

Tujuan Rusia dalam Penjatuhan Sanksi Ekonomi Komoditas Pangan ke Uni Eropa pada Tahun 2014

SKRIPSI

Disusun untuk memenuhi sebagian persyaratan memperoleh gelar sarjana (S1) Jurusan Hubungan Internasional Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik

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ABSTRAK

Pada tahun 2014, hubungan dagang antara Rusia dan Uni Eropa mencapai puncak penurunan yang cukup drastis. Hal tersebut disebabkan adanya pemberlakuan sanksi ekonomi komoditas pangan yang diberlakukan oleh Rusia kepada Uni Eropa pada bulan Agustus 2014 atas keputusan Uni Eropa yang juga menjatuhkan sanksi kepada Rusia terkait campur tangan Rusia atas perpecahan di Ukraina dan aneksasi Krimea. Hal tersebut menimbulkan dampak yang cukup signifikan bagi kedua belah pihak dikarenakan Rusia memiliki ketergantungan sangat tinggi terhadap impor komoditas pangan. Dalam hal ini bisa dikatakan bahwa Rusia hampir tidak bisa memproduksi bahan pangannya sendiri sehingga harus mengimpor dari Uni Eropa. Uni Eropa sendiri merupakan partner terbesar bagi Rusia dalam hal impor komoditas pangan, sedangkan Rusia merupakan partner kedua terbesar bagi Uni Eropa setelah Amerika Serikat. Sengketa dagang ini sempat diajukan ke Badan Penyelesaian Sengketa WTO di bulan Juli 2014 namun Rusia kalah dalam sengketa tersebut.

Penelitian ini menjadi menarik untuk diteliti dikarenakan Rusia berani menjatuhkan sanksi kepada Uni Eropa bahkan ketika negara-negara barat memberi tekanan kepada Rusia. Dalam penelitian ini, penulis menggunakan konsep sanksi dari David W. Hunter untuk menjawab tujuan Rusia dalam menjatuhkan sanksi kepada Uni Eropa ditahun 2014 tersebut. Penelitian ini diharapkan mampu menjawab tujuan Rusia dalam penjatuhan sanksi sehingga sanksi tersebut dapat berlangsung hingga tahun 2018 ini.

Kata Kunci : Rusia, Sanksi Ekonomi, 2014, Uni Eropa, Aneksasi Krimea, Konsep Sanksi David W. Hunter

ABSTRACT

In 2014, trade relations between Russia and the European Union has reached a drastic decrease peak. This is due to the imposition of economic sanctions on food commodities imposed by Russia to the EU in August 2014 on the decision of the EU which also imposed sanctions on Russia related to Russian interference over divisions in the Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea. This has a significant impact on both sides as Russia has a very high dependence on imports of food commodities. In this case, it can be said, that Russia can hardly produce its own foodstuffs so it must import from the EU. The EU itself is the largest partner for Russia in terms of food commodity imports, while Russia is the second largest partner of the EU after the United States. This trade dispute was submitted to the WTO Dispute Authority in July 2014 but Russia lost the dispute.

This research is interesting to study because Russia dare to impose sanctions on the EU even when Western countries put pressure on Russia. In this study, the author uses the concept of sanctions from David W. Hunter to answer Russia's goal in imposing sanctions on the European Union in 2014. This research is expected to answer Russia's goal in imposing sanctions so this sanctions can last until now, 2018.

Keywords: Russia, Economic sanction, Economic Restriction, 2014, European Union, Annexation of Crimea, Concept of sanction by David W. Hunter

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BAB I

PENDAHULUAN

1.1 Latar Belakang Masalah

Dalam politik internasional, dikenal dua tipe kekuatan yang dimiliki oleh negara-negara di dunia, yaitu *hard power* dan *soft power*. Definisi ini pertama kali diperkenalkan oleh Joseph Nye (1990), dimana Nye mendefinisikan kekuatan sebagai kemampuan untuk mempengaruhi pihak lain untuk memperoleh hasil yang diinginkan.¹ *Hard power* adalah kemampuan untuk mengintimidasi melalui paksaan, yang biasanya melalui kekuatan militer, diplomasi koersif, dan sanksi ekonomi, sedangkan *soft power* adalah kemampuan negara untuk membujuk negara lain menggunakan pendekatan-pendekatan diplomasi, seperti menggunakan kultur, ideologi, dan sebagainya.²

Rusia adalah salah satu dari banyak negara yang secara konsisten menggunakan *hard power*nya dalam melakukan relasi dengan negara-negara sekitar. Hal tersebut dikarenakan Rusia memang memiliki sistem politik dan militer yang kuat. Rusia diketahui memiliki banyak persediaan senjata nuklir, mereka juga memiliki kekuatan militer yang tidak segan-segan untuk digunakan dalam mengintimidasi negara-negara tetangganya. Disamping secara militer,

¹ Jan Philipp Wagner, 2014, *The Effectiveness of soft power and hard power in contemporary international relations*, Diakses pada situs <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/14/the-effectiveness-of-soft-hard-power-in-contemporary-international-relations/> tanggal 12 April 2017 pukul 15.28

² Jan Wagner, Ibid.

ekonomi Rusia juga cukup kuat didukung oleh sumber daya alam yang dimiliki dan juga wilayahnya yang luas.

Pada bulan Januari 2014, Rusia kembali menggunakan *hard power*nya melalui sanksi ekonomi dengan mengeluarkan kebijakan embargo daging babi dan produk-produk komoditas baku daging babi dari negara-negara Uni Eropa, keputusan ini dikeluarkan berselang hanya lima hari sejak ditemukan empat kasus babi hutan yang terkena infeksi *African Swine Fever* atau ASF di Lithuania, Latvia, dan Polandia.³ Kebijakan ini langsung menuai kritik dari pihak Uni Eropa melalui *European Commission* dikarenakan embargo ini dianggap melanggar peraturan WTO (*World Trade Organization*), yaitu diskriminatif.⁴ Sesuai dengan dokumen Badan penyelesaian sengketa WTO nomor DS475⁵, Rusia dianggap telah melanggar peraturan perdagangan internasional yang tercantum dalam GATT 1994 Artikel I pasal 1 mengenai *most favoured nation*⁶, Artikel III pasal 4 adalah aturan mengenai perlakuan yang sama antara barang atau jasa di negara asal dengan negara tujuan,⁷ dan Artikel XI pasal 1 adalah peraturan mengenai tidak boleh ada pelarangan atau

³ Oscar Rousseau, 24 Februari 2017, Russia loses WTO appeal over ban on EU pork imports, diakses pada situs <http://www.globalmeatnews.com/Safety-Legislation/Russia-loses-WTO-appeal-over-ban-on-EU-pork-imports> tanggal 10 April 2017 pukul 11.20

⁴ Nick Saltmarsh, 22 Agustus 2016, WTO backs EU in row over Russian import ban on pigs pork, diakses pada situs <http://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/wto-backs-eu-in-row-over-russian-import-ban-on-pigs-pork/> tanggal 10 April 2017 pukul 14.05

⁵ Dokumen diperoleh dari situs resmi WTO https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds475_e.htm

⁶ Situs resmi WTO terkait Artikel I pasal 1 https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm#art1_1

⁷ Situs resmi WTO terkait Artikel 3 pasal 4 https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm#art3_4

pembatasan dagang dan pihak yang terlibat kontrak wajib menjaga hubungan dagang tersebut.⁸ Embargo ini ternyata mempengaruhi negara-negara lain di luar Eropa yaitu China, Korea Selatan, Taiwan, dan Jepang yang ikut memberhentikan sementara kegiatan ekspor daging babi khusus dari Polandia.⁹ Polandia sendiri memiliki ketergantungan yang cukup tinggi dari kegiatan ekspor daging babinya, ketika negara-negara tersebut menjatuhkan embargo, Polandia mengalami kerugian hingga mencapai 22 juta dolar AS per bulan dan produksi daging yang memenuhi pasar Uni Eropa yang menyebabkan harga daging menurun hingga 20% dan kelebihan produksi (*food gluts*)¹⁰

Pada tanggal 16 Maret 2014, konflik antara Rusia dan Uni Eropa semakin memanas ketika wilayah Krimea Peninsula berpisah dari Ukraina dan memutuskan untuk bergabung dengan Federasi Rusia melalui referendum. Hal tersebut membuat hubungan antara negara-negara barat ikut menegang. AS dan Uni Eropa menganggap bahwa bergabungnya Krimea menjadi bagian dari Rusia telah melanggar perbatasan teritorial dan kedaulatan Ukraina. Pada akhir bulan Maret 2014, Uni Eropa dan AS menjatuhkan sanksi kepada Rusia berupa pelarangan masuk dan pembekuan aset, serta pelarangan bagi warga negara AS dan Uni Eropa untuk membuat hubungan kontrak dengan orang-orang yang

⁸ Situs resmi WTO terkait Artikel XI pasal 1

https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm#art11_1

⁹ Laura checa, 23 april 2014, *European parliamentary research service*, diakses pada situs <https://epthinktank.eu/2014/04/23/russias-import-ban-on-eu-pork-meat/> tanggal 10 April 2017 pukul 11.00

¹⁰ Vladislav Vorotnikov, 18 Februari 2014, Poland reports losses due to ban on pork exports to Russia, diakses pada situs

<https://www.globalmeatnews.com/Article/2014/02/18/Poland-reports-losses-due-to-ban-on-pork-exports-to-Russia> tanggal 4 November 2017 pukul 15:17

terlibat dalam sanksi.¹¹ Uni Eropa juga mengeluarkan data nama-nama individu dan entitas yang terkena sanksi. Mereka adalah orang-orang yang dianggap bertanggungjawab atas aneksasi Krimea oleh Rusia dan juga entitas-entitas di Krimea dan Sevastopol yang dianggap telah terlibat bersama Rusia.¹²

Upaya Uni Eropa dalam menekan Rusia terus berlanjut hingga pada bulan Juni 2014, Uni Eropa secara resmi mengangkat sengketa embargo daging babi yang diberlakukan oleh Rusia sejak bulan Januari 2014 ke badan penyelesaian sengketa (*dispute settlement body*) WTO. Memasuki bulan Juli 2014,¹³ AS dan Uni Eropa kembali memperluas sanksi kepada Rusia dan membuat hubungan dagang mereka dengan Rusia semakin memanas.

