

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theory of Decentralization

Many scholars give different perspective in decentralization theory in a two by two (positively and negatively, optimistic and skeptic). Positively, Cheema and Rondinelli (1983), represent scholars which define decentralization optimistically. Rondinelli with his rational public choice theory approach, be optimist that decentralization could benefit for social welfare. Another scholar, Schneider (2003) also concepted positively decentralization in theories as fiscal federalism, public administration, and political science highlights a dimension of decentralization. Fiscal federalism theories dealing with decentralization focus on maximizing social welfare, which is portrayed as a combination of economic stability, allocative efficiency, and distributive equity. However, decentralization has been viewed as a negative and skeptical concept. Among those, Wunsch (2001), Olowu and Wunsch (2004), and Shah (2004) and noted of skepticism about the results of decentralization, particularly, in spite of the proven weaknesses of local level democratic processes in so many countries.

2.1.1 The Definition of Decentralization

Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) define decentralization as “ *transfer planning, decision making or administrative authority from the central government to intensities field organization, local administrative unite, semi-autonomous and parastatal organizations, local governments, or non-government organization*”

Decentralization, or decentralizing governance, refers to the restructuring or reorganizations of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the principles of subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the system governance, while increasing the authority and capacities of sub national levels (UNDP, 1997).

2.1.2 The Type of Decentralization

Prior studies show there are many types of decentralization. For example, Schneider (2003) presented three types of decentralization in his work which is titled "Decentralization: Conceptualization and Measurement". While Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) constructed four types of decentralization on their manuscript on the title "From government decentralization to decentralized governance".

According to Schneider (2003), there are three types of decentralization, such follow: (1) Fiscal Decentralization, (2) Political Decentralization, and (3) Administrative Decentralization. In other term, Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) constructed four types of decentralization as follow: (1) Fiscal Decentralization, (2) Political Decentralization, (3) Administrative Decentralization, and (4) Economic Decentralization.

Schenider (2001) divided decentralization into three types, which are:

1) Fiscal Decentralization

Fiscal decentralization refers to how much central governments cede fiscal impact to non-central government entities. Fiscal decentralization focuses

on maximizing social welfare, which is portrayed as a combination of economic stability, allocative efficiency, and distributive equity.

2) Political Decentralization

Political Decentralization refers to the degree to which central governments allow non-central entities to undertake the political functions of governance, such as participation and representation. In broader sense, Political decentralization focuses on mobilization, organization, articulation, participation, contestation, and aggregation of interests. All political systems perform these processes, and the way in which they occur depends on individual contexts. Fox and Aranda (1996) postulated that decentralized political system are those in which political actors and issues are significant at the local level and are at least partially independent from those at the national level.

3) Administrative Decentralization

Administrative Decentralization refers to how much autonomy non-central government entities. The amount of administrative decentralization ranges in a continuum across systems, from those characterized by a low degree of autonomy, to those with a high degree of autonomy.

Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) constructed four types of decentralization, which are:

1) Fiscal Decentralization

Fiscal decentralization is a financial responsibility that is a major component in decentralization. If the local government and private organizations can implement decentralized functions effectively, they have

to have enough revenues, enhanced locally or transferred from the central government. Besides that, fiscal decentralization also manages the authority to make decisions about spending.

2) Political Decentralization

The aim of political decentralization is to give greater authority to the citizens and representatives of voters in public decision making.

3) Administrative Decentralization

Administrative Decentralization of environmental governance is a means of redistributing some authority for the management of human uses and activities affecting resources from central government authorities to subordinate units of government or semiautonomous public authorities, corporations, or functional authorities.

Administrative Decentralization includes deconcentration of central government structures and bureaucracies, delegation of central government authority and responsibility to semiautonomous agents of the state, and decentralized cooperation of government agencies performing similar functions through special “twinning” arrangement on provincial and local government across national borders.

4) Economic Decentralization

Economic decentralization is the most complete form of decentralization from government perspective. This type of decentralization can be done in the form of market liberalization, public-private partnership, privatization of state enterprises and deregulation, i.e. transfer of responsibility from public sector to private sector.

In this study, we will focus on three types of decentralization which are related to Schneider's postulations in 2003, such as: Fiscal Decentralization, Political Decentralization, and Administrative Decentralization.

2.1.3 The Form of Decentralization

Decentralization can take a number of different forms, of which Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) suggest four major ones. The first, deconcentration, involves the transfer of central government responsibilities to regions. The second form of decentralization, delegation, involves the "delegation of decision making and management authority for specific functions to organizations that are not under the direct control of central government ministries". The third form involves the transfer of functions from government to non-government controls, this namely privatization. Finally, devolution, the fourth form of decentralization, "seeks to create or strengthen independent levels or units of government through devolution of functions and authority".

2.1.4 The Importance of Decentralization

In most countries that were formerly colonized, centralized political and administrative institutions were a direct legacy of the colonial rulers. That is why, since the early 1950s control over development activities in most Third World countries has been centralized in national government ministries and agencies (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983).

Decentralization appeared as the critic of this centralistic government because centralistic government has some essential weaknesses in effectively and efficiently functioning of government. Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) pointed that centralized economic planning, intervention and control have been viewed by

national government authorities as the correct path to follow, despite frequent and increasingly detailed accounts of their negative effects. According to Kälén (1999), the negative effects of centralized systems are: (1) the geographical distance which led to the resulting lack of knowledge about local circumstances, and (2) the psychological distance of government officials from citizens. Thus, quite often, the central government takes measures that ignore local community needs and, therefore, lack credibility.

In their book which is titled *“Decentralization and Development Policy Implementation in Developing Countries”*, Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) stated that the increasing interest in this decentralization authority arose from three converging forces, such follow: (1) From disillusionment with the results of central planning and control of development activities during the 1950s and 1960s; (2) From the implicit requirements for new ways of managing development programs and projects that were embodied in growth-with-equity strategies that emerged during the 1970s; and (3) From the growing realization that as societies become more complex and government activities begin to expand, it becomes increasingly difficult to plan and administer all development activities effectively and efficiently from the center.

2.1.5 The Measures of Decentralization

According to Schneider (2003) decentralization concept in theories of fiscal federalism, public administration, and political science highlights a dimension of decentralization. Fiscal federalism theories dealing with decentralization focus on maximizing social welfare, which is portrayed as a combination of economic stability, allocative efficiency, and distributive equity.

