the revolt.¹⁴ These essentially anti-PKI movements, later known collectively as the 1966 generation,¹⁵ advanced three demands: that Soekarno dissolve the PKI, purge the cabinet of all leftist elements, and reduce prices in order to improve economic life.¹⁶ Soekarno, however, was unable to

¹³ For further accounts of the KAMI, see, for example, Rosihan Anwar, "The Birth of KAMI," *Quadrant* (March-April 1967), 55 - 60; Baladas Ghoshal, "Students and Politics in Indonesia: The Birth of KAMI," *China Report*, vol. 6, no. 5 (September-October 1970), 39 - 47.

¹⁴ Among the Muslim figures who played a pivotal role in these movements were M. Zamroni, M. Husni Thamrin and H. M. Subchan Z. E., who led the KAMI, the KAPPI and the KAP Gestapu/PKI, respectively.

¹⁵ For more details, see Yozar Anwar, *Angkatan 66 : Sebuah Catatan Harian Mahasiswa* (Jakarta : 1981).

¹⁶ These three demands were known as *Tritura* (*Tiga tuntutan hatinurani rakyat*, or Three demands of the people's conscience). See Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penatarann Pegawai Republik Indonesia, *Bahan Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan*

meet their demands; consequently, due to mass opposition, he soon fell from power.¹⁷

The cooperation between the army and the Muslims was motivated mainly by the fact that both were the PKI's political rivals during the Old Order regime. The army's hostility towards the Communists had begun in 1948, when the PKI staged a revolt in Madiun, East Java.¹⁸ Harold Crouch is correct when he says that "although both the army and PKI leaders professed loyalty to Sukarno as the 'Great Leader of the Revolution' they were themselves locked in irreconcilable conflict."¹⁹ Later, when the PKI rebelled again on September 30, 1965, the army cooperated with the Muslims and succeeded in destroying it. In 1966 the New Order banned the PKI and all its affiliated organizations throughout the country; all books or writings containing Communist ideas and teachings were also prohibited. Very quickly the New Order purged government posts of all leftist elements. The ban on the PKI was made by the New Order on the grounds that the party had betrayed the state and nation by attempting to exchange the state ideology of the Pancasila for Communist ideology.²⁰

Pengamalan Pancasila, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 dan Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (Jakarta : Sekretariat Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik Indonesia, 1978), 91.

¹⁷ The MPRS, with its decision no. XXX/1967, officially discharged Soekarno from the presidency, and then formally appointed Soeharto president through its decision no. XLIV/1968. It has remained a "question mark" whether Soekarno was involved or not in the Communist coup of September 31, 1965. Some say that he seemed to know about the planned Communist revolt. Unlike other Indonesian political or military leaders, who openly condemned the revolt, Soekarno did not show the same attitude. Soekarno never used the term the "Gestapu (G30S/PKI)" revolt, but employed the term the "Gestok" (Movement of October 1). Indonesians have understood the "Gestok" to be a movement which countered and thwarted the PKI revolt.

¹⁸ For details, see, for example, Ann Swift, *The Road to Madiun : The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948* (Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1989); Pinardi, *Peristiwa Coup Berdarah PKI September 1948 di Madiun* (Jakarta : Inkopak - Hazera, 1967).

¹⁹ Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 43.

²⁰ The ban on the PKI and all of its affiliated mass organizations was confirmed by the MPRS enactment no. XXV/1966.

Due to this ban, Communism has since collapsed and disappeared from the political scene in contemporary Indonesia.²¹ At the same time, the New Order took political action by severing its diplomatic relations with China, accusing that Communist country of having supported the Gestapu/PKI rebellion.²²

Having succeeded in destroying Communist power, the New Order steadily established its authority on the political stage in Indonesia. It set out to distinguish itself from the Old Order regime by defining itself as :

- (a) an order of the state and nation which is based on the implementation of the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution in a pure and consistent manner.
- (b) an order that wishes to realize the ideals of independence, that is, a just and prosperous Indonesian society based on the Pancasila.
- (c) an order which wishes to establish the system of state and society based on the constitution, democracy and law.
- (d) an order of constitution and an order of development.²³

While identifying itself with these four characteristics, the New Order denounced the Old Order as having deviated from the spirit of the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, and for implementing, for example, Guided Democracy and Nasakom, as well as appointing Soekarno as president for life. The New Order gave national priority to the implementation of development and modernization, especially in economic and agricultural life, in order to achieve social welfare for all Indonesians. Effectively supported by ABRI and a group of well-known technocrats, such as Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo, Emil Salim, Widjojo Nitisastro, M. Sadli, Ali Wardhana and others, many of whom had been educated in Western universities, the New Order succeeded in improving the economic and social conditions of Indonesians. As a result, the establishment of the New Order was widely and enthusiastically supported

²¹ On the collapse of Communism in Indonesia, see, for example, A. C. Brackman, *Communist Collapse in Indonesia* (New York : Norton Library, 1969).

²² Indonesia and China agreed to re-establish diplomatic ties in 1993.

²³ Team Pembinaan Penatar, *Bahan Penataran*, 167.

by the people, a situation which enabled it to carry out its development and modernization programs without being disturbed by serious political tensions or conflicts. The success of the New Order government in restructuring social and economic life was partly due to the fact that it regained international trust, and as a result became the recipient of foreign aid from, among others, the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia)²⁴ and the World Bank.

In its attempt to maintain the political stability and dynamic continuation of national development, the New Order used strict security measures, crushing any disturbances that, in its view, posed a threat to national order, security and stability. The use by the New Order of oppressive measures in solving disturbances, however, drew sharp criticism from many who believed that these disturbances could still have been overcome by persuasive approaches. The ban imposed upon *Tempo* magazine in 1982 is but one example of the security measures adopted by the regime. This magazine was banned because it had reported in detail on a riot which, according to the government, was not to be discussed.²⁵ In the view of the government, that kind of

²⁴ In 1993 the IGGI was transformed into the CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The membership of the CGI includes several developed countries, among others, Japan, England, France, Canada and Belgium.

²⁵ The riot occurred in Jakarta on March 18, 1982, involving the supporters of the PPP, on the one hand, and those of the Golkar, on the other, during the 1982 election campaign. Three months later, in June 1982, the government allowed *Tempo* to be published again on the condition that it support the government in maintaining order and stability. Later, in 1994, the government banned again three publications, namely *Tempo*, *Editor* and *Detik*, because they were considered to have "violated" certain conditions previously established by the government. This ban coincided with their report on the condition of a number of warships bought from East Germany by B. J. Habibie, Minister of Research and Technology. It was reported that the ships were not completely new and that they had been designed by East Germany in such a way that their conditions were questionable. The reports by *Tempo*, *Editor* and *Detik* on the case, which tended to denounce the government, prompted it to ban these three media. The government's ban stirred strong criticism and demonstrations from a group of Indonesians who were concerned with the freedom of the press. Many of the protesters, including the well-known poet Rendra, were arrested by the security forces. See *Media Dakwah*, no. 241 (July 1994), 8 - 9. See also *Jakarta Post*, June 22, 23, 1994. These three media failed to reappear because the government revoked

report could create social disorder and political unrest, which would pose trouble for national security and political stability and, in turn, would disturb the process of the implementation of the national development program. The regime argued that freedom of expression and freedom of the press in Indonesia should be accompanied by a sense of responsibility, in order not to cause social trouble and political unrest. In opposing this viewpoint, many critics concerned with democracy and freedom of the press argued that the government's bans on the media resulted in an unhealthy condition for the growth of democracy and the life of the press. In reaction to this criticism, the regime also argued that freedom of expression and freedom of the press, following the model of Western liberal democracies, could not be applied freely in the Indonesian political context. In line with this argument, the government felt obliged, in the interest of its development program, to place stability and security in the first rank of its national policies.

Shortly after its establishment, the New Order government implemented a new policy of reconciliation with Malaysia, and abandoned the aggressive posture which had been taken by the Old Order regime.²⁶ Also, under the New Order, Indonesia's membership in the United Nations was re-confirmed. The New Order then established better relations with Western countries in an attempt to seek foreign aid for the implementation of its national development and modernization program as described above. Thus, the image of Indonesia under the New Order government, in the eyes of Western nations, was improving and was very different from its image during the Soekarno era.

Rejecting Soekarno's Guided Democracy, a step "that made the indefinite their publishing licenses.

²⁶ For further discussion, see, for example, Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation: An Inquiry into the Functioning of Indonesian Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1969).

report could create social disorder and political unrest, which would pose trouble for national security and political stability and, in turn, would disturb the process of the implementation of the national development program. The regime argued that freedom of expression and freedom of the press in Indonesia should be accompanied by a sense of responsibility, in order not to cause social trouble and political unrest. In opposing this viewpoint, many critics concerned with democracy and freedom of the press argued that the government's bans on the media resulted in an unhealthy condition for the growth of democracy and the life of the press. In reaction to this criticism, the regime also argued that freedom of expression and freedom of the press, following the model of Western liberal democracies, could not be applied freely in the Indonesian political context. In line with this argument, the government felt obliged, in the interest of its development program, to place stability and security in the first rank of its national policies.

Shortly after its establishment, the New Order government implemented a new policy of reconciliation with Malaysia, and abandoned the aggressive posture which had been taken by the Old Order regime.²⁶ Also, under the New Order, Indonesia's membership in the United Nations was re-confirmed. The New Order then established better relations with Western countries in an attempt to seek foreign aid for the implementation of its national development and modernization program as described above. Thus, the image of Indonesia under the New Order government, in the eyes of Western nations, was improving and was very different from its image during the Soekarno era.

Rejecting Soekarno's Guided Democracy, a step "that made the indefinite their publishing licenses.

²⁶ For further discussion, see, for example, Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation: An Inquiry into the Functioning of Indonesian Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1969).

continuation of the system unlikely,"²⁷ the New Order has implemented what it calls "Pancasila Democracy," which is defined as a democratic system based on the family spirit and mutual cooperation intended to achieve social welfare. Furthermore, it contains a religious sensibility which rejects atheism, upholds truth and love guided by noble moral conduct, and leads to harmony between individuals and in society.²⁸ The New Order argues that in Pancasila Democracy the freedom of individuals is not absolute, but is harmonized with social responsibility, and the universal ideals of democracy are combined with Indonesian democratic ideals. Thus, according to the New Order, there exists no "majority domination" or "minority tyranny" in the political system of Pancasila Democracy.²⁹ In the political mechanism of Pancasila Democracy, decisions should be made through mutual consultation amongst the Indonesian people's representatives, the ultimate goal that of reaching unanimity.³⁰ In Indonesia's Pancasila Democracy there is no opposition party in the full and real sense like those in Western liberal democracies. Also, voting to win a majority vote is discouraged. Voting is resorted to only if unanimity cannot be reached. Thus, as Nawaz B. Mody has noted, "the Western democratic principle of 'half plus one' majority is rejected"³¹ in the system of Indonesia's Pancasila Democracy.

Under the New Order government, state institutions such as the MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, or People's Consultative Council) and the DPR (*Dewan*

²⁷ Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 42.

²⁸ Team Pembinaan Penatar, *Bahan Penataran*, 163.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Many books discussing Pancasila Democracy were written by Indonesian scholars. See, for example, Ismail Sunny, *Mekanisme Demokrasi Pancasila* (Jakarta : Aksara Baru, 1978); Hazairin, *Demokrasi Pancasila* (Jakarta : Tintamas, 1970); A. H. Nasution, *Demokrasi Pancasila di Masa Sekarang dan di Masa Depan* (Malang : Lapasila IKIP Malang, 1971).

³¹ Mody, *Indonesia*, 173.

Perwakilan Rakyat, or People's Representative Council) were established on a more permanent basis following the 1971 general election. Despite some criticism of their implementation, which we shall touch upon later, general elections as part of the process of political democratization have been regularly carried out every five years. It is worth mentioning that during Soekarno's time, state institutions such as the MPR and the DPR were temporary, and that only one general election (in 1955) was carried out during his twenty years in office; proof that democracy under Soekarno's Guided Democracy was not implemented properly.

THE NEW ORDER, ABRI AND GOLKAR IN INDONESIAN POLITICS

According to Dr. Mochtar Pabottinggi, the New Order regime, in its efforts to strengthen and stabilize its political authority and achieve its political goals, has used four methods : (1) giving ABRI a special role and position not only as a security force but also as a socio-political force (known as a "dual function" or *dwifungsi*³² in Indonesian politics); (2) treating the Golkar as a favourite child; (3) launching a systematic policy of depoliticizing all socio-political forces; and (4) filling the state's representative body in two ways, by appointing its representatives from above and by

³² ABRI's doctrine of *dwifungsi* can be traced back to its doctrine of "middle way", introduced by General A. Haris Nasution in 1957, according to which army officers were allowed to participate actively in affairs of government but not seek to achieve a dominant position. See Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy : Indonesian Politics, 1957 - 1959* (Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1966), 191 - 192. Crouch notes that "at its first seminar, held in April 1965, the army produced a doctrine which declared that the armed forces in Indonesia formed both a military force and a social-political force. As a social-political force, the army's activities covered the ideological, political, social, economic, cultural and religious fields." See Crouch, *The Army and Politics*, 344 - 345. With the development of this doctrine, known as *dwifungsi*, ABRI's position and role have become dominant and much greater than those formulated under the earlier middle way concept. For further discussion of ABRI's doctrine of *dwifungsi*, see, for example, Nugroho Notosusanto, *The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces Especially Since 1966* (Jakarta : Department of Defence and Security, Centre for Armed Forces History, 1970).

electing them through general elections.³³ As we shall see in the following lines, the New Order regime has pursued these four methods systematically.

The links between the New Order regime, ABRI and the Golkar³⁴ are close ones. The New Order is strongly supported or even dominated by ABRI, with the Golkar being an effective vehicle for the New Order to achieve its political goals. In an attempt to restore democracy in the country, the first general election was held on July 3, 1971. In it the Islamic parties (consisting of a newly-born Islamic party called the *Parmusi* (*Partai Muslimin Indonesia*, or Indonesian Muslim Party), the NU, PSII and Perti), non-Islamic and secular parties (namely the PNI, Parkindo, Partai Katholik, Partai Murba and IPKI) and the government-backed Golkar competed with each other.

The Golkar won a landslide victory (gaining 62.8 percent of the vote), while the Islamic parties obtained 27.11 percent, and the non-Islamic and nationalist parties received 10.09 percent.³⁵ Of 360 parliamentary seats contested, the Golkar won 227, the Islamic parties 94, and the secular and non-Islamic parties the remainder. An additional number of seats (100) were already filled by government-appointed members, 75 of which were reserved for the military and 25 for civilians. With a total of 327 seats out of a possible 460, the Golkar clearly dominated political power in the country, and has maintained this position up to the present. As far as Islamic politics

³³ See *Kompas*, February 9, 1994.

³⁴ The origin of the Golkar can be traced back to the Sekber Golkar (Joint Secretariat of Functional Group) which was founded on October 20, 1964. According to Leo Suryadinata, after the PKI coup of 1965 the Sekber Golkar was transformed into "some kind of political party." For more details, see Leo Suryadinata, *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture : A Study of Indonesia's Golkar* (Athens : Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989). See also Imam Pratigny, *Ungkapan Sejarah Lahirnya Golkar* (Jakarta : Yayasan Bhakti, 1984).

³⁵ See Suryadinata, *Military Ascendancy*, 159 (Appendix C). For more details on the 1971 general elections, see Masashi Nishihara, *Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971* (Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1972).

is concerned, the percentage of votes gained by the Islamic parties in the 1971 general election (27.11 percent) was less than they had obtained in the 1955 general election (45 percent), indicating that the Islamic-oriented political parties had lost considerable support.

Most agreed that the key role of both ABRI and the bureaucracy was essential to the Golkar's triumph in the 1971 general election. Lt. General Ali Moertopo, a former spokesman for the New Order government in its early phase, even acknowledged :

Some circles are of the opinion that the triumph of the Golkar was achieved due to the following factors : the availability of funds, the support of officers, particularly from ABRI, the formation of *Korpri*³⁶ within various ministries, institutions and firms, and also various forms of intimidation. All of this contributed to the triumph of the Golkar.³⁷

In addition to the above factors, Moertopo mentions the primary reason for the Golkar's victory : that is, a new image fostered by development-oriented programs which were enthusiastically received by the people. In Moertopo's words : "But one thing is sure, that the primary factor was the hope and the belief of the people in this young socio-political force, which had never had a historical stigma like other political parties."³⁸

In all the general elections held under the New Order, the Golkar has always been the winner. The victories of the Golkar in the general elections have strengthened

³⁶ Korpri is an acronym of *Korps Pegawai Negeri Republik Indonesia* (Corps of Government Workers of the Republic of Indonesia). As a corps of government workers, Korpri has become one of the important tools for the Golkar in achieving its electoral victories since its members must vote for the Golkar in general elections. In its attempts to draw widespread support from the Muslims, the Golkar reorganized the GUPPI (*Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam*, or Association for Improving Islamic Education) and the MDI (*Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah*, or Islamic Propagation Council) which also contributed to the triumph of the Golkar in general elections.

³⁷ Ali Moertopo, *Strategi Politik Nasional* (Jakarta : CSIS, 1974), 82 -83.

³⁸ Ibid.

and stabilized the political power of the New Order regime. Since the Golkar has a very close relationship with ABRI³⁹ and is supported by the latter, especially by the army, this government-backed party has been viewed by many as simply an extension of ABRI into the field of socio-politics.⁴⁰ In fact, since its foundation, the top leadership of Golkar has always been in the hands of ABRI leaders.⁴¹ This explains why in Indonesian politics ABRI has played a dual function (*dwifungsi*), as a security force on the one hand and as a socio-political force on the other.⁴² In this respect, Ali Moertopo asserts that :

ABRI leaders' statements have made it clear that *dwifungsi* will stay. This is allowed by the constitution. The concept of ABRI with regard to the state ideology has been institutionalized, and ABRI will not want to be the tool of a state which has a different ideology. Therefore, the constitutional right of ABRI to involve itself in the political struggle will not be abandoned ...⁴³

Seen from the perspective of the composition of the DPR/MPR membership, the political role of ABRI has been prominent, allowing it to fortify the position of the New Order government as well as that of the Golkar in the Indonesian political structure. As Leo Suryadinata puts it :

The grip on Indonesian politics by the military-dominated government can be seen in the composition of the DPR and the MPR. The national DPR consisted of 460 members, 360 of which were elected, while 100 were appointed (25

³⁹ For further discussions, see, for example, Ibrahim Ambong, "Relationship between the Indonesian Armed Forces and Golkar," *Indonesian Quarterly*, vol. 18, no. 3 (1990), 225 - 243; Yong Mun Cheong, "The Indonesian Army and Fungsional Groups," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 7 no. 1 (March 1976), 92 - 101.

⁴⁰ Rusli Karim, *Perjalanan Partai Politik di Indonesia : Sebuah Potret Pasang Surut* (Jakarta : Rajawali Pers, 1983), 164.

⁴¹ The appointment of Harmoko at the Golkar congress in October 1994 as its general chairman indicated that the Golkar's top leadership has gradually shifted from the ABRI to the civilian body. However, it is too early to conclude that this shift will be permanent since political developments cannot be precisely predicted.

⁴² Mohammad Hatta, *Menuju Negara Hukum* (Jakarta : Yayasan Idayu, 1980), 16.

⁴³ Moertopo, *Strategi Politik*, 123 - 124.

civilians and 75 military) by the government (president).⁴⁴ The structure clearly favoured the government. More conspicuous was the composition of the MPR which had 920 members, 460 of which came from the DPR, one-third were appointed from the military by the president, and the rest were local representatives. If we include the appointed members in the DPR, appointed members in the MPR in reality constituted more than one-third. Because of this political structure, many argued that the government and the military were bound to control the state legislative and executive branch.⁴⁵

The unique political role of ABRI in Indonesian politics can be traced back to the early establishment of the New Order government in 1966. There was some national consensus achieved by the leaders of ABRI and the representatives of all socio-political forces in 1968, part of which was an agreement that ABRI be represented in the DPR/MPR on the grounds that, according to legislation, it is not allowed to participate in elections.⁴⁶ The political dominance of ABRI is also indicated by the fact that many active and retired ABRI leaders, particularly army leaders, were given government posts as ministers, governors, or heads of state institutions. Michael R. J. Vatikiotis notes that,

By the late 1970s, half the cabinet and over two-thirds of the regional governorships were military appointees. At the district level, 56 percent of district officers were military men. In the bureaucracy, 78 percent of director-generals and 84 percent of ministerial secretaries were ABRI appointees. Even in the diplomatic service, almost half the country's ambassadors were from the military in 1977. In the early 1980s, a former US diplomat estimated that active and retired military men occupied half the positions in the 'higher central bureaucracy'. More importantly, the military dominated the affairs of every cabinet department. Some of the appointments, especially to the diplomatic service were favours granted to retiring officers. The majority were on the

⁴⁴ Since mid-1995, the number of appointed seats has been reduced to 75, while the government allows the remaining seats (25) to be contested by the Golkar, PPP and PDI. See, for example, *Warta Indonesia* (newsletter published by the Information Service of the Indonesian Embassy in Ottawa), April 1995, 3 - 4. This reduction, however, will not affect the Golkar's dominance in the DPR/MPR.

⁴⁵ Leo Suryadinata, *Political Parties and the 1982 General Election in Indonesia* (Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), 7.

⁴⁶ Suryadinata, *Military Ascendancy*, 47. However, in 1976 the election law was amended, so that military officers not in active service and ex-military officers would be allowed to take part in the election. See *Ibid.*, footnote 34.

active list and valued the wider publicity and greater opportunities for remuneration [sic] offered by their posts.⁴⁷

In addition, some of the military men were appointed as directors of companies run by the government such as *Pertamina* (*Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Nasional*, or National Oil Company). William Liddle has noted that Pertamina was "the president's and military's biggest slush fund. It was also a source of national pride in an era dominated by foreign assistance and foreign investment ... led by an Indonesian."⁴⁸ It is certain that this policy has also strengthened the socio-political role of ABRI, which enables it to control the bureaucracy in Indonesia.⁴⁹

ABRI's deep involvement in politics has led many, including former Vice-President Hatta,⁵⁰ to come to the conclusion that the New Order government under Soeharto in Indonesia is, in fact, a military regime. While the government has conveniently claimed to have implemented Pancasila Democracy, Dr. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, by contrast, claimed in 1983 that "democracy in Indonesia is still far from satisfactorily restored. The army, the ruling power at the present, do not want to share key political positions with the civilians, particularly with the Islamic-oriented figures."⁵¹ Ali Moertopo argues in this regard that giving those key positions back to civilians would endanger the process of normalization that has been established in the

⁴⁷ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto* (New York : Routledge, 1994), 70 - 71.

⁴⁸ R. William Liddle, "Indonesia 1976 : Challenges to Suharto's Authority," *Asian Survey*, vol. 17, no. 2 (February 1977), 97.

⁴⁹ For further discussion of the matter, see, for example, John A. MacDougall, "Pattern of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureaucracy," *Indonesia*, no. 33 (April 1982), 89 - 121.

⁵⁰ Hatta, *Negara Hukum*, 16.

⁵¹ Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State : A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia," (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1983), 204.

country since the coming of the New Order to power.⁵²

Furthermore, President Soeharto, in an address on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of ABRI in 1971, stressed that he would continue to promote the dual function of ABRI, and justified his policy in the name of Pancasila Democracy.

"[The] dual function of ABRI," he said, "is one of the aspects of the implementation of democracy based on the Pancasila and the system of our state administration. It is this system that the Indonesian nation has built up and which we have accepted together."⁵³

Soeharto then sternly warned that "undemocratic" steps could also be taken by ABRI if any group in the country tried to eliminate its dual function :

Let there be no group in society to impose its will to alter this system of dual function. Such a pressure to eliminate ABRI's dual function overtly or covertly would be very negative and may even stir up ABRI's sentiments to act undemocratically.⁵⁴

A group known as the *Petisi Kelompok 50* (Petition of Fifty Group, consisting of fifty retired military generals and prominent politicians) was probably the most critical of the uneven political role played by ABRI, and of the New Order government's policies in general. Among the retired generals involved in this group were Ali Sadikin, H. R. Dharsono and Hugeng Iman Santoso, who bravely criticized many of the government's policies which, in their view, did not support the healthy growth of democracy in the country. Consequently, the government imposed harsh restrictions upon them. For example, it did not allow them to go abroad where it was feared they would express their criticism of the government openly. Due to his critical attitude towards government policies, Dharsono was imprisoned for some years and

⁵² Ali Moertopo, *Strategi Pembangunan Nasional* (Jakarta : CSIS, 1982), 33 - 34.

⁵³ Department of Information of the Republic of Indonesia, *The Military in Indonesia*, issue no. 61 (1971), 1.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

then released.

One of the politicians involved in the Petition of Fifty Group was Mohammad Natsir, former leader of the Masyumi party, on whom the regime also put political restrictions, restrictions which, as Dr. Ahmad Syafii Maarif has noted, prevented Natsir from receiving a degree of Doctor Honoris Causa which would have been conferred upon him by the *Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia* (UKM). This was due to the fact that the university's letter sent to Natsir in Jakarta, informing him of the presentation of the degree, failed to reach him -- probably due to government censorship. In spite of this, Natsir himself knew about the university's intention to present him with the degree since Syafii Maarif (who was teaching as a guest lecturer at the Universiti Kebangsaan at that time) had sent him a copy of the university's letter through a friend of his. This case subsequently became a national issue which involved the Malaysian and Indonesian governments at the ministerial level. Due to political considerations, which pushed aside academic ones, the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia sent a second letter to Natsir, informing him that the conferring of the degree had been postponed. In fact, by the time of Natsir's death on February 6, 1991 the degree had still not been conferred.⁵⁵

As a result of his alleged involvement in this affair, Maarif was suspected by Indonesian Embassy officials in Kuala Lumpur of having proposed that Natsir be conferred the degree by the university. For this reason, Maarif was summoned to the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in order to furnish an explanation. He firmly

⁵⁵ See Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Dr. H. C. untuk Natsir, Mengapa Digagalkan?," *Media Dakwah*, no. 243 (September 1994), 71. The idea of conferring the degree of Honoris Causa upon Natsir came from Nik Aziz Nik Hassan (head of the Department of Islamic Propagation and Leadership in the Faculty of Islamic Studies), a Kelantan born historian. The UKM agreed with his idea. For that purpose, Prof. Dr. Hj. Faisal Othman, dean of the Faculty of Islamic Studies, was charged by the UKM with preparing a speech in connection with the presentation of the degree to Natsir. See *Ibid.*



denied any involvement with the university's efforts in this case, but acknowledged that the university asked him to write Natsir's curriculum vitae. Maarif reports that Brigadier General H. Sunarso Djajusman, Indonesian ambassador to Malaysia at that time, was of the opinion that the university's offer of the degree to Natsir was inappropriate. "Why Natsir and not other Muslim figures?" Djajusman asked, as Maarif writes in his account. Maarif disagreed with him, arguing that Natsir did deserve the degree due to his broad knowledge of Islam, his international reputation in the Muslim World and his great dedication to Islamic propagation and development in Indonesia. Maarif accused Djajusman of contributing to the thwarting of the presentation of the degree to Natsir, whom he considered to be one of the founding fathers of the Republic of Indonesia.⁵⁶

THE NEW ORDER'S ISLAMIC POLICIES AND THE MUSLIM RESPONSE

As mentioned above, in the early years of its existence, the New Order government established cooperative relations with the Muslims, who were anti-Communist, in its attempts to crush the PKI revolt. The close relationship between the New Order and the Muslims was further indicated by the fact that the former released from jail all ex-Masyumi leaders such as Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap, all of whom had been imprisoned for some five years by the Old Order regime. Due to their close relationship with the New Order regime, the Muslims saw a bright future for Islam in Indonesian political life. Unlike what happened in the Old Order period, when Islam had not played an important role in politics thanks to the dissolution of the Masyumi, the Muslims expected that under the New Order Islam would play a significant role in the political arena. As far as Islamic politics was concerned, however, their expectations did not become a reality, as will

⁵⁶ Ibid.

be seen in what follows.

1. THE POLITICAL ARENA

Shortly after the establishment of the New Order, the need for the foundation of a new Islamic party in the country was felt by many Muslims of the modernist camp. The aim was to accommodate Islamic political aspirations outside the three existing Islamic political parties, namely the NU, the PSII and the Perti. For this purpose, efforts were made in 1966 by former Vice-President Mohammad Hatta⁵⁷ and his Muslim supporters to set up an Islamic party called the PDII (*Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia*, or Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party). In his efforts to found the PDII, Hatta sent several letters to President Soeharto, one of which contained a request for his support. Had it met with success, such support would have ensured that the local and regional government officers would not oppose the establishment of the party.⁵⁸ The goals, basic program and structure of the party were fully formulated by its would-be founders.⁵⁹

Hatta was very optimistic about gaining support and approval from President Soeharto for this new party. However, Soeharto, in his letter of May 17, 1967, rejected Hatta's proposal to establish the party on the grounds that

the PDII would not be able to unify and accommodate all Islamic forces outside the existing Islamic parties, whereas reactions to the idea of establishing that movement/party were not positive. All this indicated symptoms that could

⁵⁷ It is interesting to note the Hatta phenomenon. As mentioned in Chapter I, he belonged to the Secular Nationalists who opposed the Muslim Nationalists' political aspirations. This was indicated by, among other things, his objection to the Muslim Nationalist proposal of Islam as the basis of the state. Twenty-two years later, he took the initiative to advocate democracy in Indonesia through an Islamic party he intended to found.

⁵⁸ Deliar Noer, *Mohammad Hatta : Biografi Politik* (Jakarta : LP3ES, 1990), 648.

⁵⁹ On the basic plans, programs and structure of the PDII, see Noer, *Mohammad Hatta*, 727 - 752.

signal trouble for political stability...⁶⁰

Therefore, said the president in his letter to Hatta, the idea of setting up the PDII "could not be approved at this moment." Faced with this reality, Hatta and his sympathizers felt particularly frustrated with the New Order government policy in light of their long preparations for the foundation of the PDII.⁶¹

Other efforts to form a new Islamic political party in Modernist Muslim circles came from Muljadi Djojomartono, the former Minister of Social Affairs, and several Muhammadiyah leaders, including Lukman Harun. In this instance, they attempted to revive the PII (*Partai Islam Indonesia*, or Indonesian Islamic Party), which had been established by Muhammadiyah leaders in 1938, but which did not survive the shaping of the Masyumi. Their attempt to revive the PII, however, ended when they gave way to another group of Modernist Muslims who demanded the rehabilitation of the Masyumi party. An influential and respected Muslim figure in the circle of the Modernist Muslims, Natsir succeeded in persuading the Muhammadiyah leaders to support the idea of the Masyumi's rehabilitation, instead of reviving the PII.⁶²

The attempt to rehabilitate the Masyumi was made by many of its ex-leaders following their release by the New Order regime from jail. The recommendations for the Masyumi's rehabilitation came from several circles, the most important ones being the army and the *Persahi* (*Persatuan Sarjana Hukum Indonesia*, or Association of Indonesian Lawyers). In its second seminar held in Bandung in August 1966, the army issued a statement saying that the members of the dissolved parties, such as the

⁶⁰ See Ibid., 648.

⁶¹ Ibid., 648 - 649.

⁶² M. Sirajuddin Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics in Islam : The Case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1991), 46, note 53.

Masyumi, should be allowed to participate in political life, and have an equal opportunity to participate in general elections.⁶³ In a similar tone, the Persahi, on December 3, 1966, also stated that the disbanding of the Masyumi and the PSI by the Old Order regime had been illegal and unconstitutional. In their view, the rehabilitation of the two parties would help restore and develop the democratic life of the country and would serve to consolidate the New Order.⁶⁴

The ex-Masyumi leaders and the party's supporters were very optimistic that their intention to rehabilitate their party would get the green light from the New Order government. Their great enthusiasm, however, was dampened when ABRI, on December 21, 1966, in direct contradiction to the statement made in Bandung in August 1966, issued a new one which claimed that the Masyumi, like the PKI, had deviated from the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, and which declared that ABRI would take firm measures against any individual or group which deviated from those key documents.⁶⁵ In line with ABRI's statement, Soeharto also issued a decree on January 6, 1967, stating that legal, constitutional and psychological considerations had led the army to decide not to accept the idea of rehabilitating the Masyumi.⁶⁶

It is certain that the government's rejection of the rehabilitation of the Masyumi was based on the fact that many Masyumi leaders had been involved in the PRRI rebellion of 1958. Also, the rehabilitation of that party, in the view of the government, would mean the rise of a new Masyumi movement and hence a new political threat.

⁶³ *Sumbangan Pikiran TNI - AD Kepada Kabinet Ampera* (Bandung : Panitia Seminar Angkatan Darat ke II, 1966), 42.

⁶⁴ K. E. Ward, *The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970), 25.

⁶⁵ Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics," 51.

⁶⁶ See S. U. Bajasut, *Alam Pikiran dan Jejak Perjuangan Prawoto Mangkusamito* (Surabaya : Documentica, 1972), 214 - 216. See also Boland, *Struggle of Islam*, 152.

Ex-Masyumi leaders and Masyumi members felt deeply frustrated with the government's strict policy, but they had to accept it as a bitter political reality. In this connection, Muhammad Kamal Hassan notes that "by 1968 Muslim leaders and political parties became aware of the fact that they were not to be accepted as partners in power and that politically powerful Islam was to have no place in the new political system of Pancasila Democracy."⁶⁷

However, although the New Order imposed restrictions upon the Muslims, it still opened the door for them to establish a new political party. After making substantial efforts, a committee consisting of seven prominent Muslims⁶⁸ finally succeeded in shaping an Islamic party called the Parmusi on February 20, 1968. The government's formal approval of its establishment was confirmed through presidential decree no. 70 of February 20, 1968, with H. Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun as the party's temporary general chairman and secretary general respectively.⁶⁹

In an attempt to prevent the Parmusi from becoming neo-Masyumi, Soeharto warned that no ex-Masyumi leader would be allowed to hold a leading position in this new Islamic party.⁷⁰ The government's decision did not satisfy most of the Parmusi members who were in fact ex-Masyumi members. This dissatisfaction can be seen in the first Parmusi congress held in Malang from November 4 - 7, 1968, in which Mohamad Roem, a former influential Masyumi leader, was appointed chairman of the party. The government, however, did not accept Roem's appointment because this

⁶⁷ Muhammad Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Response to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982), 44.

⁶⁸ They were E. Z. Muttaqien, Faqih Usman, Hasan Basri, Anwar Haryono, Agus Sudono, Marzuki Jatim and Mrs. Sjamsuridjal.

⁶⁹ For a detailed account of the foundation of the Parmusi, see Ward, *Foundation*.

⁷⁰ Boland, *Struggle of Islam*, 152.

was against its policy toward ex-Masyumi leaders.⁷¹ The congress then appointed Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun as its chairman and secretary respectively.

In a further development, the government showed an unwillingness to accept Hadikusumo and Harun's leadership since the two were fairly radical and did not show accommodating attitudes towards the government.⁷² Through political machinations launched by Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo's *Opsus* (*Operasi Khusus*, or Special Operation Body), Jaelani Naro and Imran Kadir were posted as chairman and secretary of the party. However, Hadikusumo and Harun rejected their leadership. This resulted in an unresolved political conflict within the party.⁷³ What is more, it prompted the government to interfere in the party's internal affairs by rejecting the leadership of both Hadikusumo and Naro. Through its decision no. 77/1970 of November 20, 1970, the government appointed H. M. S. Mintaredja, a more cooperative figure from the Muhammadiyah, to be the new general chairman of the Parmusi.⁷⁴

All this indicated that this new party was not totally independent, in the sense that it could not manage and determine its own affairs without the government's intervention and control. Viewing this situation, Ahmaddan Martha, a West Java HMI leader, was said to have "lamented the fact that the formation of a political party had required the promulgation of a presidential decision, which he felt would produce a

⁷¹ Soeharto's rejection of the appointment of Roem as general chairman of the Parmusi was expressed in a telegram sent by his State Secretary, Alamsjah Ratuperwiranegara, to the party's leaders at the Malang Congress.

⁷² Afan Gaffar, "Islam dan Politik dalam Era Orde Baru," *Ulumul Qur'an*, vol.4, no. 2 (1993), 19 - 20.

⁷³ Ibid., 20.

⁷⁴ Karim, *Perjalanan*, 158.

moral commitment between the party and the government."⁷⁵ In the words of Ajip Rosidi, "the party had been set up to serve the interests of the government rather than fulfill the needs of the Islamic community."⁷⁶

From the late 1960s until the early 1980s, the government quite often interfered in the internal affairs of political parties when they were in turmoil by promoting and supporting only pro-government candidates for the leadership of those parties. In such a situation, one might view the Parmusi and other political parties as "puppets" that could be manipulated by their master in accordance with his political will. Also, in such conditions, as Afan Gaffar has assessed it, "competitive general elections were not implemented."⁷⁷ To maintain democratic life, the government let political parties exist, but imposed strict controls upon them so that they would never attain enough strength to oppose the government.

In line with these severe policies, the government implemented prior to the 1971 general election a "floating mass" policy according to which political parties could not carry out activities at the village level. This government policy resulted in the loss of a great number of supporters for the Islamic parties, particularly the NU whose supporters were widely concentrated in the villages. On the other hand, the government, with a great number of village heads as part of its apparatus, remained active in politics and succeeded in winning widespread and effective support from the villagers for the Golkar. The government also applied a policy of "single loyalty" in which all Korpri⁷⁸ members had to vote only for the Golkar, for to do otherwise

⁷⁵ See Ward, *Foundation*, 40.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Gaffar, "Islam dan Politik," 18.

⁷⁸ For more information on the Korpri, see Korpri, *Korps Pegawai Republik*

would elicit administrative punishment. Consequently, political parties lost their supporters among the public servants. Under such circumstances, coupled with other tactics employed by the government, it is not surprising that the Golkar won the 1971 election, while the Islamic parties, as well as the secular nationalist parties, lost heavily, as we have already seen.

Two years after the 1971 general election, the New Order government implemented a new policy of political restructuring consisting in a regrouping of all political parties, a policy which resulted in the formation of the PPP and the PDI in addition to the Golkar.⁷⁹ The PPP, formally founded on January 5, 1973, is a fusion of four Islamic parties, namely the NU, PSII, Perti and Parmusi. As for the PDI (formally established on January 10, 1973), it is an amalgamation of the PNI, Parkindo, Partai Katholik, IPKI and Partai Murba. The government's justification of this policy was that it eliminated the political antagonism and instability which had occurred during the Old Order period due to the multi-party system.⁸⁰ With this political restructuring, the Soeharto regime believed that it would be able to concentrate its attention and efforts on political stability and national security, by which it could attain its goals of national development. All this political engineering was undertaken systematically by the government in an attempt at fashioning a new political format, particularly in the transitional period from the Old Order to the New Order.⁸¹

Indonesia (Jakarta : Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1972).

⁷⁹ In spite of its interest in seizing political power, the Golkar does not call itself a political party. It distinguishes itself from the political parties by claiming to be a functional group. This is indicated by laws regulating the political parties and the Golkar (Law no. 3/1975 and Law no. 3/1985 concerning political parties and Golkar).

⁸⁰ Fachry Ali and Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima, "Merosotnya Aliran dalam Partai Persatuan Pembangunan," in *Analisa Kekuatan Politik di Indonesia*, with foreword by Farchan Bulkin (Jakarta : LP3ES, 1988), 228.

⁸¹ Gaffar, "Islam dan Politik," 28.

In line with this policy, the New Order government launched its campaign of "depoliticizing" Islam which often, if not always, employed "authoritarian" acts in its efforts to achieve its political goals. Indeed, according to Gaffar, "authoritarianism" became one of the characteristics of the New Order government.⁸² The government's strict policies toward political Islam were encouraged by its suspicion that Islam was a political threat. This was notably due to its traumatic experience with the revolts of the Darul Islam which in the past had attempted to establish an Islam-based state in Indonesia. In addition, the military regime was always suspicious of the so-called 'right-wing extremists' or splinter groups of Muslims whom it regarded as posing threats to the Pancasila and the nation's unity.⁸³

In the meantime, the Muslims, who felt they had contributed much, if not the most, to the suppression of the PKI uprising, became increasingly frustrated with the government's policies since it showed sympathy towards the Christians (and the Secular group) by appointing their leaders to key positions. A religious dialogue between the Muslims and Christians, intended to harmonize relations which had grown tense following the PKI revolt, failed due to the Christians leaders' refusal to sign a charter which had been prepared by the president. While government officials portrayed Muslims as followers of the Darul Islam and as anti-Pancasila, the Christians, through their mass media, accused the Muslims of being a hindrance to modernization. As the *Mercu Suar* (the Muhammadiyah newspaper) stated :

From this forum we therefore convey to [President Suharto] the deepest feelings of the Muslim group we are representing. President Suharto must know that Muslims have been offended too frequently ... President Suharto naturally knows about the efforts of Sukarno and the Communist Party to wipe out the Muslims during the Guided Democracy period.

Now when Sukarno and the Communist Party have disappeared from the

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid., 20. Discussions of Muslim radical or splinter groups will be provided in Chapter III.

scene, it should not be thought that attempts to strike at the Muslims have vanished too. There are new enemies who are no less "fierce" against the Muslims. They belong to a group known in Islamic literature as "the Book Disciples" (Christians) who have grown big by virtue of the tolerance of the Muslims ...

Mr. President, last January you took the initiative and held a religious tolerance conference. It failed, and you know well that it failed not because the Muslims are against Pantja Sila [read : Pancasila] as was insinuated, but because the Christian group was obstinate and refused to sign the charter which you prepared.

Now, the MPRS has ended its sessions and it has failed due to attitudes which are the same as those displayed in the Religious Tolerance Conference. It would seem that tolerance need not be practiced for the Muslims. We feel that rulers in the past cared nothing about the long-standing wound in our heart.

Mr. President, we will support you and we will do our best so that you will succeed in your mission although we know that we will be continuously slandered as followers of Darul Islam, anti-Pantja Sila, and so on. In fact, we do not expect that you will have much confidence in our [Muslim] leaders because it has been widely published through their [Christian] mass media that the Muslims are only a hindrance to national development and modernization, and that the Muslims are merely disseminators of amulets and the like.

If that is what you think of us too, then we can do nothing, we can only hope and pray to God that you will succeed in your mission anyway.⁸⁴

2. RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

In 1973 full Muslim attention was directed towards the marriage bill which was being debated in the DPR. In the face of this critical issue, the PPP leaders were united, and gained widespread support from the 'ulamā' and other respected leaders of the Muslim community. The PPP leaders in the DPR along with various Islamic figures believed that the bill was secular in nature and contrary to Islamic doctrine. The Muslims referred, for example, to article 2 of the bill which stipulated that "a marriage is considered legitimate if it has been performed in front of a marriage registration officer, registered in the marriage registration office by the officer, and performed in accordance with this law."⁸⁵ In the eyes of Muslim community leaders,

⁸⁴ *Mercu Suar* [Lighthouse], April 4, 1968; quoted and translated by Allan A. Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," *Asian Survey*, vol. 8, no. 12 (December 1968), 1014 - 1015.

⁸⁵ Direktorat Jenderal Hukum dan Perundang-undangan Departemen Kehakiman,

this bill diminished the role of the Islamic religious courts and gave too many rights to secular officers. These critics also maintained that the bill did not consider a Muslim marriage legitimate if it was not registered in the marriage registration office. This kind of procedure, in the view of the Islamic group, was contrary to Islamic precepts.⁸⁶

From the very beginning, Hamka, one of Indonesia's most prominent and influential 'ulamā', expressed his opposition to the bill. He vigorously called for Muslims to reject it by saying that "if the bill is passed, the Muslims should neither accept nor implement it. If a Muslim acknowledges the other law on marriage rather than Islamic law, accordingly, this action is an act of religious infidelity."⁸⁷ As a consequence, Muslim demonstrations against the bill took place in Jakarta voicing disagreement with its "secular" nature. In condemning the bill, the Islamic group claimed that it was encouraged by anti-Islamic elements, and was prepared without proper consultation with the 'ulamā' and respected Muslim figures on the one hand, and without including the Ministry of Religious Affairs in its preparation on the other.⁸⁸

The Islamic group even asserted that the marriage bill was tendentious and was intended to Christianize Indonesia.⁸⁹ Shouting *Allāhu Akbar*, the demonstrators, consisting chiefly of Muslim youth and student organizations, advanced the demand that the bill be brought in line with the teachings of Islam. Partly due to strong and

Sekitar Pembentukan Undang-Undang Perkawinan Beserta Peraturan Pelaksanaannya (Jakarta : n.d.), 11.

⁸⁶ See *Tempo*, September 8, 1973, 6 - 10; see also *Tempo*, September 22, 1973, 8 - 9.

⁸⁷ Quoted by Umaid Radi, *Strategi PPP 1973 - 1982 : Suatu Studi Tentang Kekuatan Politik Islam Tingkat Nasional* (Jakarta : Integrita Press, 1984), 123.

⁸⁸ *Tempo*, September 8, 1973, 6.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

widespread Muslim support, the PPP faction in the DPR, though consisting of 94 members only, succeeded in defeating the bill, and forcing fundamental changes which made it acceptable to Muslims.⁹⁰ Article 2, which had become one of the most controversial issues in the DPR debates, was changed to the following :

1. A marriage is legitimate if it has been performed according to the laws of the respective religions and beliefs of the parties concerned.
2. Every marriage shall be registered according to the regulations of the legislation in force.⁹¹

Another conflict between the government and the Muslims erupted in 1978, when Minister of Education and Culture Daed Joesoef, through letter of decision no. 0211/U/1978, carried out a policy of limiting the holiday season during the month of *Ramadhān*, which had been observed for decades, even in the colonial period. Joesoef stated that the government would carry out its policy by closing the elementary, junior and senior high schools for ten days only : the first three days of *Ramadhān* and seven days after the celebration of *Īdul Fitr*.⁹² This policy, said Joesoef, was based on a thorough investigation of many Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Malaysia, where school activities continued to take place during the month of *Ramadhān*, and the 'ulamā' did not raise any objections.⁹³ Reacting strongly to the minister's policy, the MUI (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, or Council of Indonesian 'Ulamā') leaders, led by their chairman Hamka, expressed their objection and called for a full vacation during *Ramadhān*, as had been the case previously. Hamka then maintained that the Muhammadiyah during the month of *Ramadhān* would stop its

⁹⁰ For a detailed account of the marriage law affair, see J. S. Katz and R. S. Katz, "The New Indonesian Marriage Law : A Mirror of Political, Cultural and Legal System," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, vol. 23, no. 4 (Fall 1975), 653 - 681.

⁹¹ Direktorat Jenderal Hukum, *Sekitar Pembentukan*, 253.

⁹² See *Tempo*, June 2, 1979, 8.

⁹³ Ibid.

school activities as usual, even though the subsidies it received from the government would be eliminated.⁹⁴

Vigorous opposition to this policy also came from Nuddin Lubis, chairman of the PPP faction in the DPR, who, referring to education Law no. 4/1950, said that vacations for state schools were regulated by considerations of educational interest, seasonal conditions, religious tradition and national holidays. He was of the opinion that this law should be modified if the *Ramadhān* vacation was to be changed. "If we live in a state based on laws," he said, "all action should be taken according to the laws." He then urged the minister of education and culture not to force his policy upon the Muslims.⁹⁵ Furthermore, Nuddin Lubis admitted that in Saudi Arabia there is no special holiday during the month of *Ramadhān* because vacation time has been given in the summer. According to Lubis, comparing the application of vacation times in Indonesia with those in Saudi Arabia was irrelevant since the geographical conditions of the two countries were totally different. Attacking Joesoef's statement that there was no religious injunction for giving a vacation during *Ramadhān*, Lubis also argued that there was no religious command for not giving a vacation beyond *Ramadhān*.⁹⁶

In the view of Muslims, the *Ramadhān* holiday, as it had been applied for decades, was intended to provide a tranquil atmosphere for students of elementary, junior and senior high schools to fast and to perform other religious duties, including the *ṣalāt al-tarāwīḥ* during the nights of *Ramadhān*. They would not be able to do so properly if the *Ramadhān* vacation was not fully given to them. Despite strong Muslim

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

opposition, the government insisted on implementing this policy.⁹⁷

In a further development, Muslim religious sensibilities were once again offended when many state senior high schools prohibited their Muslim female students from wearing the *jilbab* (a piece of clothing covering the head). According to school discipline, all female students of state senior high schools had to wear a school uniform without covering their heads. The wearing of the *jilbab* by Muslim female students, which took place for instance at State Senior High School 6 in Surabaya, State Senior High School 3 in Bandung, State Senior High School 68 in Jakarta and State Teachers' Training School in Cirebon, was regarded by the school principals as a violation of school discipline which had been stipulated "from above" (read : Department of Education and Culture). To maintain order in the schools, State Teachers' Training School in Cirebon, for example, in 1989 dismissed three Muslim female students for wearing the *jilbab*.⁹⁸ Their dismissal aroused the anger of groups of Muslim students from state senior high schools and Muslim university students in Cirebon and Bandung: they marched in the streets, expressing their solidarity and protesting against the school principal's policy.