Sanksi yang dijatuhkan oleh Uni Eropa tersebut membuat Presiden Putin menandatangani surat keputusan presiden no 560 yang menyatakan bahwa Rusia akan mengambil langkah-langkah ekonomi untuk menjaga keamanan nasional Rusia. Keputusan tersebut ditandatangani pada tanggal 6 Agustus 2014, Rusia menjatuhkan sanksi ekonomi pemberhentian impor dari Uni Eropa pada produk-produk agrikultural, bahan-bahan mentah dan pangan.¹⁴

Produk-produk pangan tersebut meliputi daging, susu, keju, buah-buahan dari Uni Eropa, Amerika Serikat, Canada, Australia, dan Norwegia karena negara-

¹¹ Igor Gorokhov, 2014, diakses pada situs [http://www.cls.ru/press-centre/news/international-legal-sanctions-of-eu-usa-and-russia-timeline-\(march-august-of-2014\)](http://www.cls.ru/press-centre/news/international-legal-sanctions-of-eu-usa-and-russia-timeline-(march-august-of-2014))/ tanggal 4 Mei 2017 pukul 11.03

¹² Terdapat setidaknya 150 orang dan 37 entitas yang masuk dalam sanksi Uni Eropa atas Rusia. Data diunduh pada situs https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en tanggal 11 Juni 2017 pukul 11.14

¹³ Igor, op.cit

¹⁴ Berdasarkan Dekrit Presiden no 560

negara tersebut telah melakukan sanksi kepada Rusia perihal konflik di Ukraina.¹⁵ Di tahun 2013,¹⁶ produk-produk pangan tersebut bernilai hingga 5.2 juta miliar Euro atau sekitar 4% dari keseluruhan produk ekspor pangan Uni Eropa.

Pemerintah Rusia sendiri telah menyatakan bahwa negaranya selama ini tidak mengambil tindakan apapun terkait sanksi yang diberlakukan oleh negara-negara barat terhadap dirinya. Namun pemerintah telah mempertimbangkan bahwa Rusia telah dipaksa untuk mengambil langkah tegas terkait sanksi tersebut. Hal tersebut disampaikan oleh pemerintah Rusia melalui Perdana Menteri, Dmitry Medvedev dalam konverensi pers. Dmitry mengatakan *“Russia has not responded to the so-called sanctions declared against it by certain countries... and now we have been forced to respond.”*¹⁷ Dalam konferensi pers tersebut, Medvedev juga menyatakan bahwa Rusia akan memberlakukan sanksi ini hingga jangka waktu 12 bulan kedepan terhitung dari bulan Agustus 2014 dan apabila pihak Uni Eropa dan negara barat lain tetap memberlakukan kebijakan yang mengancam Rusia, maka sanksi akan terus diberlakukan. Sanksi ini mempengaruhi sektor keuangan, minyak dan gas, energi, pertahanan, hingga penerbangan Rusia.

¹⁵ Unknown, 7 Agustus 2014, *Russia hits west with food import ban in sanctions row*, BBC News, diakses pada situs <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28687172> tanggal 10 April 2017 pukul 13.20

¹⁶ Unknown, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/russian-import-ban_en diakses pada 11 Juni 2017 pukul 10.04

¹⁷ Berdasarkan konverensi pers pemerintah Rusia <http://government.ru/en/news/14199/>

Pemerintah Rusia melalui Menteri Agrikultur, Nikolai Fyodorov, menyatakan bahwa *double standards*¹⁸ yang diberlakukan oleh Uni Eropa tidak akan berlaku di Rusia. “*When we pursue our partners’ interests, we don’t need to comply with the legal procedure, but we should insist on closer compliance when it comes to Russia’s interests.*”¹⁹ Hingga Agustus 2014, Sanksi dari Uni Eropa kepada Rusia tidak hanya dibidang ekonomi namun juga keuangan, energi, dan di sektor militer. Sanksi tersebut juga melibatkan tidak hanya negara, melainkan individu yaitu dengan pembekuan aset, pembekuan visa, dan sebagainya, dimana hal tersebut sangat mempengaruhi para pengusaha besar di Rusia, terutama mereka yang berada dalam *inner circle* Presiden Putin.²⁰ Sanksi ini juga berpengaruh terhadap institusi nasional Rusia, seperti Sberbank dan *the Russian Agricultural Bank* dari memperluas ekspor dibidang agrikultur dan menjamin keamanan pangan, sehingga pemerintah Rusia memutuskan untuk segera memberlakukan sanksi ekonomi kepada negara-negara barat yang telah memberikan sanksi dan mencari kerjasama dagang dengan negara lain yang lebih *friendly* dengan Rusia.

Pada bulan April 2015, kasus embargo daging babi Rusia kepada sejumlah negara di Uni Eropa bulan Januari 2014 silam yang sempat diadakan ke badan penyelesaian sengketa WTO oleh Uni Eropa kembali terangkat

¹⁸ Ibid. *Double standards* ini adalah dimana pemerintah Rusia menyayangkan bahwa negara tidak harus mempertimbangkan hukum internasional ketika membuat suatu kebijakan untuk kepentingan negara lain, namun ketika kebijakan dibuat untuk kepentingan nasional, Rusia diserang.

¹⁹ Ibid. hal 7

²⁰ *Unknown*, 15 September 2014, *How far do EU-US Sanctions on Russia go?*, BBC, diakses pada situs <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28400218> tanggal 13 April 2017 pukul 21.09

dengan munculnya laporan dari badan WTO sendiri. Saat itu, WTO menyatakan akan mengeluarkan laporan terkait sengketa embargo daging babi ini pada bulan Februari 2016 mendatang. Namun ternyata pada bulan Januari 2016, WTO memutuskan untuk mengundur laporan tersebut dikarenakan adanya perubahan pada *timetable* dan juga skala dan kompleksitas dari sengketa itu sendiri.²¹ Bulan Agustus 2016, WTO memutuskan bahwa Rusia telah melanggar aturan perdagangan internasional dengan melakukan diskriminasi. Rusia pun melakukan banding namun akhirnya di bulan Februari 2017 yang lalu, WTO tidak memenangkan Rusia dalam sengketa ini.²²

Sanksi ekonomi melalui embargo banyak dilakukan oleh negara-negara lain seperti Amerika Serikat yang pernah mengeluarkan embargo ekonomi terhadap Myanmar sebagai desakan agar terciptanya sistem pemerintahan yang demokrasi di Myanmar.²³ Namun dalam hal embargo ini, Rusia secara tiba-tiba memutus hubungan perdagangan daging babi dengan Uni Eropa, padahal sumber impor daging dan komoditas pangan Rusia terbesar adalah berasal dari Uni Eropa itu sendiri. Uni Eropa juga tidak terima atas keputusan tersebut dikarenakan Rusia merupakan partner dagang ketiga terbesar bagi Uni Eropa.²⁴

Rusia memutuskan untuk menjatuhkan sanksi komoditas pangan karena

²¹ Report WTO DS475 terkait sengketa embargo Rusia ke Uni Eropa https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds475_e.htm dimana sengketa embargo daging babi meluas hingga hampir ke seluruh komoditas pangan dari Uni Eropa

²² Oscar Rousseau, loc.cit

²³ Mustavidy Anggara dan Tri Joko Waluyo, skripsi, diunduh pada halaman <http://download.portalgaruda.org/article.php?article=185972&val=6444&title=Motivasi%20Amerika%20Serikat%20Menjatuhkan%20Embargo%20Ekonomi%20Terhadap%20Myanmar%20Tahun%202007> tanggal 11 April 2017 pukul 15.40

²⁴ Marcin Szczepanski, 2015, Economic Impact on the EU of Sanctions over Ukraine Conflict, European Parliamentary Research Service

memang ketergantungan dibidang pangan bagi kedua belah pihak cukup besar, Rusia melihat bahwa ekspor Uni Eropa ke Rusia dibidang komoditas pangan sangat besar apabila dibandingkan dengan sektor lain. Komoditas pangan yang dimaksud juga tidak termasuk produk-produk makanan bayi dan ternak karena tingkat ketergantungannya tidak cukup signifikan.²⁵

Kerugian akibat sanksi ekonomi dari Rusia bagi negara-negara di Uni Eropa cukup besar, dimana di tahun 2013 saja nilai ekspor dari Uni Eropa ke Rusia mencapai total 5,25 milyar euro dengan jumlah ketiga terbesar berasal dari negara Lithuania, Polandia, dan Jerman.²⁶ Polandia sendiri misalnya, sekitar 40% tujuan ekspor sayur-sayuran dan buah-buahan seperti apel, paprika, dan kol Polandia adalah ke Rusia dan sejak diberlakukannya embargo, harga komoditas pangan tersebut menurun cukup signifikan hingga 50%.²⁷ Tidak hanya kerugian dari segi harga, negara-negara Uni Eropa akhirnya mengalami kelebihan komoditas pangan terutama pangan yang seharusnya diekspor ke Rusia. Bagi Rusia sendiri, negaranya cukup percaya diri bahwa embargo ini tidak begitu berpengaruh terhadap keberlangsungan komoditas pangan di negaranya karena pemerintah telah mencari alternatif importir lain seperti dari Amerika Selatan dan China. Rusia juga telah cukup mandiri dibidang

²⁵ Ibid. hal 3

²⁶ Paul Scruton, 2013, Value of EU Agri-food banned from entering Russia, Eurostat.

Berdasarkan situs

https://static.guim.co.uk/ni/1408119325663/Russia_sanctions_WEB160814.pdf tanggal

5 Mei 2017 pukul 12.03

²⁷ Ibid.

komoditas pangan terutama gandum dan yang paling rendah adalah produk-produk dari daging.²⁸

Dengan isu yang telah dijelaskan secara singkat sebelumnya, penulis tertarik untuk meneliti mengenai tujuan Rusia dalam penjatuhan embargo ke Uni Eropa melalui sanksi ekonomi. Penulis memilih tahun 2014 sebagai tahun penelitian utama dikarenakan di tahun tersebut, pemerintah Rusia secara legal mengeluarkan Dekrit Presiden terkait dengan sanksi ekonomi ini. Hal tersebut menjadi menarik untuk diteliti dikarenakan ketahanan pangan bukan merupakan keunggulan dari Rusia dan Rusia malah menutup akses impor di bidang komoditas pangan, padahal dapat dilihat bahwa Rusia merupakan salah satu tujuan ekspor agrikultural terbesar bagi Uni Eropa dan Rusia sendiri memiliki ketergantungan yang cukup tinggi namun negaranya malah memutuskan untuk menutup diri. Dalam melakukan penelitian ini, konsep yang penulis gunakan adalah konsep sanksi yang dicetuskan oleh David W. Hunter dalam bukunya yang berjudul *Western Trade Pressure on the Soviet Union*, dimana dengan konsep tersebut diharapkan dapat membantu penulis dalam mengidentifikasi tujuan Rusia dalam embargo ini.²⁹

²⁸ Stephen K., 2014, Russia's food embargoes, Russian Analytical Digest no 157, Dallas

²⁹ David Hunter, 1991, *Western Trade Pressure on the Soviet Union : An interdependence Perspective on Sanctions*, Palgrave Macmillan

1.2 Rumusan Masalah

Dari latar belakang di atas maka penulis mengambil permasalahan yaitu
Apa Tujuan Rusia dalam Penjatuhan Sanksi Ekonomi Komoditas Pangan ke
Uni Eropa tahun 2014?