Public administration theories dealing with decentralization broadly focus on how modern bureaucracies are achieved, which have been defined as efficient, effective, and rational. The proportion of share revenues between central and local governments. Political science theories dealing with decentralization focus on mobilization, organization, articulation, participation, contestation, and aggregation of interests.

These dimensions have interrelations among them which precede discussion of approaches to decentralization outlines three dimensions for analysis: fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization, and political decentralization. This interrelationship may influence or cross over into decentralization along another dimension.

For example, fiscal decentralization might generate greater administrative decentralization if local units used increased resources to assert administrative autonomy from the center. Alternatively, fiscal decentralization might lead to less administrative decentralization if central governments systematically counteracted the release of resources with an increase in bureaucratic or regulatory controls. Similar scenarios could be described for the relationships between each dimension.

According to Schneider (2003), there are at least two advantages of using income and expenditure as a measure of fiscal decentralization. *First*, data of income and expenditure is usually available in every state. *Second*, the income and expenditure is a major aspect or essence of fiscal decentralization. Expenditure and local revenue is a good measuring tool to determine the degree of fiscal decentralization. Due to describe how many efforts to control over the

local government fiscal resources. The greater proportion of expenditure and revenue expenditure and income areas than in national showed the higher the degree of decentralization.

Administrative decentralization refers to how much authority in the area of resource management. Schneider explains that the proportion of the regional income tax is a good measuring tool to see how much the control area of the management of local revenue. That's because, the percentage of the area of tax revenue shows the extent of the resource control is done by region. Furthermore, the percentage of the total grant and revenue transferred areas such as, taxes, loans, fees, sale of assets, or informal contribution is a measure of the degree of administrative decentralization. Due to improvement of the entire revenue apart from transfers provide an indication of the extent to which local governments collect their own funds.

Political decentralization refers to the extent to which the processes of democratic politics are run in the area. Schneider, explains that the local election is only the best indicator to measure how much democracy or representation of the people in doing in the area. Because the existence of local elections showed the implementation of the principle of representation in democracy in the region particularly. In addition, the elections in the area could increase the democratic political functions in the area.

2.2 Decentralization and Communal Conflict in Indonesia

2.2.1 The Definition of Communal Conflict

Derived from Latin word "conflictus" or "confligere" means "to clash or engage of fight. Several scholars defined conflict in many ways, as follow: Coser (1956) postulated the classic definition of conflict as the "struggle over values

and claims to scarce status, power, and resources, a struggle in which the aims of opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals.” If status, power, and resources are scarce whereas inevitably, they are, given the fact that they are, in part, relational constructs, it would seem that conflict is inevitable.

Palmer (1987) defined communal conflict as a public encounter in which the whole group can win by growing. Miller (2005) defined communal conflict as confrontation between one or more parties (in civil community) aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends. Brosche & Elversson (2012) defines communal conflict as violent conflict between non-state groups that are organized along a shared communal identity.

Communal conflict in this study is defined as violent conflict between state-groups, non-state groups that are organized along a shared communal identity (Galtung, 1965), such as ethnicity and how such conflicts relate to state-based violence (Brosché and Elfverson, 2012). The groups involved are non-state groups, meaning that neither actor may be involved as an important supporting actor in a communal conflict. These groups are often organized along a shared communal identity, meaning that they are not formally organized rebel groups or militias but that the confrontation takes place along the line of group identities. Following Gurr (2000), communal identity is conceptualized as subjective group identification based on a common history, a common culture or common core values. In this definition, communal identity also refers to ethnic or religious identity.

2.2.2 Communal Conflict In Decentralized Indonesia

The increasing communal conflict in Indonesia in the period between 1999 and 2014 has been linked with political transition in this country. Since 1999

Indonesia political system has been changed from centralized government to decentralized government under jurisdiction of the law 22/1999 (regulations about regional government) and the law 25/199 (regulations about fiscal balance of regional government).

Previously, in centralized government, provincial and sub provincial levels of government (regional governments) were placed under strong central government control. Booth (2014) in her manuscript which titled "Before the 'big bang': Decentralization debates and practice in Indonesia, 1949–99" elaborated about Indonesia under the centralized regimes. Centralized Indonesia, especially at the second president era (Soeharto era), has created Law 5/1974 on Basic Principles on Administration in the Regions which reflected strong central government control over all branches of government included regional governments as an integral part of government of Indonesia. That 1974 law vested power in the regional head (kepala daerah), who was under the direct control of the central government. However, regional parliaments had few powers under the 1974 law. Many governors and bupati were from the military and some of unpopular governors were often 'dropped in' from the center, especially in provinces that were rich in natural resources. Soeharto also controlled over regional governments by allocating much greater budgetary resources for central government than regional government, especially regional with rich in natural resources.

In this period, political activity was also tightly controlled as well as public information enclosure. Civil society and Public Participator's freedom of speech are tightly controlled as well as Press Freedom. In this centralized period,

Indonesia has only witnessed general election for members of representative. Indonesia has not held in direct election for presidency, and regional held. By the early 1990s (end of the centralized period), it was clear that there was considerable unrest in many parts of the country over the system of regional and local governments, negative sentiment of centralized development in Java, inequality and poverty among Java and outer of Java, etc. These factors triggered central government reformed into decentralized system era.

Different from the centralized era, since 2001, political system reformed into decentralized Indonesia. In this era, citizens could elect the local government officials who will responsible to the locally elected assembly. Decentralization also has given every district the power to perform the key functions of state, including the provision of health, education, environmental and infrastructure services. Districts can now perform any function that was previously undertaken by central or provincial government. This increase in autonomy has been supported by the substantial transfer of financial resources from center to the district: more than a third of a national budget is now under district. A fiscal reform which balances the hierarchical relationship between the central government and local governments. This fiscal reform terms was also accompanied by the reassignment of more than 2,5 million civil servants to the districts as reported by World Bank in 2008 (Sujarwoto and Tampubolon, 2014).

Recalling trajectories of decentralization reform in Indonesia, some regulations are developed which accompanied decentralization reform as we seen at Table 2.1 about regulation on regional government, regional fiscal, and district proliferation.