Muslim opposition to the bans spread to various cities in the country. Some parents of Muslim female students studying at State Senior High School 3 in Jakarta even challenged its school principal for his policy of banning the *jilbab*.⁹⁹ The Jakarta court, however, did not accept those parents' charges, because, in its view, the school

⁹⁷ A detailed record of the Muslim opposition to the shortening of the *Ramadhan* vacation can be read in *Pendidikan Agama dan Kaitannya dengan Libur Sekolah Bulan Puasa* (Jakarta : Mercu Baru, n. d.).

⁹⁸ *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 634 (January 10, 1990), 2.

⁹⁹ *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 623 (September 20, 1989), 20. *Tempo*, December 11, 1982 under its section "Agama" (Religion) also discussed a similar issue.

principal had acted in the interest of maintaining order in the school. Many of the 'ulamā' and intellectual Muslims argued that the bans on the jilbab were not wise and should be abolished. In advancing their argument, they gave the analogy of Sikhs who wear a special dress, and need not remove their turbans if they enter military service. In the view of Muslims, wearing the jilbab is a religious obligation, and a ban on it would be against their religious beliefs. One of the Qur'ānic verses to which Muslims refer on the question of the jilbab reads :

"O Prophet! Say to your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers that they let down upon them their over-garments; this will be more proper, that they may be known, and thus they will not be given trouble..."¹⁰⁰

At the national level, this issue also attracted the attention of the Muslim political élites. Ny. Safinah Oedin, a member of the PPP faction in the DPR, responded to the ban by referring to article 29 of the 1945 constitution, which guarantees religious freedom for all religious groups. In Oedin's view, the wearing of the jilbab by Muslim women was a religious practice which was guaranteed by the constitution. "It is inhuman if they [Muslim female students] are prevented from practicing their religion," she said, and then asked : "Would we treat article 29 of the 1945 constitution simply as a decoration [without legal force]?"¹⁰¹

The MUI of the West Java region responded to this issue by issuing a *fatwā* stating that the wearing of the jilbab was obligatory for Muslim women.¹⁰² In

¹⁰⁰ Sūra XXXIII : 59. The Muslims also referred to verse 31 of sūra al-Nūr (XXIV). Not all Muslims interpret these verses in the same way. I was told by Dr. Nurcholish Madjid that K. H. Saifuddin Zuhri, a leading figure of the NU, was of the opinion that the wearing of the jilbab is required only if Muslim women are performing prayer.

¹⁰¹ *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 634 (January 10, 1990), 2.

¹⁰² See Yunan Nasution, *Islam dan Problema-Problema Kemasyarakatan* (Jakarta : Bulan Bintang, 1988), 135.

addition, the central board of the MUI sent a letter to the minister of education and culture stating that the wearing of the jilbab neither disturbed school harmony nor hampered its teaching and learning process.¹⁰³ In an emotional reaction K. H. Hasan Basri (b. 1920), chairman of the MUI, said that the wearing of the jilbab had nothing to do with politics, and considered the bans "authoritarian."¹⁰⁴ He then appealed to the Department of Education and Culture to take action against school principals who had imposed the bans. In fact, this issue became a "vicious circle" because, as mentioned above, they imposed the bans on the jilbab based on instructions "from above" in the form of a letter of decision no. 052/C/Kep/D.82 issued by the director general of elementary, junior and senior high schools in the Department of Education and Culture. Finally, as a result of consultations with Muslim figures and MUI leaders, the Department of Education and Culture resolved this sensitive issue by providing an opportunity for Muslim female students wearing the jilbab to move to private schools run by Muslims. This policy, however, did not fully satisfy the Muslims.

B. THE GOVERNMENT POLICY OF APPLYING THE P 4 (GUIDELINES FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PRACTICING THE PANCASILA)

Until 1969 the New Order continued the Old Order's policy of commemorating the birthday of the Pancasila every first of June. Since 1970, however, the New Order has stopped this policy in favour of commemorating the *Hari Kesaktian* (Day of Supernatural Power) of the Pancasila every first of October. Soeharto's remarkable success in destroying the PKI rebellion of September 30, 1965 undoubtedly inspired him to commemorate the Day of Supernatural Power of the Pancasila on October 1 of every year. This new policy was in line with the government's belief that all attempts

¹⁰³ Ibid., 136.

¹⁰⁴ *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 634 (January 10, 1990), 2.

at rebellion by any group aiming to replace the Pancasila with other ideologies will always end in failure. The survival of the Pancasila through all the critical moments faced by the country, has led Soeharto firmly to believe that the Pancasila, as the philosophical basis and national ideology of the state, is undeniable. "Due to its truth, any group which would change the Pancasila will meet with destruction," said Soeharto.¹⁰⁵

NATIONAL CONSENSUS AND THE PROTECTION OF THE PANCASILA

Believing in the truth of the Pancasila as the philosophical basis and national ideology of the state, Soeharto has persisted in protecting and defending it against all threats, and has considered its advocacy a matter of life and death for the Indonesian nation:

We have not a single doubt about the truth of the Pancasila for the benefit, happiness and safety of the life of our nation. It is true that the Pancasila has been undergoing many serious tests, even up till the present moment. It is true that there have been various attempts -- some of which even employed violent means -- at uprooting the Pancasila from the hearts of the Indonesian people. There have been several efforts to change our state philosophy for others which are different from the Pancasila. However, at these critical moments, at these decisive moments, all those attempts have been thwarted by the Indonesian people themselves. All this shows that the Pancasila has truly become part of our life. And even more, the Pancasila is the soul of all of us, the soul of the entire Indonesian people, which we have to advocate as we defend our souls against any threatening danger. All Indonesian people have to defend the Pancasila against any attempt to pluck it from their life. ... The Pancasila has become a matter of life and death for our nation.¹⁰⁶

Soeharto made every effort to safeguard the Pancasila shortly after he came to power

¹⁰⁵ *Pandangan Presiden Soeharto Tentang Pancasila*, ed. by Krissantono (Jakarta : CSIS, 1976), 25. A similar opinion can be read in *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁰⁶ Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik Indonesia, *Bahan Referensi Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 dan Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara* (Jakarta : Sekretariat Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik Indonesia, n.d.).

in 1966. The results of his efforts were, among other things, that two points of national consensus were achieved between the leaders of ABRI and those of all other socio-political forces.

The first national consensus stated that both ABRI and all socio-political forces agreed to continue to defend the Pancasila following the G30S/PKI revolt. This consensus was confirmed by the MPRS enactment no. XX/MPRS/1966. In fact, this enactment was the legalization of the DPRGR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong*, or People's Representative Council for Mutual Cooperation) memorandum concerning the sources of legal order and legislation of the Republic of Indonesia formulated on June 9, 1966. It reads : (1) the Pancasila is the source of all legal principles of the Republic of Indonesia, and (2) the preamble of the 1945 constitution contains the noble ideals of the proclamation of independence of 17 August, 1945, and also the Pancasila as the basis of the state, which is inseparable from the proclamation of Indonesian independence. Therefore, the Pancasila cannot be changed by any group, including the elected MPR members, even though, according to article 37 of the 1945 constitution, they have the right to do so. Any change to the preamble of the 1945 constitution, Soeharto explained, would mean the breakup of the state.¹⁰⁷

The second national consensus between ABRI and all socio-political forces was established in 1968 in which both sides agreed that ABRI would not take part in general elections, but would receive one-third of the seats in the MPR instead (see above). This, Soeharto argued, was not contrary to the 1945 constitution.¹⁰⁸ This consensus was confirmed by Law no. 16/1969 regulating the structure and position of the MPR, DPR and DPRD (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*, or Regional People's

¹⁰⁷ *Tempo*, June 14, 1980, 8. See also *Pandangan Presiden Soeharto*, 18 - 19.

¹⁰⁸ *Tempo*, June 14, 1980, 8 - 9.

Representative Council). Again, the goal of this consensus, according to Soeharto, was to protect and safeguard the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution against any group which would attempt to make changes.

The Soeharto regime's protection of the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, as illustrated above, was very thorough. In view of the national consensus, coupled with the decisive political dominance of the Golkar and ABRI factions in the DPR/MPR, it was impossible for any group to make changes to the Pancasila or the 1945 constitution. In spite of this fact, Soeharto sought further guarantees chiefly because he was still suspicious of groups of Muslims who, in his view, wanted to replace the Pancasila with an Islamic-oriented ideology, especially after the collapse of Indonesian Communism. "By promoting the Pancasila," said Leo Suryadinata, "the government hoped to counterbalance Islamic ideology."¹⁰⁹

The government's suspicion of the Muslims became stronger when, as Allan A. Samson notes, the representatives of Islamic parties "pressed for legalization of the Jakarta Charter as the preamble to the 1945 constitution"¹¹⁰ during the MPRS session of 1968, but failed. It became clear that there was in fact mutual suspicion between the government and the Muslims. According to Deliar Noer,

the widening gap between the Muslims and the government, and increasingly mutually suspicious attitudes, can perhaps be related to Pancasila, the principles on which the state is founded. While almost everybody in Indonesia now agrees with Pancasila, the Muslims feel that the government wants to "secularize" the five principles; on the other hand, the government feels that the Muslims want to "Islamize" them.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Suryadinata, *Military Ascendancy*, 105.

¹¹⁰ Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," 1012. See also Mohamad Atho Mudzhar, "Fatwās of the Council of Indonesian Ulama : A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia 1975 - 1988," (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1990), 53.

¹¹¹ Deliar Noer, "Contemporary Political Dimension of Islam," in M. B. Hooker, ed., *Islam in Southeast Asia* (Leiden : Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 198.

Thus, the root of the inharmonious relationship between the government and the Muslims originated in their long and deep mutual suspicion. According to Suryadinata, it was also possible that the government's suspicion of the Muslims "was influenced by the Iranian political situation"¹¹² which reached its culmination with the overthrow of the Shah by Muslim 'fundamentalists' led by Ayatullah Ruhullah Khomeini. Donald K. Emmerson describes the roots of suspicion between the government and the Muslims as follows :

The government worries that Muslim groups will use their faith to break up the state. Muslim groups fear that the state will be used to break up their faith. By thinking the worst of its opponent, and behaving accordingly, each side unintentionally confirms the suspicion of the other.¹¹³

SOEHARTO'S VIEWS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE P 4

It was in light of this suspicion, and of the Muslims in particular, that Soeharto persisted in making every effort to safeguard the Pancasila as the basis and national ideology of the state; no single group or force should exist in the country which would pose a threat to the Pancasila. Between 1976 and 1977, Soeharto, in several national speeches, began to put forward the idea of formulating the P 4 which would serve as an official guide to comprehending and implementing the Pancasila. He believed that a simple, practical and understandable elaboration of the Pancasila in the form of the P 4 was urgently needed for all Indonesians, in order that they might be able to practice the values and doctrines of the Pancasila in their everyday life. In his speech before the opening ceremony of the national congress of the *Pramuka* (*Praja Muda Karana*, or Girl Guides and Boy Scouts) held in Jakarta on April 12, 1976, he appealed to the people to pledge themselves to realize the Pancasila, and proposed the name *Eka*

¹¹² Suryadinata, *Military Ascendancy*, 105.

¹¹³ Donald K. Emmerson, "Islam in Modern Indonesia : Political Impasse, Cultural Opportunity," in Philip H. Stoddard et al., eds., *Change and the Muslim World* (Syracuse, New York : Syracuse University Press, 1981), 160.

Prasetia for the pledge :

We have possessed the Pancasila for a long time. But it is not sufficient, and we do not desire that we simply possess it; we want to implement it, we promise to put it into practice, we pledge to realize it: starting from the principle of man as a social being, as a personality who can practice self-control in his life in society. This is the pledge to ourselves : that with all our courage and ability we forever struggle to control our self-interest in order to fulfill our duty as social beings in carrying out the Pancasila life, let us call it '*Eka Prasetia*' [The Single Pledge].¹¹⁴

In Soeharto's mind, to practice the Pancasila, every Indonesian citizen should pronounce a pledge to himself/herself, since practicing the Pancasila should originate from the bottom of his/her own consciousness. He proposed the name *Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa* for the intended formulation of the P 4, which he saw as a firm, strong, consistent and sincere promise to realize five ideals :

1. Submission to One God and respect for people who hold different religions and beliefs;
2. Loving our fellow-man by always considering others, not acting arbitrarily, and being tolerant;
3. Loving homeland; placing the state and nation's interests over personal interests;
4. Being democratic and obeying people's legitimate decisions;
5. Being helpful; using what we possess to help another so that we can increase the capacity of that other.¹¹⁵

The *Tim Pembinaan Penatar P 4* (Team for Supervising the Instructors of the P 4 course), by relying heavily on Soeharto's ideas on the importance of the creation of the P 4 and on the MPR enactment no. II/1978 on the P 4, formulated some important reasons why the P 4 was needed for all Indonesians. These reasons will be summarized here.

First, several revolts in the past, such as those of the Darul Islam, the G30S/PKI and other groups indicated that some doubted the truth of the Pancasila, and therefore

¹¹⁴ *Bahan Referensi Penataran*, 58 - 59.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 59.

revolted against it with the aim of replacing it with other ideologies. This kind of doubt had to be eliminated, and the truth of the Pancasila as the basis and national ideology of the state should be completely believed and enforced. In light of these facts, the government felt that the P 4 was necessary for all Indonesians to understand and practice the Pancasila properly.

Second, the notion of the Pancasila was distorted during the Old Order regime period by equating it with the Nasakom, a distortion that undoubtedly obscured its true meaning. In order to have a consistent guide to understanding the Pancasila and to practicing it accordingly in everyday life, the Indonesians needed the P 4.

Third, the values of the Pancasila should be implanted in the hearts of all Indonesians, especially in the souls of the younger generation in the face of a process of national development which has brought social, economic and cultural changes to the life of the nation. Indonesians should remain Indonesians with their own identity and personality, which is deeply rooted in the values of the Pancasila, although they should also accept the ideas of modernism.

Fourth, the creation of the P 4 was motivated by the replacement of the old generation by a new generation. The values of the Pancasila should be transferred from the older to the younger generation through the P 4 so that its values and its doctrines would continue to be preserved properly.

Fifth, the formulation of the P 4 was made even more important by the radical and drastic international developments which had brought the influence of alien values and ideologies to Indonesians. The P 4 was expected to strengthen the morality and spirituality of the Indonesian people in the face of those influences. It should function as a filter through which the Indonesians could distinguish the positive and negative impacts of alien values and ideologies, rejecting the negative and accepting the

positive, thus enriching Indonesian values.¹¹⁶

An explicit and important rationale for the P 4, according to Michael Morfit, is "the need to explain the third Five-Year Development Plan (*Repelita* [*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun*] III), which officially began in 1978 and is to run to 1983. The decision of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), which established the legal authority for P 4, stressed the need for all civil servants to undergo P 4 so that they can better understand the various programs with which they are involved and so that they will become motivated to implement and administer those programs with greater commitment and enthusiasm"¹¹⁷ In the view of C. W. Watson, the P 4 was in fact a "tactical maneuver adopted by the government to deal with mounting criticism."¹¹⁸ Furthermore, Watson has also noted that the P 4

has been more thoroughly prepared and organized than earlier initiatives, yet the underlying principle is the same : that the morality of a nation can be effectively determined by legislation and the imposition of morality through decree. It might well be argued that the government, or at least its think-tank intellectuals, are more sophisticated than perhaps my account suggests, and that they are well aware of the limited efficacy of such a campaign. If so, then one can only conclude that P 4 is intended simply to disarm critics of the government temporarily by demonstrating that the government is concerned about the moral bankruptcy of the nation to which the critics refer. ... P4 with its call to self-restraint and its appeal to work for the good of society, at its best, is only to be seen as an attempt to prick the conscience of public officials, rather than a grandiose scheme for moral regeneration.¹¹⁹

In his attempt to formulate the P 4 for the sake of all Indonesians, President Soeharto frequently invited popular leaders and institutions, chiefly academicians and

¹¹⁶ Summarized from Team Penatar, *Bahan Penataran*, 13 - 20.

¹¹⁷ Michael Morfit, "Pancasila : the Indonesian State Ideology according to the New Order Government," *Asian Survey*, vol. 21, no. 8 (August 1981), 845.

¹¹⁸ C. W. Watson, "P 4 : The Resurrection of a National Ideology in Indonesia," in his *State and Society in Indonesia : Three Papers* (Canterbury : Centre of South-East Asian Studies, University of Kent, 1987), 48.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

scientists, to join him in thinking about and elucidating the values of the Pancasila in order to arrive at a simple, clear and understandable formulation. He proposed that the

MPR legalize this formulation :

Only a Pancasila person can establish a society based on the Pancasila. People who do not feel that they possess the Pancasila, who do not comprehend the Pancasila, who do not internalize the Pancasila, who do not love the Pancasila, will certainly have difficulty in developing an Indonesian society and a people who are Pancasilaist ... When we have reached full agreement about a guideline for understanding and implementing the Pancasila, then it will be most appropriate that together we make permanent that agreement in an official decree of the MPR ... Thus, it will not only be the Pancasila in its general formulation which we will possess together; we shall also have a guideline in understanding and elaborating the Pancasila which is more specific and clear. Thus it will also be obvious to us the road we should follow in observing the Pancasila in our daily lives."¹²⁰

It was President Soeharto himself who submitted the draft of the P 4 to the MPR with the aim of helping this representative body finish its task in as short a period of time as possible. All factions in the MPR were of the opinion that the formulation of the P 4 was needed for the preservation of the values of the Pancasila, and for the implementation of its doctrine and values. The PPP faction in the MPR, however, disagreed on the form by which the draft of the P 4 was to be legalized.¹²¹ This disagreement will be discussed later when we come to the Muslim response to the P 4.

The draft of the P 4 was finally approved by the MPR in its session on March 21, 1978, and its acceptance was confirmed by enactment no. II/MPR/1978. It is worth mentioning that the legalization of the P 4 was achieved through voting, in which all factions of the MPR, except the PPP, approved it. According to the MPR session's regulations, as well as the 1945 constitution, voting is allowed if unanimity cannot be reached by the people's representatives in the body.¹²² The fact that a vote

¹²⁰ *Pandangan Presiden Soeharto*, 88 - 89.

¹²¹ Team Penatar, *Bahan Penataran*, 25.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 26.

was held indicates that a serious disagreement had occurred between the PPP and other factions, chiefly the Golkar and ABRI, on the question of the legal form of the P 4.

However, once the P 4 was approved, it applied to all factions in the MPR and to all Indonesians without exception.

THE VALUES OF THE PANCASILA AS ELABORATED IN THE P 4

The P 4 provided simple and clear guidelines for understanding and practicing the five principles of the Pancasila. The P 4 described each principle of the Pancasila as important values and norms that should be understood, internalized and implemented by every member of Indonesian society in his/her everyday life. According to the Team Pembinaan Penatar P4, there were 36 values contained in the five principles of the Pancasila as elaborated in the P 4. These values were basically derived from the ideas expressed in Soeharto's many speeches delivered to the nation and from the MPR enactment no. II/1978 on the P 4. The first principle of the Pancasila (Belief in One God) was elucidated as follows :

- (1) Belief in and obedience to One God based on one's religion and faith in a just and civilized way;
- (2) Mutual respect and cooperation between the followers of different religions and beliefs so that religious tolerance can be established;
- (3) Respecting religious freedom; and
- (4) No imposition of religion or faith upon people of other religions.¹²³

The second principle, Just and Civilized Humanity, was elaborated into eight values or norms :

- (1) Acknowledging men's equal dignity, rights and duties;
- (2) Loving each other;
- (3) Developing tolerant attitudes;
- (4) Not doing injustice to other people;
- (5) Respecting human values;
- (6) Being willing to carry out humanitarian activities;
- (7) Being brave in defending truth and justice; and
- (8) That the Indonesian nation feel itself to be a part of mankind, and therefore

¹²³ Ibid., 37.

develop mutual respect and cooperation with other nations.¹²⁴

As for the Unity of Indonesia, the third principle of the Pancasila, it was elaborated as follows :

- (1) Placing the unity, integrity, safety and the interests of the nation and state over individual and group interests;
- (2) Being willing to sacrifice for the interests of the nation and state;
- (3) Loving homeland and nation;
- (4) Being proud to be Indonesian and possessing Indonesia as a homeland; and
- (5) Preserving friendship to maintain the nation's unity in diversity.¹²⁵

The values which were developed based on the fourth principle of the Pancasila (Democracy which is guided by wisdom arising out of deliberation among the people's representatives) read as follows :

- (1) Giving priority to the state and people's interests;
- (2) Not imposing one's will upon others;
- (3) Upholding consultation in making decisions for the common interest;
- (4) Conducting deliberation in order to reach unanimity based on the family spirit;
- (5) Carrying out the results of deliberation with a sense of responsibility;
- (6) Deliberation being implemented based on common sense and a noble conscience; and
- (7) Any decision made should be morally accountable to the One God; respecting the dignity of man and the values of truth and justice.¹²⁶

The fifth and last principle, namely Social Justice for the whole of the Indonesian people, was elaborated into twelve values :

- (1) Performing good deeds which reflect togetherness and cooperation;
- (2) Doing justice;
- (3) Maintaining the balance between rights and duties;
- (4) Respecting the rights of other people;
- (5) Being willing to give assistance to other people;
- (6) Avoiding exploitation of other people;
- (7) Not being prodigal;
- (8) Not leading a luxurious life;

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 37 - 38.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 38.

- (9) Not doing something harmful to the public;
- (10) Having the motivation to work hard;
- (11) Appreciating the works of other people; and
- (12) Struggling together to achieve progress and social welfare.¹²⁷

Every member of Indonesian society was obliged to put the above values into practice in order to be a "Pancasila person". The government believed that if every member of Indonesian society succeeded in turning himself/herself into a Pancasila person, then a Pancasila family could be established and, in turn, a Pancasila society; that is, a society based on the values of the Pancasila mentioned in the P 4 above.

THE SOCIALIZATION OF THE P 4

Following the legalization of the P 4 by the MPR in 1978, a committee called the BP 7 (*Penasehat Presiden tentang Pelaksanaan P 4*, or Committee for Advising the President on the P 4), chaired by Dr. Roeslan Abdulgani (b. 1914), a former PNI leader who used to be the spokesman for President Soekarno during the pre-New Order period, was founded in Jakarta with the task of advising the president on the implementation of the government's policies respecting the P 4. The BP 7 (*Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Pelaksanaan P 4*, or Committee for Supervising and Perfecting the Implementation of the P 4) was also established in Jakarta to coordinate the implementation of the program of the P 4 course carried out at the national and regional levels. In addition, another body (already referred to above) known as the *Team Pembinaan Penatar P 4* (Team for Supervising the Instructors of the P4 course) was created. Books and reference materials on the P 4 course were produced, to which all instructors of the P 4 course and officials would refer when teaching, and to which all participants in the P 4 course, and people in general, would also refer in order to understand the Pancasila. A magazine called *Mimbar BP 7* (Pulpit of the BP 7) was

¹²⁷ Ibid., 38 - 39.

also published in Jakarta with a national mission to spread and socialize the values of the Pancasila among Indonesians, as elaborated in the P 4.

In their attempts to socialize the values of the Pancasila in the lives of Indonesians, the central, regional and local governments have regularly undertaken to teach the P 4 course which lasts about two weeks. All government workers and all members of the armed forces have to take this course, and passing is mandatory. At the beginning of every academic year, junior and senior high schools as well as universities throughout the country, both private and state, give the P 4 course. All students are required to complete the P 4 course and thereby obtain a P 4 certificate. Other means are also utilized by the government in disseminating and socializing the ideals and values of the Pancasila. Nawaz B. Mody notes that "by 1983, 1,800,000 government employees and 1,500,000 members of the armed forces had been indoctrinated."¹²⁸

It is undeniable that the implementation of the P 4 course has required and will continue to require spending a lot of government money. All this has been done by the government to spread the doctrine, ideals and values of the Pancasila through the P 4 course, in the belief that the Pancasila will take deep root in the hearts of Indonesians.

The government is confident that the Pancasila will not only be spoken of by people from time to time, but also be practiced by them in their daily lives. The implementation of the P 4 course in the eyes of the government is a must, in spite of the expense, because the success of the program will provide all Indonesian people with a strong ideological and ethical basis derived from the Pancasila. The value of this ethical basis goes beyond money. This is due to the fact that the Pancasila, as President Soeharto said, is a matter of life and death for the nation, and for which

¹²⁸ Mody, *Indonesia*, 335.

sacrifices, both material and emotional, must be made.

The importance of the notion and function of the Pancasila was clearly explained by the Team Pembinaan Penatar P 4 in order that it could be easily understood, internalized and then implemented by all participants of the P 4 course. The Team mentioned at least seven notions or functions of the Pancasila which will be summarized below.

First, the Pancasila is the soul of the Indonesian people and has given them spirit, optimism, endurance and patriotism in their struggle to achieve freedom, happiness and welfare. In the words of Soeharto, the Pancasila was not born suddenly in 1945, but had already existed along with the Indonesian people and had matured through a long historical process of struggle and observation of other nations' experiences. The Pancasila was inspired by the world's great ideas, but yet has deep and strong roots in the life of the Indonesian people.¹²⁹ It is in light of this notion that the Pancasila is believed to be the crystallization of values flourishing in Indonesian culture. As the soul of the Indonesian people, the Pancasila is believed to have allowed the Indonesian nation to survive in the face of historical challenges, and it will continue to do so in the future.

Second, the Pancasila is the Indonesian personality, which gives the people a distinct character and distinguishes them from other nations. Every nation has its own way of life which reflects its personality; the Pancasila, thus, gives the Indonesians a distinct personality and specific identity. It is firmly believed that not only does the Pancasila give a distinct character to the Indonesians, but it also develops that personality and identity in their lives. In performing this function, the Pancasila is believed to be able to maintain the Indonesian character and personality in the face of

¹²⁹ *Pandangan Presiden Soeharto*, 24.

identity crises. Without the Pancasila, the Indonesian people would lose their distinct identity and personality. In the words of Soeharto, it would be against the nature of social development if the Indonesian nation, which already has a noble personality, were to remove the Pancasila from its life.¹³⁰

Third, the Pancasila is a philosophy and way of life for Indonesians which allows them, in Soeharto's view, to see clearly all the problems they face and to achieve their lives' goals. Without a philosophy and way of life, Soeharto said further, a nation will be shaken by large and complex problems, both domestic and international.¹³¹ Without the Pancasila, Indonesians will lose their spirit and capacity to overcome problems. Thus, for Indonesians, the Pancasila is both a way of life and the goal of life.

Fourth, the Pancasila serves as a noble agreement which Indonesians have to defend forever, since it was and is able to unite all religious and ethnic groups existing in the country.¹³² The Pancasila has proved its worth in the sense that it has succeeded in defending itself against various threats posed to it by its opponents. By holding firmly to it, said Soeharto, Indonesians can maintain their freedom, unity and integrity throughout history.¹³³

Fifth, the Pancasila functions as the philosophical basis and national ideology of the state as clearly mentioned in the preamble of the 1945 constitution. In this sense, the Pancasila serves to give a philosophical foundation and ideological basis to the Indonesians in their struggle to develop themselves and to achieve their social and

¹³⁰ Ibid., 35.

¹³¹ Ibid., 27.

¹³² Ibid., 25.

¹³³ Ibid., 25.

political goals. The Pancasila provides a philosophical basis and an ideological framework for establishing a Pancasila society.¹³⁴

Sixth, the Pancasila serves as an ethical and spiritual basis for national development in Indonesia, whose citizens have the goal of attaining temporal and spiritual happiness both in this world and the next.¹³⁵ Thus, the Pancasila, for Indonesians, serves as ethical and moral guidance, as well as a world-view that guides them to the goals and ideals of their life as a nation.

Seventh, the Pancasila serves as the source of all legal order and legislation in Indonesia. This means that the Pancasila should be consulted and referred to in issuing any laws; there should be no laws, bills, regulations, decrees or decisions that contradict the Pancasila. The Pancasila, in Soeharto's words, should color the social, cultural and legal life of the Indonesian nation.¹³⁶

In addition to all this, the Pancasila is believed to be a totality whose five principles cannot be separated from one another. The five principles of the Pancasila might be universal in nature and exist randomly in other nations, but the Pancasila as a coherent totality covering those five principles exists only in Indonesia. So, according to the Team, it is the Pancasila which makes the Indonesians unique and distinguishes them from other nations.¹³⁷

The way in which the Team and government officials in general defended the indigenous Indonesian values, identity, personality and way of life against other

¹³⁴ Ibid., 36.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 28.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 29.

¹³⁷ Team Pembinaan Penatar, *Bahan Penataran*, 10.

values and systems attracted criticism from Taufik Abdullah, a noted historian who had graduated from Cornell University. Abdullah has recently referred to their defense as "cultural relativism."¹³⁸ By mimicking the officials' repeated phrases, "We have our own cultural and traditional values, why should we adopt another system which may not be consistent with them?" or "We Indonesians are created like this, so why should we change or adopt a foreign system of democracy?"¹³⁹ he attacks this cultural relativism as a justification for Indonesia's current political system. In the view of Abdullah, the nation will stagnate if it continues on this path. This approach is curtailing the democratization process because it encourages self-indulgence and complacency. He goes on to say that "the obsession of maintaining national identity is constraining our democracy. It spurs conservatism in ideology and politics."¹⁴⁰ He warns that indifference toward universal democratic values will turn Indonesia into an introverted and chauvinistic nation. In his opinion, cultural relativism will lead to the creation of a tiresome jargon in which the word Pancasila appears incessantly, such as in the phrases Pancasila Democracy, Pancasila industrial relations and others.

Furthermore, Taufik Abdullah points out that the founding fathers of the Republic of Indonesia, who were "intellectually orphaned," carried out experiments with democracy in the early years after independence in 1945. Their failure to implement liberal democracy was due to the fact that the nation was not disposed to use it. He goes on to say, "But it is unwise if we use cultural interpretation for the failure of their experiments, and say that such a type of democracy is unsuited to the character of our nation."¹⁴¹ He then warns that "the danger of using this framework is

¹³⁸ See *Jakarta Post*, January 26, 1994.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

that what is historical becomes ideological." He continues his criticism by saying that national unity has been utilized as a pretext to suppress demands for more democracy, while the government is armed with historical facts to support its position.¹⁴² As a matter of fact, the government argues that liberal democracy is not suitable for Indonesia since it results in political antagonism and instability.

For its part, the working team of the P 7 stated that based on its observations, the implementation of the P 4 course had become routine, and that many participants were fed up with it.¹⁴³ The working team conducted its observations in 1989, during which period the program of the P 4 course reached its twentieth year of implementation.

According to Dr. Roeslan Abdulgani, chairman of the P 7, the results of his working team's observations were reported to the president, and it was left to him to decide a new policy on further action. He moreover asserted that people were in agreement with his working team's observations, as indicated by the wide coverage given to discussing the matter in various newspapers.¹⁴⁴

However, there was disagreement from a certain circle of officials who questioned the validity of the results of the working team's observations. In order to assure the government that everything related to the implementation of the P 4 program was running well, these officials even warned that the results of the working team's observations should be doubted.¹⁴⁵ A pro and contra argument regarding this issue broke out among the people. In response to the disagreement of these officials,

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 631 (December 1, 1989), 18.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

Abdulgani said that everything related to the P 4 course should be openly discussed and evaluated, and should not be hidden. By doing so, improvements of the implementation of the P 4 course could be made in order to achieve its ideal results.

He also stated that it was normal that a sense of "boredom" should sometimes occur in the implementation of the P 4 course. Commenting on the attitude of these officials in pandering to the government, Abdulgani said, "...with the prevalence of the officials' mental attitude of pleasing their boss (ABS, *asal bapak senang*), they regard our observations [of the implementation of the P 4 course] as a fabricated finding."¹⁴⁶ He warned that this attitude was dangerous, and that with this kind of mentality, "How can we make improvements [for the program of the P 4 course]?"¹⁴⁷

C. MUSLIM RESPONSE TO AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE P 4

This section will analyze the reaction of the Islamic party, the PPP, to the proposal of the P 4 debated in the MPR general session of March 1978, and the reaction of Muslims in general to the government policy of putting it into practice in society. It will also consider the reaction to another proposal debated at the same time extending official recognition of the existence of *aliran kepercayaan*¹⁴⁸ (Javanese

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ The primary purpose of the teachings of the aliran kepercayaan is to achieve existential unity between its followers and the One Supreme God (*manunggaling kawula Gusti*). Scattered through many parts of the country, but mostly in Java, the aliran kepercayaan promotes mystical practices, most of which are basically derived from Islamic mysticism. See, for instance, Kamil Kartapraja, *Aliran Kebatinan dan Kepercayaan* (Jakarta : Yayasan Masagung, 1985). Religiously speaking, most followers of the aliran kepercayaan are Muslim and do not want to be included in other groups. However, santris (devout Muslims) object to most of the teachings of the aliran kepercayaan since its followers hold many old Javanese beliefs which are not Islamic. The name aliran kepercayaan, formerly called aliran kebatinan (lit. : stream of esoterism), became popular shortly before its existence was legalized in 1978 by the MPR.

spiritualism). To understand the Muslim reaction to the P 4, it is necessary to observe briefly relations between the Muslims and the government before the MPR session.

During the rise of the New Order, the government and the Muslims cooperated in quelling the PKI uprising. Their "honeymoon", however, had ended by 1969, having deteriorated due to the government's "severe" attitude towards the Muslims and the latter's reactions to this attitude. Tensions and conflicts between the two sides were common, and they intensified in the 1977 election campaign, during which the PPP raised the issues of corruption, misuse of official positions, intimidation, violence and detention as well as the secular tendencies of government officials who happened to be Golkar supporters.¹⁴⁹ The government and the supporters of the Golkar on the other hand retaliated against the PPP by accusing it of receiving financial assistance from Libya during its electoral campaign, of forging vote forms, and of encouraging the involvement of its members in anti-government movements launched by radical Muslims known as the Komando Jihad.¹⁵⁰ In the meantime, K. H. Bisri Sansuri, chairman of the consultative council of the PPP, in an attempt to gain the political support of Muslims, issued a fatwā saying that every Muslim was legally obliged to vote for the PPP, and encouraged Muslims working as government servants not to be afraid to vote for the PPP, even though they could lose their jobs, status and income.

He stated :

In order to uphold the religion and law of Allah, every Muslim who participates in the 1977 general election, whether male or female, but chiefly a member of the PPP, is legally obliged to vote for the PPP when the time comes. Any Muslim who participates in the election but does not choose the PPP symbol, whether because of fear of losing income, status, or for any other reason, has abandoned the law of Allah.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics," 96.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Cited by Daniel Dhakidae, "Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia : Saksi Pasang Naik dan Surut Partai Politik," *Prisma*, no. 9 (September 1981), 36.

Furthermore, the PPP "claimed that a number of its 2 - 3 million followers in East Java were deprived of their right to vote because of malpractice in the electoral administration."¹⁵² Despite government pressure and fraud, the PPP, as we shall see, made a slight gain in the number of votes it received, as compared with the 1971 general election and, more importantly, was able to "humiliate" the Golkar in the capital, Jakarta. The Golkar was resentful of the PPP due to its defeat in the capital, where much more freedom was felt by Muslims in the election process.

William Liddle views the political atmosphere of the 1977 election as reflecting the incessant struggle between Islam and the government,¹⁵³ an election in which the latter once again succeeded in defeating the former, as shown in the following results : the PPP obtained only 29.29 percent (and the PDI only 8.6 percent) of the vote, which was still far below the vote secured by the Golkar (62.11 percent).¹⁵⁴ This meant that the PPP in the 1977 election gained only 2.18 percent more than the total vote received by the four Islamic parties in the 1971 election (27.11 percent). However, compared with the percentage of the vote (45 percent) gained by the Islamic parties in the 1955 election under the Old Order regime, the PPP's percentage in the 1977 election (29.29 percent) was far worse, indicating that the Muslims continued to suffer political losses.

Moreover, shortly before the 1978 MPR sessions, the government intensified its strict policies towards Muslims. ABRI issued a declaration on December 15, 1977 warning that "the armed forces as an apparatus of the state shall take firm measures on the basis of their authority against anybody carrying out activities that undermine the

¹⁵² Noer, "Contemporary Political Dimensions," 194.

¹⁵³ R. William Liddle, "Indonesia 1977 : The New Order's Second Parliamentary Election," *Asian Survey*, vol. 18, no. 2 (February 1978), 180 - 181.

¹⁵⁴ For a further account of the matter, see Dhakidae, "Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia," 17 - 40.

authority of the national leadership and disturb or foil the coming Assembly session..."¹⁵⁵ In keeping with this policy, the government detained many of the 'ulamā' and Muslim leaders on the accusation of inciting anti-government movements.

As Deliar Noer observed :

... many of their 'ulamā' have been banned from preaching at one time or another. Some of them have even been imprisoned. In 1978, about the time when the MPR was to convene for the election of the country's president, a number of Muslim leaders, including Mahbub Djunaedi (a former prominent member of the Indonesian Journalists' Association and current secretary of the PPP), Ismail Sunny (professor of constitutional law at the University of Indonesia and rector of the Muhammadiyah University), and Sutomo (well-known as Bung Tomo, the Surabaya hero, who in 1977 defended the Darul Islam movement against excessive accusations from certain government quarters) were detained. So was Imaduddin A. Rahim, a lecturer at the Bandung Institute of Technology who had been active in *dakwah* (missions) at home and abroad. They were released only about a year later.¹⁵⁶

MUSLIM REACTION TO THE ALIRAN KEPERCAYAAN

It was within this politically tense situation that the PPP on the one hand, and other factions, especially the Golkar and ABRI on the other, attended the MPR general session in March 1978, in which they debated, among other things, the legalization of the proposals of the P 4 and the aliran kepercayaan. The PPP faction in the MPR and the Muslim community in general expressed their objection to the legalization of the aliran kepercayaan on the grounds that if it were officially recognized, it would "be entitled to have the same privileges as Islam and other religions"¹⁵⁷ and, as a consequence, would "be reflected in the structure of the Department of Religion."¹⁵⁸ Also, if it were officially legalized, those of its followers who were Muslim (in fact the

¹⁵⁵ Leo Suryadinata and Sharon Shiddiqi, eds., *Trends in Indonesia II* (Singapore : Singapore University Press, 1981), 25.

¹⁵⁶ Noer, "Political Dimensions," 198.

¹⁵⁷ Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics," 83.

¹⁵⁸ Noer, "Political Dimension," 196.

majority) would no longer be called followers of Islam. In the view of Muslims, official recognition of the aliran kepercayaan would mean the institutionalization of the abangan culture as opposed to the santri culture, as these have been defined by Clifford Geertz.¹⁵⁹ Consequently, this would widen the gap between the abangans and the santris which, in turn, would result in a continuation of the psychological, cultural and political antagonism that had existed in the past. There was even widespread worry in Muslim circles that the legalization of the aliran kepercayaan would lead the government to recognize the movement as a new religion in addition to the recognized five (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism), whose affairs are administered by the Department of Religious Affairs.

Muslim concerns were based on the claims of aliran kepercayaan leaders who "demanded a recognition of their belief as a religion,"¹⁶⁰ which, of course, would allow them to have their own law like other religions. If their demands were met by the government, most followers of the aliran kepercayaan would desert Islamic marriage law, which they had followed for generations. This was what chiefly worried the Muslims who felt responsible for the maintenance and enforcement of the law of God. This issue touched on Muslim religious sensitivity, and provoked a wave of opposition which was launched by Muslim university students in Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta. They called for the rejection of the proposal. Many demonstrations took place, and their leaders were arrested by government security forces.¹⁶¹

Protest also took the form of walk-outs by the members of the PPP¹⁶² from the

¹⁵⁹ Radi, *Strategi PPP*, 146.

¹⁶⁰ Noer, "Political Dimension," 196.

¹⁶¹ Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics," 84, footnote 86.

¹⁶² Those who walked out of the session were the NU members within the PPP. Later, this tactic was employed by Jaelani Naro (executive chairman of the PPP) to

MPR when the proposal was legalized. These walk-outs took place because, as suggested by K. H. Bisri Sansuri, they were afraid they would be associated with *shirk* (polytheism) if they joined in legalizing the aliran kepercayaan.¹⁶³ They believed that their recognition of it would damage their Islamic faith in that they would be mixing their belief with the aliran kepercayaan doctrine in which they did not believe. Despite their protest, the proposal of the aliran kepercayaan was finally legalized and incorporated in the GBHN (*Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara*, or Broad Outlines of State Policies).

To appease the Muslims, President Soeharto and his government officers, in referring to the GBHN enactment no. IV/MPR/1978, repeatedly stated that the aliran kepercayaan "is not a religion," and the government's official recognition of its existence was intended only to supervise it, so that it would not transform itself "into a new religion."¹⁶⁴ The government stated that aliran kepercayaan is a culture, and as such should be preserved. Due to its status, the administration of the aliran kepercayaan falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education and Culture, and not under that of the Department of Religious Affairs.¹⁶⁵ In the wake of its legalization, the aliran kepercayaan, like the five recognized religions, was given the

ject the hard line members of the NU from the PPP, which resulted in a bitter conflict within the party.

¹⁶³ Radi, *Strategi PPP*, 150.

¹⁶⁴ Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik Indonesia, *Undang - Undang Dasar, Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila dan Garis - Garis Besar Haluan Negara* (Jakarta : Sekretariat Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik Indonesia, 1978), 77.

¹⁶⁵ Minister of Religious Affairs Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara issued two letters of instruction, nos. 4 of April 11, 1978 and 14 of April 11, 1978, respectively, informing all his officials at both the national and regional levels that his Department, whose task it was to tackle religious affairs, did not manage the aliran kepercayaan. See Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, *Pembinaan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia*, ed. by Hafizh Dasuki (Jakarta : Departemen Agama RI, 1981), 70. The instructions can be interpreted as an effort to alleviate Muslim fears about the status of the aliran kepercayaan.

opportunity to present a program (like a religious service) on Indonesian national television, which is broadcast once a week.

What the Muslims had feared from official recognition of the aliran kepercayaan became a reality when its followers put forward a controversial interpretation of article 29 of the 1945 constitution, which reads : "The state guarantees freedom upon every citizen to adhere to his/her own religion and to perform religious duties according to his/her own religion and belief." The disciples of the aliran kepercayaan claimed that the word "belief" in the article also included the notion of "belief" followed and practiced by them. Their claim seemed to be intended to secure the legal status of their belief, by which they could acquire the same privileges as the five officially acknowledged religions. Their claim soon became a controversial issue among the Indonesian people and elicited a strong reaction from the Muslims. Mohammad Hatta clarified this issue on April 29, 1979 by stating that the word "belief" in the article had to be understood as religious beliefs, and had nothing to do with other forms.¹⁶⁶ With this clarification, the followers of the aliran kepercayaan had no legal basis to support their claim.

THE PPP'S RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL OF THE P 4

The proposal of the P 4, which was debated in Commission B of the MPR, also provoked a bitter reaction not only from the PPP in the MPR general session, but also from Muslims in general outside the MPR. The PPP in the MPR expressed its objection to the proposal on the grounds that if the P 4 was legalized, it would serve as an interpretation of the Pancasila that would obscure its real meaning as laid out in the preamble of the 1945 constitution.¹⁶⁷ In addition, in the view of the PPP, the P 4

¹⁶⁶ See Perwiranegara, *Pembinaan*, 71 - 72.

¹⁶⁷ Radi, *Strategi PPP*, 146.

should be considered a guide for "individuals" to understand the Pancasila. Holding this view, Imam Sofwan of the PPP argued that "the MPR did not have the authority to regulate individuals"¹⁶⁸ in relation to the implementation of the Pancasila. Sensing strong opposition, the Golkar faction stated that voting would take place if a unanimous agreement to the proposal on the P 4 was not reached. In response, Mohammad Radjab of the PPP suggested that the legalization of the proposal through voting would arouse widespread unrest. If voting were carried out, the initiators (i.e., the Golkar) would be responsible for the consequences.¹⁶⁹

Nuddin Lubis of the PPP also stated that his faction agreed with the other groups, in that any decision should be made unanimously; as far as the P 4 was concerned, his faction would be ready to accept any outcome if unanimity could not be reached. This suggested that the debate on the proposal of the P 4 was entering a tougher phase. Thus the chairman of Commission B, Imam Sudarwo, postponed the session many times in order to provide opportunities for the leaders of all the factions to consult each other, in the hope that unanimity might be reached. Sudarwo also appealed to all sides of Commission B to re-think and re-examine the contents of the proposal of the P 4 before its legalization. However, misunderstanding between the PPP and the other factions (Golkar, ABRI and PDI) resulted in an increasingly heated atmosphere during the MPR debates. Despite the PPP's strong objection to the proposal of the P 4, voting took place on March 18, 1978, resulting in its approval. The P 4 was then legalized by the MPR through its enactment no. II/1978 on March 22, 1978. The enactment stated that the P 4 was not an interpretation of the Pancasila, but a guide for Indonesians in understanding and implementing the Pancasila in their lives.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ See *Tempo*, April 9, 1977, 8.

The PPP's objection to the P 4 centered mainly on the following points. The PPP did not in fact challenge the importance of the P4 for Indonesians, provided that it was not legalized in the form of an MPR enactment, and that it did not differ from the spirit of the Pancasila as it appeared in the 1945 constitution. Basing its view on this premise, the PPP refused to support or take responsibility for the legalizing of the P 4 by the MPR.¹⁷⁰ In protest the PPP walked out of the MPR session. This action was led by K. H. Bisri Sansuri, who was reported to have issued a fatwā objecting to the P 4.¹⁷¹ Only three members of the PPP, namely Ismail Mokobombang, Ahmad Dainuri Tjokroaminoto and Chalid Djamarin, remained, but they did not take part in voting on the P 4 since they agreed with their faction's position. The government was upset with the PPP's attitude, which undoubtedly contributed to widening the gap of suspicion between the two sides in the following years. There was no sign that the inharmonious relationship between the government and the Muslims would be resolved in the immediate future; on the contrary, the gulf between the two continued to widen.

DID THE PPP DOUBT THE TRUTH OF THE PANCASILA?

In two speeches which he delivered in 1980, President Soeharto described the PPP leaders' walk-out as a sign of their doubt about the truth of the Pancasila.¹⁷²

Soeharto also pointed out that not only did the PPP launch its walk-out in reaction to the legalization of the P 4, but also in connection with the legalization by the DPR of

¹⁷⁰ Radi, *Strategi PPP*, 148.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 149.

¹⁷² This assessment was explicitly expressed by Soeharto in two speeches : the first welcoming the *Rapim ABRI* (*Rapat Pimpinan ABRI*, or Armed Forces Commanders' Meeting of March 27, 1980 in Pekanbaru, and the second marking the *Kopassandha* (*Korps Pasukan Sandhi Yudha*, or Army Para-commando Unit) anniversary of April 16, 1980 in Jakarta. His two speeches received various responses from many leaders, including the Muslim leaders. See *Tempo*, June 14, 1980, 8 - 11.

the general election bill. This was why Soeharto now called for ABRI's vigilance in facing "them" (PPP leaders) and urged ABRI to select partners who were truly reliable in defending the Pancasila, and who did not doubt its truth.¹⁷³ In his speeches Soeharto once again emphasized that ABRI did not want to make any change to the Pancasila or the 1945 constitution, and that if there were any attempt to make a change, ABRI would respond to it with force. Soeharto even warned that "kidnapping" would also be used as a means of protecting the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution :

... two-thirds of the members [of the MPR] can, if they wish, change the constitution. [But] ABRI does not wish to have a change, and if there is a change, it is its duty to use weapons. ... Rather than using weapons in facing a change of the 1945 constitution and Pancasila, we had better kidnap one out of the two-thirds who wish to make the change, because two-thirds minus one is not valid according to the 1945 constitution.¹⁷⁴

Soeharto made this grave warning because he saw that many negative issues and political moves were being used as tactics to undermine the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, and that these moves were also directed against himself with the aim of removing him from power. This statement suggests that he believed serious threats to the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution as well as to himself still existed, and for this reason he moved to counter the threats. In reaction to Soeharto's speeches, the Petition of Fifty Group issued in May 1980 a "statement of concern" accusing President Soeharto "of blatantly using the armed forces in a partisan way and of implying that an attack on him is tantamount to an attack on Pancasila."¹⁷⁵

Soeharto's claim that the PPP leaders' walk-out was a sign of their doubt about

¹⁷³ *Tempo*, June 14, 1980, 9.

¹⁷⁴ David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals : Indonesian Military Politics 1975 - 1983* (Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), 157. See also *Tempo*, June 14, 1980, 9.