1.3 Tujuan Penelitian

Adapun tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mendeskripsikan mengenai
Tujuan Rusia dalam Penjatuhan Sanksi Ekonomi Komoditas Pangan ke Uni
Eropa di tahun 2014.

1.4 Manfaat Penelitian

Manfaat yang diambil dari hasil penelitian ini adalah :

1.4.1 Secara umum

Untuk kalangan mahasiswa khususnya Jurusan Hubungan
Internasional Universitas Brawijaya Malang agar dapat mengetahui
tentang tujuan Rusia dalam menjatuhkan sanksi komoditas pangan
dari Uni Eropa di tahun 2014.

1.4.2 Secara khusus

Dapat digunakan sebagai tinjauan pustaka untuk penelitian
selanjutnya dan sebagai salah satu informasi mengenai kebijakan
Rusia dalam menjatuhkan sanksi ekonomi komoditas pangan ke Uni
Eropa tahun 2014.

BAB II

KERANGKA PEMIKIRAN

2.1 Studi Terdahulu

Mengenai studi terdahulu penulis menggunakan buku milik David W.

Hunter yang berjudul *Western Trade Pressure on the Soviet Union* yang ditulis pada tahun 1991. Buku ini juga nantinya akan penulis gunakan sebagai dasar

konsep bagi penulis dalam melakukan penelitian. Dalam buku tersebut, Hunter

memberikan penjabaran mengenai dasar teori dan penggunaan praktis dari

konsep sanksi ekonomi. Tujuan dari penjabaran itu adalah untuk

memformulasikan sebuah model pendekatan untuk dipraktekkan dalam

kebijakan di Amerika Serikat. Untuk melihat kesuksesan dari sanksi ekonomi

diperlukan pengetahuan budaya, sejarah, dan ideologi baik dari negara pemberi

sanksi maupun negara target. Hunter melihat bahwa sanksi ekonomi merupakan

alat diplomasi yang dilakukan negara untuk mencapai kepentingan politik.

Sanksi tersebut oleh Hunter diklasifikasikan menjadi dua tujuan utama negara

dalam melakukan sanksi yaitu tujuan simbolik dan tujuan instrumental.¹

Dalam contoh penelitian menggunakan simbolik dan instrumental,

Hunter menemukan bahwa sanksi simbolik dan sanksi instrumental dilakukan

oleh Amerika Serikat dan Inggris dalam sanksi ekonomi berupa pembekuan

aset-aset bank kepada Iran diawal tahun 1980an dibawah kepemimpinan

¹ Hunter, op.cit hal 53

Presiden Jimmy Carter. Dalam kasus tersebut, Amerika Serikat melakukan sanksi instrumental kepada Iran, sedangkan Inggris melakukan kedua sanksi yaitu simbolik dan instrumental kepada Amerika Serikat. Dimana dalam hal ini, Inggris melakukannya sebagai bentuk dukungan kepada aliansi dan mencegah kebijakan AS agar tidak menginvasi Iran dengan memberikan sanksi positif.²

Penulis menggunakan buku milik Hunter tersebut selain dikarenakan penulis kesulitan menemukan penelitian lain yang menggunakan konsep Hunter, penulis juga menggunakan konsep yang sama yaitu konsep sanksi dalam menjelaskan tujuan negara dalam menjatuhkan sanksi namun studi kasus yang digunakan berbeda. Dalam hal ini, Hunter membantu penulis dalam menjabarkan mengenai tujuan-tujuan negara dalam melakukan sanksi sekaligus bagaimana mengoperasionalkan konsep.

Studi terdahulu yang penulis gunakan selanjutnya adalah paper dalam jurnal *Russian Analytical Digest* no 157 yang berjudul *Russia's Food Embargo* dan ditulis oleh Stephen K. Wergen ditahun 2014.³ Dalam penelitian tersebut tidak dijelaskan mengenai konsep yang digunakan oleh Wergen namun, penelitian tersebut dilakukan untuk melihat dampak dari embargo itu sendiri.

Apakah embargo pangan Rusia ini berpengaruh terhadap perilaku konsumsi dari masyarakat Rusia sendiri. Hal tersebut penting untuk diteliti dikarenakan hubungan ekspor dan impor antara Rusia dengan Uni Eropa merupakan

² Hunter, ibid. hal 46

³ Stephen K. Wergen, 2014, Central of Security Studies, Dallas, paper diunduh pada halaman <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD-157-8-12.pdf>

hubungan yang saling membutuhkan dan sumber ekspor pangan Rusia terbesar berasal dari Uni Eropa. Penelitian tersebut dilakukan secara kuantitatif dengan menganalisa data-data impor komoditas pangan Rusia tahun 2014, ketahanan pangan Rusia dalam kurun waktu 1997 hingga 2012, dan nilai ekspor-impor Rusia tahun 2010-2013 dalam mata uang dolar AS. Wergen juga membuat survei konsumen tahun 2014 terkait pengaruh sanksi impor komoditas pangan Rusia dalam rumah tangga, apakah terdapat kesulitan dalam membeli dan melakukan konsumsi bagi keluarga.

Dalam penelitian tersebut, Wergen pun menemukan bahwa pemerintah Rusia berusaha untuk mencari alternatif importir lain sehingga pola konsumsi masyarakatnya tidak berubah dan produk-produk pangan berkualitas tetap tersedia di supermarket dan pasar lokal Rusia. Dengan survei yang dilakukan juga ditemukan bahwa sebagian besar masyarakat tidak terlalu terpengaruh dengan kebijakan tersebut.⁴

Penulis menggunakan paper milik Wergen dikarenakan persamaan kasus yang diteliti, yaitu terkait kebijakan embargo Rusia ke Uni Eropa namun Wergen menggunakan konsep yang berbeda yaitu konsep pola konsumsi. Penelitian ini cukup membantu penulis terutama dalam memperoleh data-data terkait kebijakan embargo Rusia. Penulis juga menyumbang penelitian berupa tujuan-tujuan dari pemerintah Rusia itu sendiri dalam melakukan embargo ini kepada Uni Eropa.

⁴ Wergen, *ibid.*, hal 10-12

2.2 Kerangka Konseptual

2.2.1 Konsep Sanksi David W. Hunter⁵

Dalam penelitian ini, penulis juga menggunakan konsep sanksi dari David W. Hunter untuk menjelaskan mengenai tujuan-tujuan dari negara dalam memberlakukan sanksi, khususnya sanksi ekonomi.

Dalam konsep sanksi yang dicetuskan oleh Hunter, ia mengatakan bahwa sanksi merupakan suatu kebijakan atau strategi yang dilakukan oleh negara melalui *power*; dimana kekuatan tersebut dikelola dan dimanipulasi sedemikian rupa untuk mencapai kepentingan negara.⁶

Kekuatan ini merupakan sumber daya yang pasti dimiliki oleh setiap negara, berupa kekuatan militer, ekonomi, atau politik, walaupun kapasitasnya memang akan berbeda-beda di setiap negara. Hunter melihat bahwa kepentingan negara dapat dicapai melalui sanksi ekonomi sebagai bentuk implementasi kekuatan.

Istilah sanksi berasal dari ungkapan hukum romawi kuno yang memiliki konotasi *the penalty for a crime*. Hunter mendefinisikan konsep sanksi sebagai bentuk upaya amoral dari negara-negara untuk memanipulasi nilai-nilai kemanusiaan dengan tujuan mencapai tujuan politik.⁷ Upaya tersebut dilakukan oleh negara yang memiliki kemampuan untuk menutup sumber daya di negara target. Sanksi juga dapat dipahami sebagai elemen dari mempengaruhi. Setiap negara

⁵ Hunter., op.cit., hal 41

⁶ Hunter, Ibid., hal 43

⁷ Hunter, ibid., hal 41

memiliki kemampuan untuk mempengaruhi negara yang lain agar bertindak sesuai keinginannya. Dalam studi Hubungan Internasional, kemampuan mempengaruhi ini dikenal dengan istilah *power* yang juga identik dengan paksaan.

Sanksi ekonomi telah banyak dijadikan senjata oleh negara-negara dalam relasinya dengan negara lain. Biasanya sanksi dilakukan sebagai bentuk protes atau hukuman kepada negara-negara target atas kebijakan yang mereka keluarkan. Dengan dikeluarkannya sanksi ini maka negara-negara tersebut dapat mempengaruhi bahkan mengubah kebijakan di negara lain yang tidak mereka sukai tanpa harus menekan secara militer. Sanksi ekonomi menjadi alat yang sangat efektif bagi negara-negara untuk mencapai kepentingannya tanpa harus terjadi konflik secara militer.⁸

Margaret Doxey mendefinisikan sanksi ekonomi sebagai bentuk hukuman atau konsekuensi yang harus diterima negara target karena kegagalan mereka untuk mematuhi standar internasional atau kewajiban internasional.⁹ MS Daoudi dan MS Dajani juga mendefinisikan sanksi ekonomi sebagai suatu tindakan hukuman yang diprakarsai oleh sejumlah aktor internasional, terutama Organisasi dunia seperti

⁸ Chen-Yuan Tung, 2002, *China's Economic Leverage and Taiwan's Security concerns with respect to cross-strait Economic Relations*. John Hopkins University: Maryland

⁹ Margaret P. Doxey, *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 9.

Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa, melawan satu atau lebih negara karena telah melanggar kesepakatan yang disetujui secara universal.

Hunter juga memberikan pemahaman bahwa pemberian sanksi ekonomi merupakan bagian dari *power* suatu negara dimana dalam memberikan sanksi, suatu negara tidak harus secara spesifik mempunyai efek paksaan, selama negara target memiliki persepsi bahwa sanksi tersebut akan berdampak buruk pada negaranya biasanya mereka akan bertindak sebagaimana negara yang terancam.¹⁰ Pendefinisian sanksi ekonomi menurut Doxey dan Daoudi-Dajani lebih menekankan pada bagaimana sanksi diberlakukan karena pelanggaran atas norma-norma internasional namun Hunter melihat secara lebih umum, bahwa sanksi merupakan salah satu kebijakan luar negeri suatu negara.

Sejarah embargo cukup panjang dimana hingga akhir abad ke 19, negara-negara masih cenderung memilih untuk berperang dibandingkan harus melakukan cara lain (misalnya dengan sanksi ekonomi ini).¹¹ Sanksi sendiri terdiri dari dua tipe yaitu sanksi positif dan sanksi negatif.¹² Menurut Baldwin dalam bukunya *Economic Statecraft*, sanksi positif merupakan sanksi sebagai bentuk penghargaan kepada negara-negara karena mau mematuhi aturan yang ditetapkan, biasanya sanksi ini berupa penurunan tarif atau bantuan luar negeri.