Table 2.1
Regulations on Decentralization

No	Regulation	About
1	Article No 18/UUD 1945	Dividing Regional Government Areas
3	Tap MPR No.25/MPR/1998	Guidelines for Decentralization
4	Law No. 22/1999	Regional Government
5	Law No. 25/1999	The Fiscal Balance between the National and Sub-national Governments
7	Law No.32/2004	Regional Government
8	Law No.33/2004	The Fiscal Balance between the National and Sub-national Governments
9	PP No.58/2005	Financial Regional Accounting Management
10	PP No.78/2007	Proliferation Guidelines
11	Law No.28/2009	Regional Taxes and Retributions
12	Law No.13/2009	Special Status for Yogyakarta Province
13	Law No.2/2012	Regional Grant Mechanism
13	Law No.22/2014	Regional Governor, Mayor Election Guidelines
14	Law No.23/2014	Regional Government

Sources: (Adopt by Author) from <http://www.kemendagri.go.id/produk-hukum>
<http://www.jdih.setjen.kemendagri.go.id>, <http://peraturan.go.id/>

From the Table above (Table 2.1), we could see, government of Indonesia (Gol) regulated policy in promoting decentralization in Indonesia. These regulations involve: regional government (Law No. 22/1999, Law No.32/2004, and revised by Law No.23/2014), fiscal balancing regulation (Law No. 25/1999 and revised by Law No.33/2004), Proliferation Guideline (PP No.78/2007), and Regional Governor, Mayor Election Guidelines (Law No.22/2014).

According to the current law of regional government (Law No.23/2014), regional government has government authority which consists of mandatory government affairs and government affairs mandatory option. Mandatory government affairs referred to basic services and non-basic services. Mandatory government affairs which referred to basic services functions address education, health, public work and spatial planning, housing and residential areas, and social, as well as peace, public order, and the protection of society (article 12 of Law No.23/2014).

2.2.3 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT POLICY IN INDONESIA

Since radical decentralization implementation in Indonesia (transition from centralized to decentralized Indonesia), Gol establishes several regulations in communal conflict management policy, from reactive into prevention. Table 2.2 summarizes Gol' policy on communal conflict's management.

Table 2.2
Regulations in Conflict Management Policy

No	Regulation	About
1	Law No 18/2001	Special Autonomy of Aceh
2	Law No 21/2001	Special Autonomy of Papua
3	Law No 2/2002	POLRI as the main institution in handling domestic security and order. Satpol PP as assistant of POLRI
4	Inpres No 6/2003	Accelerated Development for post conflict Maluku and North Maluku
5	Law No.34/2004	Regional Government Authority in Security and Order (To Protecting public community)
6	Inpres No.1/2004	Military Operation in Aceh
7	Inpres No.14/2005	Accelerated Development for post conflict Poso
8	Law No.11/2006	Government of Aceh
9	Inpres No.5/2007	Accelerated Development in Papua and West Papua
10	Law No.35/2008	Special Autonomy of West Papua

Table 2.2 (continued table)
Regulations in Conflict Management Policy

No	Regulation	About
11	Perpres No.65/2011	Establishment of P4B(Dedicated Agency for Accelerate Development in Papua and West Papua
12	Inpres No.2/2012	Handling Domestic Security Threats
13	Law No.7/2012	Social Conflict Management

Sources: (Adopt by Author) <http://www.kemendagri.go.id/produk-hukum>,
<http://www.jdih.setjen.kemendagri.go.id>, <http://peraturan.go.id/>

From the Table above (Table 2.2), We could see that government of Indonesia (Gol) regulated policy in handling conflict in Indonesia fluctuatively rather than stable. Since 2001, government of Indonesia has delivered political approach in handling regional conflict by constituting a special autonomy respectively for Aceh (Law No.18/2001) and Papua (Law No.21/2001). However, in 2004, government of Indonesia constituted that Aceh was a military operation zone (Inpres No.1/2004).

In handling post communal conflict and disadvantaged areas in Indonesia, Gol has delivered some regulations in offering accelerated development in those areas, such as respectively in: (1) Maluku and North Maluku (Inpres No 6/2003), (2) Poso (Inpres No.14/2005), (3) Papua and West Papua (Inpres No.5/2007), and (4) Establishment of P4B(Dedicated Agency for Accelerate Development in Papua and West Papua (Perpres No.65/2011)

In other case, Gol has constructed preventive regulation in handling social conflict, respectively as follow:

- (1) Separation of police officers (POLRI) from the military institution which stated that POLRI as the main institution in handling domestic security

and order and regulate civil servant task forces or SATPOL PP (Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja) as “the assistant” of POLRI, strengthening SATPOL PP in enforcing domestic security and order (Law No 2/2002)

(2) Regulation in handling domestic security threats (Inpres No.2/2012)

(3) Regulation on Social Conflict Management (Law No.7/2012)

All in all, Indonesia has reformed the political system under several regulations and its revision with the current law. Indonesia practices political transition from centralized to decentralized system. As has been evidenced in other parts of the world, political transition is a very delicate process. In Indonesia, although it was not very smooth, political transition from centralized to decentralized Indonesia did not result in a total breakdown for the country. However, this political transition was accompanied by a range of some communal conflicts.

2.3 The 3 (Three) Theories to Understand The Linkage of Decentralization and Communal Conflict

Several previous studies have focused on decentralization and communal conflict in developing countries. Whereas, the finding results and evidences on decentralization-communal conflict nexus remains controversial. Among those, several previous studies found that communal conflict decreases with decentralization (Ascher and Mirovitskaya, 2016; Brauchler, 2015; Gjoni, et.al, 2010; Yilmaz and Serdar, 2010; Murshed, et.al, 2009; Tranchant, 2008; Monteux, 2006; Brancati, 2006; Bertrand, 2004; Rothchild, 1994; Oates, 1977). While other studies find communal conflict increases with decentralization onset (Kingsley, 2011; Tajima, 2009; Diprose, 2009; Barron, et.al, 2009; Green, 2008; Duncan, 2007; Coppel, 2006; Hadiz, 2003; and Gurr, 1993).