¹⁷⁵ See *Arabia : The Islamic World Review*, no. 7 (March 1982/Jumadi al-Awwal 1402), 35.

the truth of the Pancasila received various responses from many Muslim leaders. The general chairman of the Muhammadiyah, H. A. R. Fachruddin, quickly reacted by saying "that [the walk-out] was launched not in an anti-Pancasila context, but in the context of democracy. Once it [the proposal of the P 4] is approved, [the PPP will accept it and] nothing will happen."¹⁷⁶ Thus, according to Fachruddin, their walk-out was not a sign of doubt about the truth of the Pancasila, but a sign of the democratic life of the country. In the view of Fachruddin, the Pancasila does not mean always saying 'yes' to government policy. In a tone similar to Fachruddin's, the vice-general chairman of the NU, K. H. Anwar Musaddad, also responded to Soeharto's assessment. Musaddad said that the walk-out by the PPP from the MPR session, and that of the NU group from the DPR session (when debating the general election bill in 1980) reflected their differences of opinion on the matters concerned. Furthermore, he claimed that their rights to these opinions were fully guaranteed by the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution. "Do all [Indonesian] people have to be "yes-men" according to the Pancasila?" asked Musaddad.¹⁷⁷ In Musaddad's view, the Pancasila should respect and tolerate differences of opinion and should not teach people to remain quiet in dealing with state affairs. He seemed to be saying that differences of opinion, such as the PPP's objection to the legalization of the P 4, should not be viewed as a sign of Muslim doubt about the truth of the Pancasila, let alone as anti-Pancasila.

In response to Soeharto's suspicion of an Islamic threat to the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, Saifuddin Zuhri of the PPP and a member of the DPR asked, "What will [the Muslims] be suspected of?" The government's suspicion was seen by Zuhri as a sign of its lack of understanding of the essence of both Islam and the Pancasila.

¹⁷⁶ *Tempo*, June 14, 1980, 9.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

both of which, according to him, could exist hand in hand in Indonesia.¹⁷⁸ Anwar Musaddad even came to the conclusion that "it is nonsense to think that the Muslims are hostile to the Pancasila since most of its formulators were Muslim."¹⁷⁹ Musaddad had a feeling that the government accused the Muslims of being anti-Pancasila in order to push them into a corner. In the meantime, Imaduddin Abdulrahim (b. 1931), the executive director of the Salman Mosque Foundation in Bandung, did not understand why the government was so suspicious of the Muslims or why it had imposed strict controls upon them. The Muslims, according to Abdulrahim, should be embraced by the government, and the two should work together in implementing and protecting the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution. He appealed to the government to cease its suspicion of the Muslims, and called on it to be open to ideas coming from Muslim leaders in order to establish mutual trust in relation to the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, which would in turn allow mutual cooperation between Muslims and the government to take root.¹⁸⁰

THE PPP'S OBJECTION TO THE CONTENTS OF THE PMP BOOKS

Following the legalization of the P 4 by the MPR, Minister of Education and Culture Daoed Joesoef included the PMP (*Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*, or Pancasila Morality Education) program in the curricula of elementary, junior and senior high schools with the objective of planting the norms and values of the Pancasila in the hearts of the younger generation (students). To carry out this program, twelve PMP books were produced in which teaching materials were presented based on the values and norms of the Pancasila as elaborated in the P 4 mentioned above. These books

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 11.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

served as the textbooks for all students of elementary, junior and senior high schools and as references to which all teachers should refer in teaching the subject to students.

However, the inclusion of the PMP program by the government in the curricula of elementary, junior and senior high schools inevitably touched on Muslim religious sensitivity. The Muslims felt that some contents of the PMP books were in conflict with Islamic principles. In the DPR session of June 13, 1981, the PPP expressed four major objections to the PMP books, especially to those used for the students of elementary schools, which can be summarized as follows.

The first of the PPP's objections focused on the question of the status of religions as mentioned in the PMP book (on page 12 of the edition designed for use in grade 5) in which it was stated that "all religions are sacred since they teach virtues according to God's commands."¹⁸¹ The PPP basically agreed that all religions teach virtues, but the status of Islam as a religion, in its belief, was different from and incomparable with other religions since it was acknowledged by God as the only true religion. One of the Qur'ānic verses upon which the PPP based its objection was "Surely the (true) religion with Allah is Islam ..."¹⁸²

Second, on the question of attending the religious ceremonies associated with the holy days celebrated by other religious groups, the PMP book states (on page 13 of the grade 5 edition) that "we should join people of other religious groups in their prayer to God." For the Muslims, this meant that they should join, for example, the Christians in praying to Jesus Christ whom they do not believe to be God or the son of God. The PPP's objection to this was based on the Qur'ānic doctrine : "... do not mix

¹⁸¹ *Tempo*, February 13, 1982, 64.

¹⁸² Sūra III : 19.

up the truth with the falsehood ..."183

Third, the PPP objected to the part of the PMP book (page 12 in the edition used by grade 6 students) which read : "We do not make friends based on the same religion." According to Amir Hamzah, a member of the PPP, to this expression should be added the word "only" after the word "religion," without which the statement might be misunderstood. For example, it might be understood that one should only become friends with people from different religious backgrounds.

The PPP's fourth objection centered on the question of praying for a deceased individual of another religious group in order that he/she be forgiven and accepted by God, as mentioned in the PMP book (page 13 in the edition used by grade 5 students). By quoting a prophetic tradition, Amir Hamzah argued that God warned the Prophet Muhammad not to pray for his uncle, Abū Tālib, who was not Muslim. "This is not a fanatic attitude, but a religious injunction that we have to follow," he said firmly.¹⁸⁴

"DO NOT MAKE THE PANCASILA A RELIGION"

Strong reactions to both the P 4 and the PMP program also came from many Muslim figures such as Mohammad Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, H. Andi Mapetawang Fatwa, Abdul Qadir Djaelani and Tonny Ardie. Djaelani's objection to the PMP books centered on what he called "syncretic ideas" which, according to him, were indicated by, among other things, a recognition of all religions as true. These syncretic ideas were viewed by Djaelani as being in contradiction to the basic doctrine of the Qur'ān, in which God acknowledges Islam as the only true religion. It was certain that Djaelani, like the PPP in the DPR, based his assessment on the Qur'ānic

¹⁸³ Sūra II : 42.

¹⁸⁴ See *Tempo*, February 13, 1982, 64.

verse (III : 19) mentioned above. Djaelani's other objection focused on the nature of the PMP program in which, according to him, the New Order government tended to regard the Pancasila as equal in importance to religion.¹⁸⁵ Djaelani was arrested and imprisoned for some two years on the accusation of launching a political movement to thwart the 1978 MPR general session during which the proposal of the P 4 was to be debated.

Like Djaelani, Fatwa held negative views on the P 4 and the PMP. In expressing his objection to both the P 4 and the PMP, Fatwa argued that the 1945 constitution was the sole explanation or elaboration of the Pancasila, and not the P 4, which allowed it to regulate one's personal life. This latter position, in the view of Fatwa, was in conflict with the basic nature of the Pancasila itself as furnishing a common basis for the various ethnic, linguistic and religious groups existing in the country. He said further that the Muslim community objected to the PMP since it was intended by the government to be a source of moral values, although it was never intended by its formulators to serve as such. Prior to presenting his views, he scrutinized the history of the Pancasila and commented that it was only in the New Order period that the term "Pancasila Morality" was introduced. Fatwa questioned how a "Pancasila Morality," which was formulated by men, could be used as a moral doctrine or a source of moral values. In the end, he predicted, the Pancasila would be developed and used by the government as an alternative to religion. For Muslims, said Fatwa, the sources of law, including moral codes, are the Qur'ān and the Sunna of the Prophet, not the Pancasila since the latter was not intended to function as such. Fatwa went on to say that if the Pancasila were interpreted as containing syncretic ideas in contradiction to

¹⁸⁵ Abdul Qadir Djaelani, *Sikap Muslim terhadap Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan* (Bogor : Pimpinan Pusat Gerakan Pemuda Islam, 1404/1984), 10 and 13; see also idem, *Azas Tunggal Islam* (Bogor : n.p., 1403/1983), 3.

the teachings of Islam, it would not be accepted by Muslims since it would then have become a "new" Pancasila.¹⁸⁶

Fatwa, like Djaelani, felt that the PMP books, introduced by Daeod Joesoef, contained many syncretic ideas. Although these books were later replaced with new ones when Nugroho Notosusanto became the Minister of Education and Culture, this issue would remain. Fatwa said further that it would be hard for Muslims to accept those syncretic ideas being included in the elaboration and development of the Pancasila.¹⁸⁷ In a tone similar to Fatwa's, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara also objected to the contents of the PMP books. He said,

... formerly there was no "Pancasila Morality" because problems of morality were left up to the individual religions. Then a committee was established consisting of people regarded as "smart" -- not a single 'ulamā' of good standing in the Muslim community was included -- and this committee of smart people drafted a kind of holy writ filled with moral prescriptions that had to be studied and practiced by all citizens, yet not all these prescriptions could be swallowed by the Muslims, for many of them contained tenets in conflict with Islamic teachings.¹⁸⁸

Tonny Ardie was another of those who objected to the notion of the Pancasila as elaborated in the P 4. In the early 1980s he was arrested by the government security forces and imprisoned for some years on the accusation of launching an anti-government movement in relation to the socialization of the values of the Pancasila. At his trial before one of the Jakarta courts, he rejected the accusation, and said that the elaboration of the Pancasila mentioned in the P 4 and PMP books was tentative and temporary. The Pancasila, according to Ardie, exists only in speeches, slogans,

¹⁸⁶ H. A. M. Fatwa, *Azaz Islam Hingga Titik Darah Terakhir* (Jakarta : Panitia Pelaksana Hari-Hari Besar Islam, 1403/1983), 7, 22, 23, 24 and 26.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, "Pancasila as the Sole Foundation," trans. by the editors, *Indonesia*, no. 38 (October 1984), 79.

songs, courses and working papers, whereas its relevance to actual daily life has not been proven.

Like Djaelani and Fatwa, the core of Ardie's objection to the Pancasila centered on what he called the government's tendency to make the Pancasila some sort of pseudo-religion which would become a rival to religion proper. This danger, according to Ardie, was proven by the fact that the government had elaborated the Pancasila in the form of the P 4, only to have the minister of education and culture then develop it in the PMP books to serve as a source of moral values which should be practiced in daily life. He believed that the Pancasila, in its original and pure sense, was not a rival to religion and was not intended by its formulators to be a moral source or a pseudo-religion. Criticizing the government policy of applying the P4, Ardie at his trial directed some questions to the judge-in-chief :

"Mister judge-in-chief, could you imagine if Islam was to be subordinated to the ideology of state and became a subculture of it? Could it be imagined that the Qur'ān and *hadith* which you respect highly, be submitted to the principles of the P 4? Would you have the Qur'ān, Bible and other Sacred Books, whose absolute truths are believed by their respective followers, surrender to a 'philosophical framework', whose elaboration and concrete details are unclear and tentative? I do not think so!"¹⁸⁹

Ardie said further that this did not necessarily mean that the Muslims were against the Pancasila itself, since they in fact had been consistent in advocating it, even though they were not able to believe in it as they believed in the Qur'ān.¹⁹⁰ What the Muslims objected to, he once again stressed, was the government's tendency of making the Pancasila some sort of a pseudo-religion.

¹⁸⁹ Tonny Ardie, *Dakwah Terpidana* (Jakarta : Yayasan Bina Mandiri, 1404 H.), 113. His further objections can be read on pages 57, 58 and 114.

¹⁹⁰ In this case, Ardie seems to have exaggerated the issue, since the Pancasila itself does not require Muslims to believe in it as they believe in the Qur'ān.

Another reaction to the PMP came from Mohammad Natsir, who always closely followed political developments in the country. Despite his basic agreement with the PMP, Natsir expressed his objection to what he called the government's tendency to sacralize the Pancasila Morality and make it equal to religion. To quote his own words, "We agree with the Pancasila Morality [Education] because it reflects the Indonesian personality. However, do we have to sacralize it and make it equal to religion?"¹⁹¹ By referring to the Qur'ān (*sūrah* III : 19), Natsir argued that the positions of the two were totally different since Islam, in his view, has been established and acknowledged by God as a sacred religion and the only true religion.¹⁹²

From the discussions outlined above, it can be concluded that the major objection made by Muslims with regard to the socialization of the Pancasila through the P 4 course and the PMP program centered on what they called the government's tendency to make it some sort of a religion. "Do not make the Pancasila a religion, and do not make religion equal to the Pancasila," was a common objection voiced by the Muslims of the time. Due to the PPP and strong Muslim objection to the PMP, the Minister of Education and Culture Nugroho Notosusanto, who had replaced his predecessor Daoed Joesoef, produced new versions of the PMP books whose contents were acceptable to Muslims, and had thousands of copies of the old version burned by the government. In the meantime, President Soeharto himself heeded Muslim objections by making a statement in which he guaranteed that "the Pancasila will not replace religion, and it is impossible to replace it. The Pancasila will not be made a religion, and religion will not be made equal to the Pancasila"¹⁹³ In a similar tone, Soeharto

¹⁹¹ *Muhibbah*, no. 5 (February 1982), 50.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ See Lukman Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas Pancasila* (Jakarta : Pustaka Panjimas, 1986), 54.

also firmly stated that "the Pancasila is not a rival to religion. The Pancasila is not a substitute for religion."¹⁹⁴

NOER'S CRITICISM OF THE SOCIALIZATION OF THE VALUES OF THE PANCASILA

Muslim reaction to the P 4 as the official elaboration of the Pancasila continued. This time it came from Deliar Noer, a political scientist who questioned the significance of the socialization of the values of the Pancasila through the implementation of the P 4 course. In his opinion, in any society, an ideology is outlined only in principle, and the Pancasila, as the ideology of the state, would be widely accepted only if its elaboration or formulations remained an outline.¹⁹⁵ One of the main characteristics of an ideology, in the view of Noer, is that it contains alternative ideas regarding the same issue. The more an ideology is elaborated in detail, the less people adhere to it, since there are many different opinions among people, all of which demand to be acknowledged and included in the elaboration of that ideology. This can stir up conflict among people, which if tackled by the government through force of arms, violence, censorship or imprisonment, rather than by persuasion and consultation, will disturb the harmony and tranquillity of people's lives.¹⁹⁶

Noer went on to say that the implementation of the Pancasila would require strong motivation and continuous effort. He suggested that an ideology or way of life should ideally be based on religious beliefs such as those found in the Islamic faith.

¹⁹⁴ Presiden Soeharto, "Sambutan pada Upacara Mukhtamar Muhammadiyah ke-41 pada Tanggal 7 Desember 1985 di Stadion Sriwedari, Surakarta," in Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas*, 32.

¹⁹⁵ Deliar Noer, *Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal* (Jakarta : Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984), 97.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 99.

Such an ideology, according to Noer, would be easily accepted and developed in the lives of its followers, thanks to the religious traditions and habits which they had practiced from childhood to adulthood. There is a strong and sensitive spiritual link which always connects them to the religion they believe in, and this enables them to internalize and practice their religion based on their inner motivation and consciousness. Having given this illustration, Noer then asked, "Did this kind of consciousness and motivation exist in one's heart to internalize and practice the Pancasila [in Indonesia]?"¹⁹⁷ By raising this question, Noer, as we shall see, in fact argued that the socialization of the Pancasila needed support from religion, by which it would then become strong and meaningful.

Deliar Noer criticized one of the ways through which the P 4 was socialized by the government. One day Noer watched a national television program in which Karamoy, the speaker on the television, conducted an interview with a pedicab driver and a fruit seller. Answering Karamoy's questions, the pedicab driver told the audience that, although he worked very hard every day, he did not earn enough money to support his daily life. In fact, he was not satisfied being a pedicab driver, but continued to do that kind of job since he was not skilled to work in any other field. He, however, did nothing illegal, but kept working as usual in order to earn a legal income. Questioned by Karamoy, the fruit seller also told a similar story to the audience. With these two cases, Karamoy attempted to show the audience that both the pedicab driver and the fruit seller, representing common people in their own ways, in fact practiced the moral values of the Pancasila in their lives.

Noer criticized Karamoy's explanation of the two cases as forced. Noer raised the question, "Is it true that the pedicab driver implements the Pancasila by doing his

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 92.

job sincerely in order to earn a legal income? Is there any feeling passing through the mind of the fruit seller when he sells fruits every day, in both rainy and hot seasons, people sometimes buying and sometimes not, that is based on the Pancasila?" After raising this question, Noer stated that it would be logical for Karamoy to have said that the fruit seller and the pedicab driver had good moral qualities, since they were sincere and honest. He then emphasized that the more people who have such good attitudes, behavior and personality in Indonesian society, the stronger the Pancasila would be.¹⁹⁸

In the view of Deliar Noer, in implementing a philosophy of life or an ideology, an elaboration is not a guarantee of success and, in many cases, it is not necessary. Elaborations are important only for those who are directly concerned with it. According to Noer, the most important thing is that an environment be fostered in which the philosophy of life may be internalized and socialized. Starting from this premise, Noer went on to say that the socialization of the Pancasila would succeed if the environment for its realization were preserved, with this preservation depending on the will and consciousness of individuals, groups and the ruling class. The latter play an important role in fostering the proper environment since this kind of environment, in addition to the will of individuals and groups, needs the ruler to preserve it.¹⁹⁹ In line with this idea, Noer proposed the creation of an environment in which the five following requirements should be realized in support of the socialization of the Pancasila. While putting forward his proposal, he also criticized the "real" condition in the country which, in his assessment, could not support the socialization of the ideological values of the Pancasila. His proposals may be summarized as follows.

First, the enforcement of law. In this case, Noer characterized it as weak. The

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 95 - 97.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 100.

enforcement of law was possible only if the government's attitude were always consistent with the law itself. The government should support and encourage the apparatus of the law since its implementation entails security and justice. Not only did he see weaknesses in the enforcement of law but also evidence of discrimination within it due to an individual's status, power, wealth and other factors: all this he viewed as a violation of the law. These deviations from law had to be stopped, and the law had to be fully respected and enforced. This would provide an atmosphere conducive to the socialization of the ethical and ideological values of the Pancasila.

Second, there must be consistency between words and actions. Noer expressed his criticism by questioning how people could obey the government officials' appeal to lead a simple life (as stressed in the P 4 course), while the officials themselves did not do so. The lack of consistency between words and actions on the part of the latter diminished people's trust in them. The practice of the Pancasila required good examples to be set by officials who reflected a consistency between word and deed.

The third requirement that Noer proposed was national and social solidarity which recently, in his assessment, had suffered serious erosion. He saw a wide gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots", which was indicated by the fact that the former could enjoy the results of modernization and national development, while the latter, who formed a majority in Indonesian society, remained poor. As long as most Indonesian people remained poor and were not capable of meeting their most basic needs, one could not expect the creation of social and national solidarity. This fact would, in turn, weaken national defense among the Indonesian people since this defense depended not only on modern technology but also, and more importantly, on the strength and integrity of the national spirit in the souls of Indonesian people. Social solidarity should be restored in order to create an environment in which the ideological values of the Pancasila might be properly socialized.

Fourth, good moral quality was needed. In the view of Deliar Noer, each member of Indonesian society (or say : each member of the Pancasila people) should be able to control him/herself, since the realization of moral virtues and the implementation of law demands control over lusts of the heart. Noer saw that those who were in power tended to be corrupt and continued to defend the power which was already in their hands. The enforcement of law and the consistency between words and acts could not be found in the personalities of men who were guilty of corruption. In the eyes of Noer, these kinds of men certainly did not tell the public that they supported corruption or luxurious life-styles in the midst of people's suffering and poverty, but rather called on them to lead simple lives and to combat corruption. It was clear that these men, according to Noer, were hypocritical and deceitful because they did not do justice to other people or to themselves, and did not have good moral quality. Moral virtues should be enforced in order to establish a good atmosphere for the socialization of the Pancasila.

The fifth requirement Noer proposed was religious obedience, which should be developed and intensified since it reminded man of the existence of God who supervises and controls him in his life. The Pancasila would flourish and develop very well if it was based on strong religious consciousness and piety.²⁰⁰

According to Deliar Noer, the five requirements mentioned above were necessary to create the kind of environment in which the Pancasila could be implemented and practiced by Indonesians. In this way, the observance of the Pancasila, he said, did not depend on the form of its elaboration or formulation (which were intentionally designed), or on the pattern of courses of instruction (which were prepared at great cost). The realization of these five requirements did not need special courses or

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 100 - 105.

programs since it could be attained by Indonesians in their daily lives.

In fact, what Noer proposed, along with his criticism, had been recognized by the government-established Team (Team Pembinaan Penatar P 4) before it began the program of the socialization of the P 4. The Team proposed three ways or methods by which the values of the Pancasila, as elaborated in the P 4, could be taught and socialized. The first method of socializing the P 4 was through the "three educational centers" of family, school and society. The role of education in the life of a family was decisive since it was here that parents were expected to understand the P 4 and then introduce the values of the Pancasila to their children, as well as to provide good examples for them in their daily life. Through this educational process, the values of the Pancasila would take root in the hearts of their children in a natural way without any force from outside. This process would lead to the establishment of a Pancasila family which, in turn, would create a Pancasila society.

The effort to socialize the P 4 should be continued by integrating it into the curricula of formal educational institutions from kindergarten to university. In the meantime, the social environment should be preserved in such a way as to support the socialization of the P 4 by involving, for example, school drop-outs, boy scouts and girl guides, in social activities reflecting the values of the Pancasila. The second method of socializing the P 4 was through the mass media, in which explanations and elaborations were given in order for the P 4 to be better comprehended and implemented by people. These included the traditional media, for instance the puppet show, through which the values of the Pancasila could be communicated, taught and disseminated. The third way of socializing the P 4 was through political institutions, with the objective of shaping their cadres in accordance with the spirit and values of

the Pancasila.²⁰¹

The application of the above-mentioned methods, according to the Team, should be supported by making every effort to create a favourable environment for the socialization of the P 4. In making these efforts, the government should first pass legislation and implement its own policies in line with the norms and values of the Pancasila. In this respect, the enforcement of law and legal penalties should be given special attention. Second, the government apparatus, as the executor and servant of the public, should understand and be sensitive to the aspirations of people's daily lives. All state institutions -- particularly the legal institution -- should function properly in guaranteeing people's rights and in protecting them against wrongdoing. Third, formal and informal leaders, including religious leaders and chiefs of ethnic groups, should play a key role in socializing the P 4 by teaching people through examples which reflected the norms and values of the Pancasila outlined in the P4.²⁰²

In keeping with the efforts mentioned above, the Team also emphasized the importance of the fact that leadership should reflect three principles : *ing ngarso sung tulodo*, *ing madya mangun karso*, and *tut wuri handayani*.²⁰³ The first principle means that a leader should be capable of presenting himself/herself as a good example to be followed by those he/she is leading. The second principle means that a leader should be able to motivate people under his/her leadership to take the initiative in a creative way. As for the third principle, it carries the notion that a leader should be capable of encouraging people under his/her leadership to act responsibly.²⁰⁴ As well, in keeping

²⁰¹ Team Pembinaan Penatar, *Bahan Penataran*, 46 - 48.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 48 - 49.

²⁰³ These three expressions are Javanese.

²⁰⁴ Team Pembinaan Penatar, *Bahan Penataran*, 45.

with the message of the GBHN, the government has carried out a policy of distributing to all segments of the Indonesian population basic needs, income, job opportunities and the benefits of national development.²⁰⁵

All this indicates that the socialization by the government of the values of the Pancasila through the P 4 program has been achieved by efforts which, in principle, I believe, are in conformity with what Noer proposed above. It seems that his criticism of the government's efforts to socialize the P 4 was based on certain "weaknesses" or "shortcomings" in a broad sense, which are to be found in the gap between ideals and reality, or, between what should be and what is. The government's task lies in narrowing this gap.

In the period from the 1970s until the present, Deliar Noer stands out as one of the Indonesian scholars who has been most critical of the government's general policies. Having criticized the government's method of socializing the values of the Pancasila through the P 4 course mentioned above, he continued by responding to the more substantial issue of Islam and the Pancasila. Both in the P 4 course and outside, the claim that "the Pancasila is not contrary to Islam" or that "the Pancasila is in agreement with Islam" was always emphasized. According to Noer, this stance implied that the Pancasila should be practiced exclusively, and that there was a tendency to see other values as subordinate to it. People holding this view, Noer stated further, would then feel content with simply speaking and practicing the Pancasila. However, he continued, people needed religion and, therefore, their observance of the Pancasila should not mean that their religious values be put aside.²⁰⁶ In his attempt to foster discussion on the matter, he advanced another approach by

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 145 - 148.

²⁰⁶ Noer, *Islam*, 107.

reversing the question to read : Was Islam in agreement with the Pancasila? Noer came to the conclusion that many Islamic teachings could not be found in the Pancasila. He gave some of the following explanations.

Islam lays down its principle of *tawhid* which teaches a strict belief in the One and only God. On the other hand, the Pancasila, although it claimed to teach the Oneness of God, tolerated the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, the Hindu belief in many idols, and Buddhist doctrine (which has nothing to do with God). Islam teaches its followers to believe in God's messengers such as Abraham, Moses, Jesus Christ, and Muhammad in particular, whereas the Pancasila does not teach people to believe in them. Islam obliges its followers to pray, fast, pay alms, perform the pilgrimage and fulfill other obligations which are not required by the Pancasila.²⁰⁷ He said that all this did not mean that Islam was against the Pancasila; since in general, it had been agreed in the country that the observance of those kinds of religious duties were allowed and even encouraged. Noer maintained that in many cases Islam gave its teachings in detail, while the Pancasila did not need to do so. By approaching these two things from such a perspective, the correlation between the implementation of the Pancasila and Islam, in his view, became clear : practicing the Pancasila only would not be enough. This was clear from the fact that it had often been stressed that the Pancasila would be empty without religion; while practicing religion, particularly Islam, means at the same time implementing the Pancasila, in the sense that its five principles are to be found there also.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 113 - 114.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 114 and 116.

SOEHARTO : THE PANCASILA DOES NOT INTERFERE IN INTERNAL RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

The Muslim response to the socialization of the values of the Pancasila through the P 4 course and the PMP program, whether the government agrees with it or not, has served to enrich the government's vision of the interpretation of the Pancasila itself, as was seen in the above discussions. Deliar Noer was correct when he stated that religious faith and practice are guaranteed and encouraged by the government. He was also correct when he said that the observance of religious teachings would have a positive impact on the Pancasila in the sense that it would provide meaning. As for the point raised by Noer concerning the Pancasila's doctrine of belief in the One God in relation to the Muslim, Christian, Hindu and Buddhist beliefs described above, President Soeharto argued that the Pancasila did not and would not interfere in the internal affairs of a religion. He said, "The Pancasila does not regulate something deeply rooted in our hearts and in our personal life, such as our religious faith and practice which we devote to God the Almighty; nevertheless, the Pancasila guarantees our right to observe our religious beliefs and practices."²⁰⁹

The question might arise : What then did the Pancasila regulate? Soeharto clarified this by saying, "The Pancasila regulates our common life as a society and nation which cannot be regulated according to the values of one ethnic group, religion, or social group."²¹⁰ This meant that the Pancasila as the national ideology of the state, in the mind of Soeharto, transcended all segments of Indonesian society, despite its cultural, ethnic and religious diversity. In fact, the nature of the Pancasila as a unifying force had been stressed by the founding fathers of the Republic in 1945 when they agreed that it constituted "a point of agreement" for all religious, social and

²⁰⁹ Presiden Soeharto, "Sambutan" in Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas*, 32.

²¹⁰ Ibid.



political streams existing in Indonesian society (as described in Chapter I). Soeharto seems to have argued that the way in which the Pancasila's doctrine of belief in the One God was questioned in relation to Muslim, Christian, Hindu and Buddhist beliefs was not relevant, since the Pancasila did not regulate or interfere in the affairs of the faith and practice of religions. This meant that the Pancasila let any religion lay down its own faith and practice, and would not interfere in its internal affairs. By so doing, the Pancasila, as the basis and national ideology of the state, continued to fulfill its function as a common umbrella under which the "existence" of different religions has been recognized.

As the basis of the state and national ideology, the function of the Pancasila was only to recognize the "existence" of different religions, and to protect, guarantee and encourage them within the country. In this way, the Pancasila was fair; it tolerated and respected each religion. This implied that it should not be questioned why the Pancasila allowed Christian, Hindu and Buddhist beliefs to flourish in the country, while it also tolerated Islam. The Pancasila did not need to deal with such an issue, let alone make a judgment on whether a belief or a religion was true or false, since that was not its function. Officially, the Pancasila should only acknowledge the "existence" of the (five) religions in the country -- and it did -- and need not acknowledge the theological and doctrinal truth of a certain religion. In other words, the Pancasila did not need to express its agreement or disagreement with the theological and doctrinal concepts of religions. The fact that the followers of religions claimed that the Pancasila was not contrary to the teachings of their religions was their own justification. Of course, the Pancasila would not object to their claims and justifications since its five principles were in fact taught by their religions, regardless of their interpretations of it -- particularly its first principle (Belief in One God).

The Pancasila offered its five principles, and it was the task of the followers of

the various religions to respond to and find a religious justification for them. By putting it this way, the Pancasila, as Soeharto said, did not interfere in the internal affairs of religious faiths and practices. Thus, the Pancasila did not offer syncretic ideas or mix various religious beliefs within itself, which would be considered polytheism (*shirk*) in the eyes of Muslims. Soeharto also seems to have argued that the Pancasila should be put in its proper place as the basis and ideology of the state.

Some of its elaborations, for example in the PMP books, might not be fully in line with the basic spirit and function of the Pancasila (as mentioned above), but this should not become a reason to ignore its significance as the basis and ideology of the state. The publication by the government (Department of Education and Culture) of the new version of the PMP books indicated the government's readiness to correct those inaccurate elaborations.

THE PANCASILA : A MUSLIM SACRIFICE

From the discussion above it is clear that the Muslim reaction to the socialization of the values of the Pancasila through the P 4 course and the PMP program caused President Soeharto himself to pay direct attention to the matter. We have noted that Soeharto made three statements in relation to the Muslim reaction to the Pancasila : (1) the Pancasila would not be made a religion, and religion would not be made equal to the Pancasila; (2) the Pancasila was not an alternative, rival or substitute for religion; and (3) the Pancasila did not regulate or interfere in religious faith and practices.

In addition to Soeharto himself, Minister of Religious Affairs Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara²¹¹ was also very active in convincing the Muslims that the government

²¹¹ Before being appointed as minister of religious affairs, Perwiranegara served as an army general, State Secretary and ambassador to the Netherlands. His appointment by Soeharto as Minister of Religious Affairs seemed to be intended to develop his department and to establish religious harmony. He was the only army general who was posted by Soeharto to lead the Department of Religious Affairs (DRA), and under

policy of socializing the values of the Pancasila through the implementation of the program of the P 4 course was in line with the message of the GBHN, and would not undermine Muslim faith and practice. As minister responsible for religious affairs in the country, he became a vocal spokesman for the government in the face of Muslim reaction to the Pancasila between 1978 and 1983. To this end Perwiranegara offered in 1978 a new interpretation of the omission of the Islamic sentences from the Pancasila and from the body of the 1945 constitution. He said that,

Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, Professor Kahar Muzakkir, H. Agus Salim and other Muslim leaders in the session of the Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence in 1945 finally agreed to accept the Pancasila as the basis of the state in the interest of the nation's unity and independence. ... before [their acceptance of the Pancasila], these Muslim community leaders insisted that Indonesia be proclaimed an independent state based on Islam. However, due to other factions, who opposed them, these Muslim leaders put their aspirations aside and thereupon agreed to the Pancasila being used as the basis of the state of the Republic of Indonesia. This was a large concession made by the Muslim community to the nation in the interest of independence.²¹²

From this quotation, it is clear that Perwiranegara made every effort to create a positive image for the Muslims in connection with the Pancasila. With this interpretation, Perwiranegara wanted to say that the Muslims were in fact not anti-Pancasila, since the Pancasila itself was a gift or sacrifice presented by their political leaders for the sake of the nation's unity.

Syafii Maarif notes that Perwiranegara, as an army general, "knew well the negative attitude towards Islam, particularly Islamic politics, held by many of his colleagues in the circle of the Indonesian armed forces."²¹³ With his interpretation of the historical context of the birth of the Pancasila, Perwiranegara seems to have tried to

his leadership a new and large building for the DRA was built.

²¹² *Pelita*, June 12, 1978, 1. A similar statement by Perwiranegara can also be read in his *Pembinaan*, 65 and 73; and his *Islam dan Pembangunan Politik di Indonesia* (Jakarta : CV Masagung, 1987), 287 - 288 and 290.

²¹³ Maarif, "Islam," 171.

convince non-Muslim groups "that the *umma's* loyalty to the Pancasila need not be questioned any longer."²¹⁴ In contrast to the earlier situation, when Muslim politicians saw the deletion of the Islamic sentences from the Pancasila and from the 1945 constitution as a political defeat, Perwiranegara argued that now, whether those Islamic sentences were mentioned in the constitution or not, the *shari'a* would continue to operate in Indonesia.²¹⁵ It should be noted, however, that this statement was correct only so long as what he meant by the *shari'a* was confined to prayer, fasting, alms, *hajj*, and family law (such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance), and was not extended to other domains such as criminal law (for example cutting off a thief's hand and whipping those who commit adultery) as applied, for example, in Iran or Saudi Arabia. This legal situation exists because Indonesia is a "Muslim" state and not an "Islamic" state, as evidenced by its constitution.

Perwiranegara's interpretation of the Pancasila mentioned above contributed to a gradual improvement of what was previously an inharmonious relationship between the Muslims and the government. In light of these increasingly favourable conditions, Perwiranegara then moved to resolve the suspicion which had built up between the two sides. In his view, the distrust of all Muslims on the part of a certain number of government officers and ABRI leaders was not wise. Perwiranegara invited them to think clearly and to differentiate between the Muslim radical groups, who constituted a minority, and the majority of Muslims, who formed a political mainstream which was

²¹⁴ Ibid., 170. Perwiranegara's interpretation of the Pancasila as a Muslim gift and sacrifice for the sake of the nation's unity provoked opposition from Minister of Education and Culture Daed Joesoef. According to Bambang Pranowo, the government favoured the former's interpretation. This was indicated by the fact that Perwiranegara was appointed again as coordinating minister of social welfare in the following cabinet in 1983, while Joesoef was not reappointed. See Pranowo, "Islam dan Pancasila : Dinamika Politik Islam di Indonesia," *Ulumul Qur'an*, vol. 3, no. 1 (1992), 13.

²¹⁵ Quoted by Mohamad Roem, *Saya Menerima Pancasila Karena Saya Orang Islam* (Jakarta : Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, n.d.), 1.

politically and ideologically loyal to the Pancasila. On the basis of this argument, he then called for a lifting of the suspicion which had been cast upon all Muslims as a single group. He said,

To abolish mutual suspicion between the Muslims, notably their leaders, and the government, [the latter] should be convinced that those who posed trouble using the name of Islam were only extremist minority groups among the Muslims ... Therefore, not all the Muslims should be suspected ...²¹⁶

In Perwiranegara's view, negative reaction to the Pancasila and the P 4 came only from certain quarters of the Muslim community, and was caused by a lack of understanding of the historical context of the birth of the Pancasila.²¹⁷ Starting from this point, he then explained the three major functions of the Pancasila. The first is as the ideology and basis of the state, the second as the national guidelines for the lives of Indonesians as citizens, and the third as a unifying force for the entire Indonesian nation. By understanding these three functions of the Pancasila, one could comprehend the position of the Pancasila in relation to the holy books of religion. He said that the Indonesian Muslims, as a religious community, are guided by the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet in carrying out their religious faith and practice, but as Indonesian citizens they are regulated by the Pancasila. This is the case with the Indonesian Christians, Hindus or Buddhists; they are regulated by their own holy books as religious communities, and by the Pancasila in their civic lives.²¹⁸ In fact, Perwiranegara's explanation was in the same spirit as Soeharto's statement that the Pancasila does not regulate or interfere in the internal affairs of religious faith and practices and that the Pancasila was not a rival or alternative to religion.

Perwiranegara's statements can be viewed as an attempt to harmonize relations

²¹⁶ Perwiranegara, *Pembinaan*, 65.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 139.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 139.

between the government and Muslims. As a matter of fact, Perwiranegara did play an important role as mediator and greatly contributed to reconciling the government and Muslims. He called for the creation of three types of harmony : harmony between the religious communities (the Muslims in particular) and the government, between one religious community and another, and between the various groups within a religious community.²¹⁹ As Minister of Religious Affairs and thus responsible for the religious life and harmony of the country, Perwiranegara worked hard to deal with a variety of religious issues, many of which were very sensitive, with the objective of establishing the three types of harmony mentioned above. He undoubtedly succeeded in carrying out his religious policies, especially in harmonizing the relationship between the Muslims and the government. Due to his success he was later appointed coordinating minister of social welfare.

THE P 4 AND ISLAM : NO CONTRADICTION

Following the legalization of the P 4 by the MPR, the Department of Religious Affairs under the leadership of Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara published in 1982 an official booklet entitled *Pedoman Pelaksanaan P 4 bagi Umat Islam*²²⁰ (The Guide to Implementing the P 4 for Muslims). As indicated by its title, the publication of the Pedoman was designed to give guidance to Muslims in their practice of the values of the Pancasila as elaborated in the P 4 in accordance with the teachings of Islam. This Pedoman was widely distributed by the Department of Religious Affairs (DRA) to instructors and participants in the P 4 course in the circle of offices affiliated with the DRA at the national and regional levels. Perwiranegara reported that every year during

²¹⁹ Ibid., 76.

²²⁰ *Pedoman Pelaksanaan P 4 Bagi Umat Islam* (Jakarta : Proyek Bimbingan Pelaksanaan P 4 Bagi Umat Beragama, Departemen Agama RI, 1982).

his ministry an average of 150,000 copies of the Pedoman were distributed.²²¹ He also reported that during the three years of the implementation of Repelita III (Third Five-Year Development Program), religious officers, preachers, counselors and leaders (approximately 6,600 in all), from various parts of the country, took part in the P 4 courses which were carried out at the national and regional levels.²²² They were expected to be the new instructors who could disseminate and socialize the values of the Pancasila among the people through the P 4 course and beyond.

Perwiranegara said that the P 4 course conducted in the circle of the offices of the Department of Religious Affairs was a success as indicated by the fact that the Pancasila and the P 4 were frequently connected with religion in religious talks, preaching and the *khutbahs* given by Muslims. This showed that Muslim acceptance of the Pancasila became more complete as the socialization of the P 4 became widespread among Muslims.²²³ Benfani Mudjilan, project director for the publication of the Pedoman, says in the preface to that work that a quick and effective method for socializing the P 4 was through religion,²²⁴ due to the fact that it is one of the most important elements in the lives of Indonesians. Welcoming the publication of the Pedoman, Perwiranegara said:

The Pancasila as the ideology of the state should be understood and internalized by people. In fact, understanding of the state ideology constitutes one of the requirements for creating a consciousness which will maintain the life of nation. The issuance by the MPR of the enactment no. II of 1978, known as the P 4, is a progressive step by which people can understand and practice the Pancasila more intensively.

Indonesia is a multi-religious society, 90 percent of which is Muslim. Through a religious approach, the Pancasila can be internalized and practiced

²²¹ Ibid., 117.

²²² Ibid. The number of 6,600 is calculated on the basis of Perwiranegara's report in which he mentioned that 2, 200 participants attended the P 4 course every year.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Benfani Mudjilan, "Kata Pengantar," in *Pedoman*, 6.

by society. By carrying out their religious teachings as well as possible, the religious communities in fact perform all the values of the Pancasila. In this way, the Pancasila will be strong and stable within the religious society.²²⁵

In elaborating each principle of the Pancasila, the Pedoman follows the systematic method used in the P 4, and then puts forward religious views and reasons derived from the Qur'ān and ḥadīth. The choice of the Qur'ānic verses or ḥadīths quoted in the Pedoman reflects Islamic teachings which, in its opinion, are in line with the P 4 (and logically, also with the Pancasila). In other words, in the view of the Pedoman, no principle or value in the Pancasila, as elaborated in the P 4, is in contradiction with Islamic precepts.

In support of the conformity between the first principle of the Pancasila (Belief in One God) and the Islamic doctrine of the Unity of God (tawḥīd), the Pedoman relies on six Qur'ānic verses and two ḥadīths.²²⁶ One of the Qur'ānic verses used by the Pedoman is from sūra CXII (al-Ikhlās) and reads :

Say : He, Allah, is One
Allah is He on Whom all depend
He begets not, nor is He begotten
An none is like Him.²²⁷

One of the ḥadīths utilized by the Pedoman in support of the agreement between the principle of Belief in One God in the Pancasila and in Islam reads : "The happiest man who will receive my blessing on the Day of Judgment is one who pronounces the words 'There is no God but Allah.'"²²⁸

²²⁵ Perwiranegara, "Sambutan Menteri Agama RI," in *Pedoman*, 3.

²²⁶ The six Qur'ānic verses were Sūras CXII : 1 - 4, II : 2 - 5 and 163, VII : 59, III : 102, and V : 105. The two ḥadīths quoted were reported by Bukhārī. See *Pedoman*, 24 - 26.

²²⁷ Sūra CXII : 1 - 4.

²²⁸ Reported by Bukhārī.

One of the fundamental values mentioned in the P 4 is mutual respect between one religious community and another, with the aim of creating religious tolerance and cooperation in the country. The P 4 teaches that, as a nation, the Indonesian people should coexist in peace and work together in building their country, and that differences in religious faith and doctrine should not become a barrier to unity and cooperation. The creation of religious tolerance was a common need which would certainly contribute to political stability and national security, in which the government would be able to carry out its development programs more effectively. The Pedoman sees the principle of religious tolerance laid down by the P 4 as being in agreement with the teaching of Islam as stated in the Qur'ān :

Say : O followers of the Book! come to an equitable proposition between us and you that we shall not serve any but Allah and (that) we shall not associate aught with Him, and (that) some of us shall not take others for lords besides Allah; but if they turn back, then say : Bear witness that we are Muslims.²²⁹

The P 4 teaches every Indonesian citizen to respect equality among humankind.

This principle was based on the fact that all humans are born equal. Here equality means that all humans have the same rights, regardless of their religion, race, sex or background. Any prejudice, whether based on religion, color, race, sex or background, is a violation of human equality and against human dignity or, to quote the second principle of the Pancasila, against the principle of "just and civilized humanity." The Pedoman views the basic spirit of the principle of Humanity elaborated in the P 4 as being in conformity with, among others, the Qur'ānic verse which runs:

O you men! surely We have created you of a male and a female, and made you tribes and families that you may know each other; surely the most honorable of you with Allah is the one among you most careful (of his duty); surely Allah is Knowing, Aware.²³⁰

²²⁹ Sūra III : 64. Another sūra quoted was sūra XLII : 15.

²³⁰ Sūra XLIX : 13.

One of the basic positions of the Pancasila mentioned in the P 4 was that the Indonesian people should place the nation's unity and the state's safety and interest over individual and group interests. This means that all individual and group interests should be put aside in favour of national interests for the sake of the state's unity, the third principle of the Pancasila. The Pedoman stresses the correlation between the principle of unity in the Pancasila and in Islam, and bases its argument on, among others, the Qur'ānic verse : "And hold fast by the covenant of Allah all together and be not disunited ..." ²³¹ and on a ḥadīth saying, "It is not our group who preaches a call for tribalism, and also it is not our group who dies defending tribalism." ²³² As for the principle and value of democracy (the fourth principle of the Pancasila) mentioned in the P 4, the Pedoman refers to, among others, the Qur'ānic verses : "... and take counsel with them in the affairs..." ²³³ and "... their rule is to take counsel among themselves ..." ²³⁴

In addition, the principle of social justice (the fifth principle of the Pancasila), as elaborated in the P 4, is seen by the Pedoman as being in line with the Qur'ānic verse : "Surely Allah enjoins the doing of justice and the doing of good (to others) and giving to the kindred, and He forbids indecency and evil and hostility; He admonishes you that you may be mindful." ²³⁵ The Pedoman also urges the conformity between the principle of social justice in the Pancasila and in Islam, finding support for this, for example, in a Qur'ānic verse which reads : "And those in whose wealth there is a fixed

²³¹ Sūra III : 103.

²³² Reported by Abū Dāwud.

²³³ Sūra III : 159.

²³⁴ Sūra XLII : 38.

²³⁵ Sūra XVI : 90.

portion. For him who begs and for him who is denied (good)."²³⁶

It is interesting to note that none of these religious arguments and justifications had ever been heard from the leaders of the Muslim Nationalists when they were involved in the ideological battles with the representatives of the Secular Nationalists in either the Investigating Body or the Constituent Assembly debates. At that time, Natsir, for example, in the Constituent Assembly debates claimed that the Pancasila had nothing to do with religion and was secular in nature, and that the God referred to in it, as Osman Raliby has said, was a "dead" God who could not make any law or pass judgment.

However, along with the Muslim acceptance of the Pancasila, there was a remarkable change in their religious views on the Pancasila. In this light, it is safe to say that a Muslim understanding of the Pancasila developed in which they saw it as being in line with the teachings of Islam. Their acceptance of the Pancasila was not surprising if we compare this to events that had occurred in history, for example, in Islamic history. 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, for instance, initially strongly rejected Islam and attempted to assassinate the Prophet Muhammad, the preacher of the new religion. However, 'Umar finally accepted Islam and became its staunchest defender. One might say that it is not an exaggeration for the 'Umar phenomenon to be used as an analogy for the Indonesian Muslim acceptance of the Pancasila. Their loyalty to it was proved in 1965, when the Muslims, in cooperation with ABRI and other New Order forces, came to the fore and spiritedly defended the Pancasila against the Communist uprising which attempted to replace it with Communist ideology.

²³⁶ Sūra L. XX : 24 - 25.

form of protection from power-holders and legality with which they declare themselves as the true adherers to Pancasila."³

The second factor was the rise of Muslim fundamentalist movements in various parts of the Muslim world in the 1970s, particularly Iran. Alarmed by the possible spread of sedition in Indonesia as a result of the Iranian revolution, the government moved to safeguard the Pancasila. The third factor prompting the government's continued protection of the Pancasila seems to have been the rise of Muslim "separatist" and "fundamentalist" movements in the country. Admiral Soedomo, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief for the Restoration of Security and Order, explained on behalf of the government its policies regarding these "radical" groups to Muslim leaders such as Hamka and E. Z. Muttaqien of the MUI and Chalid Mawardi and Nuddin Lubis of the PPP, at a meeting in Jakarta in April 1981. Mohammad Natsir and Prof. H. M. Rasjidi, as the leading representatives of the Muslims, also attended the meeting. Soedomo's explanation of the rise of these Muslim militant movements can be summarized as follows.⁴

One of these groups was Hasan di Tiro's separatist movement which emerged in Aceh in 1977, and tried to establish an independent state called the "Free Acehese State."⁵ There was also another movement called the Komando Jihad (Holy War Command), which was led by H. Ismail Pranoto (known as Hispran). The Komando Jihad committed acts of violence and terror in many areas, such as Bukittinggi, Padang and Medan; due to these actions, its leader, Ismail Pranoto, was arrested, prosecuted

³ Ibid.

⁴ For more details, see *Tempo*, April 25, 1981, 13 - 14.

⁵ Ibid., 13. Hasan di Tiro wrote a diary of this period which was published as *The Price of Freedom : The Unfinished Diary of Tengku Hasan di Tiro* (n. p. : National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra, 1984).

and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1979.⁶ Another splinter group was one led by Abdul Qadir Djaelani, who launched an anti-government movement shortly before the 1978 MPR sessions. Vigorously advocating what he called "the Islamic Revolutionary Struggle Pattern," Djaelani was arrested and imprisoned for two and a half years.⁷ The longest lasting movement was that led by Warman who, like Hispran, called his movement the Komando Jihad. This movement, operating between 1978 - 1980, murdered Parmanto (Vice-Rector of the State University of the Eleventh of March of Surakarta) and Hasan Bauw, a student of the IAIN (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri*, or State Institute of Islamic Studies) of Yogyakarta. It also stole millions of *rupiahs* (Indonesian currency) from Yogyakarta IAIN government workers' salaries and gold from West Java, killing two policemen in the Rajapolah Affair of August 22, 1980.⁸

Another rebellion was led by the Imran Group, which attacked the police office at Cicendo, Bandung, on March 11, 1981, and then hijacked a Garuda DC-9 flight from Jakarta, forcing it to land at Don Muang Airport in Bangkok. Imran called his movement the "Indonesian Islamic Revolution Council," struggling to "overthrow the Soeharto regime and transform it into an Islamic rule."⁹ Soedomo told the Muslim leaders that the government had confiscated a copy of a letter sent by Imran to Ayatullah Khomeini of Iran, requesting his spiritual and material support for the realization of the ideals of the "Indonesian Islamic Revolution Council"¹⁰ This and all

⁶ *Tempo*, April 25, 1981, 13.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ According to Soedomo, the letter, written in English, was authentic. When asked whether Imran did send this letter to Khomeini or not, Soedomo quickly responded, "I have no idea. Ask Imran himself." See *Ibid.*

the other above-mentioned movements were crushed by the armed forces. It would appear that the rise of these Muslim splinter groups was a reaction to the government's stern political policies. However, "the Islamic organizations did not take any measures to articulate their political interests."¹¹

Soedomo, accompanied by Minister of Religious Affairs Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, said that the above meeting was intended to clarify issues relating to these Muslim radical groups, and to abolish mutual suspicion between the government and the Muslims. According to Soedomo, this clarification had to be made since the Muslims "suspected that the Komando Jihad case, plane hijacking and other terrors [in the name of Islam] were in fact fabricated by the government in an attempt to push the Muslims into a corner."¹² Soedomo, however, rejected this suspicion and once again explained the government's attitude towards these groups saying that "we distinguish religion as a divine doctrine from its followers have gone astray and committed violence which is contrary to both religion and the laws." Without mentioning their names, Soedomo said that some of these Muslim splinter groups had as their long-term political objective the establishment of an Islamic state like the Darul Islam of the 1950s.