¹⁰ Hunter, Op.cit., hal 42

¹¹ Melanie Marilyn Golliard, 2013, *Economic Sanctions: Embargo on stage. Theory and empirical evidence*, halaman 14 yang diunduh pada <https://tampub.uta.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/84444/gradu06628.pdf> diakses pada tanggal 27 April 2017 pukul 15.20

¹² Ibid., hal 22

Sedangkan sanksi negatif merupakan cara dunia internasional untuk menekan negara lain secara legal yang dilakukan sebagai bentuk protes atas perilaku tertentu. Baldwin menyatakan bahwa kedua sanksi ini dilakukan dengan cara yang berbeda namun untuk tujuan yang sama yaitu menjalankan kekuasaan dan mendorong kerjasama di antara negara-negara.¹³

Mengenai konsep ini juga, penulis melihat bahwa Hunter mampu menjelaskan mengenai tujuan-tujuan negara melalui penjatuhan sanksi apabila dibandingkan dengan Baldwin yang memang lebih menekankan pada efektifitas dari sanksi itu sendiri. Dalam hal ini, Rusia memutuskan untuk melakukan embargo komoditas pangan baik pangan mentah maupun jadi dari negara-negara Uni Eropa, Amerika Serikat, Kanada, dan Australia ditahun 2014¹⁴ yang masih berlaku hingga saat ini. Dimana sengketa tersebut akhirnya menarik perhatian internasional karena telah diajukan ke badan sengketa WTO dan Rusia terbukti melakukan pelanggaran dagang.

Dalam penelitian ini, penulis melihat bahwa Rusia merupakan negara yang cukup kuat untuk dibandingkan dengan Amerika Serikat atau negara-negara di Uni Eropa. Dikeluarkannya kebijakan embargo kepada Uni Eropa dan negara-negara barat yang mendukung Uni Eropa,

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Unknown, 2014, article, diakses pada situs <http://www.dw.com/en/russia-announces-full-embargo-on-most-food-from-us-eu/a-17838717> tanggal 20 Juni 2017 pukul 14.27

semata-mata dilakukan sebagai bentuk protes atas sanksi yang diberikan oleh negara-negara tersebut kepada Rusia.

Untuk memahami mengenai studi kasus tersebut, penulis menggunakan konsep sanksi dari David W. Hunter. Sanksi merupakan suatu kebijakan atau strategi dimana sumber daya diatur dan dimanipulasi untuk kepentingan si pemberi sanksi.¹⁵ Hunter membagi sanksi menjadi dua tujuan, yaitu tujuan simbolik dan tujuan instrumental. Konsep ini merupakan upaya dari Hunter untuk mengklasifikasikan kepentingan dari sanksi agar tidak terjadi kekeliruan dalam mengidentifikasi tujuan dari pemberian sanksi tersebut.

Tujuan simbolik meliputi :¹⁶

1 *Deflect from international criticism*

Indikator ini merupakan percobaan dari negara pemberi sanksi (*sanctioner*) untuk mengelak atau menghindar dari kritik internasional, hal tersebut dapat diidentifikasi apabila terdapat kritik dari dunia internasional terkait kebijakan dari negara *sanctioner* yang dianggap menyalahi aturan internasional sehingga muncul respon dari negara-negara lain sebagai bentuk kritik. Sanksi ini diberlakukan karena adanya kepentingan yang berbeda dari negara *sanctioner* dengan sistem internasional yang ada sehingga ia melakukan sanksi untuk mencari pembenaran atas perilakunya.

¹⁵ Hunter, Op.cit., hal 43

¹⁶ Hunter, Ibid., hal 45

2 *Concerned and raising visibility of an issue*

Indikator ini dilakukan negara pemberi sanksi untuk memunculkan perhatian dan menumbuhkan fokus terhadap isu. Dalam hal ini terdapat suatu isu yang muncul sehingga negara pemberi sanksi ingin menepis isu tersebut dengan mengangkat isu lain yang lebih sejalan dengan kepentingannya. Sanksi ini diberlakukan sebagai cara bagi negara pemberi sanksi untuk lebih mengangkat isu tersebut dibandingkan isu lain yang tidak sejalan.

3 *Willingness to take some action*

Indikator ini dilakukan karena adanya keinginan dari negara pemberi sanksi untuk mencapai suatu kebutuhan negara. Keinginan ini harus disertai oleh kemampuan negara dalam mengambil tindakan. Sehingga dalam hal ini, sanksi diberlakukan sebagai bentuk tindakan untuk memenuhi keinginan tersebut. Indikator ini dapat diidentifikasi apabila negara pemberi sanksi memiliki keinginan yang sejalan dengan tindakan sanksinya.

4 *Showing leadership initiative*

Indikator ini merupakan inisiatif dari negara pemberi sanksi untuk memperlihatkan kepemimpinannya, biasanya juga dilakukan negara untuk membuktikan bahwa negaranya tidak begitu tergantung dengan negara-negara yang diberikan sanksi. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari kepemimpinan dari pemimpin-pemimpin negara pemberi sanksi untuk memperlihatkan kepentingan dan bentuk bahwa sanksi

merupakan bentuk kebijakan luar negeri negara yang dilakukan atas dasar kepentingan.¹⁷

5 *Assigning moral judgment or responsibility*

Indikator ini dilakukan negara untuk mengangkat penghakiman moral dan tanggungjawab. Dalam hal ini sanksi diberlakukan sebagai upaya dari negara *sanctioner* untuk menentang kebijakan-kebijakan yang menurut mereka salah secara moral yang biasanya dilihat dari perbedaan sejarah, perbedaan motif, lingkungan, dan sebagainya. Dari faktor tersebut akan terlihat bagaimana negara mengambil keputusan. Apa yang dianggap sebagai hal yang bermoral bagi suatu negara belum tentu hal tersebut juga bermoral bagi negara yang lain, dan lingkungan menjadi faktor yang mempengaruhi bagaimana negara merasa memiliki tanggungjawab akan suatu isu.¹⁸

Sedangkan tujuan instrumental meliputi :¹⁹

1 *Internal resistance or political reforms*

Indikator ini merupakan upaya negara pemberi sanksi untuk merubah kebijakan politik di negara target. Dengan ini negara pemberi sanksi akan mendorong pertahanan internal atau reformasi politik untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut. Hal ini memerlukan sumber

¹⁷ Ibid., hal 45, Hunter memberikan contoh Presiden Carter yang melakukan *boycott* terhadap Uni Soviet yang telah menginvasi Afghanistan ditahun 1979, dimana peran seorang pemiimpin negara berpengaruh besar terhadap dibuatnya sebuah keputusan

¹⁸ Ibid. hunter menjelaskan bahwa aktor yang memiliki sumber daya lebih besar akan memiliki kemampuan lebih dalam melakukan penghakiman moral tersebut.

¹⁹ ibid

daya untuk mempengaruhi negara target sehingga tercapai perubahan sistem politik yang drastis.

2 *Deterring undesired action compelling desired action*

Indikator ini untuk melihat apakah ada keinginan dari negara pemberi sanksi untuk mencegah aksi-aksi yang tidak diinginkan atau untuk mendorong aksi-aksi yang diinginkan. Dalam indikator ini dapat diidentifikasi apabila ada *value deprivation* atau pengurangan nilai di negara target biasanya karena diakibatkan adanya penolakan barang, jasa, dan modal.

3 *Punishing past errors or extracting reprisals*

Indikator ini bertujuan untuk memberikan hukuman terhadap kesalahan di masa lalu atau adanya keinginan untuk membalas dendam. Biasanya negara pemberi sanksi memberlakukan sanksi karena ingin membalas dendam atas adanya ketidaksetujuan akan suatu kebijakan atau sebagai bentuk hukuman karena negara target memberlakukan kebijakan yang tidak disukai oleh *sanctioner*. Hal ini dapat diidentifikasi melalui kebijakan dari negara target yang berhubungan dengan negara pemberi sanksi.

4 *Encouraging acceptance of international norms*

Indikator ini bertujuan untuk mendorong penerimaan terhadap norma internasional misalnya hak asasi manusia, dan sebagainya.

Dimana negara pemberi sanksi memberlakukan sanksi agar negara target mematuhi norma-norma internasional tersebut.

5 *Managing political parties or alliances*

Indikator ini dilakukan sebagai bentuk usaha untuk mengurus partai politik dan aliansi. Biasanya negara-negara *sanctioner* memberlakukan sanksi tidak untuk kepentingan negaranya sendiri melainkan karena sebagai bentuk dukungan terhadap negara aliansi.

6 *Undermining a political regimes*

Indikator ini untuk melihat apakah ada upaya untuk meruntuhkan rezim politik tertentu. Sanksi diberlakukan karena negara *sanctioner* tidak setuju akan suatu rezim sehingga dengan sanksi diharapkan dapat merubah rezim tersebut. Hunter melihat bahwa negara pemberi sanksi merasa bahwa rezim tersebut mengancam mereka dalam mencapai kepentingan.

7 *Restoring the status quo*

Indikator ini untuk melihat apakah ada upaya untuk memperbaiki keadaan agar keadaan tersebut sama seperti sebelumnya dari negara *sanctioner* yang dapat dilihat dari dampak kebijakan sanksi terhadap negaranya.

Tujuan Rusia hingga akhirnya mengeluarkan kebijakan embargo kepada Uni Eropa, dapat dilihat berdasarkan dua tujuan yang telah dijabarkan oleh Hunter. Apakah tujuan tersebut lebih bersifat simbolik, instrumental, atau bahkan keduanya. Untuk mencapai tujuan yang bersifat simbolik misalnya, perlu dilihat apakah Rusia memiliki tujuan untuk mencari perhatian internasional terkait kasus negaranya dengan

Ukraina atau sebagai bentuk ketidaksetujuan atas tindakan negara lain atau bisa juga sebagai bentuk dukungan kepada negara aliansi. Tujuan simbolik tersebut dapat dicapai tanpa perlu memperhitungkan apakah sanksi yang diberikan akan memberi efek negatif pada negara target atau tidak.²⁰ Biasanya sanksi diberlakukan ketika upaya diplomasi biasa tidak lagi berjalan.