Some previous studies represented negative association between decentralization and communal conflict in several ways. **First**, decentralization could reduce the likelihood of communal conflict by increasing level of allocative efficiency and the share of locally generated revenue (For example, see Fearon, et.al. (2009); Brancati, 2006; Murshed, et.al, 2006). Oates (1977) argued that decentralization would increase allocative efficiency by subjecting public spending priorities to local demand. The spending priorities to local demand could also providing more regional development expenditure. More regional development expenditure meant more initiatives in enriching the targeted communal conflict area by unifying previously antagonistic groups with development activities. These regional development activities could bring money, infrastructure, and job opportunities to the local people in targeted communal conflict region and the region as a whole (Kim and Knaap, 2001). These job opportunities as well as money and infrastructures are likely to have had a dampening effect on communal conflict in local areas. Prior qualitative study at a developed country by Fearon, et.al (2009) showed how the allocative efficiency should be operationalized in abating communal conflict. For example, In Northern Liberia, after paralyzed for years by communal conflict violence, United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID)'s project found that development aid could strengthen the local government allocative efficiency on regional development expenditure. This allows actors of communal conflict to access on development activities. Therefore, development aid could increase allocative efficiency in order to have a measurable impact on social cohesion between actors of communal conflict. However, in developing

countries, only the richer districts which have the capacity to generate proportionately great local allocative efficiency. A prior quantitative study by Murshed, et.al (2009) showed that greater local government spending can lead to communal conflict abatement. For example, in Indonesia, the richer districts only which have the capacity to generate proportionately great local allocative efficiency.

Second, decentralization could reduce the likelihood of communal conflict by ensuring fair play direct election through an indicator of the “mature” of democracy. This is usually measured by the time that a democracy has survived unscathed following the first truly democratic direct election at local district level. This ensured fair play local direct election could build better communication exchange with promoting accountability (Ascher and Mirovitskaya, 2016; Gurkan, et.al, 2010; Grindle, 2009). Ascher and Mirovitskaya (2016) constituted that ensuring fair play direct election to create good local district leader who will make people more willing to accept his/her authority. Fair play local direct election could also make political pressure on incumbents to perform effectively while in the office (Grindle, 2009). Elected capable local district leader could ensure better communication exchange with promoting accountability. Hence, Ascher and Mirovitskaya (2016) presented World Bank advice that adequate promoted accountability to local citizens must be matched in decentralized system.

In other case, special representation is needed to gain peaceful direct election. For example, In Poso, Central of Sulawesi in Indonesia, interreligious pairing of candidates of local direct election in 2005 was promoted in order to ensure the districts head and deputy direct elections there. Altogether, five slates

of candidates stood for election's candidacies which were comprised by a Moslem and a Christian in each. In three out of five pairings, the Christian candidate was for the Bupati with a Muslim as his deputy and in the other two, vice versa (Diprose, 2008).

Third, decentralization could reduce communal conflict by providing reassurance to ethnic minorities and legitimacy to the political system in order to redistribute political power and local representativeness (see Monteux, 2006; Rothchild, 1994; Gjoni, et.al, 2010; Bertrand, 2004; Yilmaz and Serdar, 2010; Diprose, 2008) and citizens participation (Brauchler, 2015). Decentralization provides greater political representation for various political, ethnic, religious, and cultural groups (see Monteux, 2006) and accommodating conflicting groups into bargaining process system (see Rothchild, 1994) with encouraging interaction and dialogue (Gjoni, et.al, 2010). For example, Monteux (2006) and Rothchild (1994) postulated that by granting ethnic minorities the legitimacy to the political system would force them to enter into a formal bargaining process with the central government. Following this political accommodation to ethnic minorities, decentralization must be combined with policies to encourage interaction and dialogue between local executive and minorities ethnic groups if it is to assuage communal conflict (Gjoni, et.al 2010). The political bargaining mechanism aims to redistribute political power, representation, and control over the state's resources to provincial or district levels. As such, it gave political elites in these territorial units more power to direct resources to their specific needs and to adopt regulations or laws that could enhance the specific cultural or religious identities of the ethnic groups represented in the area. Therefore, by redistributive political

power and representativeness, decentralization could decrease the risk of communal conflict (Bertrand, 2004). Gurkan, et.al (2010) stated that as recommending by The World Bank, a well-designed decentralized system must provide special representation of minority and marginalized groups.

However, other studies found that decentralization positively associated with increasing episodes of communal conflict in several ways. **First**, decentralization could increase local-level conflict by shifting power from ethnically heterogeneous areas to those dominated by only one or two ethnic groups (Green, 2008). In Uganda, for example, the decentralization has not only halt communal conflict but also may even contributed to it. Decentralization of districts even leads to episodes of communal conflict. Uganda consists of heterogeneous ethnics such as Banyoro, Bungungu, Japadhola, and Itetso. Communal conflicts between dominant ethnic and ethnic minorities occurred almost less than a year after a new district decentralized, such as in Buliisa districts in 2006 (Green, 2008). In other case, the shifting power could trigger competition over political representations (Coppel, 2006). It also gives a reason for communal conflict, in which some of the conflicts occur during election campaigns. Competition over political representation often uses both ethnic division to mobilize support and intra-elite competition at local level to manipulate long term primordialist social patterns (Coppel, 2006). Moreover, this shifting power could exacerbate local level communal conflict through developed rivalries between local elites over the rewards of decentralization and the practices of corruption, collusion, nepotism (See Kingsley, 2012 and Hadiz, 2004). According to Hadiz (2004), Decentralization disperses power to regional

officials, many of whom are thought to exploit their office for private gain. For instance, in North Sumatera in 2002, the leaders of two North Sumatran business associations claimed that about 70 % of regional development projects in the North Sumatera provincial administration were tarnished by the practices of collusion, corruption, and nepotism. This indirectly represents of decentralization run by the logic of money politics and rent seeking behavior. This phenomenon was begun by rivalries between local elites faced direct election. Some of the local elites were business people who entered the politics. Those examples show that the collusion, corruption, and nepotism tarnished the ideal goal of decentralization where as a counter system to bad perception of monolithic government (centralization). This bad perception pointed that centralization bred high level of rent seeking, corruption, and lack of accountability of government officials (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006).