Furthermore, without revealing its identity, he also warned that he would not tolerate a foreign state's support for a certain Muslim splinter group, support which, in his view, could be seen as an intervention in Indonesian domestic affairs.¹³ Soedomo accepted the Muslim leaders' suggestion not to use the term Komando Jihad anymore since this term would destroy the image of Islam as a whole. At the same meeting the

¹¹ M. Sirajuddin Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics in Indonesia : The Case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order, " (Ph. D. diss., UCLA, 1991), 104.

¹² *Tempo*, April 25, 1981, 13.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 13 - 14.

Muslim leaders also appealed to the government not to suspect the majority of Muslims, since they had in fact supported the state and did not want to make any change to the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution.¹⁴ In the words of Jusuf Hasjim, a leading figure of the NU, one fact that the government often forgot was that in any community extremist movements always represent a minority, not the majority.¹⁵ Therefore, in his view, it was inaccurate for the government to generalize and identify these Muslim splinter group movements with the majority of Muslims, who had been loyal to the Pancasila both politically and ideologically.

It is necessary to discuss very briefly the issue of the Komando Jihad, inasmuch as it was a crucial issue for the Muslims at that time. Muslims leaders frequently asked: Who was behind the Komando Jihad movement? Who was its real sponsor? Some have asserted that Lt. Gen. Ali Moertopo and his group were behind it. When interviewed by David Jenkins concerning the issue, Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwono, former head of the *Bakin (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, or State Intelligence Coordinating Body)*, explained that

Ali Murtopo is belonging to this group. So, for instance, you talk about Komando Jihad. It's not a new issue. From the beginning, he has had this opinion. I had to stop that at the time. He had the opinion that we must create issues. He said at "one time we will have to use this" and so on and on. Let's say it's always in his mind. I tried to stop him. But I can't stop that because he's always going to the president. He has his own Opsus.¹⁶

Based on an interview with Mohammad Natsir, David Jenkins writes:

Many in Indonesia share this suspicion, and take the view that the Komando Jihad was an operation mounted by Murtopo to discredit the Muslims. Former Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir, a prominent Muslim leader, claimed in 1978 that Ismail Pranoto, a Komando Jihad leader who was sentenced to life

¹⁴ Ibid., 14.

¹⁵ *Tempo*, June 14, 1980, 9.

¹⁶ David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975 - 1983* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), 57.

imprisonment in September 1979, was "an *agent provocateur* run by Ali Murtopo." People at the grass-roots were dissatisfied with conditions, Natsir argued, and were easily led. Murtopo's agents had planted rumors about the Communist comeback and had promised former Darul Islam activists weapons to fight the leftist "threat." The leaders of the Komando Jihad -- Ateng Jailani, Abu Darda (a son of S. M. Kartosuwirjo, the original Darul Islam leader), Danu Subroto, Zainal Abidin, Ismail Pranoto, and Kadar Salihat -- were former Darul Islam leaders who were "now in the control of Ali Murtopo and his group From the start they got help from the Ali Murtopo group, not from the military as a whole. That is his special hobby. Even the West Java commander, [Maj. Gen.] Himawan [Susanto], knows it is a fabrication, but no one can say it. He knows it. He was furious that everything is blamed on [West Java] as a center of the Darul Islam."¹⁷

Furthermore, Jenkins also notes that during interviews a number of army officers expressed an opinion almost identical with Natsir's.¹⁸ Two important members of the Moertopo group, namely Harry Tjan Silalahi and Jusuf Wanandi, corroborated that the Komando Jihad leaders did indeed have links with Moertopo. However, according to Silalahi and Wanandi, these Komando Jihad leaders "misused" this link, with the consequence that people had come wrongly to suspect him.¹⁹ In this case, Jenkins notes that "many Indonesians, a number of prominent military officers among them, find this 'explanation' unconvincing." Jenkins added that an army general even insisted that, "It is a manufactured account."²⁰

On the basis of Juwono's explanation and the corroboration of a number of army officers mentioned above, it is safe to say that, to some extent, the Muslim allegations concerning the Komando Jihad and Ali Moertopo's Opsus were not completely wrong. The Muslims at that time had a feeling that the main aim of the Moertopo Opsus was -- in addition to interfering in the internal affairs of the party and

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid. See footnote 13.

¹⁹ Ibid., 57 - 58. See also page 59.

²⁰ Ibid., 59.

weakening it -- to cause Indonesians to identify Islam with violence and terrorism.

Under such circumstances Islam and the PPP would become politically isolated. Or, to quote *Indonesia : Muslims on Trial*, "In fact, the prime purpose of the Komando Jihad canard was to link Muslim activism in the public mind with alleged terrorist activities and to intimidate the Muslim community as a whole."²¹ When put on trial, some members of the so-called Komando Jihad "argued in vain that they had been working as intelligence agents for Opsus or Special Operations, the intelligence outfit under General Ali Murtopo, and vehemently denied the existence of a Komando Jihad."²²

The Muslims felt that the image of their religion was damaged by the Komando Jihad movement at that time. At present, this issue needs to be investigated in more detail, especially since the demise of Ali Moertopo, against whom Natsir and other Muslim leaders have made allegations. By doing so, historical facts surrounding the Komando Jihad issue can be disclosed clearly and known objectively and fairly by succeeding generations.

THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTIVES IN APPLYING THE PANCASILA AS THE SOLE FOUNDATION

In line with its continued protection of the Pancasila, as illustrated above, the government began in 1982 to speak of the importance of the application of the Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties and mass organizations. The government's main motive was to safeguard the Pancasila as the state's national ideology, and to continue to socialize it in the life of the nation. In order to do this, the government felt that there should be no other ideology to rival the Pancasila. The

²¹ *Indonesia : Muslims on Trial* (London : Tapol/Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, 1987), 15.

²² *Ibid.*

government's position on the Pancasila as the sole basis was motivated by two factors.

First, the government seemed to have learned from the experiences of the previous general election campaigns in which physical clashes (often resulting in fatalities), particularly between Golkar and PPP supporters, had frequently occurred. President Soeharto acknowledged that "there had been occasional outbursts of violence in the run-up to the election," and that this happened due to the fact that "not all contestants had accepted the Pancasila as the single acceptable ideology to be upheld by all socio-political groups."²³

The confrontation between the Golkar and the PPP was due to strong religious and political sentiments which had coloured their attempts to draw wide support from the Muslims, who constitute a majority in the country. It should be noted that there is no official prohibition on raising religious issues during the election campaign.

However, the use of religious issues in an excessive manner caused conflicts between the two sides. Very often the PPP and the Golkar, in previous election campaigns, became involved in fierce "battles," armed with Qur'ānic verses and *hadīths*, whereas issues of economic development and social reform tended to be ignored. Learning from these facts, the government perceived religion to be a source of conflict and therefore began to put forward the sole foundation policy.

The second factor prompting the government to establish the Pancasila not only as the sole basis or ideology of the state, but also for all political parties and mass organizations in the country was that, ideologically, the Pancasila would occupy a much stronger position in the social and national life of Indonesians. This idea seems to have been prompted by the fact that, as far as political Islam was concerned, the PPP still maintained Islam as their basis in addition to the Pancasila. The use by the

²³ Susumu Awanohara, "A Change in the Law?," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 117, no. 35 (August 27, 1982), 20.

PPP of this "double" basis was seen by the government as proof that they were not totally committed to the national ideology of the Pancasila. In an attempt to abolish this "double" basis, the government then came up with the idea of applying the Pancasila as the sole basis.

This issue was in fact raised by President Soeharto himself in his welcoming speech to the *Rapim ABRI* (*Rapat Pimpinan ABRI*, or Armed Forces Commanders' Meeting) held in Pekanbaru, Sumatra, on March 27, 1980. It was emphasized once again when he delivered a speech at the 28th anniversary celebration of the *Kopassandha* (*Korps Pasukan Sandhi Yudha*, or Army Para-commando Unit) at Cijantung, Jakarta, on April 16, 1980. In his two speeches he referred to the national consensus that had been reached by ABRI and all socio-political forces in 1968, by which all agreed to the idea of implementing the Pancasila as their sole basis. This national consensus had not yet been fully carried out, said the president, since "there was still one political party which added another principle to the Pancasila."²⁴ In the eyes of the president, the attitude of this party led to "a question mark."²⁵

It was generally believed that the president was referring to the PPP, since he connected his remarks to the PPP leaders' walk-out from the 1978 MPR general session (done in reaction to the legalization of the P 4) as well as from the 1980 DPR session, when changes to the general election law were to be legalized. In his first speech, which David Jenkins has called "the storm over Pekanbaru,"²⁶ Soeharto called

²⁴ Peter Rodgers, "Indonesia's Faithful Flex Their Political Muscle," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 110, no. 49 (November 28, 1980), 37. See also *Tempo*, June 14, 1980, 9.

²⁵ *Tempo*, June 14, 1980, 9.

²⁶ Jenkins, *Suharto and his Generals*, 157.

for ABRI commanders to intensify their vigilance over the PPP leaders, and warned that

so long as we have not yet succeeded in bringing them to their senses, we must step up our vigilance, choose partners and friends who truly defend Pancasila and have no doubts about it. We do not mean to be hostile to the party or group which does not yet trust Pancasila 100 %, no, but we are obliged to persuade them in such a way that all social and political forces will base themselves on our national ideology, Pancasila, with no addition whatsoever.²⁷

The president's speech provoked strong reactions from various Muslim leaders²⁸ and from some prominent retired military officers. On April 18, 1980, Lt. Gen. (ret.) A. Y. Mokoginta -- a North Sulawesi Muslim who had served as chief of the Sumatran Command between 1964 and 1967 -- sent a nine-page letter to Gen. Muhammad Yusuf expressing his concern over Soeharto's address in Pekanbaru. In a tone similar to Mokoginta's, the *FKS Purna Yudha* (an association of prominent retired army officers) sent on May 2, 1980 a letter to the new army chief of staff, Gen. Poniman. The letter was signed by Lt. Gen. (ret.) H. R. Dharsono (former Commander-in-Chief of the West Java-based Siliwangi division of the army and former secretary general of ASEAN) and Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sudirman (former Commander of the East Java Brawijaya division).²⁹

In addition, on May 13, 1980, the Petition of Fifty Group presented a one-page "statement of concern" to the Indonesian parliament, claiming that President Soeharto had falsely interpreted the Pancasila. It also accused the president of using the Pancasila as a weapon to attack his political rivals, whereas the founding fathers of the Republic had intended it simply as a tool to unify the nation. The group was

²⁷ Rodgers, "Indonesia's Faithful," 37.

²⁸ Reactions from Muslim leaders to the president's speech have already been described in Chapter II.

²⁹ David Jenkins, "Marching with Golkar," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 108, no. 27 (June 27, 1980), 25.

concerned with the president's address, which invited ABRI to choose partners according to the political will of those in power and not to remain neutral toward all socio-political groups. The leading figures of this group were retired generals such as navy Lt. Gen. Ali Sadikin (former governor of the Special Region of Jakarta), Gen. A. H. Nasution (former chief of staff of the armed forces and former head of the MPRS) and Gen. Hugeng (former chief of the Indonesian Police). Former Masyumi leaders such as Mohammad Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap, as well as Muslim activists and preachers like A. M. Fatwa joined this group.³⁰ Regardless of their political purposes, the involvement of Muslim leaders and activists in this movement contributed to the inharmonious relations between the Muslims and the government.

The government's idea of implementing the Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties was first put forward shortly after the 1982 election. Prior to discussing this point however, it is necessary to consider the 1982 general election and its results, through which we can see the development of the political power of the PPP. As in previous election campaigns, the 1982 campaign was coloured by bitter rivalries and often violent clashes between the supporters of the PPP and those of the Golkar. The *Kompas* newspaper reported at the time that the supporters of the PPP and the Golkar had clashed in various areas, particularly in Jakarta and Yogyakarta where numerous people were injured and a few killed. The most serious clash between the two occurred on March 18, 1982 in Lapangan Banteng, Jakarta, where the Golkar held its campaign. The supporters of the PPP were reported to have challenged the Golkar, leading to the outbreak of a riot which resulted in the arrest of a few hundred youths. The authorities considered abolishing all election rallies, and the

³⁰ Syamsuddin Haris, "PPP and Politics under the New Order," *Prisma*, no. 49 (June 1990), 20; Jenkins, "Marching," 25; see also P. Bambang Siswoyo, *Sekitar Petisi 50* (Solo : Mayasari, 1983).

Chief of Security, Admiral Soedomo, instructed the security forces to shoot rioters on the spot.³¹

In the meantime, religious issues became quite prominent during the 1982 election campaign. Susumu Awanohara wrote at the time that "perhaps more than in the past, religious and other primordial symbols have come to the fore in the electioneering, overshadowing other political issues which might have been usefully debated."³² For example, PPP leaders and spokesmen claimed that voting for their party was tantamount to choosing Islam, while voting for other parties, especially the Golkar, was un-Islamic. PPP leaders even stigmatized the Golkar as being similar to the *Golkur*³³ (*Golongan Kuraisy*, or Qurayshi group) referring thereby to the tribe of Quraysh which opposed the Prophet Muhammad's efforts in spreading Islam. In response to these issues, Amir Moertono, general chairman of the Golkar, stressed in his campaign speech that the election was simply a political affair, and not a contest over religious loyalty.³⁴ As in the previous general elections, in the 1982 election the Golkar won a majority vote, receiving 64.34 percent of the vote, with the PPP at 27.78 percent, and the PDI at 7.88 percent.

Based on these voting percentages, the Golkar obtained 246 seats (232 in 1977), the PPP 94 seats (99 in 1977) and the PDI 24 seats (29 in 1977).³⁵ This distribution

³¹ *Kompas*, April 28, 1982 and May 1, 1982.

³² Susumu Awanohara, "Islam on the Hustings," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 116, no. 17 (April 23, 1982), 24.

³³ See Donald K. Emmerson, "Islam in Modern Indonesia : Political Impass, Cultural Opportunity," in Philip H. Stoddard et al., eds., *Change and the Muslim World* (Syracuse : Syracuse University Press, 1981), 168.

³⁴ *Kompas*, April 22, 1982.

³⁵ Panitia Pemilihan Umum, *Penetapan Anggota DPR Tahun 1982 : Daftar Perhitungan Pembagian Jumlah Wakil Untuk Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (Jakarta : n. p., 1982), 96 - 97.

indicates that the position of the PPP had weakened (losing five seats) compared with the results of the previous election, whereas the Golkar performed better and therefore became stronger, gaining fourteen seats in the 1982 election. Judging by these results, the PPP had clearly continued to suffer political losses vis-à-vis the Golkar in the political arena. As for the PDI, its position, like that of the PPP, had also continued to decline, losing five seats in the 1982 election. Both the PPP and the PDI, due to a lack of funds, poor organization and the overall political system prevailing in the country, remained too weak to present a serious challenge to the government and the military-supported Golkar in Indonesian politics.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PANCASILA AS THE SOLE BASIS

Following their political defeat, the PPP and the PDI were shocked by President Soeharto's proposal to apply the Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties. The government's idea of unifying the basis of all political parties was first put forward by the president in his state speech before the DPR session on August 16, 1982. Later, this idea of the president was incorporated into the MPR enactment no. II/1983 (point 3 of chapter IV), it being reasoned that in order to maintain, strengthen and implement the Pancasila in the social and national life of the nation, all political parties, as well as the Golkar, should make the Pancasila their sole foundation. With this enactment, the government abolished the special basis and distinct characteristics upon which the PPP and the PDI were based. In the case of the PPP this was "Islam", whereas for the PDI it was "Indonesian Democracy, Indonesian Nationalism and Social Justice". This process was part of the government's policy to establish political stability and to wipe out sharp political polarization, which was believed to be caused by factional fanaticism, as seen especially during previous election campaigns. This political polarization, coupled with religious fanaticism, frequently resulted in hostility on the part of one political party towards other political groups of a different

basis.³⁶ By applying the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties, the government believed that ideological antagonism among socio-political forces would be eliminated,³⁷ and that under such conditions it could concentrate its full attention and energy on carrying out its national development programs.³⁸

The government's intention to stipulate the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties provoked reactions from various quarters in Indonesian society. One group, which included many civil servants, agreed with the government, arguing that the stipulation of the Pancasila as the sole basis would reduce political tensions among the people which in turn would strengthen national unity and facilitate the implementation of the national development program. Moeljarto Tjokrowinoto, for example, argued that this idea would fortify the position of the Pancasila as a value system and as a cohesive and integrative force enabling Indonesians to overcome socio-political conflicts.³⁹ In support of their argument, this group pointed out how, in the 1950s, liberal democratic values and the multi-party system they had generated contributed to the nation's being torn apart by ideological strife. The very existence of the nation was threatened by political conflicts, particularly between the Secular Nationalists and the Muslim Nationalists. Under such circumstances, opposing sides

³⁶ M. Rusli Karim, *Perjalanan Partai Politik di Indonesia : Sebuah Potret Pasang Surut* (Jakarta : Rajawali Pers, 1983), 219.

³⁷ Fachry Ali, "Pancasila Sebagai Kritik Realitas Kekuasaan dan Sosial Politik" in his *Islam, Pancasila dan Pergulatan Politik* (Jakarta : Pustaka Antara, 1984), 225.

³⁸ According to Alfian, these are indications of the New Order's ideology of "development" or "modernization," adopted in the late 1960s partly in order to distinguish it from its predecessors. In his view it constituted a symbol of political legitimacy, winning it the political support and participation of the people. See Alfian, "Suharto and the Question of Political Stability," *Pacific Community*, vol. 2, no. 3 (April 1971), 536 - 557.

³⁹ See Moeljarto Tjokrowinoto, "Peranan Identitas dalam Partai Politik," *Kompas*, October 2, 1983.

were constantly being drawn into political battles which made it difficult to achieve political consensus.

While the government and its supporters have frequently "cursed" liberal democracy as a source of political conflict and disorder, Abdurrahman Wahid in his article "Pancasila dan Liberalisme" (The Pancasila and Liberalism), asked which aspects of liberal democracy can be accepted and which rejected on the basis of the

Pancasila. Wahid notes that people's opinions, which differed from the government's, especially at the grass-roots, were always regarded as being in opposition to government policies. According to Wahid, this attitude in fact "killed" democratic impulses originating from the Pancasila itself.⁴⁰ In this connection, Herbert Feith also argues that the operation of liberal or constitutional democracy in Indonesia had in fact its own dynamics characterized by, among other things, freedom of expression and freedom of the press. As he describes it :

The operation of constitutional democracy in the period of the first four cabinets was reasonably effective. Cabinets were accountable to the parliament of the day for many of their actions, although this was not an elected body. The press was exceedingly free. Courts operated with considerable independence of the government. Demands for national loyalty were rarely used to silence the critics of cabinets. And non-political administration characterized at least some major parts of the government apparatus.⁴¹

Furthermore, according to the government and its supporters, the application of the Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties would encourage every party to become "more program oriented" rather than "ideology oriented". In this way, a party's appeal would lie particularly in the quality of the programs it offered to people, not in the ideological basis it used. Thus, the major issues during an election campaign would center mainly on programs rather than ideology. In this light, it was

⁴⁰ See *Kompas*, July 21, 1987.

⁴¹ Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., *Indonesia* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1963), 314.

believed that ideology would not become a source of political violence among parties, as had occurred during the previous election campaigns.⁴²

Strong disagreement with the government proposal came from the Working Team of the Petition of Fifty Group which, in its statement of September 23, 1982, accused the government of being unfair and of being mostly concerned with defending the political and economic interests of those in power. This group said that

the unification of the basis of various [political] groups existing in Indonesian society, with fabricated reasons, was intended [by the government] to protect the interests of the ruling class, i.e., to defend their political power and economic interests which were not based on the historical ideals of the nation.⁴³

Furthermore, A. Rahman Tolleng warned the government to avoid the tendency to regulate and unify all sectors of social life, since this would result in a populace which "idolized the state." Tolleng urged that this tendency be curbed since it was against the basic nature of the Pancasila. As he puts it :

... it should be admitted that the implementation of the Pancasila in the life of the state was not without problems. As a [new] state which was in the process of searching for its own form, [the Indonesian government] could fall into a tendency to regulate and unify all sectors of social life. This would make the position of the state too strong vis-à-vis the [ruled] people, and would create what could be called "the idolization of the state." This tendency needed to be curbed since this was against the essence of the Pancasila as a democratic ideology which respects human dignity. In this regard, I was of the opinion that the only objective way to curb this tendency was to establish independent social forces to counterbalance the state and its apparatus' force.⁴⁴

In spite of these reactions, the government persisted in carrying out its plan to implement the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties. On February 19,

⁴² Karim, *Perjalanan*, 220.

⁴³ See *Ibid.*, 225 - 226.

⁴⁴ A. Rahman Tolleng, "Mencari Sistem Politik Yang Selalu Menumbuhkan Alternatif," in Imam Walujo et al., *Dialog Indonesia Kini & Esok*, Book II (Jakarta : Leppenas, 1981), 137 - 138.

1985, the government, with the DPR's approval, issued Law no. 3/1985, stipulating that political parties and the Golkar adopt the Pancasila as their sole basis. (This law was intended to amend Law no. 3/1975, issued on August 27, 1975, according to article 2 of which, the political parties and the Golkar were still allowed to maintain their specific bases in addition to the Pancasila). The law stipulated that, within one year of its promulgation, both the PPP and the PDI, in addition to the Golkar, had to conform to this new regulation. According to the law, the president, with his authority, could freeze the central boards of these political parties if they did not obey the law. It is notable that the government policy of stipulating the Pancasila as the sole basis of political parties did not pose trouble for the Golkar, due to the fact that it was the government party and thus had the Pancasila as part of its *raison d'être*. This meant that only the PPP and the PDI had to redefine their identities in response to the government policy. The PDI, for its part, would not have difficulty in adopting the Pancasila as its sole basis since its present basis was "secular", not religious, in nature. However, as far as the PPP was concerned, the new law was a sensitive issue since the party would have to remove the mention of Islam as its basis, and adopt the Pancasila in its stead.

Four months later, on June 17, 1985, the government, again with the DPR's approval, issued Law no. 8/1985 on mass organizations, stipulating that all social or mass organizations subscribe to the Pancasila as their sole basis. According to article 1 of the law, a mass organization is an organization established by a group of Indonesian citizens motivated by the same aspirations, professions, ideals, religious interests, or belief in God, with the objective of pursuing certain goals within the state of the Republic of Indonesia. With the issuance of Laws nos. 3/1985 and 8/1985, the adoption of the Pancasila as their sole basis by all political parties and by all mass organizations became an absolute requirement and beyond further debate. This meant that any rejection of the Pancasila as its basis by any political party or mass

organization would result in its dissolution by the government. We shall see in the following section how the PPP and various Islamic mass organizations, as well as individual Muslims, responded to these policies which, like earlier ones, touched upon their religious sensibilities.

B. MUSLIM RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNMENT POLICY OF STIPULATING THE PANCASILA AS THE SOLE BASIS FOR ALL POLITICAL PARTIES

INDIVIDUAL MUSLIM REACTION

Reaction to the government's policy to apply the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties came from many individual Muslims, such as Fachry Aly (b. 1954), Deliar Noer and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Fachry Ali stated that religion had played a pivotal role in the development of political parties, particularly Islamic parties, from their early history until the present. He saw the government's policy of stipulating the Pancasila as the sole basis of organizations in the country as the greatest political experiment ever conducted.⁴⁵ With this new policy, all political parties had to re-write their constitutions, re-establish their political orientations and re-formulate their programs in order to adjust to the new political situation. All this, according to Aly, would confuse their supporters, and in turn make them less loyal to their old leaders. Ali disagreed with the government's opinion and that of its supporters who said that religion was a source of political conflict. He maintained that using this argument for the unification of the basis of all political parties was fallacious. He argued that religion was not a source of political antagonism, but one of unification in political life. As he said :

For Indonesian people, religion gives basic values [to their lives]. Parts of [their] political actions were also justified based on religious reasons. Besides,

⁴⁵ See *Kompas*, September 3, 1982.

in the process of political development, religion always served as a unifying factor. This kind of situation continued to exist in the PPP.⁴⁶

In response to the government's proposal of the Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties, Deliar Noer⁴⁷ traced the issue back to the life of political parties under the Old Order regime. According to Noer, the regime tolerated any political party's special characteristic or specific basis (as its *raison d'être*) in addition to the Pancasila.

In other words, in this period a political party had its own special basis, serving as its own specific identity which differentiated it from other parties. In the 1950s, for example, the Partai Katholik based itself on the principle of belief in "One God in general, the Pancasila in particular, and action in accordance with Catholic doctrine." The Parkindo based itself on the principle of "Christianity," whereas the NU -- like other Islamic parties -- based itself on "Islam". As for the PNI, it was based on the principle of *Marhaenisme* [Proletarianism].⁴⁸

Under Guided Democracy, Soekarno stipulated that all political parties utilize the Pancasila as their "common" basis, but allowed them to maintain their special bases.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ George McTurnan Kahin writes of Deliar Noer: "He is the author of *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900 - 1942* (Oxford University Press, 1973). After securing his Ph.D. in Political Science at Cornell University, he served as a lecturer at the University of North Sumatra, the Jakarta IKIP, where he was also Rector, the University of Indonesia, and at Griffith University in Australia. Under both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes he has won the reputation of being a principled scholar unwilling to compromise his honesty and objectivity -- despite the pressures exerted by government. It was because of such pressure that in 1974 he was prevented from delivering his professional address, *Partisipasi Dalam Pembangunan* (Participation in Development). This was a valuable contribution to the pool of ideas of his country's development, and for this infringement of academic freedom his country is the poorer." See Kahin, "Preface" to Deliar Noer's *Administration of Islam in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1978), v.

⁴⁸ Deliar Noer, *Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984), 52.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Soekarno implemented this policy with the intention that all the parties had to accept and defend the Pancasila. Noer maintained that Soekarno did not question this "double" basis used by the parties since, in line with his speech on the Pancasila of June 1, 1945, he proposed only that it be used as the philosophical basis for an independent state of Indonesia; and that every political group accept the Pancasila as the state's philosophical basis. However, Soekarno allowed every political group to struggle for its own political aspirations in the independence era in conformity with its specific basis and goals.⁵⁰

In keeping with his second principle, Soekarno urged all political parties, including the Parkindo and Partai Katholik on the one hand, and the Islamic parties on the other, to struggle for their political interests by obtaining as many seats as possible in the representative body which would be established in the independence era.⁵¹

These historical facts were put forward by Noer in an attempt to show that religion-based parties, such as the Catholic, Christian and Islamic parties, were encouraged by Soekarno to struggle for their own political goals in conformity with their religious aspirations. To emphasize the importance of the specific basis of a party, Noer also pointed to the case of Mohammad Hatta, former vice-president and a staunch defender of the Pancasila, who made every effort to found the PDII in 1967. In the new party's constitution, Islam and the Pancasila were equally designated as its basis. Islam's inclusion, according to Noer, was intended to emphasize the importance of the party's specific identity, and to demonstrate that politics cannot be separated from religion in the teachings of Islam.⁵²

⁵⁰ Ibid., 53.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., 54.

Deliar Noer disagreed with the government's opinion and that of its supporters that religion was a source of political conflict or violence during the election campaigns. He argued that the main cause of the conflict in fact did not originate from the religious basis used by the parties, but from many other factors. In this respect, Noer pointed to the fact that during both the 1955 general election campaign and the election itself, in which a number of political parties with different ideological bases competed with each other, a peaceful and tranquil situation was maintained.⁵³ The cause of the political violence during the election campaigns under the New Order should, according to Noer, be sought in the government's handling of developments during the election period. Thus, in Noer's view, the problem was not as simple as the government supposed.

Noer explained that a single party system was in fact introduced one or two months after Indonesia's independence, when President Soekarno declared the PNI to be a single party. At that time all socio-political forces opposed Soekarno's policy, and due to this opposition he allowed various groups of people to found political parties with different bases.⁵⁴ When Soekarno implemented his Guided Democracy, the regime simplified the political system by allowing only ten political parties to exist.⁵⁵ When in 1973 the New Order launched into a course of political restructuring, this resulted in the amalgamation of all political parties into three parties, namely the PPP, the PDI and the government-backed Golkar. The government then issued Law no. 3/1975 on political parties and the Golkar, which acknowledged and confirmed only the existence of the PPP, PDI and Golkar, and did not allow for the creation of

⁵³ Ibid., 57.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 59.

⁵⁵ They were the NU, PSII, Perti, PNI, PKI, PSI, Murba, IPKI, Partai Katholik and Parkindo.

any new political party. However, the law still allowed the parties to use different bases, even though it encouraged them to employ the Pancasila as their common basis.

Noer argued that the government's idea of extending the Pancasila to serve as the sole basis for all political parties reflected a tendency to narrow or restrict people's aspiration; a practice which should not be carried out in democratic life.⁵⁶ Noer also saw this as a bid on the part of the government to implement a single party system.

Under such circumstances, the existence of more than one party was simply a formality. If this was to be the case, Noer continued, the implementation of democracy in Indonesia should be debated : "Did we implement democracy which gives us opportunities to develop diverse ideas freely (of course, with a sense of responsibility), or did we implement democracy just as a formality?"⁵⁷

Despite the fact that the government did not state the above tendency clearly and openly, Noer saw the implications of its policy as seeming to point in this direction. Basically, the insistence upon a sole basis for all political parties would allow for no fundamental differences among the parties; therefore, the implementation of this policy would in fact require no more than one political party.⁵⁸ Moreover, Noer maintained that the use of the Pancasila as the sole basis would not enable the parties to argue for the programs they wished to establish, since the values or criteria used to evaluate their programs were the same. This would lead the parties to be less competitive in offering programs, which would make it impossible for them to draw wide support from the people. According to Noer, the special bases of the parties should be allowed to be

⁵⁶ Noer, *Islam*, 59 - 60.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 58.

maintained, since these would determine the platforms and goals which would make them distinct from one another.⁵⁹

In Deliar Noer's opinion, President Soeharto's idea of employing the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties would not only pose trouble for the Islam-based party, the PPP, but would also cause problems for the ex-Parkindo and ex-Partai Katholik. When fused into the PDI in 1973, these two parties lost their special bases (Catholicism and Protestantism) and agreed to accept the PDI's basis instead. According to Noer, their adoption of this new basis was due to practical political considerations, not fundamental religious reasons. As far as the ex-Parkindo was concerned, Noer based his assessment of one of the decisions of the national conference on church and society, which was sponsored by the Association of Indonesian Churches held in Salatiga, Central Java, from June 19 - 29, 1967. This decision stated that "the Christian faith does not accept a view stating that the Pancasila is the source of all legal sources." Another Conference resolution, it is true, admits that the Pancasila constitutes "a material source of Indonesian positive law." However, according to another resolution, what serves as "a source of all legal sources is nothing but the [Will of] One God whom we know in Jesus Christ. He is also the source of the Pancasila."⁶⁰ As far as the Partai Katholik was concerned, Deliar Noer pointed to the existence of the Vatican state which, in his opinion, reflects a view or faith which does not separate religion (Catholicism) from politics. In the view of Noer, the Pope is a symbol of the unity of religion and politics. On the basis of these arguments, Noer concluded that, from a theological point of view, the willingness of the ex-Parkindo and ex-Partai Katholik to accept the Pancasila as their

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 56.

sole basis did not solve the real problem, and only served the purpose of practical politics.⁶¹

Deliar Noer went on to say that if the Muslims for their part accepted the government's idea of the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties, this would pose a heavy burden on their religious conscience. It would foster dishonesty among Muslims and give rise to political hypocrisy in the face of policies launched by the government. The Muslims, he said, would say "yes" to such policies, but it was not certain that they would implement them.⁶² In his opinion, if the PPP accepted the government's idea of the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties, the implication would be that the party acknowledged the following :

1. There is a separation of religion and politics in Islam. Thus, this [kind of acknowledgment] would place Islam in a position equal to that of other religions in relation to politics.
2. Religion, particularly Islam, is not in agreement with the demands of the times, at least in the political sphere.
3. Islam had posed trouble [for the Pancasila] in the past; or it was in contradiction to or, at least, not in accordance with the Pancasila in the field of politics.
4. Political disturbances during the last election campaigns had been caused by the PPP which still maintained its special basis (Islam) in addition to the Pancasila.⁶³

In addition, Deliar Noer mentioned six political implications of the application of the Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties. First, a single basis for all political parties would deny the diversity of society which flourishes in accordance with its convictions. Some of these convictions might originate from religious doctrine. Second, a single basis for all political parties would prevent groups of people deeply rooted in the same traditions from unifying and exchanging ideas based on their beliefs

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., 57.

⁶³ Ibid., 55.

(including religious belief). In this case, the single basis contained elements of force, not freedom, which constitutes a basic characteristic of democracy. Third, a single basis for all political parties would deny the relation between religion and politics. This, notably for Islam, was contrary to its doctrine. As a result, this would lead the parties into a process of secularization. Fourth, making the Pancasila the sole basis for all political parties ignored real issues which needed to be specifically formulated by the parties when establishing their programs. This might happen because their special bases, which served as the criteria needed to assess their own programs, were not allowed to be explicitly and clearly included in their constitutions. This would lead the parties to be close-minded in advancing arguments and to be hypocritical in expressing political attitudes. Fifth, a single basis for all political parties reflected a tendency to implement a single party system. In spite of the fact that this single party system would not be formally realized, it could be said that the multi-party system was in fact abolished; the multi-party system would exist in name only. Thus, this system implied the implementation of a single party system in a disguised form. Sixth, the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties would block groups of people from developing their convictions, mainly religious, which in fact strengthened the Pancasila. Consequently, people would be restricted due to a lack of alternative ideas which might be very useful in the building of the state.⁶⁴

In the view of Deliar Noer, the New Order's policy of applying the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties was not in line with the ideals of the Indonesian leaders of 1945. As mentioned above, the latter used the Pancasila as the basis of the state and allowed any political party to maintain its special basis in addition to the Pancasila. Noer was of the opinion that the application of the Pancasila as the sole

⁶⁴ Ibid., 60 - 61.

basis would have more disadvantages than advantages.⁶⁵ Why? Because this policy, according to Noer, implied -- in addition to those points mentioned above -- the following :

1. That the Pancasila as the sole basis was absolute right, whereas the absolute right is with God.
2. That other bases were contrary to this sole basis, whereas it was believed that religion was in agreement with it.
3. That openness decreased because assessments of a problem were not automatically made based on this sole basis.
4. That people were hypocrites politically.
5. That a single and uniform interpretation of this sole basis had been established, whereas different interpretations of it did not automatically mean to reject it.⁶⁶

Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the former Masyumi leader and former president of the PDRI (*Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia*, or Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia),⁶⁷ also reacted to the government policy of stipulating the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties. On July 7, 1983, he bravely sent a long letter⁶⁸ to President Soeharto, appealing to him to stop his policy. He sent copies of his letter to the vice-president of the Republic of Indonesia, to all ministers of the fourth development cabinet, to the president, the vice-president and Justices of the Supreme Court, and to the president, vice-president and members of the Supreme Advisory Council.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Ibid., 78.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 78 - 79.

⁶⁷ Sjafruddin Prawiranegara took the initiative to establish the PDRI in Sumatra after Soekarno, Hatta and many of the leaders of the central government in Yogyakarta were captured by the Dutch following their second military action in December 1948.

⁶⁸ Prawiranegara's letter was reproduced by the DDII of Jakarta, chaired by Mohammad Natsir, under the title *Perihal Pancasila Sebagai Azas Tunggal*. His letter was translated into English and published under the title "Pancasila as the Sole Foundation," in *Indonesia*, no. 38 (October 1984), 75 - 83. All quotations relating to this issue are taken from that translation.

⁶⁹ In addition to these state institutions, he also sent copies of his letter to (1) the Chairman and members of the State Finance Control Board, (2) the speakers, vice-

Prawiranegara believed that the Pancasila was simply intended by the founding fathers of the Republic to be used as the philosophical basis and national ideology of the state, and not as the sole foundation for all political parties and mass organizations. He firmly criticized the president's policy as being wrong and baseless and, for this very reason, urged him to change his mind and discontinue his policy. "It is better to turn back halfway than to err the whole way," he wrote confidently.⁷⁰ In a strong emotional reaction, coupled with a feeling of frustration and anger, Prawiranegara asked:

Why must the Islamic basis of the remaining Islamic political party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), be replaced by the Pancasila? After all, the Islamic basis of the Islamic political parties and social organizations has long existed and been recognized as not in conflict, but rather in accord, with the 1945 constitution. Why only now has the Islamic foundation to be replaced by the Pancasila? What crime has the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or the HMI, or any Muslim organization committed?⁷¹

THE PPP'S RESPONSE

The PPP is a fusion of four Islamic political parties, namely the NU, PSII, Perti and the Parmusi. Prior to their fusion, the NU was the largest party of the four, drawing its main support from rural Muslims. This can be seen, for example, from the results of the 1971 general election in which the NU won 18.67 percent of the vote (58 seats), whereas the Parmusi took only 5.36 percent (24 seats), the PSII 2.39 percent (10 seats), and the Perti 0.70 percent (2 seats).⁷² On January 5, 1973, in the

speakers and the factional leaders in the MPR and DPR and other members, (3) the Attorney General, (4) the Central Council of 'Ulamā in Indonesia, (5) the press and other mass media, and (6) Islamic social organizations. See Prawiranegara, "Pancasila," 83.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 79.

⁷¹ Ibid., 79 - 80.

⁷² Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, *Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Tahun 1971* (Jakarta : n. p., 1971).

wake of the New Order's policy of political restructuring, these four Islamic parties merged into a single party called the PPP, with the main objective of advancing Islamic political aspirations. The PPP, especially in its early development, often experienced political turmoil because single elements within it, chiefly the NU and the MI (*Muslimin Indonesia*, or Indonesian Muslims), pursued their own political aspirations. At the same time, the government often interfered in the internal affairs of the party, supporting the leadership of those who were pro-government and pushing the non-accommodationists (particularly members of the NU) out of the party. The political turmoil within the PPP, coupled with the government's intervention, resulted, for example, in the resignation of K. H. Saifuddin Zuhri, a leading figure of the NU, from the PPP leadership.⁷³

During this period, many members of the NU faction within the PPP were known as hard-liners who opposed several of the government's policies. Consequently, despite its majority position in the PPP, not one of the NU leaders ever became general chairman of the executive council of the party. This happened because the government prevented the NU leaders from holding this position, fearing that the party would be mobilized to pose a challenge to the government. The only senior and "strategic" position given to the NU was the chairmanship of the consultative or advisory councils of the PPP. While the position of the NU element within the PPP continued to be weak, that of the MI element became stronger as indicated by the fact that the chairmanship of the executive council of the PPP was always in its hands. Under the leadership of Jaelani Naro, a Parmusi activist who was supported by the

⁷³ See Slamet Effendy Yusuf et al., *Dinamika Kaum Santri* (Jakarta : CV Rajawali, 1983), 73. On pages 61 - 76 this book gives an account of the conflicts between the MI and NU elements within the PPP.

government, the position of the NU element within the PPP continued to weaken.⁷⁴

However, when Ismail Hasan Materium (a P. rmusi figure who had a moderate attitude) became the general chairman of the PPP in 1989, the position of the NU element was slightly improved, as can be seen from the fact that the position of secretary general of the party was given to Mathori Abdul Djalil, an NU man.

Before the government's application of the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties, the PPP, as an Islamic party, used the symbol of the *Ka'bah* which attracted the Muslims to vote for it in general elections. The use of this symbol was proposed by K. H. Bisri Sansuri, a leading *'ālim* of the NU who also served as chairman of the consultative council of the PPP. It was reported that prior to coming up with his proposal, Bisri had performed *ṣalāt istikhūrah* (a night prayer seeking direct guidance and blessing from God), during which he had received a vision that the symbol of the Ka'bah was suitable to be used as an emblem by the PPP. Thus, the PPP activists became convinced that their struggle for the party would be blessed by God.⁷⁵ Similarly, because the ideological basis of the PPP was both Islam and the Pancasila, this meant that it struggled for Islamic political aspirations within the context of the Pancasila. In the PPP's view, these two principles did not contradict each other.

According to its 1973 constitution, "the PPP is based on Islam and aims at building the state of the Republic of Indonesia on the foundation of the Pancasila and

⁷⁴ For more details on the PPP, see, for example, Sudarnoto Abdul Hakim, "The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan : The Political Journey of Islam under Indonesia's New Order 1973 - 1987," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1993). See also Syamsuddin Haris, "PPP and Politics under the New Order," *Prisma*, no. 49 (June 1990), 31 - 51.

⁷⁵ Haris, "PPP and Politics," 40.

the 1945 constitution, leading to the establishment of a just and prosperous society blessed by God the Almighty."⁷⁶ To achieve this goal, the PPP made every effort

- (1) to implement Islamic teachings in the life of individuals and the community in accordance with the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution;
- (2) to develop Muslim brotherhood within the context of national unity and integrity; and
- (3) to stimulate the creation of a good atmosphere in which religious activities, according to Sunnism, could be carried out.⁷⁷

Also, according to its constitution, the PPP based its programs upon the basic principle of "enjoining the good and prohibiting the evil", and implemented these programs with the objective of

- (1) building an Indonesian society obedient to God the Almighty;
- (2) establishing noble moral conduct within Indonesian society by elevating its religious consciousness and responsibility;
- (3) defending and building the state of the Republic of Indonesia based on the Pancasila, leading to the creation of a just and prosperous society blessed by God the Almighty; and
- (4) struggling to develop economic life based on the principle of family spirit.⁷⁸

In 1977, four years after its foundation, the PPP modified its constitution in which its basis was stated to read, "the PPP is based on the Pancasila, the 1945 constitution and Islam." In line with this modification, the PPP reformulated its goals, aiming at

- (a) attaining the nation's ideals as laid down in the 1945 constitution which are in agreement with those of Islamic teaching;
- (b) establishing a just and prosperous society blessed by God the Almighty, spiritually and materially based on the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution in the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ DPP PPP, *Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga PPP 1973* (Jakarta : Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1973), article 1 paragraph 2.

⁷⁷ Ibid., article 3 paragraphs 1, 3 and 6.

⁷⁸ DPP PPP, *Program Perjuangan dan Urgensi Program Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 1973* (Jakarta : Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1973), 73 - 74.

⁷⁹ DPP PPP, *Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga PPP 1977* (Jakarta : Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1977), articles 2 and 3.

From the above quotations, it is clear that these three important elements, i.e., the basis, goal and program, were closely interrelated and could not be separated from one another in the political struggle of the PPP. Indeed, these three elements gave a clear and specific identity to the PPP as an Islamic party, and distinguished it from the PDI and the Golkar. In line with its religious and political goals, the PPP exhibited a staunch and consistent attitude toward government policies which, in its view, were contrary to its principles. For example, the PPP in 1973 rejected the government's proposal of the marriage bill (which, in its view, was secular in nature) and walked out of the 1978 MPR general session held to discuss the legalization of the aliran Kepercayaan and the P 4, as discussed in the second chapter.

The PPP did not react substantially to the government's proposal to stipulate the Pancasila as the sole basis for political parties. It mostly kept silent in response to this very important issue. In fact, the PPP faction in the DPR had participated in the discussion concerning the government's proposal of Bill no. 3/1985 (in which the Pancasila as the sole basis was proposed) and, together with other factions, approved it. With the issuance by the government of the law, the PPP had no choice but to obey, meaning that it had to redefine its identity in accordance with this new regulation. In response to this law, J. Naro, general chairman of the PPP, quickly said that the PPP had to implement it fully and completely.⁸⁰ However, Naro persisted in keeping the Ka'bah as the symbol of the PPP, refusing to replace it with another symbol for fear of losing the party's traditional supporters. This provoked disagreement from his colleague, Syarifuddin Harahap, who accused him of going back to the spirit of the Jakarta Charter.⁸¹

⁸⁰ *Kompas*, July 13, 1985.

⁸¹ *Tempo*, March 23, 1985, 19.

In the meantime, Sulastomo expressed his surprise saying that "it was unbelievable that they (Naro's group) would change the basis of the party so easily, while persistently refusing to replace the ballot symbol. The symbol was in fact a representation of the Islamic basis, was it not?"⁸² In a tone similar to Naro's, Sudardji stated that "we should abandon all of these [ideologies other than the Pancasila]." ⁸³ Asked whether Islam were a narrow ideology, he answered in the affirmative.⁸⁴ Sudardji's attitude provoked criticism from Syafii Maarif (a scholar who had graduated from the University of Chicago) saying that "this is the way this PPP leader understands Islam in its relation to politics. Indeed, many of the Muslim politicians now have lost their dignity and self-respect."⁸⁵ Maarif then added that,

Here, again, we observe a shameless classic example where many Muslim official leaders have too easily become the prey of the political game. Therefore, in view of this, a question may be raised : How can one expect to be able to build a strong and attractive political party on the foundation of self-serving and irresponsible individuals? It appears to us that the Muslim "leaders" still are not clever enough to take a lesson from history. Even after a series of continuous disgraceful failures, these leaders remain incapable of benefiting from their experiences in the past. Perhaps, to them it is enough to present Islam by means of a number of slogans and generalities necessary for "buying" votes from the *Umma* in the elections.⁸⁶

It should be clear from these discussions that Muslim scholars like Noer, Maarif and Fachry Aly, as well as Muslim leaders such as Prawiranegara, felt free to express their objections to the government's imposition of the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties. They could do this because they were not PPP activists. They were

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ See Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima, "Asas Lain, Sebab Kebringasan," *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 370 (September 1, 1982), 20.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State : A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia," (Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago, 1982), 305.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 305 - 306.

Muslim figures who were concerned with the "fate" of the PPP, and who had the right to express their views on Islam and politics, particularly in relation to the PPP and the Pancasila as the sole basis. As for the PPP leaders, they faced a political dilemma in the sense that their rejection of the Pancasila as the sole basis would result in the party's dissolution by the government. In order to save the party, the PPP leaders had to choose a pragmatic way of accepting the Pancasila as the sole basis of their party.

In redefining its identity in conformity with the law, the PPP in 1985 reformulated its basis to read : "the PPP is based on the Pancasila." While the PPP has permanently maintained the Pancasila as its sole basis, it has changed its goals and programs in accordance with the political demands it has faced. In 1987 the party issued a new constitution in which its political goals were formulated and designed :

- (1) to develop the spirit of brotherhood in all aspects of social and religious activities with the aim of strengthening the national unity and integrity of Indonesians;
- (2) to implement religious doctrine in the lives of individuals and the community; and
- (3) to stimulate the creation of a good atmosphere for the implementation of legal religious practices.⁸⁷

If we compare these reformulated goals with those laid down in its 1983 constitution, we will note the following points : (1) the PPP changed the expression "to develop Islamic brotherhood" in its 1983 constitution to "to develop the spirit of brotherhood" in its 1987 constitution; (2) the PPP exchanged the formulation "to implement the teachings of Islam" in its 1983 constitution for "to implement religious doctrine" in its 1987 constitution; and (3) the formula "to carry out religious doctrine according to Sunnism" in its 1983 constitution was replaced by "to observe legitimate religious practices" in its 1987 constitution. In keeping with redefining its identity, the

⁸⁷ DPP PPP, *Anggaran Dasar PPP 1987* (Jakarta : Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1987), article 5.

PPP replaced its symbol, the Ka'bah, with that of a Star.⁸⁸ Thus, the PPP removed everything related to the use of an Islamic basis, identity, formulas and symbols following its adoption of the Pancasila as its sole basis.

Following these "radical" changes, Ridwan Saidi, a staunch activist of the PPP, warned others not to treat Islam as a "political commodity" or a "ticket which will bring them to the Senayan"⁸⁹ (parliament). This clearly shows that Saidi rejected the idea of utilizing Islam as a vehicle in the pursuit of political goals, arguing that Islam should be sincerely implemented. "I do not want to throw away Islam," he explained, "I just want the Islamic formulas of the party to be removed so that the glory of Islam not be misused as a political commodity."⁹⁰ Saidi even maintained that, with the implementation of the laws on politics, all political parties were now considered parties of the Pancasila in the sense that their ideology was the Pancasila. In his view, the PPP should be an open party which is also capable of attracting non-Muslims. Saidi's view was supported by Kyai Haji Ahmad Siddiq, a leading 'ālim in the NU circle, saying that, in line with the principle of openness, the PPP should be open to both Catholics and PDI supporters. "The PPP," Siddiq said, "should not be a narrow-minded party."⁹¹ Roeslan Abdulgani, one of the chief ideologues of the ex-PNI, shared his views saying that,

By accepting the Pancasila, the United Development Party may well lose its Islamic character. ... But this simply means that the political aspirations of Muslims can flow through whatever channel they wish. I too am a Muslim ... I used to express my political aspirations through the Indonesian Nationalist Party. ... Now I do so through the Pancasila. ... The Darul Islam [revolts]

⁸⁸ The symbol of a Star was chosen because it was the one of the five symbols of the Pancasila which represented the principle of "Belief in One God".