Sedangkan dalam mempertimbangkan tujuan yang bersifat instrumental, perlu dilihat apakah ada tujuan Rusia untuk mencari kepatuhan dari negara-negara tujuan dan tujuan ini dapat tercapai apabila memang ada pengurangan nilai (*value deprivation*) pada negara target yang biasanya dipengaruhi oleh penolakan barang, jasa, dan modal dari negara pemberi sanksi. Negara yang memiliki tujuan instrumental akan memiliki keinginan lebih besar untuk berhasil. Keberhasilan ini bisa dilihat misalnya dari sumber daya apa yang digunakan negara pemberi sanksi untuk dapat mengontrol negara target, seberapa besar tingkat ketergantungan negara target dengan negara pemberi sanksi, tingkat kepatuhan, biaya, dan strategi atau taktik yang digunakan untuk mendorong kepatuhan tersebut.²¹ Biasanya kedua sasaran tersebut, simbolik dan instrumental akan dilakukan oleh negara apabila mereka menggunakan sanksi ekonomi.

²⁰ Hunter, *ibid.*, hal 46

²¹ Hunter, *ibid.*, hal 47

2.3 Operasionalisasi Konsep

Dengan kerangka konseptual yang telah dijabarkan mengenai konsep sanksi dari David W. Hunter, penulis mengoperasionalkan konsep tersebut kedalam studi kasus yang akan diteliti yaitu tujuan Rusia dalam kebijakan embargo ke Uni Eropa sebagai berikut :

Konsep	Variabel	Indikator	Operasionalisasi
Sanksi	Sanksi Simbolik	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Deflect from international criticism</i> • <i>Concerned and raising visibility of an issue</i> 	<p>Adanya kebijakan dari Rusia yang ditentang oleh dunia Internasional namun berusaha dihindari oleh Rusia, yaitu Rusia yang menyetujui hasil referendum atas Krimea yang meminta untuk bergabung dengan Rusia dan keterlibatan Rusia secara militer di Ukraina. kritik Uni Eropa dan negara-negara lain muncul karena Rusia dianggap melanggar kedaulatan dari Ukraina.</p> <p>Adanya suatu isu dari Uni Eropa bahwa sanksi tidak akan terlalu berpengaruh bagi negara-negara Uni Eropa karena tingkat</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Willingness to take some action</i> 	<p>ketergantungan mereka yang lebih rendah dibandingkan Rusia, namun Rusia ingin mengangkat isu lain yang dianggap lebih penting, yaitu ingin menunjukkan bahwa ia merupakan partner dagang yang strategis bagi Uni Eropa dan adanya ketahanan pangan yang ingin dicapai.</p> <p>Adanya upaya negara yaitu Rusia untuk memenuhi keinginan negaranya yang dapat dicapai dalam suatu bentuk tindakan sanksi. Keinginan ini adalah untuk bebas dari ketergantungan pangan Uni Eropa di tahun 2020 mendatang sehingga sanksi yang dilakukan adalah sanksi di sektor komoditas pangan.</p>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Showing leadership initiative</i> 	<p>Adanya pengaruh dari presiden Rusia, Vladimir Putin hingga akhirnya ia menandatangani Dekrit Presiden untuk mengembargo komoditas pangan Uni Eropa secara penuh.</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Assigning moral judgment or responsibility</i> 	<p>Adanya kebijakan yang dikeluarkan oleh Uni Eropa yang tidak rasional bagi Rusia yang biasanya dipengaruhi oleh perbedaan sejarah, perbedaan motif, lingkungan, dan sebagainya, walaupun sama-sama mengembargo namun Rusia merasa bahwa embargo dari Uni Eropa tidak rasional dan hanya berdasarkan sentiment terhadap Rusia, sehingga Rusia akhirnya merasa dituntut untuk melakukan aksi balasan.</p>

<p>Sanksi Instrumental</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Internal resistance or political reforms</i> • <i>Deterring undesired action or compelling desired action</i> 	<p>Adanya tujuan dari Rusia untuk merubah kebijakan di Uni Eropa terhadap negaranya terkait sanksi ke Rusia yang telah merugikan beberapa pihak, baik level individu maupun nasional.</p> <p>Dalam hal ini terdapat reformasi politik untuk mendorong pertahanan internal dari rusia itu sendiri yaitu dengan mengganti Menteri Agrikulturnya untuk lebih mencapai ketahanan pangan.</p> <p>Adanya tujuan yang ingin dicapai oleh Rusia misalnya ingin mengurangi nilai ekspor dan impor di Uni Eropa karena telah memberikan kerugian akibat sanksi ekonomi. Hal tersebut dilakukan berupa penolakan Rusia terhadap barang dan jasa, atau modal dari Uni Eropa.</p>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Punishing or extracting reprisals</i> 	<p>Adanya tujuan Rusia untuk melakukan hukuman atau upaya untuk balas dendam disebabkan oleh adanya kebijakan yang tidak disetujui, yaitu sanksi yang diberlakukan Uni eropa terhadap negaranya terkait aneksasi Krimea.</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Encouraging acceptance of international norms</i> 	<p>Adanya keinginan dari Rusia untuk mengangkat norma internasional yaitu sanksi ekonomi sebagai norma internasional yang diakui secara legal sebagai alat kebijakan ekonomi luar negeri suatu negara.</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Managing political parties or alliances</i> 	<p>Adanya upaya dari Rusia untuk mencari aliansi melalui negara-negara yang akhirnya mendukung Rusia dalam menjatuhkan sanksi kepada Uni Eropa. Dukungan-dukkungan ini banyak berasal dari negara-</p>




		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Undermining a political regimes</i> • <i>Restoring status quo</i> 	<p>negara Eropa Tengah dan Eropa Timur serta Asia.</p> <p>Adanya rasa terancam bagi Rusia akan suatu rezim yaitu sanksi ekonomi dari Uni Eropa, sehingga melalui sanksi diharapkan dapat merubah rezim tersebut.</p> <p>Adanya upaya Rusia untuk mengembalikan keadaan terutama kondisinya atau posisinya di daratan Eropa yang dapat dilihat dari dampak kebijakan Rusia bagi Rusia sendiri sebelum dan sesudah sanksi.</p>
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2.4 Argumen Utama

Berdasarkan operasionalisasi konsep tersebut, kebijakan Rusia dalam menjatuhkan sanksi embargo kepada Uni Eropa dilatarbelakangi oleh dua tujuan yaitu yang bersifat simbolik dan juga yang bersifat instrumental. Tujuan simbolik meliputi *Deflect from international criticism*, *Concerned and raising visibility of an issue*, *Willingness to take some action*, *Showing leadership initiative*, dan *Assigning moral judgement and responsibility* sedangkan tujuan instrumental meliputi *Internal Resistance or political reforms*, *Deterring undesired action or compelling desired action*, *Punishing or extracting reprisals*, *Encouraging acceptance of international norms*, *Managing political parties or alliances*, *Undermining a political regimes*, dan *Restoring status quo*.

2.5 Alur Pemikiran



BAB III

METODE PENELITIAN

3.1 Jenis Penelitian

Dalam melakukan penelitian ini, penulis menggunakan penelitian deskriptif dimana penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menyajikan gambaran lengkap suatu fenomena yang akan dikaji dengan mendeskripsikan variabel-variabel yang telah sesuai dengan permasalahan dari fenomena tersebut. Penulis memilih untuk melakukan penelitian ini dikarenakan jenis penelitian ini sesuai dengan fenomena yang akan dikaji dan diharapkan dapat membantu dalam memberikan gambaran-gambaran atau analisa terkait fenomena tersebut.

Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menghasilkan gambaran mengenai fenomena yang dikaji, dalam hal ini membahas mengenai tujuan Rusia dalam mengembargo komoditas pangan dari Uni Eropa. Juga, penelitian ini akan menyajikan informasi dasar terkait hal tersebut, mengklasifikasikan subjek penelitian yaitu negara dan organisasi internasional, dalam hal ini Uni Eropa, serta akhirnya dapat penulis gunakan untuk menjelaskan proses dari fenomena yang akan dikaji sehingga dapat menjawab permasalahan yang akan diteliti.

3.2 Ruang Lingkup Penelitian

Untuk menghindari pembahasan makalah penelitian yang terlalu luas, maka dalam membahas kepentingan nasional Rusia dalam kebijakan embargo ke Uni Eropa ini, penulis hanya akan memberikan pembahasan terkait variabel-variabel yang terkait dengan judul penelitian. Untuk itu, penelitian ini dilakukan sebatas pada apakah ada tujuan tertentu dari Rusia sehingga negaranya memutuskan untuk mengembargo komoditas pangan dari Uni Eropa, dan juga akan disinggung mengenai badan sengketa WTO yang akhirnya memenangkan Uni Eropa dalam kasus embargo ini. Pada fenomena ini, penulis menggunakan data-data dari tahun 2014 sesuai dengan awal mula Rusia memutuskan untuk mengembargo Uni Eropa, namun tidak menutup kemungkinan untuk menggunakan data-data di tahun sebelumnya untuk mendukung proses penelitian dalam kurun waktu 2010-2017

3.3 Teknik Pengumpulan Data

Dalam melakukan penelitian ini, penulis mengumpulkan data-data sekunder atau tersier yang bisa diperoleh dari situs-situs terpercaya di Internet ataupun buku-buku literatur yang terkait dengan fenomena yang akan dikaji.

3.4 Teknik Analisa Data

Teknik analisa data yang digunakan adalah kualitatif yaitu bagaimana setelah data-data yang terkait dengan fenomena yang akan dikaji berhasil dikumpulkan, selanjutnya penulis akan memilih dan mengurangi data-data yang

akan digunakan sehingga lebih spesifik dan sesuai dengan tujuan penelitian.

Data-data tersebut bisa berupa fakta-fakta, dokumen terkait dengan kebijakan embargo Rusia, buku, internet, ataupun catatan pribadi penulis.

3.5 Sistematika Penulisan

Sistematika penulisan pada penelitian ini terdiri dari enam bab yaitu :

Bab I Pendahuluan, terdiri dari latar belakang masalah yang berisi mengenai urgensi masalah dari penelitian, Perumusan masalah yang berupa pertanyaan penelitian, Tujuan penelitian berupa jawaban atas pertanyaan penelitian, dan Manfaat penelitian yang dapat memberikan kontribusi baik bagi masyarakat, institusi terkait, dan peneliti selanjutnya.

Bab II Kerangka Pemikiran, terdiri dari Studi Terdahulu yang berisi mengenai penelitian-penelitian yang telah dilakukan sebelumnya terkait penelitian penulis, Kerangka Konseptual yang berisi jabaran akan konsep dan indikator yang penulis gunakan dalam penelitian, Operasionalisasi Konsep merupakan operasionalisasi dari variabel dan indikator konsep yang dikaitkan dengan studi kasus dalam penelitian penulis, Argumen Utama berisikan argument awal penulis sebagai dasar dalam melakukan penelitian, Alur Pemikiran adalah logika pemikiran penulis dari bab I hingga bab II Argumen Utama.