Second, decentralization could shape communal conflict because of institutional weakness following political change, from centralization to decentralization (for examples see Tajima, 2009; Barron, et.al, 2009; Gurr, 1993). All of these studies argued that decentralization have positive association with communal conflict in several ways. For example, Tajima (2009) constituted that decentralization could exacerbate communal conflict due to some mismatches in both formal and informal institutions of security and order following the decentralized Indonesia. In other case, the weakness of institution such as weak law enforcement and norms governing life within community could escalate communal conflict. In the absence of a formal rule of law, these customary rules sometimes clashed with each other and with formal state legislation (Barron et

al., 2009). In Indonesia, for example, communal conflict over land often occurs due to different kinship groups had different rules and understandings of how land should be allocated. Barron, et.al (2009) found that communal conflict often occurred in association with the possession of communal land in rural areas in Indonesia, where it is often not clear to whom the land belongs. This is followed by the weakness capacity of local leaders and the lack of an adequate response by the security force to enforce the law and the decision in handling communal conflict. In other case, this institutional weakness may fail to ensure fair play local direct election. Therefore, local elections may be manipulated by local elites. Local voters may be ill-informed or intimidated or bribed with money politics; or voters may fail to choose most capable local leader or fail to coordinate to throw corrupt incumbents out of office (Fan, et.al, 2009). Diprose (2009) found that the communal conflict at post conflict areas could occur by the political tension on unfair play local election. For example, in Donggala District in Indonesia, during the plenary session of the Donggala Elections Commissions, which ratified the winners because of unfair direct election, communal conflict occurred between representative of protesting groups and others supporting the announcement of previous winner. In other case, unfair play direct election may allow illegal campaign financing in local elections (Mietzner, 2011)

Third, decentralization could increase communal conflict because of lack of capacity of local leaders (see Duncan, 2007; Ascher and Mirovitskaya, 2016). Duncan (2007) postulated that the continued lack of capacity among district leaders, members of the municipalities' council (DPR-D), and civil servants remains the largest problem facing communal conflict related to indigenous

ethnic minorities' protests in a decentralized Indonesia. This lack of capacity of local leader is caused by limited authority (Ascher and Mirovitskaya, 2016). They argued when local leader are forced to reduce services, the deficit may include not only services in conventional sense (e.g education and health care), but also regulatory capacity to counter corruption, maintain public order, enforce peace and order, and control communal conflict. However, when local leader are well supported by citizens' trust due to his/her strong leadership, integrity, and managerial, he/she could handle peace at his/her authority. A recent prior qualitative study conducted by Dita and Dwi (2015) presented that a strong local leader in developing country could success to lead appointed officials within supporting by citizens and city council in transforming municipal area into better condition. For example, in Surabaya City in Indonesia, a good local district leader, a municipal mayor, Tri Risma Maharini, under her authority and supporting by appointed officials, municipal council, and citizens' trust, during the past decade, the city of Surabaya transformed itself from a hot and dry city into a green, cool, and comfortable place to live that is frequently acknowledged for its government performance. The people of Surabaya City could accept her authority which is featured with the mayor's personal leadership style: leading with integrity and with the heart. With integrity, she has made anti-corruption a major tenet of her leadership goals. Meanwhile, in regard to leading with the heart, she has embraced "feminine" leadership styles that emphasizes cooperation, participation by many, information sharing, reliance on interpersonal skills, and sensitivity to other's feelings and perspectives. She also adopts "motherly" and "parental" approaches such as when admonishing others. Hence,

Ascher and Mirovitskaya (2016) concluded that the limited authority and deficit fund may enable the emergence of local leader who have no capability to enhance the unity. Hence, the inability of the local leader to control conflict becomes the pathway of how small protests and demonstrations may end up in large communal riot .

From those perspectives above, we can concludes that decentralization may both decrease and increase communal conflict. Decentralization could decrease communal conflict if meet conditions, such follow: (1) by increasing level of allocative efficiency and the share of locally generated revenue, (2) by ensuring fair play direct election through an indicator of the “mature” of democracy, and (3) by providing reassurance to ethnic minorities and legitimacy to the political system. However, decentralization could increase communal conflict if meet some conditions, such follow: (1) the tendency of shifting power from ethnically heterogeneous areas to those dominated by only one or two ethnic groups, (2) the occurrence of institutional weakness following political change, from centralization to decentralization, and (3) the presence of lack of capacity of local leaders

Based on foregoing discussion, we propose three hypotheses to understand the linkage of decentralization and communal conflict in Indonesia:

First hypothesis: “Fiscal decentralization will reduce communal conflict if level of allocative efficiency is high and the share of locally generated revenue is great. In contrast, fiscal decentralization will increase communal conflict if level of allocative of efficiency is low and the share of locally generated revenue is small

Second hypothesis: “Administrative decentralization will reduce communal conflict if the capacity of institutional and local beaucracy is strong. In contrast, administrative decentralization will increase communal conflict if the institutional and local bureaucracy capacity is weak.

Third hypothesis: “Political decentralization will reduce communal conflict if the “mature” democracy is high and reassurance to ethnic minorities is provided in order to legitimate to the local political system. In contrast, political decentralization will increase communal conflict if the “mature” democracy is low and the tendency of shifting power from ethnically heterogeneous areas to those dominated by only one or two ethnic groups is high, and reassurance to ethnic minorities is provided in order to legitimate to the local political system.

2.4 Other Determinants of Communal Conflict

This literature review also introduces and broadly discussed theories of the nexus between communal conflict and other determinants besides decentralization. Among those, several studies found communal conflict associated with social, economic, politics, institutional and environmental determinants (for example see Barron, et.al, 2009; Horowitz, 1985; Garcia and Reynal, 2004; Varshney, 2003; Sambanis, 2004; Stewart, 2008; Mancini, et.al, 2005; Gleditsch et al., 2009; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Raleigh and Urdal, 2007; Caruso, et.al, 2016). By reviewing those studies, I elaborate those five theoretical determinants which explain the prevalence of communal conflict and the likelihood of it escalating into violence, such as: Social, Economic, Political, Institutional, and Environment Determinants.

2.4.1 Social Determinants

Hegree, et.al (2001) argues that communal conflicts are rooted in the social dynamics of difference within inter-group relations where groups saw themselves as different due to ethnic and culture background. Such differences are not static and given. In Indonesia for example, Barron et al. (2009) found such identities morphed based on a range of factors including population movements, the political motivations of religious and ethnic leaders, and the extent to which religious and ethnic common institutions (for example places of worship) existed.

In social determinants perspectives, communal conflicts are rooted in the dynamics of difference within inter-group relations where groups saw themselves as different due to ethnic and culture background (Hegree et. al, 2001), religion and ethnic heterogeneity (Klinken, 2007), social capital (McIlwaine and Moser, 2001; Galea, et.al, 2002), and crime violence (Scambary, 2009). Klinken (2007) argued that religion and ethnic heterogeneity are the main determinants of communal conflict in Indonesia.