⁸⁹ *Tempo*, August 25, 1984, 29.

⁹⁰ *Tempo*, August 30, 1986, 12.

⁹¹ *Tempo*, August 25, 1984, 14.

figures who called for its members not to vote for the PPP.⁹⁵ This campaign, known as "*aksi pengembosan*" (puncturing the tires), was launched by many of the NU's leaders because they were resentful of the MI element within the PPP which was always upstaging the NU. Despite this internal conflict, the PPP in the 1988 MPR general session remained active in voicing Islamic aspirations. For example, it put forward proposals to the MPR that :

- (1) the section of the discussion on religion and that of the aliran kepercayaan in the GBHN be separated;
- (2) religious education, which has been given at all state schools at all levels, be given at private schools as well;
- (3) the pesantren as an Islamic educational institution be incorporated into the GBHN; and
- (4) gambling in any form be abolished.⁹⁶

As far as the first point was concerned, the PPP argued that the essences of the two are totally different : the aliran kepercayaan is a culture, whereas religion is a divine revelation. In support of its argument, the PPP referred to article 29 of the 1945 constitution, and to the 1983 GBHN enactment stating that the aliran kepercayaan is not a religion.⁹⁷ For the second proposal, the PPP argued that religious education should be given to students in all schools, not only in the state schools but also in the private ones. In the view of the PPP, the dichotomy between the state and private schools lay only in administrative affairs, not in teaching materials. In the meantime, the PPP saw the pesantrens as playing an important role in educating and enlightening the public; therefore, they should be given a place in the GBHN. Finally, the PPP saw the harmful impact of gambling on society, and proposed that all forms

⁹⁵ On this development see A. Zuhdi Mukhdlor, *NU dan Pemilu* (Yogyakarta : Gunung Jati & U., 1986).

⁹⁶ See Asfari Jaya Bakri, "PPP : Pergumulan Identitas dalam Kancan Orde Baru," *Pesantren*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1991), 19.

⁹⁷ See *Jawa Pos*, March 2, 1988.

should be abolished in order that social life be based on moral and religious principles.⁹⁸

In addition, the PPP also presented some important ideas for the completion of the government's proposal of national educational system bill when the bill was debated in the DPR in 1988. One of the PPP's accepted proposals was that the formulation of educational objectives receives the additional word *iman* (faith) along with the word *takwa* (religious devotion) previously mentioned in the bill. In the PPP's view, the emphasis on the principle of "faith" was significant in establishing an educational objective which was not secular in nature. Also, supported by the Golkar and ABRI factions, the PPP succeeded in promoting its proposal that religious courses should be given to students by teachers embracing the same religion as that of the students.⁹⁹

All this indicated that, following the PPP's adoption of the Pancasila as its sole basis, the party, in fact, continued to advocate Islamic aspirations which, of course, were put within the context of the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution. Although the PPP has removed its Islamic symbol, as well as the mention of its Islamic basis and formulas from its constitution, Islamic values, which have long been integrated into the PPP, continue to be present. Also, its long spiritual and historical ties with its Muslim supporters persist. It might be correct to say that the PPP is now a Pancasila-based party which voices Muslim aspirations. Or, in Chalid Mawardi's words, "The PPP is no longer an Islamic party, but a party for Muslims."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Bakri, "PPP : Pergumulan Identitas," 19.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 20.

¹⁰⁰ Panji Masyarakat, no. 306 (March 21, 1983), 51 - 52.

Minister of Religious Affairs H. Munawir Sjadzali¹⁰¹ argued in 1992 that, with the acceptance by the Muslims of the Pancasila as the sole basis in their social and national life, the government has paid much more attention to Muslims' interests and has been more successful in developing the religious life of the Muslims.¹⁰² As he puts it :

In 1985, all socio-political institutions, including Muslim parties, and social organizations agreed to accept the Pancasila as the sole basis in the social and national life. With this, Indonesian Muslims have formally given up the idea of an Islamic state, and so eliminated the possibility of the birth of an Islamic state in Indonesia. As a result, as we have seen, there has been a change in the government and the legislative body's attitude towards the Muslims. In the new political atmosphere, where the "threat of an Islamic state" is no longer prevalent, the government and the parliament have come to realize that the Indonesian Muslims, being the majority group of the population in this "Pancasila" state and in line with the message of democracy, are entitled to more attention for their interests, including their religious interests, without hindering the interests of other religious groups. This explains why in the last few years the government has listened more attentively to the wishes of the Indonesian Muslims. The change of attitude on the part of the government, the legislative branch, and the society in general reminds me of the popular expression made by Dr. Nurcholish Madjid in the beginning of 1970 when he said : "Islam, yes; Muslim party, no."

I think we are of the opinion that the religious life of the Muslims in Indonesia has developed much better at the time when Muslim parties are no longer in existence. Obviously, in the Pancasila state, as long as we hold fast to the rules of the game and intelligently utilize the mechanism of democracy, the Muslims political interests will be better served without having recourse to Muslim parties.¹⁰³

Sjadzali goes on to warn Muslims to take a lesson from their past and realize that they will achieve their political goals only if they struggle constitutionally and in line with

¹⁰¹ Born on November 7, 1925 in Klaten, Central Java, Munawir Sjadzali obtained his M. A. from Georgetown University, Washington DC., in 1959. He served as ambassador to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirate (1976 - 1980), and was director general for political affairs of the Department of Foreign Affairs (1980). He was appointed minister of religious affairs for two terms (1983 - 1988 and 1988 - 1993).

¹⁰² This point will be developed in the last section of this chapter when we discuss the Muslim acceptance of the Pancasila as sole basis for all mass organizations.

¹⁰³ Munawir Sjadzali, *Muslims' Interests are Better Served in the Absence of Muslim Parties* (Jakarta : Departemen Agama RI, 1992), 9 - 10.

C. MUSLIM RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNMENT POLICY OF APPLYING THE PANCASILA AS THE SOLE BASIS FOR ALL MASS ORGANIZATIONS

Having applied the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties, next on the political agenda of the New Order was to implement the Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations. For this purpose, a mass organizations bill was prepared and submitted in 1984 by the government to the DPR for approval.¹⁰⁸ The debate on the bill in the DPR lasted for one and a half months,¹⁰⁹ indicating that the bill received a critical and comprehensive assessment from all factions in the DPR, including the PPP and the PDI. To deal with the issue, a Special Committee and a Working Team were established to which mass organization leaders gave input and suggestions to be used in the completion of the bill. According to the "Inventory List of Problems" recorded by the Special Committee and Working Team, there were 86 points relating to the rights of mass organizations, eight of which were regarded as crucial and therefore provoked extensive debate.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ The government submitted the mass organizations bill to the DPR together with four other bills in one package. The other four bills consisted of the election amendment bill, the DPR/MPR amendment bill, the political parties and Golkar amendment bill and the referendum bill. The mass organizations bill was the last one debated in the DPR and became the most controversial issue.

¹⁰⁹ According to Dr. Suhardiman, chairman of the Special Committee, the length of the debates on the mass organizations bill was unusual compared with those on other bills which usually lasted for only three weeks. Since the mass organizations bill was approved in the month of Ramaḍān, Minister of Home Affairs Soepardjo Rustam, on behalf of the government, congratulated all factions, saying that Ramaḍān was indeed a month filled with blessing. "It was also in Ramaḍān that our independence took place," said Rustam with confidence. See Uf Saimima, "RUUK, Setuju di Bulan Suci," *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 470 (June 11, 1985), 14 and 15.

¹¹⁰ The eight crucial points were the title, the guidance of the mass organizations, the relation between the Pancasila and religious life, the freezing of the board and dissolution of the organizations, the general regulation and its clarification, the clarification of the term "basis", the clarification of the transitional regulations, and the consideration of the bill. See Uf Saimima, "RUUK," 15.

Objections came not only from the PPP and the PDI factions in the DPR, but also from various socio-religious organization which were concerned that the government, with this proposed bill, would interfere in their internal affairs. The MAWI (*Majelis Agung Wali Gereja Indonesia*, or Supreme Council of Indonesian [Catholic] Churches) and the DGI (*Dewan Gereja Indonesia*, or Council of Indonesian [Protestant] Churches), for example, objected to the bill. Their leaders argued that both the MAWI and the DGI were not mass organizations, but institutions which were parts of an international institution. For this very reason, they said that the mass organizations bill could not be applied to them.¹¹¹ On the other hand, the Working Team argued that the MAWI and the DGI were mass organizations to which the bill also applied.¹¹² Finally, following the promulgation by the government of the mass organizations law, both the DGI and the MAWI accepted the Pancasila as their sole basis in 1986. After adopting the Pancasila as its sole basis, the DGI was transformed into the PGI (*Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia*, or Alliance of Indonesian [Protestant] Churches).

As far as the Muslims were concerned, they had begun as early as 1982 to express their reactions to government's proposal of the Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations. Many Muslim mass organizations at first objected to the government's idea for fear that adopting the Pancasila as their sole basis would mean that the Pancasila would replace Islam, or that the Pancasila would be made equal to religion.¹¹³ In response to this objection, the government stated that the Pancasila

¹¹¹ Abu Jihan, "Undang-Undang Keormasan," *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 470 (June 11, 1985), 13; Saimima, "RUUK," 16 - 17; *Tempo*, June 8, 1985, 12. See also "MAWI, PGI dan Asas Tunggal," *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 469 (June 1, 1985), 13.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Saimima, "RUUK," 17.

should be understood as a single basis regulating the civic life of Indonesians.¹¹⁴ In this case, President Soeharto guaranteed that "the Pancasila would not replace religion, and it was impossible that the Pancasila would replace religion. The Pancasila would not be made equal to religion, and it was impossible that religion would be made equal to the Pancasila."¹¹⁵ Also, as in the case of other social groups, the Muslim objection to the Pancasila as the sole foundation was caused by a fear that the government would diminish the diversity flourishing in Indonesian society, and that this would restrict their socio-religious activities. In response to this objection, Dr. Suhardiman (a prominent member of the Golkar faction and chairman of the Special Committee) stated that,

the bill did not aim at diminishing the plurality of Indonesian society which was reflected in people's creativity and freedom. [It] did not restrict freedom of association, but gave good order to all citizens in carrying out their social responsibility to build a Pancasila society. Neither did the bill deny freedom of movement to any mass organization.¹¹⁶

In a tone similar to Suhardiman's, Minister of Home Affairs Soepardjo Rustam said that "the bill should be seen as a simple and easy problem. There was nothing complicated which would cause trouble for any mass organization."¹¹⁷ Furthermore, he also asserted that it was up to mass organizations to redefine themselves according to this bill, and to intensify their role and activities in line with their distinctiveness in implementing their programs. Thus, the social position of mass organizations was to be the same as that of political parties although the former were not affiliated with the latter. According to the spirit of the bill, Rustam continued, all mass organizations

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ See *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 470 (June 11, 1985), 20.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

were free to implement their own roles.¹¹⁸ However, unlike the PPP, which unanimously accepted the Pancasila as its sole basis, the Muslim response to the Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations can be divided into two categories: a majority which accepted it, and a minority which did not.

THE NU'S RESPONSE

Established by a group of 'ulamā' in Surabaya, East Java, on January 31, 1926, the NU is known as the biggest socio-religious organization amongst the Traditionalist Muslim groups.¹¹⁹ It draws support chiefly from rural Javanese Muslims, and operates thousands of pesantrens throughout the country. According to its constitution, the basic principles of the religious ideology of the NU are as follows :

- (1) The NU bases its ideology on the sources of Islamic doctrine : the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, *ijmā'*, and *qiyās*;
- (2) In understanding and interpreting Islam from its sources, the NU follows Sunnism and uses the following approaches : (a) the teachings of Abū Ḥasan al-Ash'ārī and Abū Maṣṣūr al-Maturidī in theology; (b) one of the four *madhāhib*: the Ḥanafī, the Mālikī, the Shāfi'ī, or the Ḥanbalī *madhhab* in Islamic law; and (c) the teachings of al-Junayd al-Baghdādī, al-Ghazālī and their like in mysticism.¹²⁰

When the Masyumi was founded in November 1945 in Yogyakarta to serve as the only Islamic party, the NU joined it. However, due to political conflicts that occurred

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Among the 'ulamā' who took the initiative to establish the NU were K. H. Hasyim Asy'ari, K. H. Abdulwahab Khasbullah, H. Abdullah Ubaid, Abdul Halim, K. Ma'sum, Alwi Abdul Aziz, Abdullah Faqih and K. H. Nakhrowi. See Saifuddin Zuhri, *Kyai Haji Abdulwahab Khasbullah : Bapak dan Pendiri NU* (Yogyakarta : Sumbangsih, 1983), 28 - 29.

¹²⁰ *Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali ke Khittah 1926* (Bandung : Risalah, 1985), 118.



between the NU and Masyumi leaders, the former declared itself an independent political party at its national congress of 1952 in Palembang, South Sumatra.¹²¹

Together with the PSII and the Perti, the NU under Soekarno's Guided Democracy vigorously struggled for Islamic political aspirations. Critics often accused the NU of being opportunistic under Guided Democracy since it showed its readiness to cooperate with the PKI and demonstrated accommodating attitudes toward the regime. Other however have argued that the NU in fact struggled from within, facing the PKI directly in the political arena : sometimes it showed readiness to cooperate with the PKI, while at other times it maintained a distance vis-à-vis the latter.¹²²

Some said that it was not fair to label the NU alone as being opportunistic since the PSII and the Perti had done the same thing. The NU's political attitude towards the PKI became clear when the latter staged its revolt in 1965. It was the NU which "first" demanded that the PKI be dissolved, and it was also the NU, supported by its mass organizations such as the *Banser* (*Barisan Serba Guna*, or Multi-use Front) and the *Gerakan Pemuda Ansor* (Helpers Youth Movement), which made an important contribution to the New Order forces in their destruction of the rebellion.¹²³

In the early development of the New Order, the NU exhibited a "radical" attitude towards the regime. Nakamura is correct when he states that the NU in the 1970s

¹²¹ Before the NU, the PSII had separated from the Masyumi in 1947. In 1960, the Masyumi was dissolved by Soekarno due to its "radical" opposition and the involvement of many of its leaders in the PRRI revolt in 1958. The remaining three Islamic parties under Guided Democracy were the PSII, the Perti and the NU. Abdurrahman Wahid was of the opinion that the split of the NU in particular from the Masyumi was a blessing in disguise in the sense that if the NU and other Islamic political parties in 1958 had acted like the Masyumi (launched radical opposition to the regime), all of them would have been dissolved by Soekarno. See Abdurrahman Wahid, "Kata Pengantar," in Einar Martahan Sitompul, *NU dan Pancasila* (Jakarta : Sinar Harapan, 1989), 17.

¹²² Yusuf et. al., *Dinamika*, 48.

¹²³ Ibid., 50.

emerged as the boldest and most defiant critic of the New Order government.¹²⁴ When the NU, together with the Parmusi, Perti and PSII, fused in 1973 into a single Islamic party called the PPP, its critical attitude remained. It was the NU element within the PPP which most strongly objected to the legalization of both the P 4 and the aliran kepercayaan in the 1978 MPR general session. The same attitude was taken by the NU when changes to the election law were legalized by the DPR in 1980. In the 1977 election campaign, K. H. Bisri Sansuri (a leading figure of the NU and chairman of the consultative council of the PPP) issued a *fatwā* saying that every Muslim was legally obliged to vote for the PPP. From this it could be deduced that voting for the Golkar, the government party, was prohibited under Muslim law.

During this period, NU supporters within the PPP were known as the so-called hard-liners and were disliked by the regime. In order to please the latter, Naro, chairman of the executive board of the PPP, began to "purge" the so-called hard-liners of the NU element from the party. Without consulting any NU members, he presented on October 27, 1981 a list of candidates for the 1982 election to the General Election Committee in which he belittled and pushed aside 29 prominent figures (including the so-called hard-liners) of the NU. Among those pushed aside by Naro were K. H. Masjkur, K. H. Saifuddin Zuhri, Rahmat Muljomiseno, Jusuf Hasjim, Chalik Ali, Imron Rasyadi, Mahbub Djunaedi, Aminuddin Aziz, T. Jafizham and Hasjim Latief. In light of its dissatisfaction with Naro's action, the NU element, led by Jusuf Hasjim and his friends, submitted another list of candidates to the General Election Committee, but it was rejected. However, Minister of Home Affairs Amir Mahmud

¹²⁴ See Mitsuo Nakamura's article, "The Radical Transformation of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia: A Personal Account of the 26th National Congress, June 1979, Semarang," *Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 19, no. 2 (September 1981), 187 - 204. His article was translated into Indonesian by Al Ghazie Usman under the title *Agama dan Perubahan Politik : Tradisionalisme Radikal Nahdlatul Ulama di Indonesia* (Surakarta : Hapsara, 1982).

unhesitatingly accepted the first list as valid. As a result, these prominent leaders and the so-called hard-liners of the NU were not elected as members of the DPR/MPR.¹²⁵

However, the NU showed a cooperative attitude in response to the government's idea of the Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations. It may be that the NU wanted to abandon its confrontational attitude towards the government, and make efforts to establish better relations with it. In spite of the fact that the mass organizations law had not been officially promulgated by the government, the NU expressed its agreement to accept the Pancasila as its sole basis. Later, this agreement was formalized by a decision made by the NU at its 27th national congress held from December 8 - 12, 1984 in the *Pesantren* Salafiyah Syafiiyah of Sukorejo, Situbondo, East Java. Another important decision made by the NU was its declaration that it would return to the spirit of 1926, serving again as a socio-religious organization, and abandon practical politics and sever all links with any political party.¹²⁶

In line with this decision, the NU reformulated its constitution to read (in article 2) that it is "based on the Pancasila." In keeping with its character as an Islamic mass organization, the NU, in article 3 of its constitution, states that it "follows Islamic doctrine according to the teachings of Sunnism (*ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā'ah*) and follows one of the four madhāhib : the Hanāfi, the Māliki, the Shāfi'i, or the Hanbālī madhhab. By stating its position in this way, the NU did not abandon its nature as an Islamic social movement, while clearly acknowledging the Pancasila as its sole basis. The way in which the NU defined itself in relation to the Pancasila as the sole basis

¹²⁵ For further discussions and studies of the recent developments of the NU, see, for example, Yusuf et. al., *Dinamika*; Chairul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama* (Sala : Jatayu, 1985); Mahrus Irsyam, *Ulama dan Partai Politik* (Jakarta : Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984); Abu Jihan, ed., *PPP, NU dan MI : Gejolak Wadah Politik Islam* (Jakarta : Integritas Press, 1984); Sitompul, *NU dan Pancasila*; Chairul Fathoni et. al., *NU Pasca Khittah* (Yogyakarta : MW Mandala, 1992).

¹²⁶ For more details, see *Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali*.

became a "model" which, as we shall see, other Islamic mass organizations adopted.

It is worth mentioning that the NU was known as the "first" to accept the Pancasila as its sole basis.¹²⁷

The decision taken at the 1984 national congress was made easier by the groundwork performed at a national meeting held one year earlier in the very same location. At this meeting a number of prominent NU 'ulamā', including K. H. Ahmad Siddiq, discussed the significance of the NU's return to the spirit of 1926 and also issued a declaration on the relation between the Pancasila and Islam. This declaration read:

1. The Pancasila, as the basis and philosophy of the state of the Republic of Indonesia is not a religion: neither can it replace religion nor be used to replace the position of religion.
2. The principle of "Belief in One God" as the foundation of the Republic of Indonesia, as stated in article 29 paragraph 1 of the 1945 constitution which gives life to all other principles, reflects "monotheism" (*tawhīd*) in accordance with the notion of belief (*īmān*) in Islam.
3. For the NU, Islam, which teaches *ʿaqīdah* and *sharīʿah*, encompasses aspects of the relationship of a human being to his/her God and the interrelationship between human beings.
4. The acceptance and observance of the Pancasila constitutes a realization of the Indonesian Muslims' aspirations to carry out their *sharīʿah*.
5. As a consequence of this creed, the NU has the obligation to maintain the true notion of the Pancasila and its correct and consistent observance by all.¹²⁸

This declaration was used by the NU as a religious justification to accept the Pancasila as its sole foundation at the 1984 congress mentioned above. Furthermore, the 'ulamā' of the NU said that the question of the Pancasila had been finalized long ago when it was agreed on August 18, 1945 that it be used as the basis and national ideology of the state.¹²⁹ In view of this, the NU called for all groups to maintain a

¹²⁷ Mahbub Djunaidi, "Tentang Penerbitan," in *Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali*, 1.

¹²⁸ *Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali*, 50 - 51.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 57.

correct and consistent perception of the Pancasila according to the form in which it had been laid down in the 1945 constitution. The NU's acceptance of the Pancasila as its sole basis also had a historical precedent in the fact that K. H. Wahid Hasjim (1914 - 1953),¹³⁰ a leading figure of the NU, actively participated in formulating the Pancasila and the preamble of the 1945 constitution along with other Muslim Nationalist leaders. Because of this, its formulation was regarded by the NU as acceptable to Muslims. Similarly, in its view, the Pancasila as the basis of the state is not contrary to the teachings of Islam, and should not be opposed.¹³¹

A number of NU 'ulamā' also advanced arguments in favour of the Pancasila which were based on traditional sources. Referring to the Qur'an (sūra Ali 'Imrān : 64), K. H. Ahmad Siddiq,¹³² general chairman of the consultative council of the NU, viewed the Pancasila as a *kalimatun sawi'in* (an equitable proposition) which unified all segments of Indonesian society.¹³³ An expert in Islamic law, Siddiq in 1984 made a legal analogy (*qiyās*) stating that the Pancasila, which had been used as the basis and national ideology of the state for forty years, was like a fruit which was eaten every day by Muslims. The question of whether eating the fruit was lawful or unlawful for

¹³⁰ He served as Minister of Religious Affairs from 1949 - 1952. Together with his father, K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari, he was recognized as a national independence hero by the government in honor of his struggle during the independence war between 1945 - 1949. For further account of his life, career and ideas, see H. Aboebakar, *Sejarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar* (Jakarta : Panitia Buku Peringatan K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957).

¹³¹ *Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali*, 57.

¹³² One of the prominent 'ulamā' in the NU circle, Kyai Haji Ahmad Siddiq devoted himself to teaching in his own pesantren called "Ash-Shiddiqiyah" in Jember, East Java. Due to his broad religious knowledge, charisma and skillful leadership, he was elected general chairman of the consultative council of the NU for two terms (1984 - 1989 and 1989 - 1994). He was born on January 24, 1926 and passed away in the hospital of Dr. Sutomo in Surabaya on January 23, 1991.

¹³³ See K. H. Ahmad Siddiq, *Islam, Pancasila dan Ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Jakarta : Lajnah Ta'lif wan Nasyr PBNU, 1985), 15.

Muslims was strange and illogical.¹³⁴ Siddiq seemed to say that any Islamic mass organization which questioned whether the Pancasila was acceptable to be used as its sole foundation was not only mistaken but irrelevant and a-historical. In this connection, he claimed that the acceptance by the Muslims of the Pancasila as the sole basis in socio-political life was a legal obligation. Thus, other bases would not become alternatives or rivals to the Pancasila.¹³⁵ Siddiq even asserted that, for the Muslims, the establishment of the Pancasila-based state of Indonesia was the final goal of their political aspirations, not simply a transitional goal.¹³⁶ This meant that any idea of establishing an Islamic state cannot be considered part of Muslim political aspirations, and any attempt to do so by any Muslim group would not represent the aspirations of the entire community. In a tone similar to Siddiq's, Abdurrahman Wahid,¹³⁷ general chairman of the executive council of the NU, also said in 1993 that religion could no longer question the position and legality of the Pancasila.¹³⁸ He argued that this view had become the final political decision of the NU, which did not treat religion as an ideological tool, but saw its political function as one which provided prosperity to people in a broad sense, including religious freedom.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ See Sjadzali, *Asas Pancasila, Aspirasi Umat Islam dan Masa Depan Bangsa* (Jakarta : Harian Pelita), 1.

¹³⁵ *Kompas*, September 30, 1982.

¹³⁶ See Siddiq, *Islam, Pancasila dan Ukhuwah*; see also Abdurrahman Wahid, "In Memoriam Kiai Ahmad Shiddiq," *Kompas*, January 26, 1991.

¹³⁷ Born in 1940 in Jombang, East Java, Abdurrahman Wahid is the son of K. H. Wahid Hasyim, a prominent leader of the NU and minister of religious affairs in the 1950s. Wahid was also the grandson of K. H. Hasyim Asy'ari, one of the founders of the NU. He has served as general chairman of the executive council of the NU for three terms (1984 - 1989, 1989 - 1994 and 1994 - 1999). Known as one of the founders of Forum for Democracy, Wahid is active in taking part in seminars and conferences both in the country and abroad.

¹³⁸ See *Kompas*, September 17, 1993.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

Siddiq's legal reasoning was often referred to by Minister of Religious Affairs Munawir Sjadzali in his efforts to convince Muslim mass organizations to accept the Pancasila as their sole foundation. In a tone similar to that of other top government officials, he tried to convince Muslim mass organizations that "the acceptance of the Pancasila as the sole basis did not diminish the integrity of Islamic belief."¹⁴⁰ He was of the opinion that the idea of the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties and mass organizations was not intended by the government to replace religion, or to make the Pancasila equal to religion.¹⁴¹ The government's single motivation was to finalize the question of the sole foundation for political and social organizations before the running of the state was transferred from the 1945 generation (which is now in power) to the succeeding generation. In this way, national crises which occurred in the past in relation to the basis and ideology of the state (Pancasila), such as the Gestapu/PKI affair and other occasions of political turmoil, would not be repeated.¹⁴²

Munawir Sjadzali expressed his satisfaction that many Islamic mass organizations had accepted the Pancasila as their sole basis, and their decision to accept it, in his opinion, was taken consciously. As far as the NU was concerned, he rejected the accusation that its acceptance of the Pancasila as its sole basis was simply political opportunism, and claimed rather that it was based on a deep political and religious consciousness. He then raised the question, "If there are any Muslim groups which still object to the Pancasila as the sole basis, whom do they represent?"¹⁴³ This question seemed to be addressed by Sjadzali to Muslim individuals or minority groups

¹⁴⁰ See *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 512 (August 11, 1986), 30 - 33.

¹⁴¹ Sjadzali, *Asas Pancasila*, 3.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 5.

as well as the PII (*Pelajar Islam Indonesia*, or Indonesian Muslim Students) which, as we shall see, firmly opposed the Pancasila as the sole basis.

THE MUHAMMADIYAH'S RESPONSE

The Muhammadiyah,¹⁴⁴ founded by K. H. Ahmad Dahlan¹⁴⁵ (1868 - 1923) on November 18, 1912 in Yogyakarta, is known as the largest socio-religious organization amongst the Modernist Muslim groups. In establishing the Muhammadiyah, Dahlan was inspired by the teachings of the Qur'ān, notably verses 104 and 105 of sūra Ali 'Imrān :

And from among you there should be a party who invite to good and enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong, and these it is that shall be successful.

You are the best of the nations raised up for the benefit of men; you enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong and believe in Allah ...

The Muhammadiyah has traditionally been supported particularly by members of the urban Muslim middle class, who work as traders, businessmen, teachers, religious preachers, intellectuals, and as employees of the government. Stressing the importance of *ijtihād*, it claims that it does not subscribe to any particular *madhhab*, but follows the opinion of one or another when, according to investigation, it is proved to be in agreement with or close to the basic spirit of the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*.

¹⁴⁴ Recent studies of the Muhammadiyah are numerous. See, for example, Ahmad Jaenuri, "The Muhammadiyah Movement in Twentieth Century Indonesia : A Socio-religious Study," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1992); Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politik"; Yusuf Abdullah Puar, *Perjuangan dan Pengabdian Muhammadiyah* (Jakarta: Pustaka Rakyat, 1989); M. T. Arifin, *Muhammadiyah : Potret Yang Berubah* (Surakarta : Institut Gelanggang Pemikiran Filsafat, Sosial Budaya dan Kependidikan Surakarta, 1990).

¹⁴⁵ Dahlan, together with his wife (Nyai Ahmad Dahlan), was recognized as a national hero by the Indonesian government due to his dedication and contribution to the nation. For detailed accounts of Dahlan, see, for instance, Junus Salam, *Riwayat Hidup K. H. A. Dahlan : Amal dan Perjuangannya* (Jakarta : Depot Pengajaran Muhammadiyah, 1968); Muhammady Idris, "K. H. A. Dahlan : His Life and Thought," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1975).

Organizationally, the Muhammadiyah has no formal ties with any political party established by Modernist Muslim groups. However, it has had a close relationship with the Masyumi in the past, and maintains a close link with the MI element within the PPP at present. In fact, individually, many members of the Muhammadiyah in the past were active in the Masyumi, and are currently involved, through the MI element, in the PPP. Some leaders of the Muhammadiyah took the initiative in establishing the PPP in the late 1960s and became prominent leaders in its early development. This close relationship was made possible because of their similarity in religious outlook, which is deeply rooted in what they claim to be the ideas of Islamic modernism.

Influenced by the puritanical teachings of Wahhābism, the Muhammadiyah is concerned with the purification of Islam by ridding it of what is regarded as *bid'ah*.¹⁴⁶ Adopting Afghānī's and 'Abduh's ideas of Islamic modernism,¹⁴⁷ the Muhammadiyah has also been concerned with the reformation of Islamic thought. According to Mu'ti 'Alī, the main goals of the Muhammadiyah can be summarized as a call for:

- (1) the purification of Indonesian Islam from corrupting influences and practices;
- (2) the reformulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern thought;
- (3) the reformation of Muslim education; and
- (4) the defense of Islam against external influences and attacks.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ On this issue see, for example, James Peacock, *Purifying the Faith : The Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesia* (California : The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, 1978).

¹⁴⁷ According to H. A. R. Gibb, the modernist ideas of 'Abduh can be summarized as a call for : (1) the purification of Islam from corrupting influences and practices; (2) the reformation of Muslim higher education; (3) the reformulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern thought; and (4) the defense of Islam against European influences and Christian attacks. See Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (New York : Octagon Books, 1981), 33.

¹⁴⁸ 'Abdul Mu'ti 'Alī, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," (M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1957), 56. It seems that the way 'Alī summarized the Muhammadiyah's goals was inspired by H. A. R. Gibb's summary of 'Abduh's modernist ideas mentioned above.

As a Muslim modernist movement, the Muhammadiyah gives special attention to reform, which from the outset it has made every effort to achieve. "It has carried on much of its work through auxiliary organizations such as youth and women's associations, clinics, orphanages, and above all, a large school system which presented academic subjects and taught Islam not merely by recital and exegesis but also as a basic system of religious, ethical, and social belief."¹⁴⁹

Many have said that the Muhammadiyah succeeded in modernizing Islamic thought in its early development, and in some later periods, by calling for its members to exercise *ijtihad* and independent Islamic rational thinking. Recently however, some have criticized the Muhammadiyah for not playing a role in the renewal of Islamic thought. For example, Prof. Rasjidi (himself a respected scholar and prominent figure in the Muhammadiyah circle) has complained that "most of the Muhammadiyah leaders have become monuments,"¹⁵⁰ due, perhaps, to their concerns in running their institutions, without undertaking serious reflection, rational contemplation and intellectual thinking in relation to scientific and religious matters.

In response to the government's proposal of stipulating the Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations, the Muhammadiyah took calm and careful steps. At the very beginning, the Muhammadiyah -- like many other mass organizations -- believed that the principle of the Pancasila as the sole basis stated in the 1983 GBHN enactment was intended by the government to be used only by all political parties. After consulting with the president, Junior Minister of Youth and Sport Affairs Abdul Gafur, on August 30, 1982, clarified that this policy also applied to all mass

¹⁴⁹ David Joel Steinberg, ed., *In Search of Southeast Asia : A Modern History* (Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 290.

¹⁵⁰ See Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State," 117.

organizations, without exception.¹⁵¹ He also said that for this purpose the government, after having the DPR's approval, would establish a law stipulating that all mass organizations subscribe to the Pancasila as their sole foundation. Despite the government's clarification, there was still much confusion over the issue, resulting in different opinions or interpretations of the 1983 GBHN enactment respecting the matter. For example, Hardi, former vice-prime minister and a chief leader of the ex-PNI, was of the opinion that based on a correct interpretation of the content of the 1983 GBHN enactment, the stipulation of the Pancasila as the sole basis did not apply to mass organizations, but only to the political parties and the Golkar.¹⁵² In fact, it is true that no clear mention was made in the 1983 GBHN enactment that the adoption of the Pancasila foundation should also apply to all mass organizations. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara reacted to this move by the government by saying that the law would be easily produced since "the Peoples' Representative Council more often expresses 'His Master's Voice' [sic] than giving voice to its own feelings."¹⁵³

Before moving on to discuss the Muslim responses to the government's plan of applying the Pancasila as the sole basis, it is first necessary to recognize the very strong position of the president in the Indonesian political system. The 1945 constitution does not follow J. J. Montesquieu's theory of *trias politica* which divides powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, through which "checks and balances" can be maintained. Instead, the 1945 constitution distributes powers between different but cooperative organs of government which individually or collectively serve national interests. In practice,

¹⁵¹ *Sinar Harapan*, August 30, 1982.

¹⁵² *Kompas*, July 1, 1983.

¹⁵³ Prawiranegara, "Pancasila," 80.

however, much of the power is in the hands of the president.¹⁵⁴ This situation allows him to "act beyond his capacity as the head of the executive branch of the government."¹⁵⁵ In such a political culture, any proposal or policy of the president (including his idea of the Pancasila as the sole basis) will readily receive approval from the DPR because this body (and the MPR), according to Amien Rais, is in fact the president's institution, since its members are screened by the government and must be approved by the president.¹⁵⁶ In other words, as critics point out, it is clear that the DPR and the MPR have functioned as a "rubber stamp"¹⁵⁷ to legitimate the president's policies since they have largely served the president's wishes and interests in

Indonesian political culture. As Adnan Buyung Nasution has noted :

According to the constitution of 1945, the People's Consultative Assembly has the greatest power. It also elects the president for a period of five years, and in theory it can recall the president. However, in practice more or less 60 percent of the members of the People's Consultative Assembly are appointed by the president, while only 40 percent are elected through general election.¹⁵⁸ In all general elections until now the Government's party, Golkar, has obtained about 70 percent of the vote. Although every five years there is a ritual of presenting a report by the president to the newly elected and appointed People's Consultative Assembly, it is obvious that the public accountability of President Soeharto is as ineffective as was that of President Sukarno during the era of Guided Democracy. His frequently-used title *Mandataris* (proxy) of the People's Consultative Assembly denotes his unlimited authority rather than his subordination to the People's Consultative Assembly. President Soeharto's

¹⁵⁴ See Soerjadi's statement in *Amanah*, no. 221 (January 20, 1995), 7.

¹⁵⁵ Nur Fadhil Lubis, "Institutionalization and the Unification of Islamic Courts under the New Order," *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1995), 12.

¹⁵⁶ Amien Rais, "Suksesi itu Sunnatullah," *Suara Masjid*, no. 233 (February 1994), 18. See also his article, "Suksesi 1988 : Suatu Keharusan," *Media Dakwah*, no. 237 (March 1994), 36.

¹⁵⁷ See, for example, David Jenkins, "The Aging of the New Order," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 108, no. 27 (June 27, 1980), 22.

¹⁵⁸ In giving this percentage Adnan Buyung Nasution refers to Ismail Sunny's book, *Mencari Keadilan : Sebuah Otobiografi* (Jakarta : Ghalia Indonesia, 1982), 517.

continuous augmentation of power beyond any constitutional limit is due to the absence of any significant countervailing power.¹⁵⁹

Having made this assessment, Nasution expressed the opinion that President Soeharto's continuous augmentation of power beyond any constitutional limit is based on the concept of the family state and supported by the Javanese aristocratic philosophy of the unlimited power of the monarch.¹⁶⁰ He based his opinion on Soemarsaid Moertono's book, which describes the concept of power of the old Javanese kings :

The [ideal] king's power was understood as unlimited. He could not be regulated by worldly means, but within himself there was a force reflecting, or higher still, identical with the Soul (*Hyang Suksma Kawekas*), which checked his individual will. Divine Guidance expressed itself in the *kewitjaksanaan* (wisdom) of the king ... which not only endowed [him] with the widest possible range of knowledge but also the deepest awareness of realities and a sense of justice.¹⁶¹

On the other hand, President Soeharto has argued that he has done his best to execute policies and actions (of course, including his policy of stipulating the Pancasila as the sole foundation) which are in the best interest of his nation as a whole. The president has likewise firmly stated that he has carried out the will of the people, as expressed to him through their representatives in the MPR and the DPR, after seeking God's guidance, to the best of his ability. As he said:

Thank God, until now I have not failed in fulfilling my duty ... I have never felt that I have committed a failure ... What has been assigned to me, I have executed as best as I can, praying to God for his guidance and direction.

Concerning faults, I think : "Who will measure them? Who is to blame me?" For instance, I have done my duty, it is going well and succeeds

¹⁵⁹ Adnan Buyung Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia : A Socio-legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956 - 1959* (Jakarta : Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992), 429.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. The book by Soemarsaid Moertono to which Nasution referred is *State and Statecraft in Old Java : A Study of the later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century* (Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1981), 39.

according to my criteria. If there are other people who see the results of my works from a different angle, and then blame me or consider them a failure, I will say : "That is their business." I do believe that what I have done, after I prayed to God for His guidance and direction, is the result of the guidance of God.¹⁶²

The government's idea of stipulating the Pancasila as the sole basis prompted the Muhammadiyah to hold a *tanwir* session (its second highest legislative forum after the congress) in May 1983, which passed three resolutions :

First, the Muhammadiyah agreed to include the Pancasila in its constitution, without changing the presently existing Islamic basis.

Second, since the problem of the Pancasila as the sole basis was a national problem for the Muhammadiyah, it was to be faced by its central board on a national scale; therefore, those on the regional boards and down were not allowed to express any opinion or adopt any attitude relating to this problem.

Third, the discussion of the matter would be held at the coming 41st national congress.¹⁶³

Not all Muhammadiyah figures demonstrated the same attitude in response to the issue of the Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations. Some hard-liners within the Muhammadiyah circulated pamphlets objecting to the sole basis plan on the grounds that it would pose a threat to Islam. Among the Muhammadiyah hard-liners was Malik Ahmad, vice-chairman of the organization and a well-known scholar from West Sumatra, who "was prepared at one point to accept the disbanding of Muhammadiyah"¹⁶⁴ by the government. In addition, "one Muhammadiyah leader from that part of the country [West Sumatra] was forced to resign after he bowed to pressure from local officials and declared his acquiescence in the *asas tunggal* [sole foundation] policy."¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Soeharto, *My Thoughts, Words and Deeds* (Jakarta : PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), 563.

¹⁶³ Lukman Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas Pancasila* (Jakarta : Pustaka Panjimas, 1986), 38.

¹⁶⁴ *Asiaweek*, vol. 12, no. 3 (January 19, 1986), 15.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* See also Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas*, 43.

While the mass organizations bill was being discussed in the DPR, the Muhammadiyah was active in providing input and suggestions which it hoped would be included in the bill. In the meantime, the leaders of the central board of the Muhammadiyah consulted and exchanged views with ABRI faction, some ministers (for example, the ministers of religious affairs and of home affairs) and other related government officials who were involved in drafting the bill. In line with the resolutions passed in its tanwir session, the Muhammadiyah's early attitude toward the issue was as follows :

First, the Muhammadiyah was born into Islam, without which this organization would not be the Muhammadiyah anymore.

Second, the Pancasila was not a problem with the Muhammadiyah since its leaders, i.e., Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Prof. Kahar Muzakir and Kasman Singodimedjo, participated in formulating the Pancasila and accepted it [as the basis and national ideology of the state] on August 18, 1945.

Third, based on this fact, the Muhammadiyah could include the Pancasila in its constitution without changing the basis of Islam which it had used so far.¹⁶⁶

The Muhammadiyah's concern with the issue prompted K. H. R. Fachruddin (its general chairman) and its other prominent leaders to meet and consult directly with President Soeharto on September 22, 1983. In this consultation, the president informed Fachruddin that the best course of action for the Muhammadiyah to take in relation to the Pancasila as the sole basis was to wait until the mass organizations law was promulgated. Regarding the nature of the Muhammadiyah as an Islamic social movement, the president said to Fachruddin that this nature could be clearly expressed in its program outlined in its constitution, but that the Pancasila had to be included in it as its sole basis under the chapter on its foundation.¹⁶⁷ Other steps taken by the Muhammadiyah were to hold meetings with the MUI, the NU and some members of the PPP, exchanging views on the matter. As far as its input and suggestions made to

¹⁶⁶ Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas*, 41.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 42.

the DPR were concerned, the Muhammadiyah claimed that about 60 percent of its proposals were accommodated and incorporated into the mass organizations bill.¹⁶⁸

Five of the Muhammadiyah's most important proposals read :

- (1) The president's statement that "the Pancasila will not replace religion, and it is impossible for the Pancasila to replace it. The Pancasila will not be made a religion, and it is impossible that religion will be made equal to the Pancasila," should be included in the mass organizations bill.
- (2) Socio-religious organizations should be given the right to include their own specific characteristics and identities.
- (3) Socio-religious organizations should be given the right to develop their activities in accordance with their own religious teachings.¹⁶⁹
- (4) Socio-religious organizations should be given the right to develop their activities in the affairs of women, youth and students in an effort to incorporate them as cadres. Also, they should be given the right to develop their activities in the field of religious propagation, as well as in the fields of education, health and other social programs.
- (5) The freezing and banning of a mass organization should be executed only after the Supreme Court has issued a legal decision [stating that the mass organization concerned violated the law].¹⁷⁰

Waiting for the official promulgation of the mass organizations law, the Muhammadiyah decided to postpone its 41st national congress, which had been scheduled to be held in Surakarta, Central Java, in February 1984. Almost two years later, the congress finally took place in Surakarta from December 7 - 11, 1985. At the invitation of the central board of the Muhammadiyah, President Soeharto attended the congress and delivered a welcoming speech saying :

The assertion of the Pancasila as the sole basis not only means upholding its principles, which are basically in agreement with the teachings of our religion, but also strengthening our unity and integrity as a nation. We are a pluralistic nation in terms of ethnic group, religion, race and social group. Without a common philosophy such as the Pancasila, we will be in conflict with each other which will lead us to disunity. ...

The declaration of the Pancasila as the sole basis not only means including it in the constitution of an organization, but also obliges us to develop it in our

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 66.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 53 - 54.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 49 - 50. Other proposals can be read in *ibid.*, 49, 50, 53 and 54.

social and national programs. We endlessly make every effort to make the Pancasila color all aspects of our social and national life.¹⁷¹

Having stressed the strategic role of the Pancasila in the life of the nation and its position vis-à-vis religion in the country, as well as his intention of stipulating the Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations, the president then directed his remarks specifically to the Muhammadiyah. Of course, his message also applied to all other mass organizations existing in the country. Soeharto said:

The Muhammadiyah can develop much more activities in the life of the nation. A great number of the members of the Muhammadiyah, who are widely scattered in the country, have long made a valuable contribution to the nation in various fields. Keep going in these efforts, and keep competing with other mass organizations. The assertion of the Pancasila as the sole basis is not intended to minimize the wide range of efforts by the Muhammadiyah, but rather to encourage it to be more advanced in carrying out its efforts on a wider scale.¹⁷²

It was at the Surakarta congress that the Muhammadiyah formally accepted the Pancasila as its sole basis. It should be noted that before this acceptance had been made, pamphlets by Malik Ahmad objecting to the imposition of the Pancasila as the sole basis as a threat to Islam surfaced again in the dormitories where most Muhammadiyah delegates were accommodated during the congress. Some cynics described the acceptance by the Muhammadiyah of the Pancasila as its sole basis as constituting "political suicide."¹⁷³ However, thanks to the efforts of Lukman Harun (b. 1937), who was known for his "persuasive powers", the hard-liners within the Muhammadiyah were finally convinced to accept the Pancasila foundation.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 32.

¹⁷² Ibid., 32 - 33.

¹⁷³ *Asiaweek*, vol.12, no. 3 (January 19, 1986), 15.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

According to article 2 of its reformulated constitution, the Muhammadiyah is "based on the Pancasila." In keeping however with its character as an Islamic mass organization, article 1 of the Muhammadiyah constitution states that "it is a socio-religious movement with the objective of enjoining the good and prohibiting the evil, subscribing to the Islamic creed in conformity with the teachings of the Qur'an and Sunna of the Prophet." The acceptance by the Muhammadiyah of the Pancasila as its sole basis, according to H. A. R. Fachruddin, was like a motor-cycle rider wearing a "safety helmet."¹⁷⁵ Dr. Amien Rais also asserted that the Muhammadiyah accepted the Pancasila principle "easily",¹⁷⁶ on the grounds that "the Pancasila was a valid ticket with which we could take the "bus" of Indonesia. Without this ticket, "we could not take that bus."¹⁷⁷

The whole process illustrated above demonstrates that, despite objections by some hard-liners at the beginning, the Muhammadiyah in adopting the Pancasila as its sole basis faced the problem calmly and patiently, proposing ideas and suggestions, and conducting negotiations and consultations with government circles in an attempt to influence the mass organizations bill. This meant that, on the whole, the Muhammadiyah as an organizational body preferred consultation and avoided confrontation in any form with the government. The president's guarantee that it could retain its nature as an Islamic social movement, and that the Pancasila as the sole foundation was not intended to minimize or restrict its activities, prompted the Muhammadiyah to acquiesce officially at the Surakarta congress. Thus, the

¹⁷⁵ See Amien Rais, "Kata Pengantar," in M. Rusli Karim, ed., *Muhammadiyah dalam Kritik dan Komentari* (Jakarta : Rajawali, 1986), ix.

¹⁷⁶ Rais, "Kata Pengantar," ix.

¹⁷⁷ See M. Bambang Pranowo, "Which Islam and Which Pancasila? : Islam and the State in Indonesia (A Comment)," in Arief Budiman, ed., *State and Civil Society in Indonesia* (Clayton, Victoria : Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), 488.

ideological issue surrounding the Pancasila and Islam was resolved by the Muhammadiyah in such a way that the latter, like the NU, did not abandon its nature as a socio-religious movement.

THE RESPONSE OF THE MUI, HMI, PII AND OTHERS

Founded on July 26, 1975, the MUI¹⁷⁸ plays an intermediary role between Muslims and the government. As indicated by its name, this council serves to exercise *ijtihād* and gives *fatwās* to Muslims or to the government in relation to social problems whose legal status cannot be found in either the Qur'an or *ḥadīth*. The MUI at first faced a dilemma in response to the Pancasila as the sole basis, since it considered both religion and nation to be important. In 1982, together with other associations, it met in the Consultative Body for Religious Communities to discuss the issue fully. At the meeting, the MUI, the MAWI, the DGI, the PHDP (*Parisadha Hindu Dharma Pusat*, or Representative Council of Indonesian Hindus) and the Walubi (*Perwakilan Umat Budha Indonesia*, or Representative Council of Indonesian Buddhists) issued a declaration that "the religious councils and organizations, each of which possesses a basis in conformity with its respective religion, appeal to their adherents to be loyal to their own religion and at the same time to be good Pancasilaists."¹⁷⁹ This statement attempted to reconfirm religion as the basis of their respective associations, while in the same breath it declared their obedience to the national ideology of the Pancasila.

As Yunan Nasution, one of the chief leaders of the MUI, puts it :

They appealed to the government : "Let us utilize our own basis in our respective constitutions as it has been laid down since we were born in the land

¹⁷⁸ A good study of the MUI was undertaken by Mohamad Atho Mudzhar. See his "Fatwās of the Council of Indonesian 'Ulamā' : A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia 1975 - 1988," (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1990).

¹⁷⁹ Yunan Nasution, *Islam dan Problema-Problema Kemasyarakatan* (Jakarta : Bulan Bintang, 1988), 132.

of Indonesia, that is our respective religions. This is our way of life here and guidance for life in the Hereafter. Our basis does not at all pose a threat to the Pancasila. On the contrary, while we are building up the Islamic community in concert with our religious basis, we are also leading it to perform the five principles of the Pancasila, in order to be Pancasilaists. Thus, in developing the Indonesian nation, as we are doing now, our religious basis can be a "partner" to the Pancasila.¹⁸⁰

One year later, at the Consultative Body's meeting held in November 1983, the MUI, the Walubi, the PHDP, the MAWI and the DGI still defended their position in relation to the Pancasila as the sole basis. They stated that "religious associations and religious mass organizations continue to use their respective religions as their organizational basis."¹⁸¹ Later, they all accepted the Pancasila as their sole foundation after the law had been formally promulgated by the government. As far as the MUI was concerned, it formally adopted the Pancasila as its sole basis at its national congress held in Jakarta in July 1985. The MUI clearly made the Pancasila its sole basis in article 2 of its reformulated constitution, while its nature as an Islamic organization was expressed in article 1.