Bab III Metode Penelitian, terdiri dari Jenis Penelitian, Ruang Lingkup Penelitian, Teknik Pengumpulan Data, Teknik Analisa Data, Sistematika Penulisan. Dimana pada bab ini, penulis memaparkan cara menyusun tulisan

hingga menjadi tulisan yang komprehensif dan dapat dijadikan sumber informasi terpercaya.

Bab IV Gambaran Umum tentang konflik Rusia-Ukraina, Sikap pemerintah Rusia dan *Agri-food trade* Rusia yang akan berisi mengenai penjabaran konflik yang terjadi antara Rusia dan Ukraina hingga akhirnya Rusia menganeksasi wilayah Semenanjung Krimea, sikap pemerintah Rusia terkait dengan penjatuhan sanksi yang diberlakukan oleh Uni Eropa, dan perkembangan kerjasama dagang agrikultur Rusia itu sendiri.

Bab V Tujuan Rusia menjatuhkan Embargo ke Uni Eropa di Tahun 2014 yang berisi mengenai analisa tujuan dari pemerintah Rusia itu sendiri hingga memutuskan untuk menjatuhkan sanksi ekonomi komoditas pangan kepada Uni Eropa yang dijelaskan melalui penjabaran dari variabel dan indikator-indikator konsep sanksi David Hunter.

Bab VI Penutup, yang berisi kesimpulan dari penelitian dan saran

BAB IV

GAMBARAN UMUM

4.1 Konflik Perdagangan antara Uni Eropa dan Rusia di Tahun 2014

Melihat kebelakang mengenai hubungan kerjasama dibidang agribisnis antara Rusia dan Uni Eropa, keduanya telah lama menjalin kerjasama dagang sejak disahkannya *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement* pada tanggal 1 Desember 1997.¹ Perjanjian dagang tersebut juga mengatur mengenai hubungan politik dan ekonomi antar kedua belah pihak. Secara umum, Rusia merupakan partner dagang ketiga terbesar bagi Uni Eropa, sedangkan Uni Eropa merupakan partner dagang pertama bagi Rusia. Pasar ekspor Uni Eropa ke Rusia didominasi oleh mesin dan peralatan transportasi, bahan-bahan kimia, serta obat-obatan dan produk agrikultural. Namun dalam hal pasar agrikultural, Rusia merupakan importir kedua terbesar bagi Uni Eropa setelah Amerika Serikat.² Hubungan tersebut pun harus merengang sejak diberlakukannya sanksi dan mengharuskan mereka untuk mencari partner lain.


¹ Ana Martinez Juan. 20 November 2015. Diakses pada situs <https://epthinktank.eu/2015/11/20/russian-measures-against-european-union-agricultural-products-one-year-on/> tanggal 9 september 2017 pukul 12:05

² Ibid.

Apabila melihat dari gambar tabel GDP³ dibawah, tahun 2013 hingga tahun 2015 merupakan saat-saat dimana Rusia mengalami penurunan GDP yang signifikan.

Padahal dari tahun 2009 hingga 2013, Rusia mengalami kenaikan GDP cukup besar.

Tabel 1 GDP Rusia dalam Milliar US Dollar



Penurunan di tahun 2013 hingga 2014, tidak terlepas dari dampak embargo daging babi Rusia kepada negara-negara tertentu seperti Amerika Serikat, Lithuania, dan sebagainya dikarenakan adanya virus flu babi pada daging-daging impor tersebut. Di awal tahun 2014 tepatnya pada bulan Januari, Rusia memutuskan untuk menjatuhkan embargo daging babi kepada beberapa negara di Uni Eropa seperti Polandia, Lithuania, dan Latvia dikarenakan ditemukan virus Flu babi di negara-negara tersebut. Saat itu Uni Eropa mengancam kebijakan embargo Rusia tersebut dikarenakan virus Flu babi tersebut datang dari Rusia sendiri tepatnya di wilayah perbatasan antara Rusia dan Belarus. Daging-daging mentah seperti babi merupakan salah satu sumber pangan impor terbesar bagi Rusia, hal tersebut menyebabkan Rusia mencari alternatif sumber

³ Sumber TABEL 1
 Andrey Movchan, 2017, hal 12, Decline, not collapse: the bleak prospects for russia's economy, Carnegie. Diakses pada situs http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Movchan_2017_web_Eng_2.pdf tanggal 29 September 2017 pukul 21:51

lain seperti dari China. Memasuki tahun 2014, tidak mengherankan apabila terjadi penurunan yang signifikan dimana kegiatan ekspor-impor terutama komoditas pangan Rusia harus berhenti.

Data dibawah ini merupakan tabel ekspor komoditas pangan Uni Eropa dalam kurun waktu 2013 hingga 2015 ke negara-negara yang menjalin kerjasama dagang *agri-food*, dimana Rusia merupakan negara kedua importir

Tabel 2 Ekspor Komoditas Pangan Uni Eropa tahun 2013-2015

EU28 agri-food exports to (million Euro) COMEXT	cumulative data: August to July				monthly data: July			
	Aug 2013- Jul 2014	Aug 2014- Jul 2015	Difference Aug14 - Jul15 to Aug13 - Jul14		Jul 2014	Jul 2015	Difference Jul 2015 to Jul 2014	
	mio €	mio €	mio €	%	mio €	mio €	mio €	%
Extra-EU28	120 755	127 458	6 704	6%	10 355	11 211	856	8%
United States	15 696	18 258	2 563	16%	1 413	1 735	322	23%
China	7 064	9 407	2 343	33%	738	1 025	287	39%
Switzerland	7 138	7 471	333	5%	560	616	56	10%
Russian Federation	11 006	6 277	- 4 729	-43%	833	480	- 353	-42%
Japan	5 335	5 233	- 102	-2%	512	491	- 21	-4%
Hong Kong	4 139	4 933	794	19%	368	377	9	2%
Saudi Arabia	3 960	4 352	392	10%	360	434	74	20%
Norway	3 970	4 044	74	2%	319	310	- 9	-3%
Algeria	3 542	3 409	- 133	-4%	185	261	77	41%
Turkey	2 648	3 343	696	26%	210	263	53	25%
Canada	3 142	3 292	150	5%	280	295	14	5%
United Arab Emirates	2 545	2 898	353	14%	221	282	61	28%
Australia	2 382	2 695	314	13%	233	275	41	18%
Korea, Republic of	1 955	2 526	571	29%	190	195	5	3%
Egypt	1 875	2 370	495	26%	110	152	42	38%
Singapore	1 987	1 964	- 23	-1%	181	193	12	6%
Brazil	1 581	1 672	91	6%	149	150	1	1%
South Africa	1 540	1 656	117	8%	133	175	42	32%
Morocco	1 498	1 509	11	1%	77	96	20	25%
Ukraine	1 999	1 443	- 556	-28%	133	110	- 23	-17%
<i>other countries</i>	<i>35 754</i>	<i>38 705</i>	<i>2 951</i>	<i>8%</i>	<i>3 149</i>	<i>3 296</i>	<i>147</i>	<i>5%</i>

produk agrikultur terbesar setelah Amerika Serikat.⁴ Sejak diberlakukannya sanksi, kegiatan ekspor dengan Rusia pun menurun hingga mencapai 43% dari

⁴ TABEL 2

Russian import embargo: EU export development until July 2015. Diunduh pada situs https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/russian-import-ban/pdf/2015-09-22-russian-import-ban_en.pdf tanggal 9 september 2017 pukul 12:05



akumulasi bulan Agustus dan Juli tahun 2013-2014 dan 2014-2015, sedangkan apabila dilihat per bulan Juli 2014 hingga 2015 mencapai 42%. Namun juga dapat dilihat bahwa Uni Eropa mencari alternatif dagang ke negara-negara seperti China, Korea Selatan, Mesir, Turki, dan Hongkong.

Tahun 2013 hingga 2015, menjadi tahun-tahun yang cukup berat bagi Rusia.

Negara-negara Barat seperti Amerika Serikat dan negara-negara yang tergabung dalam Uni Eropa secara kompak menjatuhkan sanksi ekonomi kepada Rusia terkait dengan tindakannya dalam menganeksasi wilayah Semenanjung Krimea, Ukraina. Sektor yang dituju juga merupakan sektor-sektor utama yang memegang peranan penting bagi perekonomian di Rusia. Namun, penjatuhan sanksi tersebut nyatanya tidak membuat Rusia mengubah kebijakannya bahkan hingga saat ini. Rusia juga menyalahkan Uni Eropa atas krisis ekonomi yang sedang terjadi di Eropa dikarenakan oleh sanksi yang mereka jatuhkan sendiri. Walaupun begitu, Rusia tetap pada pendiriannya bahwa mereka akan melakukan apapun untuk mencapai kepentingan negara dan mereka tetap percaya diri bahwa sanksi tersebut tidak memberikan dampak yang parah bagi perekonomian Rusia.

Kemudian dilihat dari data ekspor per sektor komoditas,⁵ sektor pangan ini merupakan produk-produk yang masuk kedalam daftar embargo Rusia, Rusia mampu mengurangi impornya dari Uni Eropa hingga diatas 50%, bahkan untuk produk susu diberhentikan total. Tindakan balasan yang dilakukan oleh Rusia, embargo komoditas pangan, merupakan langkah yang cukup dapat memberikan *damage* pada negara-negara tujuan. Komoditas pangan merupakan salah satu sektor terpenting dalam perekonomian karena merupakan kebutuhan

⁵ Sumber TABEL 3, Ibid.

Tabel 3 Perbandingan Ekspor Komoditas Pangan Uni Eropa ke Rusia dan EU-28 tahun 2013-2015

EU28 agri-food exports (in million €)	Extra-EU28			Russian Federation		
	Aug 2013 - July 2014	Aug 2014 - July 2015	%	Aug 2013 - July 2014	Aug 2014 - July 2015	%
Bovine sector (total)	1.374	1.685	23	221	95	-57
Pig sector (total)	5.729	5.753	0	810	42	-95
Poultry sector (total)	2.015	2.121	5	132	44	-67
Butter	653	671	3	164	2	-99
Cheese	3.892	3.346	-14	964	34	-97
Skimmed milk powder	1.825	1.645	-10	58	0	-100
Whole milk powder	1.657	1.259	-24	13	0	-100
Fruit &Vegetables	6.991	6.160	-12	1.900	210	-89

pokok manusia yang dikonsumsi setiap saat. Apabila suatu negara memiliki ketersediaan pangan yang lebih kecil dibandingkan dengan kebutuhannya maka akan menimbulkan ketidakstabilan ekonomi, sehingga dalam kasus ini solusi yang dapat diberikan adalah Rusia harus mencari partner dagang lain yang dapat menutupi kekurangan pangannya baik dari segi impor dan ekspor.