In this section, I also focus on how to operationalize ethnicity, social capital, and small scale violence and as a driver on communal conflict.

(1) Ethnicity

Several scholars defined the concept of ethnicity in various definitions (see for example, Horowitz, 1985; Bulmer, 1996; Baumann, 2004). Among those, Donald Horowitz (1985) defined “ethnicity” as describing identities such as race, language, religion, tribe, and caste. Bulmer (1996) constituted “ethnicity” as a collectivity within a large population which defines the group’s identity, such as kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance. In

other term, ethnicity is generally defined as a sense of group belonging with the core characteristics of common origin, history, culture, language, experiences and values (Baumann, 2004). In this study, I adopt Donald Horowitz's usage of term of "ethnicity" due to its common usage in quantitative study which link the ethnicity and communal conflict (see for example Tajima, 2009; Tadjoeeddin, et.al, 2014)

Mancini (2008) shows a review of the empirical literature on communal conflict that focuses on how to operationalize ethnicity as a driver on communal conflict. He discussed about ethnic diversity with other name by various scholars and its several forms measurement as a driver of communal conflict. Among those, Collier (2001) introduced ethnic dominance and Ellingsen (2000) stated that the size of the second largest group to measure of ethnic diversity. While Barrows (1976) and Bangura (2001) proposed categorical indicators ranking ethnic structure from unipolar to fragmented multipolarity, as well as Herfindahl-type measures of ethnic dispersion, commonly known as *ethnic fractionalization indices* (Alesina *et al.*, 2003). In other case, in measuring the ethnic diversity, Garcia and Reynal (2002) constituted median-based indicators of demographic clustering around ethnic poles, commonly known as *polarization indices*.

There are several studies focused on communal conflict and ethnic diversity in developing countries. Among those, Horowitz (1985) and Collier (2001) points out that the most severe conflicts arise in societies where a large ethnic minority faces an ethnic majority or ethnic dominance. Ethnic dominance also represents ethnic polarization. Ostby (2008) found that ethnic polarization positively insignificant related to communal conflict. However, Garcia and Reynal

(2004) found a positive and statistically significant association of polarization ethnicity on the incidence of communal conflict. While Esteban and Ray (2008) found that highly fractionalized societies are mostly prone to the occurrence of conflict, but its intensity would have been moderate. This two latest studies convincingly argued that to explain communal conflict, polarization is superior to fractionalization because collective action is needed for conflict and greater fragmentation makes collective action more difficult. If groups are not large enough to represent viable political bases, their cultural cleavages remain unexploited (Posner, 2004).

Vanhanen (1999) postulated that communal conflict related to ethnicity seems to be common in all countries of the world where people are divided into separate ethnic groups, that may have a racial, national, linguistic, tribal, religious or caste basis. He found that ethnicity could escalate communal conflict in two ways: (1) significant ethnic division tends to lead to ethnic interest conflict in all societies and (2) the more a society is ethnically divided, the more political and other interest conflict tend to become channeled into ethnic lines. However, Varshney (2003) found that communal conflict related to ethnicity, on the whole, tends to be highly locally or regionally concentrated, not evenly spread across the length and breadth of the country.

Indonesia must aware of this latent root of communal conflict because of these demographic types of ethnicity, fractionalized rather than polarized. Arifin, et.al (2015) found that Indonesia is relatively ethnically fractionalized, though not as polarized. Among provinces and districts, They have seen a continuum ranging from ethnically homogeneous to heterogeneous, from the least

fractionalized to the most fractionalized, and from the least polarized to the most polarized province or district. Variation in ethnic diversity is also seen across islands although provinces and districts in the Island of Java are more likely to be homogeneous, less fractionalized and less polarized than provinces and districts outside Java Island.

Although there has not been yet empirical significant evidence that fractionalized ethnicity in Indonesia triggered communal conflict, some studies argues that, several communal conflict were also caused by ethnic: patronage and heterogeneity (for example see Aragon, 2001; Bertrand, 2016). For example, Aragon (2001) postulated that communal conflict in Poso were triggered by patronage politics that mobilized groups who harbored pre-existing resentments about ethnic disparities in land and political control, and who subscribed to ideologies divided along twentieth-century religious currents. In the long run, this mobilizing ethnic identity by the elite in gaining power at local political competition may cause communal conflict.

(2) Social Capital

Reviewing the literature on communal conflict and social capital, I found that social capital linked with communal conflict conversely and non-linear with dynamic (for example see McIlwaine and Moser, 2001; Galea, et.al, 2002). They showed that lack of individual social capital (trust) generated communal conflict in Guatemala. These communal conflicts usually around two issues. First, fights over land tenure in contexts where people felts they had been unfairly dealt with by neighborhood groups responsible for the allocation of land and housing. Second, physical and verbal conflict among neighbors occured due to concerning

access to water. However, this association of social capital and violence communal conflict is not always linear. Galea, et.al (2002) found that the relationship between social capital and violent communal conflict over time was non-linear and dynamic.

There is much debate about what exactly is meant by the term 'social capital'. Lynda Hanifan in OECD insights defines Social Capital as "those tangible assets [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit". Social capital also means as the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition. (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 119). While Fukuyama (1997) defined social capital simply as the existence of a certain set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation among them. The sharing of values and norms does not in itself produce social capital, because the values may be the wrong ones. Robert D. Putnam in Making Democracy Work (1993) has measured social capital as: Trust, Social Norm, and Community Group (Putnam, et.al, 1993)..

Putnam, et.al (1993) found that networked-social groups and associated norms not only exert pressure on district governments to provide better public services, but also present models of the services that will best enhance citizen wellbeing. At the same time, such groups provide a channel for the personal and social support to decrease communal conflict. This research only focuses in Community Group Social Capital.

Following Putnam (1993), this study uses the density of community groups active in a village to measure social capital. This provides information about community groups found within villages or urban neighborhoods include '*regu keamanan/ronda*' (security group).

(3) Large Scale Violence versus Small Scale Violence

Prior studies showed the association of small scale violence, daily crimes and communal conflict (see for example Scambary, 2009; Varshney, 2008; Barron and Sharpe, 2008). Scambary (2009) found that violent between gangs in East Timor in the period of 2006-2007 could escalate into communal conflict due to overlapping identities and membership (means that a gang is also within family membership and member of political affiliation) .