The HMI¹⁸² also had a response to the Pancasila as the sole foundation. Established by Lafran Pane on February 5, 1947 in Yogyakarta, the HMI is known as an independent organization which is not affiliated with any political or social group in the country. However, thanks to its religious outlook, which may be described as Islamic modernism, it has at present close ties with the Muhammadiyah, and in the

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 133.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² For more details on the HMI, see, for example, Agussalim Sitompul's works, *Sejarah Perjuangan HMI 1947 - 1975* (Surabaya : Bina Ilmu, 1976); *Pemikiran HMI dan Relevansinya dengan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa Indonesia* (Jakarta : Integritas Dinamika Press, 1986); Victor Tanja, *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam : Sejarah dan Kedudukannya di Tengah-Tengah Gerakan Muslim Pembaharu di Indonesia* (Jakarta : Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1991).

past was associated with the Masyumi. A militant and well-organized institution, the HMI played an important role, as may be seen in the fact that

Under Sukarno, the HMI established a tradition of opposition to the government and became the most powerful students organization in the country. Many leading Muslim personalities and intellectuals in Indonesia today come from HMI ranks. In the latter years of Guided Democracy, the HMI came under frequent attack from the left, though efforts to have it outlawed along with the Masyumi were unsuccessful. After Suharto seized power in 1965, the HMI was in the vanguard of the Student Action Front (KAMI) which rallied support in the big cities for the army in its anti-communist crusade.¹⁸³

With good programs and a well trained staff, the HMI has provided national leadership. This can be seen from the fact that in the present Indonesian cabinet (Sixth Development Cabinet) there are some HMI alumni who have been appointed as ministers by the president, two of whom are Mar'ie Muhammad (finance minister) and Akbar Tanjung (minister of people's housing). In addition to this, the HMI has played an important role in developing and elevating the intellectual capacity of its members. Dr. Nurcholish Madjid (b. 1939), who graduated from the University of Chicago, is just one of the HMI members who have benefited from this development. While being actively involved in and leading the HMI for many years, Madjid has also made every effort to further the education of the organization's members. As a result, a large number of HMI alumni have become intellectuals and scholars holding important positions and acquiring impressive reputations.

In response to the Pancasila being made the sole foundation for all mass organizations, the HMI held a series of discussions at its 15th national congress held in Medan, North Sumatra, in late May 1983. Through Junior Minister of Youth and Sport Affairs Abdul Gafur (himself a former chairman of the HMI of the Jakarta branch), the government pressed the HMI to endorse the Pancasila as its sole basis,

¹⁸³ *Muslims on Trial*, 15.

even though the mass organizations bill was still being prepared and was in the process of being submitted by the government to the DPR. According to Gafur, the adoption by the HMI of the Pancasila as its sole basis would not uproot the specific nature of the HMI's movement, since this nature could clearly be included in its programs.¹⁸⁴ The participants at the HMI congress split into two groups : the first wanted the HMI to accept the Pancasila as its sole basis, while the second objected and insisted that the HMI postpone its decision on the issue until the law was formally promulgated.

Ahmad Zacky Siradj, former HMI chairman, in defending the organization's position in relation to the Pancasila as the sole basis at that time, said that for the HMI the Pancasila was not a new thing, since one of the goals of its establishment was to defend the state of the Republic of Indonesia with the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution as its basis.¹⁸⁵ This can be interpreted as an assertion that the Pancasila as the basis of the state was not a problem for the HMI; therefore, it accepted and defended it. However, the HMI at its Medan congress showed some hesitancy toward the government's idea of the Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations. One objection expressed by many prominent figures of the HMI was that the Pancasila as the sole basis would eliminate its specific Islamic identity and that it would abolish the basically diverse nature of Indonesian society in general.¹⁸⁶ For the HMI, this condition would in turn pose a threat to the creativity and dynamism which had become important elements in the development of the nation. An argument similar to this was also voiced by retired General Abdul Haris Nasution :

¹⁸⁴ See *Tempo*, June 4, 1983, 13.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 12.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.



Pancasila stresses harmony between diversity and unity. One cannot exist without the other. To emphasize diversity alone will destroy unity. On the other hand, to centralize unity through losing diversity will lead us to regimentation of our lives as a nation, as citizens and as ordinary people, closing out the space for initiative, creativity and dynamism.¹⁸⁷

The opinion of the second group at the congress was so dominant that it eventually became the HMI's position in the face of the problem of the sole basis; a development with which the government circles were disappointed. Due to this attitude, the HMI was seen by authorities as refusing to endorse the Pancasila as its sole basis. In 1984, one year after the Medan congress, the central board of the HMI issued a booklet entitled *Pandangan Kritis terhadap RUU Keormasan*¹⁸⁸ (A Critical View of the Mass Organizations Bill) in which it evaluated the bill as having a potentially negative impact on mass organizations in general and on Islamic mass organizations in particular. Why? Because the bill, according to the HMI, was part of a government political engineering project which was intended to establish a monolithic system, designed to place the government in a very strong position. With this as its aim it did not see the need for dialogue in settling issues. Referring to the 1945 constitution which guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, the HMI questioned the proposed bill which, in its view, would give full authority to the government to dissolve mass organizations. The HMI was of the opinion that if a mass organization indeed violated a law issued by the state, it was the executive board, not the organization itself, that should be disbanded.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ Cited by Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto* (New York : Routledge, 1994), 104.

¹⁸⁸ Pengurus Besar Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, *Pandangan Kritis terhadap RUU Keormasan* (Jakarta : n.p., 1984).

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

The HMI saw that the mass organizations bill would give strong powers to the government, with which it could restrict and even interfere in the life and activities of a mass organization. In turn, this situation would make mass organizations apathetic in the face of national affairs. If this condition continued to exist, the HMI stated, Indonesia's political life in the future would become undemocratic.¹⁹⁰ Holding this view, the HMI argued that,

The Pancasila as the sole basis is acceptable and valid only in the context of the state's life. This is in agreement with the correct notion of the Pancasila mentioned in the 1945 constitution. In line with the nature of the plurality of Indonesian society, which is rooted in religion, the basic nature of this religious society cannot be uprooted. This means that Indonesian society, as individuals or groups, should receive legal protection to lead their lives according to the teachings of their religions and according to their rights as citizens.¹⁹¹

The basic spirit of the above argument was in fact the same as that of the HMI's decision at the Medan congress held one year before. However, at its meeting of April 1 - 7, 1985, held at Ciloto, Jakarta, the Working Committee of the HMI resolved this matter by issuing a statement that the HMI now agreed to adopt the Pancasila as its sole basis.¹⁹² This decision was later ratified by the HMI at its 16th national congress held in Padang, West Sumatra, in 1986.¹⁹³

Not all branches of the HMI, however, felt able to accept the decision made by both the Working Committee and the congress of the HMI in Padang; consequently, open reactions and protests came from its several branches. They were firmly united, and challenged the executive board of the HMI by establishing a body called the MPO

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 12.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 15.

¹⁹² The declaration of the Working Committee of the HMI to accept the Pancasila as its sole basis was confirmed by its decision no. 1/Kpts/MPK-2/07/1405 of April 4, 1985.

¹⁹³ Saimima, "RUUK," 17.

(*Majelis Penvelamat Organisasi*, or Council to Save the Organization), led by Eggie Sudjana. This conflict became more serious when the MPO claimed to take over the Jakarta executive board office, and established its own executive board which was completely separate from the "official" one. The MPO-established board became known as the "rival" HMI which firmly retained Islam, rather than the Pancasila, as its sole organizational basis. This rival HMI claimed to be consistent with the original ideals of the HMI, and called itself the "true" HMI. It bitterly accused the official HMI of deviating from the true spirit of 1947 when the association was established. On the other hand, the official HMI accused the "rival" one of violating the organization's constitution.¹⁹⁴ While the official HMI held its 17th national congress at Lhokseumawe (Aceh) in July 1988, the rival one did the same thing in Yogyakarta, indicating that the two sides remained bitterly divided. The government, however, did not recognize the upstart HMI.

In adopting the Pancasila as its sole basis, the HMI put forward the following argument: that Islam and the Pancasila were not in conflict, as long as the latter was placed within its true historical context. It also believed that the values of the Pancasila would become rich, strong, and dynamic if it were based on Islamic norms and values which emanate from divine revelation. This meant that the Pancasila would become meaningful and safe in the cradle of Islam.¹⁹⁵ Starting from this premise, the HMI then reaffirmed its position, role and commitment to the Pancasila in the life of the nation:

¹⁹⁴ *Tempo*, July 16, 1988, 28 - 29. See also "Inside Story on Official Manipulation: Split in Islamic University Students Organization (HMI)," *Indonesia Report*, no. 36 (November 1988), 8 and 16 - 17.

¹⁹⁵ Pengurus Besar HMI, "Memori Penjelasan tentang Pancasila Sebagai Asas Organisasi HMI," (issued by the Central Board of the HMI in connection with the decision no. 1/Kpts/MPK-2/07/1405 of April 4, 1985 made by its Working Committee), 2.

- (1) The HMI, as an Islamic organization, should always show its capacity to make the best contribution to the nation in line with its sincere ideals;
- (2) As a student organization, the HMI should implement the Pancasila in a rational and realistic way;
- (3) As part of the nation, the HMI should play an important role and set a good example in carrying out the Pancasila; and
- (4) As an organization for the younger generation, the HMI should be a pioneer in socializing the Pancasila, and should take responsibility to prevent any deviation from its true values as established in 1945.¹⁹⁶

Nurcholish Madjid commented that the acceptance by the HMI of the Pancasila as its sole basis was a good decision since, by doing so, it put Islam and the Pancasila on the right path within the context of "Indonesianness". Its acceptance of the Pancasila, Madjid said, would not diminish or abolish its specific Islamic identity or the special characteristics which had been with the HMI since its birth.¹⁹⁷

As for the PII,¹⁹⁸ established on May 4, 1947 in Yogyakarta, it took a different road in response to the Pancasila as the sole basis. Like the HMI, the PII was an independent organization which was not affiliated with any Islamic political or social organization. However, the PII had close links with the HMI and other Muslim Modernist organizations due to its religious outlook, and subscribed to Islamic modernism. An organization for Muslim students of senior high schools, the PII persisted in defending Islam as its sole basis and firmly refused to replace it with the Pancasila. Due to this attitude, the Minister of Home Affairs, through his decisions nos. 120 and 121 of December 10, 1987, banned the PII on the grounds that it did not comply with the fundamental principles of the mass organizations law.¹⁹⁹ As far as the

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ See *Tempo*, February 13, 1988, 29.

¹⁹⁸ A brief history of the PII can be read in *Suara Masjid*, no. 243 (December 1994), 7-18.

¹⁹⁹ In addition to the PII, the GPM (*Gerakan Pemuda Marhaen*, or *Marhaenist Youth Movement*) was also banned. See *Tempo*, February 6, 1988, 24. See also "PII and GPM Banned by the Government for not Complying with Social Organizations Law,"

Islamic mass organizations were concerned, this government ban applied only to the

PII.

General chairman of the PII, Mutammimul Ula, defended the position of his organization by saying that the PII was legally obliged to use Islam as its sole basis, to the exclusion of all others. Ula claimed that the decision of his organization not to subscribe to the Pancasila as its sole basis was made by the PII after deeply and thoroughly examining the Pancasila from legal and sociological as well as philosophical standpoints in the light of Islamic doctrine.²⁰⁰ With the banning of the PII, it might be said that the Muslim community, particularly the circle of the Muslim Modernist groups, lost one of its national assets, in which young Muslim cadres had been trained as skillful and capable leaders. To a great extent the PII had contributed to the strength of the HMI, since the former's alumni mostly joined the latter shortly after they finished senior high school and continued their studies at various universities.

Joining the NU in adopting the Pancasila as their sole basis were the Muhammadiyah, the HMI, the MUI and all other Islamic mass organizations (except the PII) such as the Persis, the Perti, the Syarikat Islam,²⁰¹ the PMII (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*, or Indonesian Muslim University Student Movement) and others. This action was taken by all Islamic mass organizations because the government allowed them to maintain the nature of their movements and activities, and allowed them to continue to observe their socio-religious activities according to their religious aspirations and ideals, as they had previously. In this light it appeared that

Indonesia Report, no. 30 (May 1988), 27. The GPM was formerly affiliated with the PNI before the latter merged with several other parties to form the PDI in 1973.

²⁰⁰ See *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 470 (June 11, 1985), 17.

²⁰¹ For a discussion of the recent development of the Syarikat Islam, see M. A. Gani, *Cita dan Pola Dasar Perjuangan Syarikat Islam* (Jakarta : Bulan Bintang, 1984).

the government would not diminish or abolish the plurality of Indonesian society, but would allow social and religious aspirations to flower; a situation which worried the Muslim mass organizations, as it did other mass organizations throughout Indonesia.

THE RESPONSES OF INDIVIDUAL MUSLIMS AND SPLINTER GROUPS

Opposition from certain individual Muslims and Muslim splinter groups to the government's proposal of applying the Pancasila as the sole basis was very strong and bitter. They firmly rejected this proposal on the grounds that the Pancasila would become a religion, and that religion would be Pancasilaized. They feared that, with the stipulation of the Pancasila as the sole basis, the Muslims would no longer be allowed by the government to establish, maintain or develop religious and social organizations according to Islamic aspirations. This kind of fear can be seen, for example, in the feelings of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who bravely sent a long letter to President Soeharto, dated July 7, 1983, expressing his strong objection to the Pancasila as the sole basis. In his letter, Prawiranegara first underlined Soeharto's statements made in the *Nuzulul Qur'ān* commemoration of June 27, 1983, that "Pancasila and religion are not in opposition to each other and must not be made to oppose each other" or "the Pancasila is not a religion and cannot ever replace religion."²⁰²

Essentially, Prawiranegara agreed with Soeharto's statement, but was very afraid of the government's policy of stipulating the Pancasila as the sole basis. For this reason, he expressed his fear to the president saying, "However, even if the Pancasila is not a religion, with the power that lies in your hands and with the support of the People's Representative Council -- which reflects more the sovereignty of the president than that of the people -- the Pancasila is *de facto* put into effect and is being

²⁰² Prawiranegara, "Pancasila," 79.

enforced as a comprehensive religion, that touches on all aspects of the lives of those human beings who are Indonesian citizens."²⁰³ In a tone similar to this statement, Prawiranegara said further, "If Pancasila, rather than being the foundation of the state has to be turned into the basis of human life, then this means that the religions revealed by Almighty God (or so perceived) have to be exchanged for an ideology, which does not call itself a religion, but in its behavior seems to wish to replace existing religions."²⁰⁴

In expressing his objection to the president's idea of applying the Pancasila as the sole basis, Prawiranegara also underlined certain opinions expressed in the editorial of the *Kompas* newspaper of July 4, 1983, which had discussed the mass organizations bill when it was being prepared. The editorial said,

If the issue is viewed solely from the standpoint of practical politics, the government, with the support of majorities in the representative bodies and the surfeit of power it possesses, can as it were enforce anything it pleases, and the community will acquiesce, at least formally, and for so long as the power structure supporting it remains effective.

Still, because what is to be achieved and preserved is essentially a political infrastructure and political culture which is to unify the nation and the state, mere formal acquiescence, without the process of dialogue, cannot suffice.

A statesmanlike political approach will at the same time strive for implanting strong roots and building a firm structure, so that not mere formal acquiescence and enforcement are achieved but rather a form of dialogue that is national oriented, so that, even though it may take some time, a national consensus will ultimately be attained.²⁰⁵

Prawiranegara was of the opinion that replacing an Islamic foundation with a Pancasila foundation would not only be contrary to Islamic teachings, but also to the 1945 constitution in which the "official" Pancasila is mentioned. He said that Muslim people in general were afraid to express their true feelings in the face of the

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 78.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 79.

government's idea of the Pancasila as the sole basis for fear of losing their positions, offices, or salaries, or of being considered confrontational dissidents.

Taking moral responsibility for the Islamic cause, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara seemed to establish himself at the forefront of those who voiced Muslim feelings in the face of the issue of the Pancasila as the sole basis. He said that the objections in his letter were not intended to provoke a confrontation with the president, but rather were an expression of his rights and duties as an Indonesian citizen in conformity with freedom of opinion and expression, freedoms guaranteed and protected by the constitution. Prawiranegara was of the opinion that

Replacing an Islamic foundation by a Pancasila foundation conflicts with a constitution which is based upon the Pancasila, and thus is in contravention with the Pancasila itself. That is, the original Pancasila, which formed the basis of the 1945 constitution. What is plain is that to exchange this basis contravenes the freedom of religion and worship guaranteed by article 29, paragraph (2) of the constitution. Because, according to Islamic teachings, the establishment of an Islamic association whose membership consists of Muslims who want to practice Islamic teachings together -- that is an association which is based upon Islam -- is in itself an act of worship which is blessed by Allah. For, according to the teachings of Allah, all Believers are brothers. And therefore it is very good for them to establish organizations consisting of Muslims, in whatever field.²⁰⁶

From the above quotation, it is clear that Prawiranegara was afraid that, with the stipulation of the Pancasila as the sole basis, the government would contravene freedom of religion and worship as well as freedom of association and assembly, and would also abolish the specific identity of Islamic organizations. In his view, this condition, in the end, would result in the restriction and even prohibition of Muslims establishing and running Islamic organizations; consequently, Islam would become simply a private matter, which would have nothing to do with social and political life.

The sole basis plan, he said, was a systematic attempt designed and launched by the

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 80.

government not only to depoliticize Islam but also to "kill" Islam through the Pancasila. As he puts it :

If Muslims are no longer allowed to establish Islamic organizations -- whether political organizations or social organizations -- then Islam will come to be regarded as a private matter, which is completely contrary to Islamic teachings. The Islamic religion is not merely a private matter, but is also, and primarily, a matter of the '*Ummat*' [Community]. ... if the Indonesian Muslim community is to be prohibited from establishing and maintaining Islamic associations, whether in the political field or in other social fields, this is not only in contravention of the 1945 constitution, and thus in contravention of the Pancasila itself, but in practice means an attempt to kill Islam -- through the Pancasila!²⁰⁷

In keeping with the above arguments, Prawiranegara was of the view that the president's idea of applying the Pancasila as the sole basis would pose a serious danger to the continuous development of mass organizations, particularly Islamic mass organizations, and to the basic nature of cultural pluralism flourishing in Indonesian society. Espousing this view, he warned Soeharto in his letter that "making Pancasila the sole foundation for all social organizations may at first glance appear to be the way to bring about national unity and social improvements. But believe me, you will only achieve the opposite. I hope that you, Mr. President, are aware of the dangers threatening our country and people if the sole foundation plan should be implemented."²⁰⁸ Having warned the president, Prawiranegara then appealed to him by saying "... after you have read this letter of mine, you will agree at the very least to halt the enforcement of Pancasila as the sole foundation,"²⁰⁹ and closed by requesting of him that

... all citizens be allowed to establish any organizations whatsoever, so long as the aim of these organizations is to work for the benefit of Indonesian society, and in pursuit of their objectives they refrain from all illegal actions, especially the use of force. This would be in accordance with article 28 of the

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 80 - 81.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 82.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

constitution which guarantees the principles of freedom of association and assembly and of the expression of opinion in speech and writing, as was laid out by Bung Karno in his address at the end of the BPUPKI's session on June 1, 1945, and also in accordance with the promises of the New Order at the beginning of its career -- namely your promises to implement the 1945 constitution in a pure and principled manner.²¹⁰

The president, however, did not respond specifically to Prawiranegara's letter. While repeating his guarantee not to make the Pancasila a religion and not to make religion equal to the Pancasila, the president persisted in his idea of stipulating the Pancasila as the sole basis in the belief that this policy would be strategically meaningful and provide great advantages to the life of the nation as a whole.

Objections to the plan of the Pancasila foundation were also raised by *khatibs* on the occasion of their *khutbahs* especially in the country's political center (Jakarta) where dissent became particularly heated at that time. For instance, in a *khutbah* given after the *salat 'Id al-Fitr* of 1983, H. M. Yunan Nasution said that the Muslims, who constituted a significant majority of the Indonesian population, had accepted and advocated the Pancasila as the foundation of the state and had implemented it in their daily life in conformity with the basic spirit of each principle mentioned in the Pancasila. He said that the Pancasila as the foundation of the state had been finalized long ago when the Muslims accepted on those terms; therefore, the Pancasila was no longer a problem for them.²¹¹ This stance can be seen, for example, in the following statement made by Mohamad Roem, one of the founding fathers of the Republic and a former leading figure of the Masyumi: "I accept the Pancasila because I am a

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ See the excerpt from the text of his *khutbah*, "Azas Tunggal Pancasila," in Prawiranegara, *Prihal Pancasila*, 20, 21.

Muslim."²¹² Thus, for Muslims, the Pancasila and Islam are not in conflict and must not be made to oppose each other. Opposition was voiced, however, from various segments of the Muslim community when the government made its initial attempt to apply the Pancasila as the sole foundation for all mass organization. In response to this attempt, Yunan Nasution for one questioned why the government would extend the role of the Pancasila in this fashion. This move, in Nasution's view, would replace an Islamic foundation with a Pancasila foundation, giving the impression that Islam was disliked and distrusted in Indonesian social and national life. To quote his own words :

Why should it be an idea [held by the government] not to allow mass organizations to use their own specific bases, Islam for example, in their constitutions? Does not this idea give an impression that the religion of Islam is disliked and distrusted in the social and national life of our country?

If the idea of the Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties is to be extended to be applied to all mass organizations, and this process is finally forced in the name of democracy, a fear will arise and will be felt by Indonesians in general and Muslims in particular like a bone skidded in flesh which props up the body. This fear will become more widespread if there is a certain group [in the government circle] which accuses those who have different opinions [regarding the Pancasila] of being anti-Pancasila ... ²¹³

Furthermore, in a *khuṭbah* delivered after the observance of the *ṣalāt 'Id al-Fiṭr* of 1983 in a district of Jakarta, A. M. Fatwa sternly opposed the idea of the Pancasila as the sole foundation, and called for the Muslims to advocate "the basis of Islam until the last drop of their blood."²¹⁴ Abdul Qadir Djaelani echoed the same view as Fatwa when he called for Muslims to subscribe firmly and consistently to "the sole basis of

²¹² See Mohamad Roem, *Saya Menerima Pancasila Karena Saya Orang Islam* (Jakarta : Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, n.d.), 1.

²¹³ Nasution, "Azaz Tunggal," 20 - 21.

²¹⁴ See the text of his *khuṭbah*, *Azas Islam Hingga Titik Darah Terakhir* (Pegangsaan Timur, Jakarta : Panitia Pelaksana Hari - Hari Besar Islam, 1403/1983).

Islam."²¹⁵ Like Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who saw the idea of the sole foundation as a dangerous attempt to "kill" Islam through the Pancasila, Djaelani was of the opinion that the mass organizations bill was political engineering systematically designed by the government "to bury all Islamic organizations in Indonesia. Therefore, it is forbidden for us to agree to this bill, and it is obligatory for us to reject it."²¹⁶

In response to this opposition, the government censored the texts of *khuṭbahs* which would be delivered by Muslims on the occasion of prayer services such as *Id al-Fiṭr* and *Id al-Adḥa*. As a result, vigorous opposition to the mass organizations bill mounted from a small group of militant Muslims. M. Sirajuddin Syamsuddin (b. 1958) described this explosive situation as follows :

... there had been restlessness in the Muslim community regarding the issue of the Pancasila as the sole foundation ... Many Muslim leaders were concerned that the process of Pancasilaization would mean de-Islamization. Many preachers used the Friday prayer forum and other religious gatherings to raise the issue and evoke Muslims' religious sentiment to reject the Pancasila's becoming the sole foundation. For them, Muslim acceptance of the Pancasila as a national consensus should not be understood as a theological statement, but only as a political statement.²¹⁷

Signing a statement rejecting the Pancasila as the sole basis for mass organizations, many of those who made up this splinter or militant Muslim group claimed to be prepared to die as martyrs for the cause of Islam.²¹⁸ For them, Islam was their sole ideology and distinct identity. They believed that it should not be replaced by or subordinated to any other ideology, such as the Pancasila. Moreover, according to this group, the replacement of Islam with another ideology would mean

²¹⁵ Abdul Qadir Djaelani, *Asas Tunggal Islam* (Bogor : n. p., 1403/1983).

²¹⁶ Translation of Abdul Qadir Djaelani's speech in *Indonesia Report-Culture & Society Supplement*, no. 13 (1985), 5.

²¹⁷ Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics," 102.

²¹⁸ Translation of Djaelani's speech in *Indonesia Report-Culture and Society Supplement*, no. 13 (1985), 2 - 3.

de-Islamization, which they viewed as contrary to the basic teachings of Islam. In response to this wave of opposition, the government repeatedly guaranteed that the stipulation of the Pancasila as the sole basis was not intended to replace religion, and that it was impossible for the Pancasila to replace it. The government continued to lay emphasis on the fact that the Pancasila would not become a sort of religion or a rival to it.²¹⁹ This firm guarantee, however, did not appease the militants' heated feelings.

The tension between this Muslim splinter group (comprised of about 1,500 people) and the government's security forces finally reached a climax with the outbreak of a bloody confrontation, known as the Tanjung Priok affair, which took place in the Jakarta harbor area on September 12, 1984.²²⁰ This confrontation was sparked by the actions of these Muslim hard-liners in burning a motorcycle belonging to Sergeant Hermanu, a member of the *Babinsa* (*Bintara pembina desa*, or non-commissioned officers responsible for the supervision of villages). They did so in response to a report that he had entered the holy mosque of Al-A'raf without taking off his shoes, a mosque where sermons calling for the rejection of the Pancasila as the sole basis had frequently been given by Muslim preachers. The crowd was very resentful of Sergeant Hermanu's action and regarded this action as an affront to the sacred house of Allah. The crowd also demanded the release of four of their members who had been detained by the security forces.

In contrast to the government's version, which claimed that a preliminary warning was given to the rioters, another report stated that "the rally was fired on without warning by heavily armed troops."²²¹ According to an official report released

²¹⁹ Susumu Awanohara, "At First Warning Shot," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 125, no. 39 (September 27, 1984), 15.

²²⁰ For details, see *Muslims on Trial*. See also Awanohara, "At First Warning Shot."

²²¹ *Muslims on Trial*, 17.

by the government, nine people were shot to death and 53 were injured in this incident.²²² Some unofficial reports, however, cited by Syamsuddin, said that "hundreds of Muslims died by the hands of the Indonesian army,"²²³ a number which was far greater than that reported by the government. Amir Biki, known as one of the prominent leaders of this group, was one of the victims in the Tanjung Priok riot. The place where the conflict occurred was quickly cleansed by the security forces of blood and other evidence, to make it seem that the tragic incident had not taken place at all.

Long after the Tanjung Priok incident, families of the victims did not know where the bodies of the slain were buried, and yet chose to keep silent because they were afraid to question the government on the matter. Later, it was reported that the bodies of all the victims, except the remains of Amir Biki (which were sent to his family to be buried), were interred by the security forces in a mass grave in the village of Jeger, Kampung Rambutan (East Jakarta).²²⁴ In the meantime, those who were suspected as having been leaders of the riot or of having opposed the Pancasila as the sole basis were arrested and brought to trial by the government on the accusation of launching subversive actions. Among them were H. Oesmany Al-Hamidy (rector of the PTDI, *Perguruan Tinggi Dakwah Islam*, or College for Islamic Propagation), Abdul Qadir Djaelani, Tony Ardie and Mawardi Noor; all of them were imprisoned after the courts found them guilty in connection with the Tanjung Priok riot or for their

²²² Awanohara, "At First Warning Shot," 14.

²²³ Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics," 102. See also *Muslims on Trial*, 17.

²²⁴ This account was revealed to *Tempo* magazine by HMA Sampurna, an assistant of the intelligence body of the *Kodam* (Military District Command) of Jakarta when the Tanjung Priok affair took place, who later served as vice-governor of West Java. See *Tempo* (October 16, 1993), 39.

rejection of the Pancasila as the sole basis.²²⁵ Al-Hamid, to mention just one example, was jailed for eight years.

H. R. Dharsono and A. M. Fatwa were also arrested and imprisoned. Together with their friends in the Petition of Fifty Group, Dharsono and Fatwa called for the establishment of a national "independent" fact-finding commission to investigate the Tanjung Priok affair thoroughly and fairly, including the real number of victims.²²⁶ Their call, however, did not receive any response from the government. A retired army general who was critical of government policies, Dharsono once bravely attacked the government by saying that "there is a basic contradiction between the tolerant nature of Pancasila and its actual intolerance in practice."²²⁷ Thus, according to Dharsono, there was a gap between ideals and reality, or between what should be and what is, in the implementation of the Pancasila by the New Order government.

Following the eruption of the Tanjung Priok riot, a series of violent actions were launched between 1984 and 1985 by Muslim political splinter groups in many parts of the country. Some of these disturbances, which posed a threat to the order and stability of the government, took the form of bombings at the Bank of Central Asia (BCA)²²⁸ in Jakarta, the Borobudur Buddhist temple at Muntilan (Central Java)²²⁹ and

²²⁵ *Muslims on Trial*, 56 - 57. This book gives detailed reports concerning their trials and the length of their imprisonment.

²²⁶ In 1993, a call was again voiced in many circles, including the Petition of Fifty Group, for the establishment of a fact-finding commission. This call was made because many Muslim families complained that they had lost members in connection with the Tanjung Periok affair and did not know where their graves were. See *Tempo* October 16, 1993, 30.

²²⁷ See Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics*, 191.

²²⁸ On the bombing of the BCA, see *Tempo*, January 19, 1985, 12 - 19. See also *Muslims on Trial*, 71 - 79.

²²⁹ See "Pengadilan Borobudur," *Tempo*, November 17, 1990, 26. See also *Straits Times*, May 1, 1991, 15.

the Marine Base at Cilandak (Jakarta). These "militant" or "fundamentalist" movements did not however win the support of the majority of Muslims as a mainstream political force. As far as the Tanjung Priok incident was concerned, many Muslim leaders regretted the way the government's armed forces handled the affair in causing such loss of life. The number of victims in that incident, Muslims argued, could in fact have been minimized if the situation had been handled differently. Many in Muslim circles tended to put the blame on General Benny Moerdani, commander-in-chief of ABRI at the time and a Christian. They considered him to be the one most responsible for the Tanjung Priok incident.

From the above discussion, it can be seen that the Muslim community in general accepted the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties and for all mass organizations. It seemed that the government was satisfied with the Muslim attitude, despite the fact that certain dissenters objected to and rejected the Pancasila as the sole basis. In spite of this fact, the government tended to ignore these objections, and laid strong emphasis on the significance of the majority of the Muslim community's acceptance of this new role for the Pancasila. Seen in this political context, the government felt that its policy of applying the Pancasila as the sole basis was successful. Following these historical events, many Muslim leaders commented that the acceptance by Muslims of the Pancasila as the sole foundation constituted a sound development which promised a positive result for Islam and Muslims in the future. Lukman Harun (former secretary general of the Parmusi and former chairman of the Muhammadiyah), for example, said that with the acceptance by the Muslims of the Pancasila as the sole basis, the government's long and bitter suspicion of the Muslims had ended, just as the negative image of Muslims as opponents of the government had disappeared.²³⁰

²³⁰ See *Tempo*, July 6, 1991, 35.

Syahirul Alim (a senior lecturer at Gadjah Mada University of Yogyakarta and a prominent Muslim preacher who has periodically been detained by the government for months at a time) has said something similar to what Harun had, and added that any attempt by an individual or group to contrast Islam with the Pancasila was simply a game of political manipulation intended to destroy the good and harmonious relations between the Muslims and the government.²³¹ Echoing this statement, Imaduddin Abdulrahim (likewise once detained for fourteen months because of his "severe" criticism of the government) said that there was no longer a dichotomy between the ruler and the ruled since there was no longer a boundary between the Muslims and the government. "The government is Islamic too," he stressed with confidence.²³²

In the meantime, in order to convince the government of their loyalty, many prominent Muslim leaders repeatedly stated that the idea of an Islamic state in Indonesia was not the goal of Muslim political aspirations. Jusuf Hasjim for his part stated that at none of the meetings held by the PPP (when it still served as an Islamic party) was the idea of an Islamic state ever considered.²³³ According to E. Z. Muttaqien (a former Masyumi leader and one of the prominent figures of the MUI), for Indonesian Muslims, the idea of an Islamic state, politically speaking, was not as important as was the implementation of Islamic teachings to the fullest extent possible in Muslim social life. In his view, Islamic teachings were gradually being implemented by the government, as could be seen, for instance, from the fact that it had issued regulations on *zakat fitrah* and that it had banned all forms of gambling. Muttaqien asserted further that, in fact, the issue of an Islamic state had been

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ *Tempo*, May 2, 1981, 15.

exaggerated by anti-Islamic elements who wanted to create a situation in which the government and the Muslims would distrust and oppose each other.²³⁴

Furthermore, in the view of Imaduddin Abdulrahim, the Muslims felt very happy with the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, believing that if both were implemented in a just and pure manner, they would provide a good atmosphere in which Islamic ideals could be actualized.²³⁵ Saifuddin Anshari (b. 1938) held the view that the issue of an Islamic state in Indonesia was an old song that should never be sung again. According to Anshari, the label "Islamic state" was not important; rather, what was important was that the state's "contents" and "substance" should be in agreement with Islamic values.²³⁶ In this connection, Nurcholish Madjid also said that the Pancasila was advantageous for the Muslims since it provided them the opportunity to materialize Islamic values in the lives of Muslims in Indonesia. For this reason, he strongly believed that the primary goal for the Muslims should be not to establish an Islamic state, but to carry out Islamic values in their collective social life.²³⁷

D. GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARDS MUSLIMS AFTER THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PANCASILA AS THE SOLE BASIS FOR ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS

As a consequence of Muslim acceptance of the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties and mass organizations and their repeated claims to have abandoned the idea of an Islamic state, relations between Muslims and the government have

²³⁴ Ibid., 14.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid., 16.

²³⁷ Ibid.

improved, and the latter has fundamentally changed its policies towards the former. A new era of co-operation between the two sides began in the late 1980s and a friendly atmosphere has continued to develop. Many in Muslim circles have commented that an intimacy or honeymoon condition between the government and Muslims has arisen, and that it is not expected to end soon.

The government has abandoned the "severe" and "strict" policies which it had imposed upon the Muslims for almost twenty years. However, it should be noted that this change in policy has been restricted to "cultural" Islam, to the exclusion of "political" Islam. In light of this, critics say that the government has in fact followed a policy similar to that advocated by Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857 - 1936) when he served as an expert advisor to Dutch colonial officials in Indonesia. As Ira M. Lapidus puts it :

The policy of the Sukarno and Suharto governments toward the Muslim movements was an echo of the policies introduced by the Dutch toward the end of the nineteenth century. The Dutch distinguished between the religious and the political aspects of Islam, tolerating the former and repressing the latter.²³⁸ Following the same line of thought, the Javanese military and bureaucratic elite has broken the political power of the Muslim parties.²³⁹

In words that echo those of Lapidus, Dr. Mohamad Atho Mudzhar (b. 1948), a Muslim scholar and a graduate of UCLA, also points out that "although officially the government policy towards Islam is sympathetic just as towards any other religion, in

²³⁸ For further discussions, see, for instance, H. Aqib Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta : LP3ES, 1985); Harry J. Benda, "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia," *Journal of Modern History*, no. 30 (1958), 338 - 347; C. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*, trans. by A. W. S. O'Sullivan (Leiden : E. J. Brill, 1906).

²³⁹ Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1991), 773.

practice it is sympathetic only towards cultural Islam, and remains suspicious of political Islam."²⁴⁰

In spite of this, Muslims in general seem to be satisfied with government policy, as can be seen, for example, in Nurcholish Madjid's statement from the 1970s, "Islam, Yes! Islamic parties, No!" This statement implied that Islamic parties should be rejected because they are no longer important tools for pursuing Muslim political interests. On the other hand, the Muslim community has been encouraged to strengthen and develop its social, cultural and intellectual foundations in an effort to achieve the progress and glory of Islam in a future Indonesia. This encouragement seems to have been stressed because, as Dr. Imaduddin Abdulrahim has argued, "the government is also Islamic in nature," and has in fact struggled for the interests of Muslims. Indeed, as Munawir Sjadzali argued in some of his statements referred to above, the government has served the Muslims' interests better in the absence of Islamic parties.

CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT POLICIES REGARDING SOCIO-RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

Actually, prior to the acceptance by the Muslims of the Pancasila as the sole basis, the government had demonstrated some of its "positive" policies towards them. In 1975, the government moved to help a group of 'ulamā' establish the MUI in view of their important position in the Muslim community and of their significant role in the process of the implementation of national development. Fulfilling a strategic role, the MUI was expected to "translate" the government's ideas and policies on the national development program into "religious" language so that all segments of Muslim society, particularly the grass-roots, could understand them and then participate actively in the

²⁴⁰ Mudzhar, "Fatwās," 53.

national development process. At the same time, the MUI served to transmit Muslim aspirations and interests to the government and to the people's legislative body. In addition, the MUI has also provided religious guidance and legal opinions to the government and to the legislative, executive and judiciary branches in order that they not violate the *shari'ah* and other Islamic teachings.²⁴¹ In short, the MUI has played an important role in bridging the gap between the Muslim community and the government, and in bringing the two sides closer together.

In relation to other religious communities existing in the country, the MUI has acted as a Muslim representative body consulting with community members to resolve the religious issues faced in their common social life. In this way misunderstandings among religious communities have been avoided. In fact, the establishment of the MUI has provided advantages to both the Muslims and the government. The success of the government's family planning and transmigration programs, for example, have been partly due to the role of the MUI in particular and to the '*ulamā*' in general. On the issue of family planning, for instance, the MUI issued a *fatwā* saying that it is permitted and encouraged by Islamic doctrine; therefore, Muslims have practiced it and, as a result, the program has greatly contributed to the success of the government's efforts to reduce the rate of population growth.

On February 17, 1982, Soeharto (in his capacity as a Muslim citizen and not as president) established a foundation called the YAMP (*Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila*, or Foundation for the Dedication of Pancasilaist Muslims) with himself as chairman. According to Sjadzali, the foundation of the YAMP was motivated by the fact that the Muslim community still needed much more funding in order to establish or

²⁴¹ Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, 203.

rehabilitate houses of prayer and mosques throughout the country.²⁴² Usually the Muslim community itself, rather than the government, is encouraged to establish or rehabilitate its mosques. However, realizing that the Muslims still needed much more money for this purpose, Soeharto as a member of the Muslim community took the initiative in raising funds through the YAMP. By July of 1990, the YAMP had succeeded in establishing almost 400 mosques of various sizes in various parts of the country, each at a cost of between 110 - 130 million *rupiahs*.²⁴³ To raise funds, every Muslim government worker and every Muslim member of ABRI, according to his/her rank, was strongly encouraged to contribute a certain amount of money to the YAMP every month. At the end of 1991, the YAMP had a total fund of 83 billion *rupiahs*.²⁴⁴ By this means, the YAMP continues to finance its activities.

In cooperation with the YAMP and with Soeharto's consent, the MUI sent 1000 Muslim preachers to provide Islamic instruction among Muslim settlers in various parts of the country. This program was carried out because many of them needed spiritual and moral guidance in the resettlement areas where they had begun their new lives. These Muslim preachers received from the YAMP a certain amount of money every month to support them during their stay in these areas.²⁴⁵ In addition to the YAMP, President Soeharto supported Muslim efforts to establish the *Bank Muamalat Indonesia* in 1991. Professionally administered by Muslim entrepreneurs, businessmen and bankers, this bank opened for business with capital of 100 billion *rupiahs*. The establishment of this bank was intended to provide loans, particularly to Muslims, to develop economic activities and businesses in order to achieve prosperity

²⁴² Ibid., 202.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ See *Tempo*, July 6, 1991, 29.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

and welfare which, in turn, would contribute to improving the Muslim community's welfare as a whole. Unlike public banks, this Islamic bank operates without charging the borrowers any interest.²⁴⁶

The government has been very concerned with the continued improvement of the infrastructure and administration of the *hajj*. This concern is always presented in the GBHN as one of the most important national policies. Munawir Sjadzali (Minister of Religious Affairs responsible for the administration of the *hajj*) reported that the Saudi Arabian government was very impressed with the Indonesian government's administration of the *hajj*, which is carried out by the Department of Religious Affairs. In the view of the Saudi Arabian government, Sjadzali reported further, the Indonesian government's administration of the *hajj* is one of the best when compared with that of other Muslim countries.²⁴⁷ It is important in this context to mention that about twelve hundred Indonesian *hajjis* died in an accident in Mecca in 1990. To commemorate this national tragedy, the Muslims, strongly encouraged and supported by President Soeharto, established memorial hospitals at *hajj* embarkation ports in Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan and Ujung Pandang. Soeharto also supported a group of Muslims in the establishment of the IPHI (*Ikatan Persaudaraan Haji Indonesia*, or Association of Indonesian *Hajjis*).²⁴⁸

In addition, as Sjadzali also notes, President Soeharto instructed in 1980 that a large new building for the Department of Religious Affairs be established in a part of the complex situated on Lapangan Banteng Barat Street, which had previously belonged to the *Kodam* (*Komando Daerah Militer*, or Military District Command) of

²⁴⁶ See *Tempo*, November 9, 1991, 23.

²⁴⁷ Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, 203.

²⁴⁸ Sjadzali, *Muslims' Interests*, 5 - 6.

Jakarta. Sjadzali explained that, except in Saudi Arabia, he had never seen in any Muslim country a *waqf* and Islamic affairs building as large as the one designed for the Department of Religious Affairs in the Republic of Indonesia.²⁴⁹ More important, the location of the Department of Religious Affairs building is very strategic because it is close to the Istiqlal Mosque of Jakarta, a great mosque constructed during the Soekarno era in remembrance of the independence struggle in which many Muslims died as martyrs to Islam and country. In this connection, it is also worth mentioning that, for the same purpose, a mosque called the Syuhada Mosque was also built by Muslims in Yogyakarta during the Soekarno era.

Another of the government's national policies that reflects Islamic values and Muslim interests is the continuation of the national Qur'anic reading competition (*Musbaqah Tilawatil Qur'an Tingkat Nasional*). This competition, which costs billions of rupiahs and takes place in different provincial cities, is officially opened by the president as a major event and is broadcast on national television to Muslims throughout the country. The funding for the competition comes mostly from the government, while the rest is made up of contributions from Muslim entrepreneurs and private businesses. Apart from this, since the late 1980s, Arabic language instruction has been provided to Muslims once a week through government national television. This program had long been requested by Muslims, but only in the late 1980s did the government meet their request and allow it to be included among the national television programs. Almost at the same time (1991), with the support of the Soeharto government, the Muslims held an Islamic cultural exhibition called the Istiqlal Festival which was viewed as a success since it attracted a large audience. More importantly, this festival was held in the Istiqlal Mosque complex of Jakarta, and might be seen as

²⁴⁹ Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, 203.

the only great Islamic cultural festival to have been held thus far in the history of Indonesian Islam.

In the meantime, the government at the beginning of the 1990s finally abolished the SDSB (*sumbangan dana sosial berhadiah*, or social contribution with reward) which, in practice, was considered by Muslims to be a form of lottery, and therefore, in the view of Muslims, prohibited according to Islamic law. Before its abolition, the Muslims were very concerned about the negative impact of the SDSB on the moral life of Muslims and on society as a whole. Despite their stern opposition, the SDSB, having obtained formal permission from the government (the Minister of Social Affairs), continued to be carried out under the pretext of financing sporting activities in the country sponsored under the government's national plan. It was only after the Muslim acceptance of the Pancasila as the sole basis that the SDSB was abolished. Understandably, the Muslims were very happy with this governmental policy.²⁵⁰

THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE IAINs AND IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

In the field of education, the New Order government continued its efforts to improve the national educational system from which the Muslims have naturally benefited. The government endeavoured to improve and develop the status of the fourteen IAINs in the country. For this purpose, in 1985 it issued Government Regulation no. 33 which, among other things, gives the IAINs, which are officially administered by the Department of Religious Affairs, the same status, organizational structure, facilities and treatment as the state universities formally administered by the Department of Education and Culture. Government Regulation no. 33 was then confirmed and elaborated by presidential decree no. 9 of 1987. With the issuance of

²⁵⁰ See *Media Dakwah*, no. 234 (December 1993), 10 - 12.

this decree, the existence, status and organizational structure of the IAINs were improved and developed, while they reached the same legal status as the state universities existing in the country.²⁵¹ In the meantime, on February 16, 1991, the government (through the Director General of Elementary, Junior and Senior High Schools in the Department of Education and Culture) issued letter of decision no. 100/C/Kep./D/1991 by which it has allowed Muslim female students of state junior and senior high schools throughout the country to wear the jilbab. As we saw earlier in the second chapter, the government had formerly prohibited them from wearing this article of clothing, although due to the strong opposition from Muslims it gave them the opportunity to move to private schools.

In 1989 the government issued Law no. 2 on the national educational system which, among other things, confirms and emphasizes that religious teaching constitutes a sub-system of the national educational system. The law also confirms that religion constitutes an obligatory subject that must be taught in all public schools from the elementary to university levels, and it also acknowledges the important role of religious educational institutions in the process of national character building.²⁵² It should be noted that at the beginning the national educational system bill aroused reaction and criticism from the Muslim faction. Lukman Harun, a leader and spokesperson for the Muhammadiyah, criticized the bill as deviating from the stipulation in the GBHN that religious instruction should be compulsory at all levels of education. Harun stated that in the draft version of the proposed national curriculum, religious instruction is not mentioned except for the primary school level. In his view,

²⁵¹ Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, 202.

²⁵² Ibid.

the bill was secular in nature.²⁵³ Many in Muslim circles saw that the status of the *madrasas* (Islamic schools) was left unclear. According to one of its articles, the bill stated that acceptance of a student in an educational unit might not depend on religion, sex, race, social status or economic capacity. As far as the issues of religion and sex were concerned, the bill implicitly affected some madrasas, for example those run by the Muhammadiyah, which were reserved only for men or only for women.²⁵⁴ Muslim criticism of the national educational system bill "also reflects a tendency among Muslim institutions to suspect the government of eroding the role of Islam, under the state ideology of Pancasila."²⁵⁵ However, after revisions based on substantial suggestions proposed by the Muslims in particular, the bill was finally modified and passed by the DPR, thus satisfying the Muslims and benefiting them at the same time.

THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE RELIGIOUS COURTS

Islamic law, strongly enough, was one field in which the Muslims and the government were able to co-operate in introducing reforms, and from an early date besides. It is generally accepted, particularly in Muslim circles, that Islamic law constitutes a sub-system of the Indonesian national legal system. And it is a historical fact that Islamic courts had existed in and been attached to many Islamic kingdoms long before the establishment of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. Along with the establishment of their colonial rule, the Dutch restricted the role and authority of the Islamic courts in an attempt to weaken Islam and the Muslims of the time. Despite the

²⁵³ See Michael Vatikiotis, "Faith in Teaching," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 141, no. 30 (July 28, 1988), 25.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid. See also "National Education Bill roused widespread suspicion within devout Muslim community leading establishment Muslim organizations go on offensive to modify it," *Indonesia Report*, 36 (November 1988), 11.

fact that during the independence era improvements were seen in Islamic courts, these improvements needed to be continued in order fully to serve Muslim interests in this field. In an effort to achieve this, President Soeharto took the initiative in 1985 of establishing the Project for the Compilation of Islamic law, with the aim of composing standardized legal books to be used by Islamic judges in settling legal problems and cases arising among the Muslim community.

The idea of establishing the Project was motivated by the fact that the legal writings upon which Indonesia's Islamic judges based their decisions were the product of the 'ulamā' of the medieval period, and were no longer suitable because of the demands of modern times. The Project succeeded in drafting three standardized books on Islamic law : the first dealing with marriage, the second with inheritance, and the third with endowments. The composition of these three drafts, which involved prominent 'ulamā' and many leading experts in Islamic law, was completed in 1987. At the final stage, these three drafts were critically and thoroughly discussed in a workshop attended by many 'ulamā' and experts in Islamic law, and based on their suggestions the drafts were then completed. With the promulgation by the government of Law no. 7 of 1989 on the Islamic religious courts (which will be discussed below), these three standardized books on Islamic law were ready for use. By referring to these three books, legal decisions on similar cases made by Islamic judges in Islamic courts throughout the country could be standardized, thus avoiding situations where different decisions were produced by different Islamic courts.²⁵⁶

The promulgation by the government of Law no. 7 of 1989 should be traced back to the issuance of Law no. 14 of 1970, which stipulates that the decisions of the public courts, Islamic religious courts, military courts, and administrative courts must

²⁵⁶ Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, 202.

be carried out by the courts concerned. However, according to the judicial system in Indonesia, the decisions implemented by these four courts defer to the Supreme Court. As a follow up to Law no. 14 of 1970, on December 29, 1989, the government promulgated Law no. 7 of 1989 regulating the status, role and authority of the Islamic religious courts. With the promulgation of this law, important fundamental improvements and a substantial restructuring of the Islamic courts were carried out. Sjadzali said that in 1945 an Islamic party had proposed that the KNIP (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*, or Indonesian National Central Committee), which served as provisional parliament at that time, improve the position of the Islamic courts, but all factions in the Committee strongly rejected its proposal.²⁵⁷ According to Sjadzali, it was only in the New Order period, when the Islamic parties no longer existed, that improvements in the Islamic courts took place. These improvements, as Munawir Sjadzali has noted below, had a special strategic meaning for Muslims in relation to the government's policies towards them. Sjadzali mentioned four important points in relation to the restructuring of the Islamic religious courts.