Sebelum memberlakukan sanksi, Rusia memang terlihat telah mengincar pasar-pasar Asia seperti China. Pada bulan Mei 2014, Rusia dan China menyepakati kerjasama energi selama 30 tahun dan kerjasama ini merupakan yang terbesar sepanjang sejarah.⁶ Di sisi lain, kepentingan Rusia dengan Asia konsisten dimana Rusia membutuhkan negara-negara berkembang di Asia sebagai pembeli untuk sumber mineralnya dan sebagai eksporter komoditas pangan. Namun tetap sulit bagi Rusia untuk bisa mencari rekan dagang yang setara dengan Uni Eropa sehingga sampai krisis diselesaikan,

⁶ Sebastian Paust, 2014, From the Russian's federation focus on Europe to its pivot to asia. Diakses pada <https://www.asiapathways-adbi.org/2014/11/from-the-russian-federations-focus-on-europe-to-its-pivot-to-asia/> tanggal 30 september 2017 pukul 23:51

Rusia akan berusaha menyeimbangkan sumber dan produksi komoditas pangannya dari negara-negara di Asia.⁷

4.2 Konflik antara Rusia dan Ukraina hingga sanksi Uni Eropa kepada Rusia

4.1.1 Konflik Ukraina dan aneksasi Rusia

Konflik yang terjadi antara Rusia dan Ukraina telah lama menjadi sorotan dunia internasional seperti PBB dan Uni Eropa terutama terkait dengan aneksasi semenanjung Krimea yang dilakukan oleh Rusia. Rusia sendiri memiliki ketertarikan sumber daya minyak dan gas yang kaya di Krimea. Dalam kurun waktu 2011 hingga 2013 nilai impor gas Ukraina dari Rusia menurun cukup signifikan dari 45 bcm (*billion cubic meters*) menjadi 28 bcm.⁸ Wilayah Krimea menjadi salah satu cadangan gas terbesar bagi Ukraina dengan estimasi antara 4 hingga 13 triliun cm yang tersedia di Laut Hitam.⁹ Hal tersebut membuat Ukraina percaya diri untuk mencapai ketahanan energi di tahun 2035 dan memutuskan impor gas dari Rusia di tahun 2020.¹⁰

Sejak tahun 1991, internal Ukraina telah mengalami perpecahan antara wilayah timur dan barat sejak jatuhnya Uni Soviet. Wilayah barat menjadi wilayah yang lebih condong untuk berintegrasi dengan Eropa, sedangkan wilayah timur dan wilayah selatan lebih didominasi oleh Rusia. Dapat dilihat

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Frank Umbach, *The Energy Dimensions of Russia's annexation of Crimea*, NATO. Diakses pada situs <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/NATO-Energy-security-running-on-empty/Ukraine-energy-independence-gas-dependence-on-Russia/EN/index.htm> tanggal 27 September 2017 pukul 18:11

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

pada gambar¹¹ di bawah bahwa wilayah-wilayah timur dan selatan memiliki kedekatan teritorial dengan Rusia sedangkan wilayah barat berbatasan langsung dengan Romania dan Polandia.

Sejak abad ke-18, Krimea sendiri merupakan bagian dari Rusia hingga Nikita Khrushchev¹² secara sukarela memberikan wilayah tersebut kepada Krimea ditahun 1954 sebagai bentuk ‘persahabatan’.¹³ Saat itu Ukraina masih menjadi wilayah Uni Soviet hingga akhirnya memerdekakan diri ketika Uni Soviet jatuh di masa Perang Dingin, sehingga saat ini ada rasa kedekatan wilayah dan budaya antara Rusia dan Ukraina. Bahasa Rusia sendiri banyak digunakan di wilayah

Gambar 1 Peta wilayah Ukraina



timur dan selatan Ukraina dan sebagian besar masyarakat Ukraina dapat

¹¹ Sumber Gambar 1.

Unknown. 2015. Ukraine crisis in maps. BBC News diakses secara online pada situs <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27308526> tanggal 27 September 2017 pukul 15:51

¹² Khrushchev merupakan seorang politikus (Sekretaris dari partai komunis Uni Soviet dan Perdana Menteri) yang pernah memimpin Uni Soviet pada masa Perang Dingin.

¹³ Roberto Savio, 2016, The Tension between Europe and Russia, Wall Street International. Diakses pada situs <https://wsimag.com/economy-and-politics/20823-the-tension-between-europe-and-russia> pada tanggal 24 September 2017 pukul 17:16

berbicara bahasa Rusia, hal tersebut juga yang mendorong pengesahan Undang-Undang bahasa Rusia sebagai bahasa resmi kedua di Ukraina di tahun 2010.¹⁴

Pada bulan November 2013 merupakan puncak dari konflik, dimana presiden Ukraina saat itu, Presiden Viktor Yanukovych memutuskan untuk menolak kesepakatan dengan Uni Eropa untuk menjalin kerjasama yang lebih erat dengan Rusia.¹⁵ Uni Eropa telah mengajak Ukraina dalam perjanjian terkait kerjasama, perdagangan bebas, dan bantuan finansial dengan imbalan reformasi demokratis yang akan ditandatangani pada tanggal 29 November 2013, namun Yanukovych menunda penandatanganan perjanjian tanpa batas waktu.¹⁶ Hal tersebut membuat Uni Eropa menduga bahwa Ukraina telah lebih dulu menjalin kerjasama dengan Rusia ketika kedua pemimpin negara secara rahasia bertemu di landasan militer dekat Moskow.¹⁷ Keputusan tersebut menimbulkan krisis internal yang cukup besar dan demo besar-besaran dari masyarakat anti-pemerintah di Kiev, ibukota Ukraina. Berdasarkan data dari BBC,¹⁸ pemberontakan tersebut mencapai setidaknya 100.000 orang yang turun ke jalan dan pada bulan Desember jumlahnya meningkat hingga 800.000 orang.

Pada tanggal 16 Januari 2014,¹⁹ parlemen Ukraina mengeluarkan Undang-Undang anti-protes yang membatasi kebebasan berekspresi dan memicu

¹⁴ Ruslan Burhani, 2014, DK PBB Gagal sepakati resolusi untuk Ukraina, antaranews. Diakses pada situs <http://www.antaraneews.com/berita/424274/dk-pbb-gagal-sepakati-resolusi-untuk-ukraina> tanggal 27 September 2017 pukul 17:54

¹⁵ Unknown, 2013, How the EU lost Ukraine, diakses pada situs <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-the-eu-lost-to-russia-in-negotiations-over-ukraine-trade-deal-a-935476.html> tanggal 27 September 2017 pukul 18:49

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Unknown, BBC, loc.cit

¹⁹ Ibid.

bentrokan kekerasan di Kiev²⁰ karena pemberontakan menimbulkan banyak korban jiwa dan pengunjuk rasa anti-Yanukovych mula menyerbu kantor pemerintah daerah. Krisis tersebut semakin meningkat dimana pada tanggal 20 Februari 2014²¹ tercatat bahwa setidaknya 88 orang terbunuh hanya dalam jangka waktu 2 hari dan ratusan lainnya luka-luka dalam pemberontakan di Kiev antara pengunjuk rasa dengan aparat kepolisian dan penembak jitu berseragam. Ketika itu presiden Yanukovych telah menghilang sehingga pengunjuk rasa dapat menguasai gedung-gedung pemerintahan.

Masyarakat anti-pemerintahan melalui parlemen saat itu berhasil menggulingkan kekuasaan Yanukovych dengan memutuskan untuk memberhentikan kekuasaannya dengan pemilihan di bulan Mei 2014.²² Para aparat kepolisian elit pun dibubarkan karena bertanggung jawab atas kematian puluhan pengunjuk rasa dan sempat dikeluarkan pembatalan Undang-Undang tahun 2010 yang menjadikan Rusia bahasa resmi kedua Ukraina, namun hal tersebut menimbulkan protes besar dari masyarakat pro Rusia. Pemberontakan terjadi terutama di wilayah Krimea dimana pasukan bersenjata pro Rusia menguasai gedung utama di ibukota Krimea, yaitu Simferopol.

²⁰ Undang-Undang anti-protes dikecam oleh Uni Eropa walaupun akhirnya pada tanggal 31 Januari, Yanukovych secara resmi mencabut undang-undang ini. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*, 2014, Diakses pada situs <http://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/news/17748-rezolyucija-jevropejskogo-parlamentu-shhodo-situaciji-v-ukrajini-vid-06022014-roku> diakses pada tanggal 28 September 2017 pukul 11:44

²¹ Unknown, BBC, loc.cit

²² Ibid.

Sebagian besar masyarakat Ukraina juga mengidentifikasi diri sebagai etnis Rusia yang berbicara bahasa Rusia sebagai bentuk keterlibatan Rusia selama setidaknya 200 tahun di wilayah tersebut.²³ Di bulan Maret 2014, parlemen Krimea secara resmi mengeluarkan referendum untuk wilayah Krimea bergabung dengan Rusia dan diperoleh hasil total 97%²⁴ memutuskan untuk menjadi bagian dari Rusia. Di wilayah Sevastopol sendiri mencapai 95,6%.²⁵

Gambar 2 Hasil Referendum Krimea



Rusia pun secara resmi mengirim pasukan militer ke wilayah Krimea dengan alasan untuk membantu sebagian besar masyarakat Rusia dalam krisis Krimea. Namun jumlah tersebut diperdebatkan setelah muncul dokumen yang

menyatakan bahwa hanya sekitar 50 hingga 60 persen²⁶ yang menyetujui referendum. Referendum tersebut dikecam oleh dunia internasional, Uni Eropa

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Sumber Gambar 2.

²⁵ Unknown, 2014, Crimea declares independence seeks UN recognition. Diakses pada situs <https://www.rt.com/news/crimea-referendum-results-official-250/> tanggal 28 September 2014 pukul 12:34

²⁶ Unknown, 2014, Sevastopol City Council, diakses pada situs <https://web.archive.org/web/20140722133147/http://sevsovet.com.ua/index.php/2011-06-30-23-44-03/12395-na-sessii-gorodskogo-soveta-utverzhdenny-rezultaty-obshchekrymskogo-referenduma-16-marta-2014-goda> tanggal 28 September 2014 pukul 12:40

²⁶ Paul Gregory, 2014, Putin's Human Right Council accidentally posts real Crimean election results, Forbes. Diakses pada situs <https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2014/05/05/putins-human-rights-council-accidentally-posts-real-crimean-election-results-only-15-voted-for-annexation/#75d86376f172> tanggal 28 September 2014 pukul 12:53

dan Amerika Serikat secara resmi memutuskan penjatuhan sanksi ekonomi individu kepada pejabat Rusia dan sekutu Moskow di Ukraina.