A Prior Reviewing Study by Varshney (2008) contrasted the point of view of the study of Barron and Sharpe in 2008 with the result of the study by Varshney, et.al in 2004. They both tabulated communal conflict dataset by reading communal conflict reported in national newspaper. While Varshney, et.al (2004) priored the study used provincial newspapers in 14 provinces from 1990 to 2003, Barron and Sharpe used regency-level or sub provincial newspapers in twelve districts of two provinces from 2001 to 2003. Varshney, et.al (2004) claimed that in Indonesia communal conflict violence is concentrated although the levels of violent communal conflict in Indonesia may be very high. However, Barron and Sharpe (2008) showed that violence communal conflict in Indonesia is widespread. Therefore, Varshney (2008) concluded that as elsewhere, large-scale communal violence in Indonesia, such as: riots and pogroms, may be

heavily locally concentrated, but small scale group communal violence, such as lynching and intervillage brawls is quite widespread.

2.4.2 Economic Determinants

Communal conflicts are rooted within economic determinants such as economic rivalries and supply of public goods, poverty, and economic inequality (Mancini, et.al, 2008). Following the study by Mancini, et.al in 2008, Barron, et.al (2008) found also that high economic inequality is associated with higher level of communal conflict in rural areas. The classical literature of communal conflict states that countries or regions with poorer and more unequal distribution of wealth are held to be more vulnerable to various forms of communal conflict violence (Stewart, 2008; Gleditsch et al., 2009). The existing literature provides a strong theoretical foundation of how poverty and economic inequality lead to polarization of group belonging which facilitate group mobilization to violence collective action. For example, Collier & Hoeffler (2004) explains that groups which are disadvantaged in the distribution of resources share both a common grievance and a common identity, which facilitate recruitment for radical action to assert and to protect group interests.

Barron, et.al (2009) confirmed the relevance of economic factors in explaining the emergence of local communal conflicts together with ethnic reasons in rural areas and religious diversity in urban areas. High inequality is associated with higher level of communal conflict in rural area.

Inequalities approach measures differences in access to resources and outcomes (Mancini, 2008). It is argued that Inequality defined as differences between culturally formed groups in political opportunities, social access,

economic assets, employment and income, play an important role in determining when and where violent communal conflict will take place. This accords with Gurr's view that relative deprivation is a necessary precondition for civil strife: 'treat a group differently by denial or privilege, and its members become more self-conscious about their common bonds and interests. Minimize differences and communal identification becomes less significant as a unifying principle' (Gurr, 1993).

2.4.3 Political Determinants

Prior studies examined the episodes of communal conflicts and political determinants nexus (for example see Horowitz, 1985; Duncan, 2008). Horowitz (1985) showed that the episodes of communal conflicts are caused by unequal state policy favoring one ethnic community. In Indonesia, for example, Java has dominated government structure for long time and therefore state policies in favoring Java ethnic rather than others. In other case, Duncan (2008) showed that unequal state policy in favoring ethnicity could lead to districts proliferation. Districts proliferation has also a positive association with communal conflict. For example, in Halmahera, the communal clash between Makian migrants and indigenous populations erupted on the island of Halmahera, occurred because of government plans to create a new sub district of Makian daratan from the southern half of the Kao district.

2.4.4 Institutional Determinants

Prior studies addressed the association of institution and communal conflict (see for example Easterly, 2001; Barron, et.al (2009); Sujarwoto, 2015). For example, Easterly (2001) found that institutional factors negatively interacted

with communal conflict and ethnic diversity, as they affected whether communal conflict related to ethnicity was destructive or was contained by the rules of the game. He concluded that good institutions lower communal conflict that might otherwise from ethnic fractionalization. He promoted that ethnically diverse nation that wish to endure peace and prosperity must build good institutions. In other case, Barron, et.al (2009) argues that communal conflicts occur due to the weakness of institutions such as weak law enforcement and norms governing life with in community. In the absence of a formal rule of law, these customary rules sometimes clashed with each other and with formal state legislation. Sujarwoto (2015) found that the source of widespread of communal conflict in Indonesia has strong association with institutional factors, such as acute problem of capture elite, and weak capacity of institution in managing fiscal resources.

In practice, Barron, et.al (2009) proposed that institutional determinants of communal conflict involved the participation of local and traditional elites' roles in communal conflict mitigation, self-community of security system, Non-Government Organization (NGO), Ormas, and Religion Organization, the impact of local, national and foreign television, and the role of territorial security force and police officers. In this section, I will elaborate about the association of informal and formal institutions determinants of communal conflict and communal conflict mitigation.

- (a) The role of citizens participation: traditional leader, ormas and religion organization at districts

Prior studies in qualitative approach by Kingsley (2012) and Brauchler (2015) showed that traditional institution with citizen participation also related to communal conflict negatively. Kingsley (2012) showed the role of a local leader

who has high levels of standing was needed in communal conflict avoidance. For example In Lombok, West South Island Province, Kingsley constituted about building partnership between state and non-state actors was needed in maintaining social stability and the avoidance of communal conflict due to villages leaders' election in Bok village. By empowering the role Tuan Guru (local Moslem leader), the tensions of communal conflict related to the village leader's election at those village was resolved without the need of large-scale police intervention.

In other case, Brauchler (2015) found that traditional institution could bring peace at post communal conflict areas. Prior qualitative study in Indonesia shows that citizen participation could reduce communal conflict (see for example Brauchler, 2015). For example, In Maluku, the new national legislation on autonomy and decentralization which has legitimize and enforce the revival of local traditions and structures was produced by citizen participation, such as intensive discussion by interdisciplinary team from a state university in Ambon in cooperation with some traditional leaders (Raja) from Ambon. Brauchler (2015) constituted that they finally managed to negotiate draft versions of the regional regulation, such as Perda No. 14/2005, Perda No.1/2006, and several other Perdas covering issues, such as the election of the *raja*, the functioning of village government, *negeri* and financial matters, and the setting up of *saniri*.

(b) Local and International NGO

Prior qualitative and quantitative study in developing countries, in Indonesia, shows that Local and International Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)'s activities could reduce communal conflict (see for example Tajima, 2014). For example, in Central Sulawesi after communal conflict broke, NGO's

which owned by Moslem and Christian work together as a part of peace building activities. They created a narrative in their respective communities the communal violence was being masterminded by political elites to detriment of both Christian and Moslem non elites.