First, all Islamic religious courts, which now number 304 throughout the country, are regulated by and follow only a single law, that is, Law no. 7 of 1989. This law marks the end of all restrictions imposed by the Dutch upon the Islamic religious courts in Java and Madura since 1882, and on the Islamic religious courts in South Kalimantan since 1937 (these restrictions were not substantially changed until the promulgation of this law). Second, legal decisions made by the Islamic religious courts are final in the sense that they do not need to be confirmed by the public courts as had been the practice before. Decisions are executed by the Islamic religious courts themselves, no longer by the public courts. For this reason, the position of bailiff in the Islamic religious courts was established. Third, judges in the system of Islamic

²⁵⁷ Sjadzali, *Muslims' Interests*, 3.

religious courts, like state judges, are appointed by the president, no longer by the minister of religious affairs. The position, rights and facilities given by the state to Islamic judges are the same as those given to other judges in other courts. At least in theory, the possibility exists for an Islamic judge to be appointed by the president to serve as head of the Supreme Court. Fourth, the positions of judge, secretary and bailiff in the system of Islamic religious courts are exclusively given to Muslims.²⁵⁸

According to Sjadzali, with these substantial improvements and restructuring, the position of the Islamic religious courts in Indonesia is very solid and even prestigious when compared with that of Islamic courts in many other Muslim countries. Even in other Muslim countries, which have Islam as their constitutional basis, the position of the Islamic courts is not as strong or prestigious as it is in Indonesia. This, according to Sjadzali, can be seen from the fact that Islamic courts in those Muslim countries exist only in certain states or regions, have limited authority, and have no standing within the central governments.²⁵⁹

It should be noted that when the Islamic religious courts bill was proposed, and then formally submitted to the DPR by the government for approval, the PGI began to voice strong opposition. The PGI sent a statement to the executives and factions of the DPR in which it expressed its objection that (a) in line with the "Archipelago Insights" (*Wawasan Nusantara*), only one national law should be applied to serve the national interest; (b) a bill on the Islamic religious courts was beyond the DPR's jurisdiction, since it was the responsibility of the entire nation to lay down a basic framework in the

²⁵⁸ Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, 200.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 200 - 201. In this case, Sjadzali did not mention the names of Islamic states whose Islamic courts he compared with those of Indonesia.

legal field; and (c) the bill was in "contradiction" to the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution in a pure sense.²⁶⁰

Through their magazine *Hidup* (Life), Christians charged that the proposed bill on Islamic religious courts constituted an attempt to revive the Jakarta Charter and was discriminatory towards non-Muslim groups in the legal domain.²⁶¹ Indeed, this issue became so sensitive that it aroused strong opposition from the Protestant and Catholic elements in the Golkar faction during the DPR sessions. In the face of this issue the Golkar, which was usually solidly united, almost split. In response to this opposition, President Soeharto stated firmly that the proposed bill was intended by the government to protect the rights of Muslims to perform the entire range of their *'ibādāt* (which consist of far more than just prayer, fasting and paying alms) as suggested in article 29 paragraph 2 of the 1945 constitution.²⁶² In the meantime, Minister of Religious Affairs Munawir Sjadzali appealed to the DPR to approve the bill, arguing that a new law on Islamic religious courts was urgently needed by Muslims due to the process of national legal development. Sjadzali believed that this law, which would be exclusively applied to the Muslims, would not disturb, let alone violate, the interests of other religious groups in the country. He asked that the birth and execution of the law be understood by non-Muslim communities and that they accept this development.²⁶³ Thanks to the ABRI faction's lobbying of its opponents in the DPR, the bill was finally passed.

²⁶⁰ The PGI's letter, dated May 10, 1989, to the speakers and chairmen of factions in the DPR, as referred to by Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics," 257 - 258.

²⁶¹ *Hidup*, no. 7, February 1989. Their charge was widely discussed by Muslims in their mass media. See for example, *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 616 (July 10, 1989), 10.

²⁶² See Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics," 259.

²⁶³ See *Tempo*, February 4, 1989, 77 - 78.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ICMI AND THE RISE OF MUSLIM PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS

Another of the government's policies which was considered to be in line with Muslim aspirations was its official support for the establishment of the ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*, or Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). The ICMI was established in Malang, East Java, following a symposium on "Developing Indonesian Society in the 21st Century" held at the University of Brawijaya from December 6 - 8, 1990 by a group of Muslims concerned with the development of Muslim intellectual activity in the country. President Soeharto himself, accompanied by a number of his ministers such as Burhanuddin Jusuf Habibie and Emil Salim, delivered an important speech in which he encouraged Muslims to play an active role in enlightening the nation and in developing its abilities in the face of the challenge of modernity in the 21st century. B. J. Habibie (b. 1936), State Minister of Research and Technology, a graduate of the University of Aachen in West Germany and known internationally as an expert in the construction of aircraft, was elected general chairman of the ICMI.

It was reported that Habibie's appointment to the chairmanship of the ICMI was supported by the president, who considered him capable and suitable for the position. At a symposium prior to the establishment of the ICMI, Habibie presented a paper entitled "The Role of Science and Technology in the Process of Social Transformation" in which he stressed, among other things, that Indonesians should work to make themselves free from illiteracy in science and technology, because only a country with the ability to develop new technology and science in concert with its culture can survive.²⁶⁴ Quoting a statement by the president, Habibie called for

²⁶⁴ B. J. Habibie's speech on this matter was widely quoted by the Indonesian mass media. See, for example, *Surya*, December 7, 1990.

Muslims to make "Indonesia's Second 25 Year-Long Term Development Plan" a starting point for "the second phase of the national awakening."²⁶⁵ The establishment of the ICMI was widely welcomed, and a number of branches or organization units both in the country and abroad were established by Muslim students and intellectuals.

According to its constitution, one of the goals of the ICMI is to improve the quality of Muslim intellectual life and to encourage the participation of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals in the national development process in order to create a peaceful, just and prosperous community blessed by God in the spirit of the 1945 constitution.²⁶⁶ The ICMI also established a comprehensive program of activity, consisting of 13 points, the five most significant of which are as follows :

- (1) To participate actively in the development of education and human resources with the aim of developing the intellectual capacity of the nation, especially that of the Muslim community;
- (2) To improve the quality of its members and to develop their expertise through coordination of information and communication networks among intellectuals, institutions and organizations within the country and abroad;
- (3) To promote ideas, research and studies which are innovative, strategic and anticipative; and to make serious attempts in solving local, regional and national problems;
- (4) To promote library and documentation centers, and to develop integrated communication and information networks with the objective of collecting, storing, processing, and distributing information in the fields of science, technology and human resources, as well as social, economic, legal and cultural affairs; and
- (5) To promote Islamic economic and financial institutions through, among other means, mobilization of funds, management of financial capital, banks, cooperatives, small business, alms, and other legal means.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁵ The first "National Awakening" was associated with the establishment in 1908 of the Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavour), which prompted the emergence of various nationalist movements against colonialism in Indonesia. Thanks to these nationalist movements, Indonesians succeeded in freeing their country from colonialism.

²⁶⁶ See the ICMI's constitution (chapter 3 article 5) in Abrar Muhammad, ed., *ICMI dan Harapan Umat* (Jakarta : Yayasan Pendidikan Islam Ruhama, 1991). 269 (appendix).

²⁶⁷ "Apa dan Bagaimana ICMI," *Suara Masjid*, no. 199 (April 1991), 16 - 17.

In view of its program, it is clear that the ICMI has taken a strategic step and has shown itself to be an intellectual movement which is concerned with developing the nation and Muslim intellectual ability, and elevating the nation's scientific capacity on the eve of the 21st century.

Observing the new relationship between Muslims and the government, Kuntowijoyo (b. 1943), a well-known historian teaching at Gadjah Mada University, has voiced the opinion that this development will change all political discourse in Indonesia. In his view, if the ICMI is any indication, new trends in cooperation are taking place in the life of the Muslim community. First, the cultural dichotomy between the abangans and the santris has ended. Thanks to the realization of Islamic religious education in the state schools, the children of both the abangans and the santris receive an identical program of religious education. Meanwhile, new curricula, introducing non-religious subjects, are taught in the pesantrens, traditionally the centers of traditional Islamic education. Thus, cultural exclusivism is no longer the norm.

Second, according to Kuntowijoyo, the dichotomy between Muslim Traditionalists and Muslim Modernists no longer exists. Religious education at all levels has changed fundamentally due to the use of the government's standardized texts which put aside the issue of religious distinctions. Furthermore, the publication and circulation of a great number of religious books representing various religious viewpoints has made Muslims face complex ideas and choices, resulting in a blurring of the difference between the two positions.

Third, the dichotomy between the 'ulamā' and Muslim intellectuals, who had become so polarized by 1952 that it caused the NU to leave the Masyumi, is no longer felt. Today, the 'ulamā' sit together with the Muslim intellectuals in various discussions, conferences and seminars, both sides contributing fully.

Fourth, the dichotomy between the religious group and the "secular" faction has also ended. Today, there are many Muslim intellectuals who are concerned with secular matters, from population control and the environment to literature, art and sports. The boundary between secularity and religiosity in the life of an Indonesian Muslim has become blurred and is in danger of disappearing.

Fifth and last, Kuntowijoyo states that the application by the government of the mass organizations law of 1985 terminated the distinction between Islamic and non-Islamic parties. This can be seen from the fact that the 'ulamā' gave permission to members of the Muslim community to vote for any political party they wished in general elections.²⁶⁸ Pointing to the composition of the central board of the ICMI, Kuntowijoyo notes that its membership varies and consists of individuals who are affiliated with various political streams. Thus it can be said that Islam and bureaucracy go hand in hand in Indonesian politics, and that this development, in Kuntowijoyo's view, marks the end of the myth of Muslims as trouble makers and protesters in Indonesia.²⁶⁹

While the majority of Muslims enthusiastically show their support and sympathy for the ICMI, there are some Muslim individuals who are opposed to it. Abdurrahman Wahid, for example, who refused an important position on the Advisory Board of the ICMI, claimed that many who joined the ICMI were opportunistic, and were just looking for positions and rewards from the government through participation in this organization. Wahid was even "suspicious of the project (read : the ICMI) because it has the stamp of Suharto."²⁷⁰ Deliar Noer, who has been critical of government

²⁶⁸ Kuntowijoyo, "Kiblat Baru Politik Kaum Santri," *Pesan*, no. 1 (1992), 23 - 24.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 24.

²⁷⁰ Michael Vatikiotis, "Suharto Courts Islamic Intellectuals : The Muslim Ticket," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 150, no. 51 (December 20, 1990), 10.

policies from the very beginning, viewed the establishment of the ICMI and other events, which are seen by Muslims as reflecting good relations between them and the government, as being good in appearance only, and intended by the government to serve only a temporary purpose.²⁷¹ Chalid Mawardi (a parliamentary member from the PPP faction) questioned the political interests behind the foundation of the ICMI.²⁷² Answers to these doubts might vary depending on who responds to it and on his/her political views and background. One can argue that one of the political interests behind the establishment of the ICMI (and other government-sponsored Islamic activities and programs) was to legitimize, strengthen and perpetuate the power of the regime by providing more services to Muslims. Furthermore, one can also argue that the regime is very much concerned with Muslims since they constitute a significant majority of the population (87 percent), and are thus deserving of much more attention and services than other groups.

Such are the new developments which, in the eyes of the majority of Muslims, reflect an improved relationship between Islam and the regime. It was in view of these developments that President Soeharto, his wife (Ny. Tien Soeharto) and other members of his family, accompanied by some of his ministers, performed the pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca in 1991, one year before the implementation of the 1992 general election and two years before presidential elections. The timing of this event, prompted observers both in the country and abroad to observe that Soeharto's pilgrimage to Mecca was political, and that he was seeking thereby to obtain Islamic legitimacy in order to be re-elected. However, it was widely reported that his pilgrimage to Mecca had nothing to do with politics, but was purely a religious

²⁷¹ Deliar Noer, "Dibayangi Kesemuan," *Tempo*, December 28, 1991, 27.

²⁷² "Harus Dibuktikan ICMI Bukan Barisan Politik," *Media Indonesia*, December 6, 1990.

impulse to seek God's favour.²⁷³ Muslims showed their support for the president's decision finally to make the hajj,²⁷⁴ having previously only performed the 'umrah in 1977.

Although Soeharto's pilgrimage did not appear to have a political motivation, it did have a political implication, which increasingly convinced Muslims to support him in his bid for re-election as president. This can be seen, for example, in the case of Kyai Badri Masduki, the head of the pesantren of Badridduja of Probolinggo, East Java, who collected more than 1000 signatures from influential kyais and 'ulamā' in East Java supporting Soeharto's return as president in the 1993 MPR general session.²⁷⁵ In the meantime, Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara (a retired army general and former minister of religious affairs who later became known as the leading figure of the Group of Twenty-One) also campaigned for Soeharto's re-election, as noted by Michael R. J. Vatikiotis :

Alamsjah's chief weapon in persuading the Muslim faithful ... highlights the extent to which individuals rather than social forces dominate the political scene. Alamsjah spread alarm among the Muslim clergy by casting Benny Murdani [minister of defense] as the only alternative. Murdani's Christian faith, tied to his implication in the brutal suppression of a Muslim riot in Tanjung Priok in September 1984, was effective in persuading many Muslims that Suharto had to remain in power to prevent the Republic being ruled by an "infidel".²⁷⁶

²⁷³ See *Tempo*, July 6, 1991, 25.

²⁷⁴ Detailed coverage of the president's pilgrimage to Mecca was documented by Tim Penyusunan dan Penerbitan Buku Perjalanan Ibadah Haji Pak Harto, ed., *Perjalanan Ibadah Haji Pak Harto* (Jakarta : Departemen Agama RI, 1993).

²⁷⁵ *Tempo*, October 19, 1991, 26.

²⁷⁶ Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics*, 163.

In the 1992 general election, the PPP obtained only 17 percent of the vote, while the Golkar received 68 percent and the PDI 15 percent.²⁷⁷ In spite of this, more interestingly, the PPP unanimously supported Soeharto's re-election as president (and nominated Try Sutrisno as vice-president); its support had been voiced before other parties announced their presidential candidates. The re-election of Soeharto became a reality when the MPR in its 1993 general session appointed him again to be president, granting him his sixth term, to end in 1998. Soeharto is currently accompanied by Try Sutrisno (former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) as vice-president.

It is interesting to note that, of the 40 ministers who sit on the sixth development cabinet he established after his most recent re-election, 38 are Muslim.²⁷⁸ Commenting on this, K. H. Hasan Basri of the MUI said that the cabinet's composition reflects the real situation existing in the country, where Muslims have become more advanced in politics, economics, the military, and other fields.²⁷⁹ Dr. Juwono Sudarsono, an expert in political science and a prominent lecturer at the University of Indonesia, has said that the Muslims are now truly represented in the cabinet, and that they now have a great opportunity to take part as policy-makers in state affairs.²⁸⁰ Unlike in the past, when the president had appointed his ministers from among socialist technocrats, secular nationalists and Christians, now in the Sixth Development Cabinet he has turned to Muslims to fill strategic positions. K. H. Hasan Basri appealed to the Muslims who sit in the cabinet to carry out their duties as effectively as possible, to

²⁷⁷ See *Inside Indonesia : Bulletin of the Indonesia Resources and Information Programme*, no. 31 (June 1992), 5.

²⁷⁸ See *Media Dakwah*, no. 226 (April 1993), 48.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 46 and 47.

prove themselves capable of meeting their responsibilities and not to disappoint the president who had entrusted those positions to them.²⁸¹

The rise in the participation of Muslims in Indonesian politics has generated concern in Christian circles. An anxious Christian Indonesian once told Donald K. Emmerson, a professor in political science at the University of Wisconsin, that "if things keep going this way, there is a 50 % to 60 % chance my country could be an Islamic state by 2010."²⁸² Emmerson believes that such concern is simply an exaggeration since "militant Muslims will not dictate the direction of Indonesian politics anytime soon -- if ever. Islam's emergence in Indonesia, a country I have been visiting and studying for a quarter of a century, is an understandable consequence of the nation's political stability and economic growth."²⁸³ Thus, according to Emmerson, the increasing role of Muslims in Indonesian politics should be viewed as a natural growth in line with their continued success in improving the quality of their social, educational and economic life. Due to this success, many Muslims are now highly educated in science and technology, and this should be recognized by the government appointing them to appropriate positions in the state. In Emmerson's view, the assumption that a Muslim officer will place the interests of political Islam over those of the armed forces is baseless. As he puts it :

Times have changed. After two decades of stable government and 6 % average annual economic growth, Islamic identity is now peacefully on the rise. In the shadow of factories, mosques have sprung up. In traffic-jumped cities like Jakarta, Muslims messages circulate with frequency in popular magazines and newspaper, on audio and video tapes. ...

Into these signs of Islamic identity some Indonesians might read a serious threat to religious harmony in the country. But such a reading seems alarmist to me. Militant Islamists are not taking over Indonesia. The proportion of top

²⁸¹ Ibid., 48.

²⁸² Donald K. Emmerson, "Indonesia's Gains are Islam's, Too." *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1993.

²⁸³ Ibid.

- echelon officers in the armed forces who are Muslims, for example, has gone up. But in a country where nearly nine out of every 10 people acknowledge Islam as their faith, this should come as no surprise. The assumption that a Muslim officer would put the interests of political Islam above those of the armed forces as a national institution is unfounded.

The same logic holds true, I believe, when it comes to Mr. Suharto's government. In the 41 - person cabinet installed last March, only three ministers are Christian, down from six in the previous government. But the new proportion, at 7 %, is not much less than the 10 % of the population that is Christian. By naming two Christians to high posts outside the cabinet, moreover, Mr. Suharto seems to have tried to reassure Western governments and Christian Indonesians that he is not about to exclude religious minorities from representation, let alone countenance an Islamic state. The academic Johannes Sumarlin and Adm. Sudomo, Catholics who held posts in the last cabinet, now head the Audit Board and Supreme Advisory Council, respectively. The appointment of a Hindu - Balinese general, Ida Bagus Sudjana, as minister of mining and energy further undercuts the notion that Jakarta is tilting toward political Islam.²⁸⁴

From the above quotation, it can be said that in spite of the increased participation of Muslims in Indonesian politics, it should not be concluded that Indonesia is leaning toward political Islam. Emmerson is correct when he says that President Soeharto "gave no indication that he might be reorienting his ship of state toward Mecca. The country's constitutional guarantee of religious freedom remains intact."²⁸⁵ Emmerson's argument found a solid basis when President Soeharto in 1993 reaffirmed that "Indonesia is neither a religious nor a secular state. ... The government will not meddle in people's internal religious beliefs, including their understanding, perception and institutionalization of their religions. Religious faith is a matter of inner consciousness of respective religious followers, and the state therefore respects and fully guarantees the exercise by the people of this fundamental right."²⁸⁶

Commenting on Habibie's appointment as the chairman of the ICMI and the role of the organization itself, Emmerson says that Habibie's greatest concern is economic

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ *Indonesia Times*, October 19, 1993.

and that he, together with ICMI, does not want, nor will he encourage, any project to Islamize Indonesia. Furthermore, as far as President Soeharto is concerned, he supports the ICMI since he wants the support of the ICMI thinkers and leaders in return:

Mr. Suharto's decision to allow his minister of research and technology, B. J. Habibie, to head -- and thereby legitimate -- ICMI has also worried the alarmists. ICMI is known to have in its ranks members who favour a greater role for Islam in Indonesian life. But Mr. Habibie, in my estimation, does not want, and will not encourage, an extension of this agenda into a project to Islamize the state. His goal is largely economic: Mr. Habibie hopes to mobilize ICMI and its Muslim scholars' influence behind advanced industrial development and leap-frog his country into a high-tech future. My guess is that the organization has received Mr. Suharto's support because he wants the support of Muslim thinkers and leaders and also because Mr. Habibie is an old friend.²⁸⁷

The greater role of Islam in Indonesian politics should be seen as a reflection of the importance of the position of Muslims as a majority group, whose abilities have become increasingly advanced in various fields. Emerson puts this perspective into context by observing that, in fact, "Indonesia's gains are Islam's, too."²⁸⁸

THE POSITION OF THE PANCASILA AFTER ITS STIPULATION AS THE SOLE BASIS

Under Soeharto, the implementation of the national development program intensified, and reached strategic momentum when Indonesia declared itself to be entering the "take-off" stage. Indonesia formally began its first Long-Term 25 Year Development Program in 1969, and is now entering a new era in which it is implementing its second Long-Term 25 Year Development Program. Dr. Amien Rais, a graduate of the University of Chicago, lecturer at Gadjah Mada University and an

²⁸⁷ Emerson, "Indonesia's Gains."

²⁸⁸ Ibid.



expert in political science, presented in 1994 an assessment of Soeharto's leadership mentioning five achievements and five weaknesses.²⁸⁹

Soeharto's first achievement in Rais's view was his success in maintaining monetary stability, which resulted in economic growth. In 1967 Indonesia's GNP per capita was 70 US dollars, but today it is 600 US dollars. In 1970, 60 percent of Indonesians lived under the poverty line, but today this has decreased to 15 percent. Thus, Indonesia's average annual economic growth has been between 6.5 - 7 percent under his leadership. Second, Soeharto has also succeeded in preserving national security and political stability. Under his leadership there have been no major disturbances or serious separatist movements, and only minor upheavals, such as in Dilli (East Timor) or in the Tanjung Priok affair, all of which are now under control. Third, Soeharto has succeeded in strengthening the unity and integrity of his nation, which is pluralistic in religion, ethnicity, culture and tradition. The national motto "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" (Unity in Diversity) does not exist only as a slogan, but in reality. This situation is very important in view of the many foreign countries which have undergone serious political turmoil because of ethnic conflicts or political rivalry. A few examples are Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and India. Fourth, under Soeharto, Indonesia has succeeded in carrying out its agricultural program as witnessed by the fact that it has reached self-sufficiency in food (rice). Fifth, the image of Indonesia in the eyes of the international community is good, as indicated by the fact that, for instance, it has been entrusted with the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Bloc. Also, Indonesia played a strategic role as intermediary in settling political conflicts in Cambodia and the Philippines.

²⁸⁹ See his article, "Suksesi itu Sunnatullah." *Suara Masjid*, no. 233 (February 1994), 17 - 18. Similar assessments can be read in his article, "Suksesi 1988 : Suatu Keharusan," *Media Dakwah*, no. 237 (March 1994), 34 - 35.

On the other hand, according to Rais, the Soeharto government's first weakness lies in the fact that under its leadership the gap between "the haves" and "the have-nots" has remained very wide. The condition of those who live below the poverty line is very serious, while the conglomerates enjoy to an excessive degree the country's wealth and the fruits of its development. Second, the rate of corruption in the government is high. Rais points to Prof. Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo's (a prominent economist) estimation that about 30 percent of development program funds are wasted or diverted by corrupt officials. Third, the implementation of human rights is not sufficient, as indicated by the fact that the protection of laborers is very poor. Laborers do not have the right to launch a strike against their employers' policies. Fourth, in settling many land property cases between the haves and the have-nots, the government often takes the side of the haves. In many cases, the have-nots are not reasonably protected. Fifth, there is chronic nepotism in the country. This is a situation which is not easily corrected. Rais has urged that regeneration of the government must take place in the immediate future if this nepotism is ever to be overcome.

The strength of Soeharto's leadership lies in the fact that it combines three key elements : the enforcement of national ideology (the Pancasila), political stability and economic growth. These three key elements are closely interrelated and cannot be separated from one another. With the application of the Pancasila as the basis and national ideology of the state, the socialization of the P 4 and the stipulation of the Pancasila as the sole foundation for all political parties and mass organizations, the position of the Pancasila has become very strong in the lives of Indonesians. Ideologically speaking, this condition will persist long into the future, alongside the continuous process of social transformation which has been taking place in the life of the Indonesian people. Dr. Alfian, an expert in political science and a graduate of the University of Wisconsin, has analyzed the Pancasila in relation to social change in

Indonesian life. He describes these elements which are essential to any successful ideology. His conclusions on the matter will be summarized here.²⁹⁰

First, an ideology should have the "dimension of reality." This is necessary since an ideology reflects a real situation existing in a particular society, it being most important when that ideology is first formulated and introduced to people. The Pancasila, according to Alfian, reflects clearly this kind of real situation. When the Indonesian political leaders in 1945 discussed what kind of ideology should serve as the basis for an independent state of Indonesia, they first tried to understand the basic nature of Indonesian society, which is pluralistic with regard to religion, ethnicity, culture, tradition and politics. Alfian says that the Pancasila embraces all these values and ideas, as is indicated by, for example, the first principle of the Pancasila (Belief in One God). This central principle serves as a point of agreement for all segments of Indonesian society, regardless of their religious beliefs. With this principle, as well as the four others, the Pancasila is made acceptable to all the diverse groups of Indonesian society, allowing it to regulate their national life and bring them together in harmony and peace. To borrow A. H. Johns' words, "the Pancasila is the answer to such diversity."²⁹¹ In Alfian's view, the Pancasila, as an ideology, has the capacity to continue to survive and can be developed for the sake of togetherness in the life of the nation.

Second, an ideology should have the "dimension of idealism." What Alfian means by this is that an ideology should contain clear aspirations and firm ideals from which its supporters may draw the motivation, capacity and strength to work together

²⁹⁰ See Alfian, "Pancasila dan Perubahan Masyarakat" (The Pancasila and Social Change) in his book, *Politik, Kebudayaan dan Manusia Indonesia* (Jakarta : LP3ES, 1980), 104 - 133.

²⁹¹ Johns, "Indonesia," 224.

to build a better life. Alfian is of the opinion that the Pancasila meets this requirement.

However, he sees that there has been a tendency in Indonesian society, especially during the Old Order regime, to put special emphasis on one of the five principles of the Pancasila over the others. For example, one group emphasized the importance of democracy or humanitarianism, while other groups stressed the significance of Belief in One God. This kind of approach does not see the Pancasila as a whole, or as an interrelated set of values. This tendency was recognized by the New Order government, and for this reason it felt the need to establish the P 4 to elaborate fully all the principles of the Pancasila.

Third, an ideology should contain the "dimension of flexibility." This dimension reflects the ability of an ideology to adapt itself to the process of social change and growth in which it finds itself. While adapting itself, at the same time it colours and directs the process of social change in accordance with the ideals of the society or nation in question. Alfian explains that since the process of social transformation is always taking place in the life a society, continuous and accurate interpretations of an ideology are imperative. In his view, theoretically and formally speaking, the Pancasila meets this requirement. For example, he points to the "Explanation of the 1945 Constitution" which states that the constitution, which contains only 37 chapters, is brief and elastic in nature. The issues not covered in the constitution can be dealt with by the government by issuing laws, bills, regulations and decrees based on the principles of the Pancasila in agreement with the demands and needs of the nation. Here it should be added that the president and government officials since 1985 have begun to speak of the Pancasila as an open ideology, in the sense that its basic spirit and values as well as its fundamental ideas are unchanged, but that these values and

ideas can be developed creatively and dynamically.²⁹² Within this context, the Pancasila can accept other values coming from other nations as long as they do not challenge the basic values of the Pancasila itself. In this way, the Pancasila, according to the president and government officials, will not become frozen, but will always be creative, dynamic and relevant in response to the process of social transformation taking place in the lives of Indonesians.²⁹³

With the acceptance of the Pancasila as the only ideology to be applied in state and social affairs, there seem to be no further major ideological or political issues relating to the Pancasila which Muslims (or other groups) may challenge. The central issue surrounding the Pancasila, which has now become the main concern of the government, is how the nation as a whole should fortify its loyalty to the state ideology. In line with this concern, President Soeharto, in a speech delivered in 1993 inaugurating the new campus of the Pancasila University of Jakarta, urged the nation to strengthen its allegiance to the state ideology in order to be able to face the future challenges of modernization. Without loyalty to the Pancasila, he emphasized, the Indonesian nation will be bewildered amidst dynamic and radical global changes. Stressing the importance of each principle of the Pancasila vis-à-vis the radical and dynamic changes resulting from rapid globalization, Soeharto said that if the Indonesian people did not believe in God (the first principle of the Pancasila), ethics, morality and spirituality would be ignored. Without the values of a just and civilized humanitarianism (the second principle of the Pancasila), progress in economics, technology and sciences would deteriorate. Echoing the third principle of the

²⁹² See Saafroedin Bahar, "Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Kehidupan Pertahanan Keamanan," in Oetojo Oesman et al., eds., *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi* (Jakarta : BP - 7 Pusat, 1991), 350.

²⁹³ Moerdiono (State Secretary) wrote an article on the matter, entitled "Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Terbuka," in Oesman et al., eds., *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi*, 397 - 421.

Pancasila, he said that the nation could be split by internal conflicts if it did not adhere to the principle of national unity. In addition, authoritarian forces would emerge and bring the nation down if the values of democracy -- the fourth principle of the Pancasila -- were ignored. Finally, economic progress could widen the social gap and create unrest if people neglected the values of social justice, the fifth principle of the Pancasila.²⁹⁴



Chapter Four

CONCLUSION

From the discussion presented in Chapters I, II and III, we have come to understand that the responses of Indonesian Muslims to the Pancasila varied depending on the political issues to which they reacted. The Muslim representatives at first objected to both the proposal of the Pancasila as the basis of the state and to that of the P 4 as an official elaboration of the Pancasila, but later accepted them. The Muslim Nationalists' objection to the Pancasila occurred when it was proposed by the Secular Nationalists as the basis of the state in the sessions of the Investigating Body that took place shortly before Indonesia's independence in 1945 and again later in the Constituent Assembly debates that lasted from 1956 to 1959. The same attitude was demonstrated by the representatives of the Islamic party (the PPP) toward the P 4 when the New Order government proposed that it be legalized by the MPR in its 1978 general session. Both of these were put to a vote in the representative assemblies of the time. As far as the Pancasila as the basis of the state was concerned, the issue at stake was Soekarno's proposal to return to the 1945 constitution, which, in fact, also meant a return to the Pancasila since this is contained in the preamble to the 1945 constitution. In this instance, the representatives of the Muslim Nationalists participated in the voting process in the Constituent Assembly which took place on May 30, June 1 and June 2, 1959, respectively. However, as for the proposal of the P 4, the representatives of the PPP did not take part in the voting process on March 21, 1978, but walked out of the MPR session in protest.

Both the proposal of the Pancasila as the basis of the state and that of the P 4 were dealt with by the Muslims under a cloud of ideological rivalry, political conflict and mutual suspicion between themselves and the government. The Muslim response to the proposal of the Pancasila as the foundation of the state was more ideological in nature, in accordance with the issues of the day. To the proposal of the P 4, the Muslim response was by contrast more legalistic and theological, since the PPP

refused to join the MPR in legalizing it, and certain Muslims regarded it as a rival or alternative to religion. These two categories (another will be mentioned below) are not firm, since a political issue in relation to a religious community is in fact interrelated politically, ideologically and religiously.

Unlike their response to the proposal of the Pancasila as the foundation of the state and to that of the P 4 (to which they objected at first), the Muslim reaction to the proposal of the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties and mass organizations was generally favourable : the majority of Muslims accepted it, while a minority rejected it. This period was marked by a lessening of ideological rivalry and mutual political suspicion between the Muslims and the government. For instance, the PPP faction in the 1985 DPR sessions supported and participated in legalizing both the proposal of the Pancasila as the sole basis for all political parties and that of the Pancasila as the sole foundation for all mass organizations. The PPP accepted very easily the Pancasila as its sole basis. The NU for its part expressed its readiness to subscribe to the Pancasila as its sole foundation despite the fact that the law on the matter had not yet been promulgated by the government. Both the Muhammadiyah and the MUI eventually adopted the Pancasila as their sole basis. As for the HMI, it split into two groups : its mainstream accepted it, while the splinter group (the MPO) did not. The PII was the only organization within the Muslim community which rejected the Pancasila foundation, resulting in its dissolution by the government. Individual Muslims such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, A. M. Fatwa, Abdul Qadir Djaelani and several splinter groups were among those who opposed the Pancasila foundation. Their strong objections contributed to the outbreak of the Tanjung Priok incident. The Muslim response to the sole foundation was both theological and political in nature. Those who were in favour of it saw it as being in the spirit of Islam, while those who were opposed to it saw it as a challenge to the Islamic faith.

The government has seemed satisfied with the Muslim acceptance of the Pancasila as the sole foundation, and has ignored the minority Muslim group which objected to it. With the Muslim acceptance of the sole basis, the government's long held suspicions as to their ultimate loyalty has ended. Following this development, the government has abandoned the strict and severe policies it had imposed upon Muslims during the last twenty years. In line with its new policies, the government has served Muslims' interests better by, for example, allowing an Arabic course to be broadcast on national television, allowing Muslim female students of junior and senior high schools to wear the jilbab, and abolishing the SDSB. The government has likewise issued laws which have been received favourably by Muslims, for instance the law on the national educational system and the law on Islamic religious courts. In addition to this, the government also supported the Muslims in establishing the Muamalat Bank and the ICMI. Moreover, it has appointed a majority of Muslim ministers to the Sixth Development Cabinet. All this is evidence that a close relationship between the government and the Muslims has been established in a new political atmosphere, and that Muslim participation in Indonesian politics is on the rise. This phenomenon should be seen as resulting from the continued success of the Muslims in improving their social, economic and educational conditions, and as a reflection or representation of the importance of their position as a majority in the country. Some say that Soeharto's eventual successor will continue to maintain the government's close relationship with the Muslims since ideological rivalry and mutual political suspicion between the two sides has ended.

The Muslims have subsequently confirmed the relation between Islam and the Pancasila by saying that Islam and the Pancasila are not in conflict and must not be made to oppose each other. Espousing this belief, they say that the Pancasila-based state is the final goal of Muslim political aspirations, not simply a transitional goal. This statement suggests that Indonesia, for Indonesian Muslims, is an ideal type of

state. This statement also leads to the conclusion that the Muslims in fact have accepted the Pancasila-based state wholeheartedly; they live in it and fully participate in all stages of implementation of the national development program. It has been argued by many Muslim leaders that the success of the latter program depends primarily on the Muslims since they constitute a majority in the country. Therefore, it is understandable that Emerson should write "Indonesia's gains are Islam's, too" -- a statement with which I am in complete agreement.

With the application of the Pancasila as the sole foundation in Indonesians' social and political life, the position of the Pancasila has become much stronger. The Pancasila continues to play a significant role in leading Indonesians to strengthen their commitment and loyalty to the state and in enabling them to face the challenges of the future. This means that, for Indonesians, the Pancasila has a fundamental role, a concrete meaning and a strategic function in their social and national life. In addition to serving as the philosophical basis and ideology of the state, the Pancasila also functions as the national character and way of life for Indonesians. Throughout history, the Pancasila has proven itself to have the capacity to function as an inspiring, guiding, integrating and unifying force which is able to accommodate people's various aspirations flourishing in the country, as well as to bind and unite all segments of Indonesians as a nation, regardless of their religious, political, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. In short, the Pancasila serves as a common platform allowing all segments of Indonesian society to coexist and work together in building their country and in struggling to achieve their national goals and ideals.



BIBLIOGRAPHY



I. Books, Documents, Brochures and Pamphlets

‘Abd al-Rāziq, ‘Alī. *al-Islām wa Uṣul al-Hukm : Bahth fī al-Khilāfah wa al-Hukūmah fī al-Islām* 3rd ed. Cairo : Maṭba‘ah Miṣr, 1925.

Abdulgani, Roeslan. *Nationalism, Revolution, and Guided Democracy*. Melbourne : Monash University, 1973.

Abdulgani, Roeslan. *Negara dan Dasar Negara*. Jakarta : Endang, 1958.

Abdulgani, Roeslan. *Pancasila : The Prime Mover of the Indonesian Revolution*. Jakarta : Prapanca, n .d.

Abdulgani, Roeslan. *Pengembangan Pancasila di Indonesia*. Jakarta : Idayu Press, 1977.

Abdulgani, Roeslan. *Resapkan dan Amalkan Pancasila*. Jakarta : Yayasan Prapanca, 1963.

Abdullah, Taufik, and Sharon Shiddique, eds. *Islam and Society in Southeast Asia*. Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986.

Abdullah, Taufik. *Islam dan Masyarakat : Pantulan Sejarah Indonesia*. Jakarta : LP3ES, 1987.

Aboebakar, H., ed. *Sejarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar*. Jakarta : Panitia Buku Peringatan Almarhum K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957.

Agung, Ide Anak Agung Gde. *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945 - 1965*. The Hague : Mouton & Co., 1973.

Ahmad, Z. A. *Membentuk Negara Islam*. Jakarta : Wijaya, 1956.

Ahmad, Z. A. *Republik Islam Demokratis*. Tebing Tinggi, Deli : Pustaka Maju, 1957.

Alfian. *Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*. Jakarta : Leknas, 1971.

Alfian. *Muhammadiyah : The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism*. Yogyakarta : Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989.

Alfian. *Politik, Kebudayaan dan Manusia Indonesia*. Jakarta : LP3ES, 1980.

‘Alī, ‘Abdul Mu‘ṭi. "The Muhammadiyah Movement: A Bibliographical Introduction." M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1957.

Ali, Fachry, and Bachtiar Effendy. *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam*. Bandung : Mizan, 1986.

Ali, Fachry. *Islam, Pancasila dan Pergumulan Politik*. Jakarta : Pustaka Antara, 1984.

Alisjahbana, S. Takdir. *Indonesia : Social and Cultural Revolution*. Trans. by Benedict R. Anderson. Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press, 1966.

Amin, S. M. *Indonesia di Bawah Demokrasi Terpimpin*. Jakarta : Bulan Bintang, 1967.

Amin, Ahmad. *Zu'ama' al-Islāh fī al-'Asr al-Hadīth*. Cairo : Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-Miṣriyah, 1948.

Anam, Choirul. *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama*. Sala : Jatayu, 1985.

Anderson, B. R., and Ruth T. McVey. *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia*. Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971.

Anderson, Benedict Richard O'Gorman. *Java in a Time of Revolution : Occupation and Resistance, 1944 - 1946*. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1972.

Anderson, Benedict Richard O'Gorman. *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation, 1944 - 1945*. Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961.

Anshari, M. Isa, et al. *Bahaya Merah di Indonesia*. Bandung : Front Anti-Komunisme, 1955.

Anshari, Saifuddin. "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945 : A History of the Gentleman's Agreement between the Islamic and the Secular Nationalists in Modern Indonesia." M. A. thesis. McGill University, 1976.

Anwar, Khaidir. *Sejarah Pergerakan Ummat Islam Indonesia*. Bandung : IKIP Bandung, 1971.

Anwar, Yozar. *Angkatan 66 : Sebuah Catatan Harian Mahasiswa*. Jakarta : 1981.

Ardie, Tonny. *Dakwah Terpidana*. Jakarta : Yayasan Bina Mandiri. 1403/1983.

Arifin, M. T. *Muhammadiyah : Potret yang Berubah*. Surakarta : Institut Gelanggang Pemikiran Filsafat, Sosial Budaya dan Kependidikan Surakarta, 1990.

Asas Tunggal. Jakarta : Biro Informasi dan Data, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1985.

Asyari, Muhammad. "The Rise of the Masyumi Party in Indonesia and the Role of the 'Ulamā' in its Early Development (1945 - 52)." M. A. thesis. McGill University, 1976.

el-Awa, Muhammad S. *On the Political System of the Islamic State*. Indianapolis : American Trust Publications, 1978.

Aziz, M. A. *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia*. The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1955.

Bajasut, S. U. *Alam Pikiran dan Jejak Perjuangan Prawoto Mangkusasmito*. Surabaya : Documentica, 1972.

al-Banna, Hasan. *Five Tracts of Hassan al-Banna*. Trans. by Charles Wendell. Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1978.

Benda, Harry J. *The Crescent and the Rising Sun : Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942 - 1945*. The Hague : W. Van Hoeve, 1960.

Benda, Harry J., and Ruth T. McVey. *The Communist Uprising of 1926 - 1927 in Indonesia : Key Documents*. Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1960.

Benda, Harry J., et al. *Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia : Selected Documents*. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1965.

Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964.

Binder, Leonard. *Islamic Liberalism : A Critique of Development Ideologies*. Chicago : University of Chicago, 1988.

Bocquet-Siek, Margaret, and Robert Gribb. *Islam and the Pancasila*. Townsville, Australia : James Cook University of North Queensland, Centre for Southeast Asian studies, 1991.

Boland, B. J. *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*. The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.

Bonneff, Marcel, et al. *Panjasila Trente Années de Debats Politiques en Indonesia*. Paris : Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1980.

Brackman, A. C. *Communist Collapse in Indonesia*. New York : Praeger, 1969.

Brackman, A. C. *Indonesia : the Gestapu Affair*. New York : American Asian Educational Exchange, 1969.

Brackman, A. C. *Indonesian Communism : A History*. New York : Praeger, 1963.

Budiman, Arief, ed., *State and Civil Society in Indonesia*. Clayton, Victoria : Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990.

Burns, Peter. *The Decline of Freedom of Religion in Indonesia*. Townsville, Qld : James Cook University of North Queensland, 1985.

Burns, Peter. *Revelation and Revolution : Natsir and the Pancasila*. Townsville, Qld : James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981.

Carvallo, Bosco, and Dasrial, eds. *Aspirasi Umat Islam Indonesia*. Jakarta : Leppenas, 1983.

Christenson, Reo M., at al. *Ideologies and Modern Politics*. New York : Dodd, Mead & Company, 1975.

Chumaidy, A. F. "The Jam'iyyah Nahdlatul 'Ulamā' : Its Rise and Early Development (1926 - 45)." M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1976.

Crouch, Harold, and Hall Hill, eds. *Indonesia Assessment 1992 : Political Perspectives on the 1990s*. Canberra : Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1992.

Crouch, Harold. *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1988.

Dahm, Bernhard. *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century*. Trans. by P. S. Falla. New York : Praeger Publishers, 1971.

Dahm, Bernhard. *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence*. Trans. by F. Somers Heidhues. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1969.

Darmaputera, Eka. *Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society*. Leiden : E. J. Brill, 1988.

Darmodihardjo, Darji, et al. *Santiaji Pancasila*. 10th ed. Surabaya : Usaha Nasional, 1991.

Darmodiharjo, Darji. *Pancasila : Suatu Orientasi Singkat*. Jakarta : Aries Lima, 1984.

Dhofier, Zamakhsyari. *Tradisi Pesantren : Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai*. Jakarta : LP3ES, 1982.

Di Tiro, Hasan. *The Price of Freedom : The Unfinished Diary of Tengku Hasan di Tiro*. n. p. : National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra, 1984.

Djaelani, Abdul Qadir. *Azaz Tunggal Islam*. Bogor : n. p., 1403/1983.

Djaelani, Abdul Qadir. *Sikap Muslim terhadap Rancangan Undang - Undang tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan*. Bogor : Pimpinan Pusat Gerakan Pemuda Islam, 1404/1984.

Ecip, S. Sinansari, ed. *NU dalam Tantangan*. Jakarta : Al-Kautsar, 1989.

Effendi, Djohan, et al., eds. *Agama dalam Pembangunan Nasional : Himpunan Sambutan Presiden Soeharto*. Jakarta : Kuning Mas, 1984.

Effendy, Bachtiar. "The Nine Stars and Politics : A Study of the Nahdlatul Ulama's Acceptance of *Azaz Tunggal* and Its Withdrawal from Politics 1983 - 1987." M. A. thesis, Ohio University, 1988.

Emmerson, Donald K. *Indonesia's Elite : Political Culture and Cultural Politics*. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1976.

Enayat, Hamid. *Modern Islamic Political Thought*. Austin : University of Texas Press, 1982.

Faruki, Kemal A. *Islamic Constitution*. Karachi : Khokhropar Gateway Publication, 1952.

Fathoni, Chairul, et al. *NU Pasca Khittah*. Yogyakarta : MW Mandala, 1992.

Fatwa, H. A. M. *Azaz Islam Hingga Titik Darah Terakhir*. Jakarta : Panitia Pelaksana Hari-Hari Besar Islam, 1403/1983.

Federspiel, Howard M. *Muslim Intellectuals and National Development in Indonesia*. Commack : Nova Science, 1991.

Federspiel, Howard M. *Persatuan Islam : Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia*. Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1970.

Feith, Herbert, and Lance Castles, eds. *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945 - 1965*. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1977.

Feith, Herbert. *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. Ithaca : Cornell University, 1962.

Feith, Herbert. *The Indonesian Election of 1955*. Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971.

Gani, M. A. *Cita Dasar dan Pola Perjuangan Syarikat Islam*. Jakarta : Bulan Bintang, 1984.

Geertz, Clifford. *The Religion of Java*. Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1976.

Gibb, H. A. R. *Modern Trends in Islam*. New York : Octagon Books, 1981.

Goshal, Baladas. *The Role of the Military in Indonesia*. Madras : University of Madras, 1980.

Hadikusumo, Ki Bagus. *Islam sebagai Dasar Negara dan Akhlak Pemimpin*. Yogyakarta : Pusataka Rahayu, n.d.

Hakim, Sudarnoto Abdul. "The Political Journey of Islam under Indonesia's New Order, 1973 - 1987." M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1993.

Hanifah, Abu. *Tales of a Revolution*. Cremorne, Sydney : Angus and Robertson, 1972.

Harun, Lukman. *Muhammadiyah dan Asas Pancasila*. Jakarta : Pustaka Panjimas, 1986.

Harvey, Barbara S. *Permesta : Half a Rebellion*. Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press, 1977.

Harvey, Barbara S. "Tradition, Islam and Rebellion : South Sulawesi 1950 - 1965." Ph. D. diss., Cornell University, 1974.

Hassan, Muhammad Kamal. *Muslim Intellectual Response to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia*. Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982.

Hatta, Lembaga Soekarno -. *Sejarah Lahirnya Undang - Undang Dasar dan Pancasila*. 2nd ed. Jakarta : Inti Idayu Press, 1986.

Hatta, Mohammad. *Menuju Negara Hukum*. Jakarta : Idayu Press, 1980.

Hatta, Mohammad. *Pengertian Pancasila*. Jakarta : Idayu Press, 1977.

Hatta, Mohammad. *Portrait of a Patriot*. Trans. by Deliar Noer. The Hague : Mouton Publishers, 1972.

Hatta, Mohammad. *Rencana Dasar, Program dan Struktur Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia*. Bandung : Angkasa, 1967.

Hatta, Mohammad. *Sekitar Pancasila*. Jakarta : Tintamas, 1970.

Hatta, Mohammad. *Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945*. Jakarta : Tintamas, 1982.

Hazairin. *Demokrasi Pancasila*. Jakarta : Tintamas, 1970.

Hill, Hall, ed. *Indonesia's New Order : The Dynamics of Socio-economic Transformation*. Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press, 1994.

Hindley, Donald. *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951 - 1963*. Berkeley : University of California Press, 1964.

Hodgson, Marshall G. *The Venture of Islam*. Vol.2, *The Expansion of Islam in the Middle East*. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1977.

Holt, Claire, ed. *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1972.

Hughes, John. *The End of Sukarno*. London : Angus & Robertson, 1968.

Hugo, Graeme J., et al., *The Demographic Dimension in Indonesian Development*. Singapore : Oxford University Press, 1987.

Hurgronje, Christiaan Snouck. *The Achehnese*. Trans. by A. W. S. O'Sullivan. Leiden : E. J. Brill, 1906.

Ibrahim, Ahmad, et al., eds. *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*. Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985.

el-Ibrahimi, M. Nur. *Teungku Muhammad Daud Buereueh : Peranannya dalam Pergolakan di Aceh*. Jakarta : Gunung Agung, 1986.

ICMI Dalam Sorotan Pers : Desember 1990 - April 1991. Jakarta : Sekretariat Pusat Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia, 1991.

Idris, Muhammad. "Kiyai H. Ahmad Dahlan : His Life and Thought." M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1975.

Imarah, Muhammad. *al-Dīn wa al-Dawlah*. Cairo : al-Hay'ah al-Misriyah al-'Ammah li al-Kitab, 1986.

Imarah, Muhammad. *al-Islām wa Usūl al-Hukm li 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq*. 2nd ed. Beirut : al-Mu'assasah al-'Arabiyyah li al-Dirāsāt wa al-Nashr, 1988.

Indonesia, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik. *Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara* 1988. Surabaya : Indah, 1988.

Indonesia, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik. *Ketetapan - Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat tahun 1978*. Jakarta : Sekretariat MPR, 1978.

Indonesia, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik. *Ketetapan - Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat tahun 1983*. Jakarta : Departemen Penerangan RI, 1983.

Indonesia, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara Republik. *Ketetapan MPRS No. XX/1966 tentang Memorandum DPRGR mengenai Sumber Tertib Hukum dan Tata Urutan Peraturan Perundangan Republik Indonesia*.

Indonesia : *Muslims on Trial*. London : Tapol/ Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, 1987.

Indonesia, Presiden Republik. *Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 12 tahun 1968 /13 April 1968 tentang penyeragaman tata urut dan rumusan sila - sila dalam penulisan/pembacaan/pengucapan Pancasila*.