(c) Police Post

In the prior study by Nollan, et.al (2014) showed by their qualitative study that police institution in disadvantaged and difficult areas in Indonesia could lead to communal conflict. For example, at the Puncak and Nduga, Papua, the cases highlight how local elections in relatively in relatively new districts can exacerbate existing social fault lines, causes deadly conflict and strain local budgets. Many of new units cover hugest swathes of difficult terrain but have only a single police post with just seven to ten personnel and no capacity to enforce the law, let alone prevent violence.

(d) Security Force

In the prior study by Sangaji (2007) showed by his qualitative study that the significantly presence of the security force in several disadvantaged areas and mostly prone to communal conflict areas in Indonesia increases the communal violence itself. For example in Poso Districts, in Central of Sulawesi Provinces, Police and Security Force Army involved in several cases of engaging directly on communal violence, losing control of the distribution of firearms and ammunition, mysterious shootings/killings, tolerating the communal violence, mobilization of force, business of the security forces, and rivalry between armed unit. All of those seem to lead to increase the tension of communal violence in Poso. Therefore, Sangaji concluded that the deployment and addition of organic troops, and the expansion of territorial commands or of other security institutions

in same level, all prove that the security forces have succeeded in reinforcing the escalation of communal violence instead of deflating it.

(a) Television

The debates is still ongoing in linking the television impact and violent behavior which escalates to communal conflict (for example Sheehan, 1991; Bridgman, 1996; Weaver, 1996; Smith, et.al 2002). For example, Sheehan (1991) postulated that several studies have demonstrated that viewers were more prone to influence from real televised violence as opposed to fictional or unreal televised violence. Bridgman (1996) presented the Mental Health Foundation's statement that 'evidence for a link between television and violent behavior has continued to grow. In other case, Weaver (1996) constituted that in New Zealand, as in many national context there was an evident public belief that portrayals of violence on television have the potential effect to incite aggressive, violent and anti-social behavior in viewers. While Smith (2002) presented that the broadcast networks and the basic cable channels present the most potentially harmful depictions of violence during the prime time.

2.4.5 Environmental Determinants

Many scholars argue that communal conflicts may also be triggered by climate change and meteorological disaster related to climate change as determinants. Climate changes are represented by rainfall and temperatures anomalies. Meteorological disasters which are related to climate change, such as: Rising Sea Level, Hurricane, Drought, and Flood.

This meteorological disaster, for example, flood could also trigger communal conflict both positively and negatively in indirect association. Hendrix

and Glaser (2007) with Raleigh and Urdal (2007) pioneered in studying how results from the climate change models can provide input to rigorous studies of communal conflict. The disaster related to climate change could make sudden loss of property right. In the long run, this triggers the risk of communal conflict due to poverty. However, Caruso, et.al (2016) found that there was also a negative and significant indirectly association communal conflict and climate change. They found since climate change influenced harvest pattern, whenever food availability increased and communal violence could be decreased.

As academic researcher, we have to consider carefully what kinds of conflict violence we expect to result from climate change. Many scholars have pioneered to study the linkage between conflict violence and climate change. Hendrix and Glaser (2007) with Raleigh and Urdal (2007) pioneered in studying how results from the climate change models can provide input to rigorous studies of conflict. Firstly, Hendrix and Glaser (2007) studied state-based internal armed conflicts at the national level. Secondly, Raleigh and Urdal (2007) used the same set of conflicts but focus on climate-related scarcities in the conflict zones, since most internal conflicts affected only a limited part of the country. Moreover, Following Hendrix and Glaser with Raleigh and Urdal, Reuveny (2007) studied the linkage among climate changes, migration, and conflict. He referred to several kinds of violence, including one-side violence (genocide and politicide), non-state violence (between groups, but where the state is not an actor), and unorganized violence. Meier et al. (2007) also study non-state conflicts, but based on event data reported by a conflict early warning network for a limited area along the border of three states.

In more recent years, some scholars presented some evidence in linking climate change and violent conflict in developing countries even in developed world. Calderone, et.al (2013) stated that temperature anomalies at North and South Sudan were found to strongly affect the risk of conflict and extreme temperature shocks were found to strongly affect the likelihood of violence. Mares (2013) found that neighborhoods with higher levels of social disadvantage in St. Louis, MO, USA were very likely to experience higher levels of violence as a result of anomalously warm temperatures. The 20 % of most disadvantaged neighborhoods were predicted to experience over half of the climate change-related increase in cases of violence. Maystadt and Ecker (2014) found research results that extreme weather events causal related to civil conflict incidence at the global level, and also valid for droughts and local violent conflicts in a within-country setting over a short time frame in the case of Somalia. They estimated that a one standard deviation increase in drought intensity and length raises the likelihood of conflict by 62%.

2.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this study, I frame the concept of the linkage of decentralization and communal conflict as follows (Figure 2.1)




Figure 2.1. Conceptual Framework

Source: Developed by author by reviewing prior studies on decentralization-communal conflict nexus, and determinants of communal conflict

By considering previous studies, this study is conducted under conceptual framework as be seen at Figure 2.1 above. The figure shows us that this study

frame not only in examining the nexus of decentralization and communal conflict in Indonesia, but also considering other determinants of communal conflict.

The conceptual framework above (Figure 2.1) also explains that communal conflict varied within regencies/cities and villages/neighborhoods determinants. **First**, In regencies/cities level, communal conflict associates with decentralization dimensions which consist of fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization. In regencies/cities level, several determinants may also relate to communal conflict, such follows:

- (1) Social Determinants, e.g.: Ethnic Fractionalization Index
- (2) Economic Determinants, e.g.: GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic Product)
Gini Ratio, and Poverty
- (3) Institutional Determinants, e.g.: NGO, and territorial force officers

Second, In villages/neighborhoods level, communal conflict may be varied by

- (1) Social determinants (e.g. social capital¹ (community group/network), daily crimes, slum areas,)
- (2) Economic determinants (e.g.: converted land to non agricultural use, mining area),
- (3) Institutional determinants (e.g: local traditional leader, local media), and
- (4) Environmental determinants (e.g.: natural disasters, and topography).