Indonesia, Presiden Republik. *Undang - Undang Republik Indonesia No. 3/1985 tentang Perubahan atas Undang - Undang No. 3/1975 tentang Partai Politik dan Golongan Karya*.

Indonesia, Presiden Republik. *Undang - Undang Republik Indonesia No. 8/1985 tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan*.

Indonesia, Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik. *Bahan Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, dan Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara*. Jakarta : Sekretariat Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik Indonesia, 1981.

Indonesia, Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik. *Bahan Referensi Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, dan Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara*. Jakarta : Sekretariat Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik Indonesia, 1981.

Indonesia, Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik. *Undang-Undang Dasar, Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, dan Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara*. Jakarta : Sekretariat Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik Indonesia, 1981.

Irsyam, Mahrus. *Ulama dan Partai Politik : Upaya Mengatasi Krisis*. Jakarta : Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984.

Islam, Pengurus Besar Himpunan Mahasiswa. *Memori Penjelasan tentang Pancasila Sebagai Asas Organisasi HMI*. Jakarta : PBHMI, 1985

Islam, Pengurus Besar Himpunan Mahasiswa. *Pandangan Kritis terhadap RUU Keormasan*. Jakarta : n.p., 1984.

- Ismail, Faisal. "The Nahdlatul Ulama : Its Early History and Religious Ideology." M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1988.
- Jainuri, Achmad. "The Muhammadiyah Movement in Twentieth Century Indonesia : A Socio-religious Study." M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1992.
- Jaylani, Timur. "The Sarekat Islam Movement : Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism," M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1959.
- Jenkins, David. *Suharto and his Generals : Indonesian Military Politics 1975 - 1983*. Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984.
- Jihan, Abu, ed. *PPP, NU dan MI : Gejolak Wadah Politik Islam*. Jakarta : Integrita Press, 1984.
- Kahin, George McTuman. *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1952.
- Kalim, Bahadur. *The Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan : Political Thought and Action*. New Delhi : Chetana Publication, 1977.
- Kanahele, George Sanford. "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia : Prelude to Independence." Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1967.
- Karim, M. Rusli, ed. *Muhammadiyah dalam Kritik dan Komentar*. Jakarta : Rajawali, 1986.
- Karim, M. Rusli. *Dinamika Islam di Indonesia : Suatu Tinjauan Sosial Politik*. Yogyakarta : Hanindita, 1985.
- Karim, M. Rusli. *Islam dan Konflik Politik Era Orde Baru*. Yogyakarta : MW Mandala, 1992.
- Karim, M. Rusli. *Nuansa Gerak Politik Era 1980-an di Indonesia*. Yogyakarta : Media Widya Mandala, 1992.
- Karim, M. Rusli. *Perjalanan Partai Politik di Indonesia : Sebuah Potret Pasang Surut*. Jakarta : Rajawali Pers, 1983.
- Kartapraja, Kamil. *Aliran Kebatinan dan Kepercayaan*. Jakarta : Yayasan Masagung, 1985.
- Kartodirjo, Sartono. *Pengantar Sejarah Indonesia Baru, 1500 - 1900*. 2nd ed. Jakarta : Gramedia, 1988.
- Kehakiman, Direktorat Jenderal Hukum dan Perundang-Undangan Departemen. *Sekitar Pembentukan Undang-Undang Perkawinan Beserta Peraturan Pelaksanaannya*. Jakarta : n. d.
- Kembali kepada Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*. Jakarta : Kementrian Penerangan, 1959.
- Kuangan, Pimpinan Masyumi Bagian. *Pedoman Perjuangan Masyumi*. Jakarta : PP Masyumi, 1955.

- Khan, Qamaruddin. *Al-Mawardi's Theory of the State*. Lahore : Bazm-i-Iqbal, n. d.
- Khan, Qamaruddin. *Political Concepts in the Qur'an*. Karachi : Institute of Islamic Studies, 1973.
- Khan, Qamaruddin. *The Political Thought of Ibn Taimiya*. Islamabad : Islamic Research Institute, 1973.
- Krissantono, ed. *Pandangan Presiden Soeharto Tentang Pancasila*. Jakarta : CSIS, 1976.
- Kuntowijoyo. *Dinamika Sejarah Umat Islam Indonesia*. Yogyakarta : Salahuddin Press, 1985.
- Kuntowijoyo. *Paradigma Islam : Interpretasi untuk Aksi*. Comp. and ed. by A. E. Priyono. Bandung : Mizan, 1991.
- Lambton, Ann K. S. *State and Government in Medieval Islam*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Lapidus, Ira M. *A History of Islamic Societies*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Lee, Oey Hong, ed. *Indonesia After the 1971 Election*. Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Legge, J. D. *Indonesia*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.
- Legge, J. D. *Sukarno : A Political Biography*. London : Allen Lane and the Penguin Press, 1972.
- Lev, Daniel S. *The Transition to Guided Democracy*. Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1966.
- Liddle, R. William, ed. *Political Participation in Indonesia*. New Haven : Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University Press, 1973.
- Lima Undang - Undang Baru di Bidang Politik serta Peraturan - Peraturan Pelaksanaan (PP. no. 35 - 36/1985). Jakarta : Ghalia Indonesia, 1985.
- Lima, Panitia. *Uraian Pancasila*. Jakarta : Mutiara, 1980.
- Ma'sum, Sjihabuddin. *Sejarah Pertumbuhan Nahdlatul Ulama*. Yogyakarta : Sumbangsih, 1968.
- Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. "Islam as the Basis of State : A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1983.
- Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan : Studi Tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante*. Jakarta : LP3ES, 1985.
- Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. "Islamic Politics under Guided Democracy in Indonesia (1959 - 1965)." M. A. thesis, Ohio University, 1980.

Madjid, Nurcholish. *Islam, Doktrin dan Peradaban : Sebuah Telaah Kritis tentang Masalah Keimanan, Kemanusiaan, dan Kemoderenan*. Jakarta : Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 1992.

Madjid, Nurcholish. *Islam, Kemoderenan dan Keindonesiaan*. Bandung : Mizan, 1987.

Malang, Laboratorium Pancasila IKIP. *Pancasila dalam Pemikiran dan Pemasarakatannya*. Malang: Panitia Pringatan Dwiwindu Laboratorium Pancasila IKIP Malang (5 Juli 1967 - 5 Juli 1983), 1983.

Mangkusasmito, Prawoto. *Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara dan Sebuah Refleksi*. Jakarta : Hudaya, 1970.

Mas'ood, Mochtar. *Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966 - 1971*. Jakarta : LP3ES, 1989.

Maududi, S. Abul A'la. *Islamic Law and Constitution*. 10th ed. Trans. by Khurshid Ahmad. Lahore : Islamic Publication (Pvt) Ltd., 1990.

May, Brian. *The Indonesian Tragedy*. London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

McVey, Ruth T, ed. *Indonesia*. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1963.

McVey, Ruth T. *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1965.

Mintaredja, Syafaat. *Islam dan Politik Islam dan Negara di Indonesia*. Jakarta : n. p., 1973.

Mitchell, Richard P. *The Society of Muslim Brothers*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1969.

Mody, Nawaz B. *Indonesia Under Suharto*. New York : Apt Book, 1987.

Moertono, Soemarsaid. *State and Statecraft in Ole Java : A Study of the later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century*. Ithaca : Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1981.

Moertopo, Ali. *Dasar - Dasar Pemikiran Akselerasi Modernisasi Pembangunan 25 Tahun*. Jakarta : Centre for Strategic and Internatinal Studies, 1973.

Moertopo, Ali. *Strategi Pembangunan Nasional*. Jakarta : CSIS, 1982.

Moertopo, Ali. *Strategi Politik Nasional*. Jakarta, CSIS, 1974.

Mudzhar, Mohamad Atho. "Fatwās of the Council of Indonesian 'Ulamā' : A Sudy of Legal Thought in Indonesia 1975 - 1988." Ph. D. diss., UCLA, 1990.

Muhammad, Abrar, ed. *ICMI dan Harapan Umat*. Jakarta : Yayasan Pendidikan Islam Ruhama, 1991.

Mukhdlor, A. Zuhdi. *NU dan Pemilu*. Yogyakarta : Gunung Jati & U, 1986.

Musa, Husaini Ishak. *The Muslim Brethren : The Greatest Modern Islamic Movement*. Beirut : Khayat's Book Cooperative, 1956.

Nagazumi, Akira. *The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism*. Tokyo : Institute of Developing Economics, 1972.

Nahdlatul Ulama Kembali ke Khittah 1926. Bandung : Risalah, 1985.

Naim, Mochtar. "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party 1952 - 1955 : An Inquiry into the Origin of its Electoral Success." M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1960.

Nainggolan, Z. S. *Pandangan Cendekiawan Muslim Terhadap P 4*. Jakarta : Gema Isra Utama, 1990.

Nakamura, Mitsuo. *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree : A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in Central Java*. Yogyakarta : Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983.

Nasution, A. H. *Demokrasi Pancasila di Masa Sekarang dan di Masa Depan*. Malang : Lapasila IKIP Malang, 1971.

Nasution, A. H. *Sejarah Kembali ke UUD 45*. Jakarta : n. p., 1976.

Nasution, Adnan Buyung. *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia : A Socio-legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956 - 1959*. Jakarta : Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992.

Nasution, Harun. "The Islamic State in Indonesia : the Rise of the Ideology, the Movement for its Creation and the Theory of the Masyumi." M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1968.

Nasution, Yunan. *Islam dan Problema - Problema Kemasyarakatan*. Jakarta : Bulan Bintang, 1988.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Capita Selecta*. Vol. 2. Jakarta : Pustaka Pendis, 1957.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Islam sebagai Dasar Negara*. Bandung : Fraksi Masyumi dalam Konstituante, 1957.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Islam sebagai Ideologie*. Jakarta : Pustaka Aida, 1951.

Natsir, Mohammad. *Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs*. Ithaca : Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, 1954.

Natsir, Mohammad. *The Role of Islam in the Promotion of National Resilience*. Jakarta : The Organizing Committee of the Diplomatic Club, 1976.

Nishihara, Masashi. *Golkar and the Indonesian Election of 1971*. Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1972.

Noeh, Zaini Ahmad and Abdul Basit Adnan. *Sejarah Singkat Pengadilan Agama di Indonesia*. Surabaya : Bina Ilmu, 1983.

Noer, Deliar. *Administration of Islam in Indonesia*. Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1978.

Noer, Deliar. *Islam dan Pemikiran Politik : Bahasan Kitab "Islam dan Tata Negara" oleh H. Munawir Sjadzali*. Jakarta : LIPPM, 1990.

Noer, Deliar. *Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal*. Jakarta : Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984.

Noer, Deliar. "Masyumi : Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia." M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1960.

Noer, Deliar. *Mohammad Hatta : Biografi Politik*. Jakarta : LP3ES, 1990.

Noer, Deliar. *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945 - 1965*. Jakarta : Grafitipers, 1987.

Noer, Deliar. *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900 - 1942*. Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press, 1973.

Notonagoro. *Beberapa Hal Mengenai Falsafah Pancasila*. Jakarta : CV. Rajawali, 1982.

Notonagoro. *Pancasila : Dasar Falsafah Negara*. 7th ed. Jakarta : PT Bina Aksara, 1988.

Notonagoro. *Pancasila Secara Ilmiah*. Jakarta : Pancuran Tujuh, 1971.

Notosusanto, Nugroho, and Ismail Saleh. *The Coup Attempt of 30 September Movement in Indonesia*. Jakarta : Pembimbing Masa, 1968.

Notosusanto, Nugroho. *Naskah Proklamasi yang Otentik dan Rumusan Pancasila yang Otentik*. Jakarta : Pusat Sejarah ABRI Departemen Hankam, 1971.

Notosusanto, Nugroho. *Proses Perumusan Pancasila Dasar Negara*. Jakarta : Balai Pustaka, 1981.

Notosusanto, Nugroho. *The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces Especially Since 1966*. Jakarta : Department of Defence and Security, Centre for Armed Forces History, 1970.

Oesman, Oetojo, and Alfian, eds. *Pancasila sebagai Ideologi*. Jakarta : BP-7 Pusat, 1991.

P 4 : *the Guide to the Living and the Practice of Pancasila and GBHN (the Broad Outlines of the State Policies)*. Jakarta : Yayasan Proklamasi, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1978.

P 4, Team Kerja Penyusunan Jawaban terhadap Pertanyaan-Pertanyaan yang Sifatnya Prinsipil dan atau Berulang pada Setiap Angkatan Penataran. *Buku Himpunan Tanya Jawab P-4, UUD 1945 dan GBHN*. Yogyakarta : Lukman offset, 1983.

Pak Harto, Tim Penyusunan dan Penerbitan Buku Perjalanan Ibadah Haji, ed. *Perjalanan Ibadah Haji Pak Harto*. Jakarta : Departemen Agama RI, 1993.

Peacock, James L. *Purifying the Faith : The Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesia*. California : The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, 1978.

Pedoman Pelaksanaan P-4 Bagi Umat Islam. Jakarta : Proyek Bimbingan Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila bagi Umat Beragama, Departemen Agama RI, 1982.

Pembangunan, DPP Partai Persatuan. *Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga PPP Tahun 1973*. Jakarta : Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1973.

Pembangunan, DPP Partai Persatuan. *Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga PPP Tahun 1977*. Jakarta : Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1977.

Pembangunan, DPP Partai Persatuan. *Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga PPP Tahun 1984*. Jakarta : Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1984.

Pembangunan, DPP Partai Persatuan. *Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga PPP Tahun 1987*. Jakarta : Sekretariat DPP PPP, 1987.

Pendidikan Agama dan Kaitannya dengan Libur Sekolah Bulan Puasa. Jakarta : Mercu Baru, n. d.

Penerapan Pancasila dalam Demokrasi di Indonesia. Comp. by BP 7. Jakarta : n. d.

Penetapan Pancasila Sebagai Asas Organisasi. Keputusan Sidang Majelis Pekerja Kongres (MPK) ke II Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) Nomor : 1/KPTS - 2/07/1405 tanggal 12 Rajab 1405/4 April 1985.

Perwiranegara, Alamsjah Ratu. *Islam dan Pembangunan Politik di Indonesia*. Jakarta : Masagung, 1987.

Perwiranegara, Alamsjah Ratu. *Pembinaan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia*. Ed. by Hafizh Dasuki. Jakarta : Departemen Agama RI, 1981.

Piagam Jakarta Menjiwai Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Jakarta : Departemen Agama RI, 1963.

Pinardi. *Peristiwa Coup Berdarah PKI September 1948 di Madiun*. Jakarta : Inkopak - Hazera, 1967.

Pinardi. *Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo*. Jakarta : Aryaguna, 1964.

Poesponegoro, Marwati Djoened, and Nugroho Notosusanto, eds. *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*. 6 vols. Jakarta : Balai Pustaka, 1984.

Pospielovsky, Dimitry V. *A History of Marxist Leninist Atheism and Soviet Anti - Religious Policies*. London : Macmillan Press, 1987.

Pospielovsky, Dimitry V. *Soviet Anti Religious Campaign and Persecutions*. New York : St. Martin Press, 1988.

Powell, David E. *Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union : A Study of Mass Persecutions*. Massachusetts : The MIT Press, 1975.

- Pranarka, A. M. W. *Sejarah Pemikiran Tentang Pancasila*. Jakarta : CSIS, 1985.
- Pratigny, Imam. *Ungkapan Sejarah Lahirnya Golkar*. Jakarta : Yayasan Bhakti, 1984.
- Prawiranegara, Sjafruddin. *Perihal Pancasila sebagai Azas Tunggal*. Jakarta : Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, 1983.
- Pringgogidgo, A. K. *Sejarah Pergerakan Rakyat Indonesia*. Jakarta : Dian Rakyat, 1967.
- Pringgogidgo, A. K. *Tiga Undang - Undang Dasar*. Jakarta : PT Pembangunan, 1981.
- Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia*. Jakarta : Ministry of Information, 1950.
- Puar, Yusuf Abdullah, ed. *Mohammad Natsir 70 Tahun : Kenangan dan Perjuangan*. Jakarta : Pustaka Antara, 1978.
- Puar, Yusuf Abdullah. *Perjuangan dan Pengabdian Muhammadiyah*. Jakarta : Pustaka Rakyat, 1989.
- Purdy, Susan Selden. "Legitimation of Power and Authority in a Pluralistic State : Pancasila and Civil Religion in Indonesia." Ph. D. diss., Columbia University, 1984.
- Radi, Umaid. *Strategi PPP 1973 - 1982 : Studi tentang Kekuatan Politik Islam Tingkat Nasional*. Jakarta : Integrita Pers, 1984.
- Rais, Amien. *Cakrawala Islam : Antara Cita dan Fakta*. Bandung : Mizan, 1989.
- Ramage, Douglas Edward. "Ideological Discourse in the Indonesian New Order : State Ideology and Beliefs of an Elite, 1985 - 1993." Ph. D. diss., University of South Carolina, 1993.
- al-Rayis, Muhammad Diyā al-Din. *al-Islām wa al-Khilāfah fī 'Asr al-Ḥadīth : Naqd Kitāb al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm*. Jeddah : 1973.
- Reeve, David. *Golkar of Indonesia : An Alternative to the Party System*. Singapore : Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Reid, Anthony. *The Indonesian National Revolution 1945 - 1950*. Hawthorn, Victoria : Longman, 1974.
- Ricklefs, M. C. *A History of Modern Indonesia ca 1300 to the Present*. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1981.
- Risalah Perundingan*. Comp. by Konstituante Republik Indonesia. Vols. I, II, and VII. Bandung : Masa Baru, 1958.
- Roeder, O. G. *The Smiling General : President Suharto of Indonesia*. Jakarta : Gunung Agung, 1970.

Roeder, O. G., and Mahidin Mahmud. *Who's Who in Indonesia*. Singapore : Gunung Agung, 1980.

Roem, Mohamad. *Tinjauan Pemilihan Umum I & II dari sudut Hukum*. Surabaya : Documenta, 1971.

Roem, Mohamad. *Bunga Rampai dari Sejarah*. Jakarta : Bulan Bintang, 1972.

Roem, Mohamad. *Saya Menerima Pancasila Karena Saya Orang Islam*. Jakarta : Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, n.d.

Roem, Mohamad. *Tiga Peristiwa Bersejarah*. Jakarta : Sinar Hudaya, 1972.

Rose, Mavis. *Indonesia Free : A Political biography of Mohammad Hatta*. Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1987.

Saidi, Ridwan. *Kepemimpinan Islam Indonesia Kini dan Esok*. Jakarta : Antar Kota, 1986.

Saidi, Ridwan. *Pemuda Islam dalam Dinamika Politik Bangsa*. Jakarta : Rajawali Press, 1984.

Salam, Junus. *Riwayat Hidup K. H. A. Dahlan : Amal dan Perjuangannya*. Jakarta : Depot Pengajaran Muhammadiyah, 1968.

Salam, Solichin. *Bung Karno : Putra Fajar*. Jakarta : Gunung Agung, 1982.

Salim, Haji A., and Mohamad Roem. *Ketuhanan Y. M. E. & Lahirnya Pancasila*. Jakarta : Bulan Bintang, 1977.

Sastroamidjojo, Ali. *Milestones on my Journey*. Trans. by C. L. M. Penders. Queensland : University of Queensland Press, 1979.

Schiller, James N. "Development Ideology in New Order Indonesia : The Suharto Regime and its Crisis." M. A. thesis, Ohio University, 1975.

Schwarz, Adam. *A Nation in Waiting : Indonesia in the 1990s*. Boulder : Westview Press, 1994.

Sekitar Tanggal dan Penggalinya. Jakarta : Yayasan Idayu, 1981.

Seminar Angkatan Darat ke II. *Sumbangan Pikiran TNI - AD Kepada Kabinet Ampera*. Bandung : 1966.

Shakir, M. H. *Holy Qur'an*. New York : Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an, Inc., 1986.

Shiddiqi, Nourouzzaman. "The Role of the 'Ulamā' during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia (1942 - 45)." M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1975.

Siddiq, Achmad, and Fakhruddin. *Leksikon Islam*. Jakarta : Pustazet Perkasa, 1988.

Siddiq, K. H. Ahmad. *Islam, Pancasila dan Ukhuwah Islamiyah*. Jakarta : Lajnah Ta'lif wan Nasyr PBNU, 1985.

Sidjabat, Walter Bonar. *Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith : A Study Concerning the Concept of Divine Omnipotence in the Indonesian Constitution in the Light of Islam and Christianity*. Jakarta : Badan Penerbit Kresten Gunung Mulia, 1982.

Silalahi, Harry Tjan. *Konsensus Politik Nasional Orde Baru : Ortodoksi dan Aktualisasinya*. Jakarta : CSIS, 1990.

Simorangkir, JTC, and B. Mang Reng Say. *Konstitusi dan Konstituante Indonesia*. Jakarta : Surungan, n. d.

Siswoyo, P. Bambang. *Sekitar Petisi 50*. Solo : Mayasari, 1983.

Sitompul, Agussalim. *Citra HMI*. Yogyakarta : Sumbangsih Offcet, 1986.

Sitompul, Agussalim. *HMI dalam Pandangan Seorang Pendeta*. 2nd ed. Jakarta : Gunung Agung, 1984.

Sitompul, Agussalim. *Pemikiran HMI dan Relevansinya dengan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa Indonesia*. Jakarta : Integrita Dinamika Press, 1986.

Sitompul, Agussalim. *Sejarah Perjuangan HMI 1947 - 1975*. Surabaya : Bina Ilmu, 1976.

Sitompul, Einar Martahan. *NU dan Pancasila*. Jakarta : Pusataka Sinar Harapan, 1989.

Sjadzali, H. Munawir. *Asas Pancasila, Aspirasi Umat Islam dan Masa Depan Bangsa*. Jakarta : Harian Pelita, 1986.

Sjadzali, H. Munawir. *Aspirasi Umat Islam Terpenuhi Tanpa Partai Islam*. Jakarta : Departemen Agama RI, 1992.

Sjadzali, H. Munawir. *Islam dan Tata Negara*. Jakarta : UI Press, 1990.

Sjadzali, H. Munawir. *Muslims' Interests are Better Served in the Absence of Muslim Parties*. Jakarta : Departemen Agama RI, 1992.

Soeharto. *Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya*. Jakarta : PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989.

Soeharto. *My Thoughts, Words and Deeds*. Jakarta : PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989.

Soekarno. *Bung Karno dan Islam : Kumpulan Pidato tentang Islam 1953 - 1966*. Comp. by CV Haji Masagung in cooperation with Yayasan Pendidikan Soekarno. Jakarta : CV Haji Masagung, 1990.

Soekarno. *Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi I - II*. Jakarta : Panitia Penerbitan Buku di Bawah Bendera Revolusi, 1963 - 1964.

Soekarno. *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism*. Trans. by Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon. Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1984.



- Soekarno. *Negara Nasional dan Cita - Cita Islam*. Jakarta : P P Endang, 1954.
- Soekarno. *Pancasila Sebagai Dasar Negara*. Jakarta : Inti Idayu Press - Yayasan Pendidikan Soekarno, 1986.
- Soekarno. *Piagam Jakarta Mewajibkan Syari'at Islam bagi Pemeluk - Pemeluknya*. Jakarta : Departemen Agama, 1964.
- Soekarno. *The Birth of Pancasila : An Outline of the Five Principles of the Indonesian State*. Jakarta : Ministry of Information, 1958.
- Soekarno. *Sukarno : an Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams*. New York : The Bobbs - Merrill Company, Inc., 1965.
- Soemarsono, Sumarso, ed. *Mohamad Roem 70 tahun : Pejuang - Perunding*. Jakarta : Bulan Bintang, 1978.
- Solichin, Salam. *Bung Karno Dalam Kenangan*. Jakarta : Pustaka, 1981.
- Statistik Indonesia*. Jakarta : Biro Pusat Statistik, 1975.
- Steinberg, David Joel, ed. *In Search of Southeast Asia : A Modern History*. Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press, 1986.
- Sujarwanto et al., eds. *Muhammadiyah dan Tantangan Masa Depan*. Yogyakarta : Tiara Wacana, 1990.
- Suminto, H. Aqib. *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda*. Jakarta : LP3ES, 1985.
- Sun Yat-Sen. *San Min Chu I : Tiga Asas Pokok Rakyat*. Trans. by Anizar Ibrahim. Jakarta : Balai Pustaka, 1961.
- Sunni, Ismail. *Mencari Keadilan : Sebuah Otobiografi*. Jakarta : Ghalia Indonesia, 1982.
- Sunny, Ismail. *Mekanisme Demokrasi Pancasila*. Jakarta : Aksara Baru, 1978.
- Sunoto. *Mengenai Filsafat Pancasila*. 4 vols. Yogyakarta : PT Hanindita, 1983.
- Suryadinata, Leo, and Sharon Shiddiqi, eds. *Trends in Indonesia II*. Singapore : Singapore University Press, 1981.
- Suryadinata, Leo. *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture : A Study of Indonesia's Golkar*. Athens : Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989.
- Suryadinata, Leo. *Political Parties and the 1982 General Election in Indonesia*. Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982.
- Suryohadiprojo, Sayidiman. *Pancasila, Islam dan ABRI*. Jakarta : Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992.
- Swift, Ann. *The Road to Madiun : The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948*. Ithaca : Cornell Modern Project, 1989.

Syamsuddin, M. Din. *Muhammadiyah Kini & Esok*. Jakarta : Pustaka Panjimas, 1990.

Syamsuddin, M. Sirajuddin. "Religion and Politics in Islam : The Case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order." Ph. D. diss., UCLA, 1991.

Syamsuddin, Nazaruddin. *The Republican Revolt : A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion*. Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985.

Tanja, Victor. *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam : Sejarah dan Kedudukannya di Tengah-Tengah Gerakan Muslim Pembaharu di Indonesia*. Jakarta : Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1991.

Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante. 3 vols. Bandung : Konstituante Republik Indonesia, 1958.

Titaley, John A. "A Sociohistorical Analysis of the Pancasila as Indonesia's State Ideology in the Light of the Royal Ideology in the Davidic State (Islam)." Ph. D. diss., Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, 1991.

Tjokroaminoto, H. O. S. *Tafsir Program-Asas dan Program-Tandhim Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia*. Jakarta : Lajna-Tanfidihiya, 1958.

Truna, Dody S. "Islam and Politics under the "New Order" Government in Indonesia." M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1992.

Umum, Lembaga Pemilihan. *Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Tahun 1971*. Jakarta : n. p., 1971.

Umum, Panitia Pemilihan. *Penetapan Anggota DPR Tahun 1982 : Daftar Perhitungan Pembangian Jumlah Wakil untuk Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*. Jakarta : n.p., 1982.

Van der Kroef, Justus M. *Indonesia since Sukarno*. Singapore : Asia Pacific Press, 1971.

Van der Kroef, Justus M. *The Communist Party of Indonesia*. Vancouver, B. C. : University of British Columbia Press, 1966.

Van Dijk, C. *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam : The Darul Islam in Indonesia*. The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.

Van Niel, Robert. *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite*. The Hague and Bandung : W. van Hoeve, 1960.

Van Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. O. *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*. The Hague : W. van Hoeve, 1958.

Vatikiotis, Michael R. J. *Indonesian Politics under Soeharto : Order, Development and Pressure for Change*. New York : Routledge, 1994.

Wahid, Abdurrahman. "Islam and Pancasila : Development of a Religious Political Doctrine in Indonesia." Paper presented at the Assembly of the World's Religions in Seoul on 25 August 1990.

Wahid, Abdurrahman. *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan*. Jakarta : Leppenas, 1981.

Walujo, Imam, et al., eds. *Dialog Indonesia Kini dan Esok II*. Jakarta : Leppenas, 1981.

Ward, K. E. *The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia*. Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1970.

Ward, Kenneth E. *The 1971 Election in Indonesia : An East Java Case Study*. Victoria : Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1974.

Weatberbee, Donald E. *Ideology in Indonesia : Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution*. Detroit : Southeast Asian Studies, 1966.

Wertheim, W. F. *Indonesian Society in Transition*. The Hague : W. van Hoeve, 1969.

Williams, Michael C. *Sickle and Crescent : The Communist Revolt of 1926 in Banten*. Ithaca : Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1982

Yamin, Muhammad, ed. *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*. 3 vols. Jakarta : Yayasan Prapanca, 1959/1960.

Yamin, Muhammad. *Konstitusi Indonesia dalam Gelanggang Demokrasi*. Jakarta : Jambatan, 1956.

Yamin, Muhammad. *Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia*. Jakarta : Yayasan Prapanca, n. d.

Yamin, Muhammad. *Proklamasi dan Konstitusi Republik Indonesia*. Jakarta : Jambatan, 1952.

Yamin, Muhammad. *Sistematika Filsafah Pancasila*. Jakarta : Yayasan Prapanca, 1958.

Yatim, Badri. *Soekarno, Islam dan Nasionalisme*. Jakarta : Inti Sarana Aksara, 1985.

Yusuf, Slamet Effendy, et al. *Dinamika Kaum Santri : Menelusuri Jejak dan Pergolakan Internal NU*. Jakarta : CV Rajawali, 1983.

Zuhri, Saifuddin. *Kyai Haji Abdulwahab Chasbullah : Bapak dan Pendiri Nahdlatul Ulama*. Yogyakarta : Sumbangsih, 1983.

Zuhri, Saifuddin. *Sejarah Kebangkitan Islam dan Perkembangannya di Indonesia*. Bandung : PT Al-Ma'arif, 1979.

II. Articles

Abdullah, Taufik. "Tanpa Islam, Tidak Ada Indonesia." *Media Dakwah*, no. 241 (July 1994), 53 - 56.

Alfian. "Suharto and the Question of Political Stability." *Pacific Community*, vol. 2, no. 3 (April 1971), 536 - 548.

- Ali, Fachry and Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima. "Merosotnya Aliran Dalam Partai Persatuan Pembangunan." In *Analisa Kekuatan Politik di Indonesia : Pilihan Artikel Prisma*. With a foreword by Farchan Bulkin. Jakarta : LP3ES, 1988, 226 - 261.
- Ambong, Ibrahim. "Relationship between the Indonesian Armed Forces and Golkar." *Indonesian Quarterly*, vol. 18, no. 3 (1990), 225 - 243.
- Anwar, Rosihan. "Islam and Politics in Indonesia." In Robert O. Tillman, ed., *Man, State, and Society*. New York : Praeger, 1969, 115 - 131.
- "Apa dan Siapa ICMI." *Suara Masjid*, no. 199 (April 1991), 16 - 17.
- Arndt, A. W. "Development of Equality : The Indonesian Case." *World Development*, no. 3 (1975), 77 - 90.
- Awanohara, Susumu. "A First Warning Shot." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 125, no. 39 (September 27, 1984), 14 - 15.
- Awanohara, Susumu. "A Change in the Law?." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 117, no. 35 (August 27, 1982), 20 - 21.
- Awanohara, Susumu. "Islam on the Hustings." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 116, no. 17 (April 23, 1982), 24 - 29.
- Bachtiar, Harsya W. "The Religion of Java : A Commentary." In Ahmad Ibrahim et al., eds., *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*. Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 1985, 279 - 285.
- Bakri, Asafri Jaya. "Partai Persatuan Pembangunan : Pergumulan Identitas Dalam Kancan Orde Baru." *Pesantren*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1991), 10 - 21.
- Basri, Agus, et al. "Pasang Surut Hubungan Islam - Beringin." *Tempo*, September 21, 1991, 23 - 24.
- Benda, Harry J. "Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942 - 1945." *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1955), 350 - 362.
- Bunell, Frederick P. "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy 1960 - 1965 : President Sukarno Moves from Non-Alignment to Confrontation." *Indonesia*, no. 2 (October 1966), 37 - 76.
- Crouch, Harold. "The Army, the Parties and Elections in Indonesia." *Indonesia*, no. 11 (April 1971), 177 - 191.
- Dhakidae, Daniel. "Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia : Saksi Pasang Naik dan Surut Partai Politik." *Prisma*, no. 9 (September 1981), 17 - 40.
- Dhofir, Zamakhsyari. "Santri - Abangan dalam Kehidupan Orang Jawa : Teropong dari Pesantren." In *Agama dan Tantangan Zaman : Pilihan Artikel Prisma 1975 - 1984*. Seri II. Jakarta : LP3ES, 1985, 179 - 194.
- Emmerson, Donald K. "Indonesia's Gains are Islam's, Too." *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1993.

Emmerson, Donald K. "Islam in Modern Indonesia : Political Impass, Cultural Opportunity." In Philip H. Stoddard et al., eds. *Change and the Muslim World*. Syracuse : Syracuse University Press, 1981, 159 - 168.

Federspiel, Howard M. "The Military and Islam in Soekarno's Indonesia." In Ahmad Ibrahim et al., eds., *Reading on Islam in Southeast Asia*. Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985, 151 - 158.

Federspiel, Howard M. "The Muhammadiyah : A Study of an Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia." *Indonesia*, no. 10 (October 1970), 57 - 79.

Feith, Herbert. "President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists : Triangle Changes Shape." *Asian Survey*, vol. 4, no. 8 (1964), 969 - 980.

Feith, Herbert. "Suharto's Search for a Political Format." *Indonesia*, no. 8 (October 1968), 88 - 105.

Gaffar, Afan. "Golkar dan ABRI : Loro-Loro Ing Atunggal." *Ummat*, vol. 1. no. 1 (July 10, 1995), 70 - 71.

Gaffar, Afan. "Islam dan Politik dalam Era Orde Baru : Mencari Bentuk Artikulasi yang Tepat." *Ulumul Qur'an*, vol. 4, no. 2 (1993), 18 - 25.

Geertz, Clifford. "Modernization in a Moslem Society : The Indonesian Case." *Quest*, no. 39 (Autumn 1963), 9 - 17.

Haris, Syamsuddin. "Aspek Agama dalam Perilaku Politik NU." *Pesantren*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1991), 26 - 41.

Haris, Syamsuddin. "Nahdlatul Ulama and Politics : A Search for Identity." *Indonesian Quarterly*, vol. 18, no. 3 (1990), 209 - 222.

Haris, Syamsuddin. "PPP and Politics under the New Order." *Prisma*, no. 49 (June 1990), 31 - 51.

Hatta, Mohammad. "Demokrasi Kita." *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 22 (May 1, 1960), 3 - 8.

Hefner, Robert W. "Islam, State, and Civil Society : ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class." *Indonesia*, no. 56 (October 1993), 1 - 35.

Hindley, Donald. "Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order." *Indonesia*, no. 9 (April 1970), 23 - 66.

Inside Story on Official Manipulation : Splits in Islamic University Students Organization (HMI). *Indonesia Reports*, no. 36 (November 1988), 8 - 17.

Ismail, Faisal. "Traditionalist Muslims and Modernist Muslims in Indonesia : Past and Present." *Al - Jami'ah*, no. 51 (1993), 34 - 50.

Jenkins, David. "Marching with Golkar." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 108, no. 27 (June 27, 1980), 24 - 27.

Jenkins, David. "Pancasila Belongs to Everyone." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 108, no. 23 (May 30, 1980), 23 - 24.

Jenkins, David. "The Aging of the New Order." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 108, no. 27 (June 27, 1980), 22 - 24.

Jenkins, David. "The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking : The Concept of Dwi fungsi." *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1983), 15 - 30.

Jihan, Abu. "Undang - Undang Keormasan." *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 470 (June 11, 1985), 13.

Johns, Anthony H. "Indonesia : Islam and Cultural Pluralism." In John L. Esposito, ed., *Islam in Asia : Religion, Politics, and Society*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1987, 202 - 229.

Jones, Sidney. "The Contraction and Expansion of the *Ummat* and the Role of the Nahdlatul Ulama." *Indonesia*, no. 38 (October 1984), 1 - 20.

Karim, M. Rusli. "PPP di Tengah Arus Rekayasa Politik Orba." *Media Dakwah*, no. 242 (August 1994), 52 - 54.

Kaye, Lincoln. "To the Same Drummer : A Modernist Islamic Group Conforms to Government Legislation." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 130, no. 51 (December 26, 1985), 34 - 35.

"Keeping Faith with Islam." *Asiaweek*, vol. 12, no. 3 (January 19, 1986), 14 - 16.

Kuntowijoyo. "Kiblat Baru Politik Kaum Santri." *Pesan*, no. 1 (1992), 23 - 24.

Lev, Daniel S. "Political Parties in Indonesia." *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, vol. 8, no. 1 (March 1967), 52 - 67.

Liddle, R. William. "Indonesia 1976 : Challenges to Suharto's Authority." *Asian Survey*, vol. 17, no. 2 (February 1977), 95 - 106.

Liddle, R. William. "Indonesia 1977 : The New Order's Second Parliamentary Election." *Asian Survey*, vol. 18, no. 2 (February 1978), 175 - 185.

Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. "Dr. H. C. untuk Natsir, Mengapa Digagalkan?" *Media Dakwah*, no. 243 (September 1994), 71.

Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. "Islam di Masa Demokrasi Liberal dan Demokrasi Terpimpin." *Prisma*, no. 5 (1988), 24 - 36.

MacDougal, John A. "Patterns of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Bureaucracy." *Indonesia*, no. 33 (April 1982), 89 - 121.

Madjid, Nurcholish. "Islam in Indonesia : Challenges and Opportunities." *Mizan*, no. 3 (1984), 71 - 85.

Madjid, Nurcholish. "Islamic Roots of Modern Pluralism : Indonesian Experiences." *Studia Islamika*, vol. 1, no. 1 (April - June 1994), 55 - 77.

"MAWI, PGI dan Asas Tunggal." *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 469 (June 1, 1985), 1.

Morfit, Michael. "Pancasila : The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government." *Asian Survey*, vol. 21, no. 8 (August 1981), 833 - 851.

Muzadi, A. Muchith. "NU Berasas Pancasila : Wawancara Imajiner dengan al-Maghfurlah K. H. Achmad Shiddiq." *Aula*, no. 5 (Mei 1991), 29 - 37.

Nakamura, Mitsuo. "The Radical Transformation of the Nahdatul Ulama in Indonesia : A Personal Account of the 26th National Congress, June 1979, Semarang." *Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 19, no. 2 (September 1981), 187 - 204.

Natsir, M. "Pengorbanan Umat Islam Sangat Besar." *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 542 (June 11, 1987), 26 - 29.

Natsir, Mohammad. "Apakah Pancasila Bertentangan dengan Ajaran Al-Qur'an?" In *his Capita Selecta*, vol. 2. Jakarta : Pustaka Pendis, 1957, 144 - 150.

Noer, Deliar. "Contemporary Political Dimensions of Islam." In M. B. Hooker, ed., *Islam in Southeast Asia*. Leiden : E. J. Brill, 1983, 183 - 215.

Noer, Deliar. "Islam as a Political Force in Indonesia." *Mizan*, no. 3 (1984), 32 - 47.

Noer, Deliar. "Islam dan Politik : Mayoritas atau Minoritas." *Prisma*, no. 5 (1988), 3 - 21.

Oesman, Oetojo. "Upaya Perluasan Pemasyarakatan P-4 untuk Menunjang Proses Tinggal Landas." *Mimbar BP-7*, vol. 8, no. 43 (1990), 5 - 11.

"Pancasila dan Konsensus 1968." *Tempo*, June 14, 1980, 8 - 10.

Perwiranegara, H. Alamsjah Ratu. "Prospek Pembangunan Umat Islam di Indonesia." *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 817 (February 1, 1995), 12 - 13.

"PII and GPM Banned by Government for not Complying with Social Organizations Law." *Indonesia Reports*, no. 30 (May 1988), 27.

PP Muhammadiyah. "Muhammadiyah 70 tahun : Dasar Dorong Berdirinya." *Suara Muhammadiyah*, no. 20 (Oktober 11, 1980), 3 and 29 - 31.

Pranowo, M. Bambang. "Islam dan Pancasila : Dinamika Politik Islam di Indonesia." *Ulumul Qur'an*, vol. 3, no. 1 (1992), 4 - 14.

Prawiranegara, Sjafruddin. "Pancasila as the Sole Foundation." Trans. by the editors. *Indonesia*, no. 38 (1984), 74 - 83.

Rahman, Fazlur. "A Recent Controversy over the Interpretation of Shūrā." *History of Religion : An International Journal for Comparative Historical Studies*, vol. 20, no. 4 (June 1981), 291 - 301.

Rahman, Fazlur. "The Islamic Concept of State." In John J. Donohoe and John L. Esposito, eds., *Islam in Transition : Muslim Perspectives*. New York : Oxford University Press, 1982, 261 - 271.

Rais, Amien. "Islam Sebagai Perekat." *Media Dakwah*, no. 241 (July 1994), 56 - 57.

Rais, Amien. "Suksesi 1998 : Suatu Keharusan." *Media Dakwah*, no. 237 (March 1994), 33 - 40.

Rais, Amien. "Suksesi itu Sunnatullah." *Suara Masjid*, no. 233 (February 1994), 17 - 18.

Rodgers, Peter. "Indonesia's Faithful Flex their Political Muscle." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 110, no. 49 (November 28, 1980), 37 - 39.

Roem, Mohamad. "Syari'at Islam, Pancasila dan Pembangunan." *As-Siyasah*, vol. 1, no. 3 (May 1973), 6 - 16.

Roem, Mohamad. "Tidak Ada Negara Islam." *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 386 (February 11, 1983), 30 - 32.

Said, Salim. "The Political Role of the Indonesian Military : Past, Present and Future." *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, vol. 5, no. 1 (1987), 16 - 34.

Saimima, Iqbal Abdurrauf. "Asas Lain, Sebab Kebringasan." *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 370 (September 1, 1982), 18 - 20.

Saimima, Uf. "RUUK, Setuju di Bulan Suci." *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 470 (June 11, 1985), 14 - 19.

Samson, Allan A. "Islam in Indonesian Politics." *Asian Survey*, vol. 8, no. 12 (December 1968), 1001 - 1017.

Samson, Allan A. "Army and Islam in Indonesia," *Pasific Affairs*, vol. 19, no. 4 (Winter 1971 - 72), 545 - 565.

Samson, Allan A. "Indonesian Islam since the New Order." In K. D. Jackson and L. W. Pye, eds., *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*. Berkeley : University of California Press, 1978, 196 - 226.

Sjadzali, H. Munawir. "Penerimaan Pancasila Tidak Mengurangi Keutuhan Aqidah." *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 512 (August 11, 1986), 30 - 33.

Sjahrir, Abdullah. "UUD 45 dan Kewajiban Melaksanakan Syari'at Islam bagi Pemeluknya," *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 62 (August 1970), 20 - 21.

Soedibyo. "Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia : Prospect of the 1990s." *Indonesian Quarterly*, vol. 18, no. 3 (1990), 223 - 234.

Soedjatmoko. "Indonesian Problems and Opportunities." *Australian Outlook*, vol. 21, no. 3 (December 1967), 263 - 286.

Soedjatmoko. "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia." In Philip W. Thayer, ed., *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia*. Baltimore : The John Hopkins Press, 1956, 128 - 129.

Soemitro. "Budaya Politik Dalam Perkembangan Demokrasi di Indonesia." *Suara Masjid*, no. 238 (July 1994), 33 - 40.

Soenario. "Pancasila Harus Dilihat Secara Modern, Bukan Zaman Majapahit." *Panji Masyarakat*, no. 542 (June 11, 1987), 29 - 31.

Soeprapto. "Pancasila Ideologi Bangsa Indonesia." *Mimbar BP-7*, vol. 8, no. 43 (1990), 12 - 19.

Tamara, Nasir. "Islam under the New Order : A Political History." *Prisma*, no. 49 (June 1990), 6 - 30.

Vatikiotis, Michael. "Faith in Teaching : Muslims Say New Education Law is too Secular." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 30, no. 141 (July 28, 1988), 25.

Vatikiotis, Michael. "Suharto Courts Islamic Intellectuals : The Muslim Ticket." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 150, no. 51 (December 20, 1990), 10.

Wahid, Abdurrahman. "Kata Pengantar." In Einar Martahan Sitompul, *NU dan Pancasila*. Jakarta : Sinar Harapan, 1989, 9 - 18.

Watson, C. W. "P 4 : The Resurrection of a National Ideology in Indonesia." In his *State and Society in Indonesia : Three Papers*. Canterbury : Centre of South-East Asian Studies, University of Kent, September 1987, 17 - 49.

Weatherbee, Donald E. "Indonesia 1984 : Pancasila, Politics and Power." *Asian Survey*, vol. 25, no. 2 (February 1985), 187 - 197.

III. Journals, Priodicals, Magazines and Newspapers

Abadi, March 4, 1957.

Al-Jami'ah, nos. 41 (1990); 5 (1993).

Amanah, nos. 8 (July 28, 1989); 219 (December 16, 1994); 221 (January 20, 1995).

Arabia : The Islamic World Review, no. 7 (March 1982/Jamadi al-Awwal 1402).

Aula, nos. 8 (September 1990); 1 (January 1993); 3 (March 1993); 3 (March 1994); 4 (April 1994); 6 (June 1994); 7 (July 1994). 10 (October 1994); 11 (November 1994); 1 (January 1995).

Hidup, no. 7 (February 1989).

Indonesia Report - Culture & Society Supplement, no. 13 (1985).

Indonesia Times, October 19, 1993.

Indonesia Circle, no. 58 (June 1992).

Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1 (October 1972); vol. 12, no. 4 (October 1984); vol. 15, no. 1 (1990); vol. 22, no. 2 (1994).

Inside Indonesia : Bulletin of the Indonesia Resources and Information Programme, nos. 31 (June 1992); 33 (December 1992); 34 (March 1993); 37 (December 1993); 40 (September 1994).

Jakarta Post, December 8, 1993; January 26, 1994; June 22, 23, 24, 1994; November 28, 1994; January 12, 1995.

Jawa Pos, March 2, 1988.

Jurnal Ilmu Politik, no. 3 (1988).

Kiblat, nos. 46 (December 1990); 49 (February 1991); 55 (June 1991); 59 (August 1991).

Kompas, April 22, 1982; April 28, 1982; May 1, 1982; September 3, 1982; October 2, 1983; July 13, 1985; June 24, 1987; September 17, 1993; February 9, 1994.

Media Dakwah, nos. 226 (April 1993); 229 (July 1993); 232 (October 1993); 234 (December 1993); 241 (July 1994).

Media Indonesia, December 6, 1990.

Mimbar BP-7, vol. 8, no. 43 (1990); vol. 9, no. 55 (1992).

Mizan, vol. 1, no. 3 (1984); vol. 4, no. 4 (1984).

Muhibbah, no. 5 (February) 1982.

Panji Masyarakat, nos. 370 (September 1, 1982); 306 (March 21, 1983); 470 (June 11, 1985); 512 (August 11, 1986); 623 (September 20, 1989); 631 (December 1, 1989); 634 (January 10, 1990); 817 (February 1, 1995)..

Pelita, June 12, 1978.

Pesantren, vol. 8, no. 2 (1991).

Prioritas, April 27, 1987.

Prisma, nos. 5 (1988); 49 (1990).

Studia Islamika, vol. 1, no. 2 (1994); vol. 1, no. 3 (1994).

Suara Masjid, nos. 199 (April 1991); 239 (August 1994); 243 (December 1994).

Suara Muhammadiyah, nos. 20 (October 16, 1994); 24 (December 15, 1994); 12 (June 16, 1995).

Surya, December 7, 1990.

Tempo, September 8, 1973; September 22, 1973; April 9, 1977; June 2, 1979; June 14, 1980; April 25, 1981; May 2, 1981; February 13, 1982; December 11, 1982; June 4, 1983; August 25, 1984; December 15, 1984; December 29, 1984; January 19, 1985; March 23, 1985; June 8, 1985; August 30, 1986;

April 18, 1987; February 13, 1988; July 6, 1991; November 9, 1991;
December 28, 1991; October 16, 1993.

Ulumul Qur'an, vol. 3, no. 1 (1992); vol. 4, no. 2 (1993); vol. 4, no. 3 (1993).





Chapter Three

MUSLIM RESPONSE TO AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE PANCASILA AS THE SOLE BASIS FOR ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS

A. THE GOVERNMENT POLICY OF STIPULATING THE PANCASILA AS THE SOLE BASIS FOR ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND FOR ALL MASS ORGANIZATIONS

CONTINUED PROTECTION OF THE PANCASILA

Along with the promotion of national stability and economic development, the protection and fortification of the Pancasila as the basis and national ideology of the state became the New Order government's main priority. This policy seems to have been motivated by a number of factors. First, in the wake of the suppression of the PKI revolt of 1965, the government was wary of the party's re-emergence despite an official ban. The government saw the recently-banned PKI, with its millions of members, as a latent danger that could consolidate itself and re-emerge to pose a serious threat to the national ideology of the Pancasila. As recently as January 1995, Dr. Suhardiman, Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Board, warned Indonesians of the possibility of a re-emergence of the PKI by saying that, "The 30 years since the 1965 abortive Communist coup attempt have provided enough time for former members of the Indonesian Communist Party and their followers to re-establish their power."¹ According to Suhardiman, the Communists now employ a new tactic by which "they will no longer build their base from the bottom, through workers and farmers. Instead they will build it from the top through the bureaucracy, the technocracy and capitalism by supporting neo-feudalism, which has been widening the gap between the rich and the poor."² Furthermore, he warned people that in order to achieve their goals, the Communists "will make sure they have political security in the

¹ *Jakarta Post*, January 12, 1995.

² *Ibid.*