4.1.2 Sanksi Uni Eropa ke Rusia

Hasil referendum atas Krimea tidak dapat diterima oleh Ukraina dan dunia internasional, terutama Uni Eropa sebagai organisasi regional terbesar di wilayah Eropa merasa memiliki tanggungjawab untuk mengambil tindakan. Dokumen terkait hasil referendum yang tanpa sengaja bocor²⁷ membuat Uni Eropa yakin bahwa Rusia sengaja melakukan intervensi di Ukraina bahkan hingga mengambil wilayah Krimea. Sanksi ekonomi yang dilakukan oleh Uni Eropa dan didukung oleh Amerika Serikat kepada Rusia dilakukan sebagai bentuk tekanan kepada Rusia agar negaranya berhenti melakukan intervensi di Ukraina dengan mengambil alih wilayah Krimea dan hukuman karena Rusia menolak ajakan untuk menciptakan perdamaian dari Uni Eropa. Namun Rusia tidak bergeming walaupun telah dijatuhkan sanksi tersebut.

Pada bulan Maret 2014,²⁸ Uni Eropa dan negara-negara yang tergabung dalam G8 memutuskan untuk menunda persiapan *G8 Summit* di Sochi untuk mengadakan pertemuan khusus terkait konsekuensi yang harus diberikan kepada Rusia. Pengerahan militer Rusia ke Krimea bagi Uni Eropa merupakan tindakan aneksasi yang telah melanggar kedaulatan Ukraina. Per tanggal 17 Maret 2014, Uni Eropa secara resmi memberlakukan sanksi dengan pembekuan aset dan

²⁷ Ibid. Parlemen HAM Rusia sempat memposting hasil referendum yang jauh dari angka 97% namun postingan tersebut langsung dihapus.

²⁸ Timeline EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine, diakses pada situs <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/> tanggal 28 September 2014 pukul 13:20

pelarangan pergi,²⁹ selain itu Uni Eropa juga mengundur proses negosiasi Rusia dalam bergabung dengan OECD dan *International Energy Agency* sekaligus membatalkan pertemuan dan untuk sementara memutus hubungan bilateral (terkait visa dan sebagainya dengan negara anggota Uni Eropa).³⁰ Sanksi tersebut pun semakin berkembang menjadi sanksi ekonomi yang resmi dijatuhkan kepada Rusia pada bulan Juli 2014 karena Uni Eropa melihat Rusia semakin memperkeruh krisis yang ada di Ukraina.³¹

Secara resmi, Uni Eropa (UE) mengeluarkan dokumen No. 833/2014³² terkait sanksi terhadap Rusia. Beberapa bentuk sanksi ekonomi yang diberikan UE terhadap Rusia adalah:³³

- (1) Pengurangan kuantitas ekspor dan impor antara Rusia dan Uni Eropa dalam jangka panjang.
- (2) Ekspor produk-produk dari Rusia yang berhubungan dengan energi tertentu dan teknologi akan dikenakan otorisasi oleh pejabat yang berwenang dari Uni Eropa.

²⁹ Foreign Affairs Council, 2014, diakses pada situs <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/03/17/> tanggal 28 September 2014 pukul 14:01

³⁰ European Union Newsroom, diakses pada situs https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en tanggal 28 September 2014 pukul 14:09

³¹ Ibid.

³² European Union Law. Diakses pada <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32014R0833> tanggal 28 September 2014 pukul 14:34

³³ Andrew Rettman, 2014, EU names 24 new people, 14 Firms in Russia Sanctions. Diakses pada <https://euobserver.com/foreign/125594> tanggal 28 September 2014 pukul 14:38

(3) Uni Eropa beserta semua perusahaan yang berasal dari Uni Eropa dilarang melakukan kerjasama terhadap 5 bank Negara milik Rusia, yaitu:³⁴

- Sverbank

- VTB

- Gazprombank

- Vnesheconombank (VEB)

- Russian Agriculture Bank (Rosselkhozbank).

Selain bank-bank diatas UE juga melarang 3 perusahaan energi Rusia untuk melakukan kerjasama. Berdasarkan data tahun 2013, ketiga perusahaan ini merupakan perusahaan penghasil minyak terbesar milik pemerintah, yaitu:³⁵

- (1) Rosneft, merupakan perusahaan minyak terbesar dengan memproduksi minyak mencapai 42% dari keseluruhan produksi.
- (2) Transneft, bagi perusahaan ini larangan hanya berlaku di wilayah Uni Eropa saja.
- (3) Gazprom Neft menyumbang produksi minyak sebesar 7%.

³⁴ Tercantum dalam lampiran (Annex III) dokumen *Council Regulation EU No 833/2014*

³⁵ Daniel Fjaertoft dan Indra Overland, 2015, Vol 113 no 8, hal 66, *Financial sanctions Impact Russian oil, equipment export bans effect limited*, *Oil and gas Journal*. Diunduh secara online pada situs

<https://www.fni.no/getfile.php/133218/Files/Publikasjoner/OGJ%20Sanctions.pdf> tanggal

29 September 2017 pukul 10:19

Selain itu perusahaan luar angkasa, senjata, dan teknologi Rusia juga masuk dalam daftar larangan untuk bekerjasama. Mereka adalah:³⁶

- (1) OPK Oboronprom
- (2) United Aircraft Corporation
- (3) Uralvagonzavod

4.3 Sikap pemerintah Rusia terhadap krisis di Ukraina dan sanksi Uni Eropa

Sanksi yang diberikan negara-negara Barat kepada Rusia tidak membuat Rusia merubah kebijakannya bahkan tahun 2017, setelah tiga tahun berlangsung sejak diberlakukannya sanksi. Dalam suatu kesempatan, Perdana Menteri Rusia, Dmitry Medvedev mengatakan,

“For a long time, Russia has not responded to the so-called sanctions declared against it by certain countries. Until the last moment, we hoped that our foreign colleagues would realise that sanctions lead to a blind alley, and that no one benefits from them. But they didn’t realise this, and now we have been forced to respond.”³⁷

Dalam pertemuan tersebut, Perdana Menteri Rusia menyatakan bahwa Rusia tidak pernah mengambil tindakan apapun terkait serangan-serangan yang dilakukan oleh negara-negara barat dan sanksi-sanksi yang selama ini diberikan merupakan jalan buntu dan merugikan semua pihak, sehingga dengan pertemuan ini Rusia menyatakan mulai ‘dipaksa’ untuk memberikan respon.

³⁶ Russia sanctions Update September 2014, hal 1, Chadbourne. Diunduh pada situs http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/chadbourne/publications/russia_sanctions_update_september_2014.pdf tanggal 29 September 2017 pukul 10:41

³⁷ Berdasarkan konferensi pers pemerintah Rusia pada tanggal 7 Agustus 2014 di Moskow. Diakses pada website resmi pemerintah Rusia <http://government.ru/en/news/14199/>

Namun tidak dapat dipungkiri bahwa Rusia telah melakukan tindakan-tindakan tertentu sebelum akhirnya memutuskan untuk menjatuhkan sanksi ekonomi (embargo) balasan. Ketika presiden Ukraina pro-Rusia, Yanukovych saat itu melarikan diri akibat pemberontakan atas kebijakannya untuk lebih dekat dengan Rusia, Rusia telah melakukan pendekatan-pendekatan dengan melakukan pertemuan rahasia dengan Yanukovych³⁸ sebelumnya untuk menjalin kerjasama sehingga perjanjian antara Ukraina dan Uni Eropa tidak ditandatangani. Hal tersebut memicu pertentangan besar-besaran dan pemberontakan baik dari pihak pro-Rusia, pro-Barat dan aparat kepolisian.

Setelah pasukan Ukraina menarik diri dari Krimea, banyak terdapat laporan bahwa Rusia mengerahkan tentara-tentaranya berkumpul di daerah

Gambar 3 Peta Konflik Ukraina



Note: Control of Mariupol regained by Ukraine

perbatasan yang berdekatan dengan wilayah timur Donetsk dan Luhansk,

³⁸ Pertemuan tersebut tercatat dilakukan di pangkalan militer Moskow pada tanggal 9 November 2013 silam dan pertemuan kedua berlangsung tanggal 20 November 2013 di St. Petersburg antara kedua Perdana Menteri Negara yaitu Ukraina, Mykola Azarov dan Rusia, Dmitry Medvedev.

Oksana Grytsenko, 2013, Ukraine U-turn on Europe pact was agreed with Vladimir Putin. diakses pada situs <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/26/ukraine-u-turn-eu-pact-putin> tanggal 29 September 2017 pukul 11:17

wilayah tersebut merupakan jantung industri bagi Ukraina.³⁹ Pasukan militer Rusia pun semakin sering terlihat berjaga-jaga di sepanjang wilayah semenanjung Krimea dan bagian timur dari Ukraina. Pada tanggal 11 Mei 2014, yaitu setelah referendum yang tidak diakui oleh Ukraina dan negara barat, kelompok separatis pro-Rusia di wilayah Donetsk dan Luhansk mengumandangkan kemerdekaan sebagai “*people’s republics*” dengan hasil *voting* 89% di wilayah Donetsk dan 96% wilayah Luhansk. Saat itu pemimpin kelompok separatis Luhansk, Valery Bolotov menyatakan keinginannya untuk bergabung dengan Rusia diikuti oleh Denis Pushilin perwakilan ketua dari Donetsk.⁴⁰

Pasukan militer Rusia yang telah berjaga-jaga di garis perbatasan sejak April memunculkan kekawatiran bahwa aneksasi wilayah-wilayah lain mungkin akan terjadi.⁴¹ Ukraina menegaskan bahwa pasukan militer Rusia secara reguler terlihat terlibat dalam pertempuran kelompok separatis dengan otoritas Ukraina dan Rusia secara sengaja mengirimkan sukarelawan-sukarelawan yang terlatih baik dalam memegang senjata untuk menyeberangi perbatasan dan membantu para pemberontak, bahkan pemimpin pemberontak

³⁹ Sumber Gambar 3.

Diambil dari artikel *Ukraine crisis in maps*, 2015, BBC, diakses pada situs <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27308526> tanggal 28 September 2017 pukul 19:05

⁴⁰ *Unknown*, 2013, Ukraine separatists declare independence, Aljazeera. Diakses pada situs <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/05/ukraine-separatists-declare-independence-201451219375613219.html> tanggal 29 September 2017 pukul 11:39

⁴¹ BBC, op. cit

di Donetsk mengatakan bahwa banyak tentara-tentara Rusia yang telah bergabung dalam pemberontakan tersebut.⁴²

Dalam hal ini Rusia secara resmi menolak segala bentuk tuduhan-tuduhan tersebut dan menyatakan bahwa pemerintahnya selama ini mengerahkan tentara militer untuk membantu pengamanan masyarakat keturunan Rusia yang memang mayoritas berada di wilayah Timur Ukraina.

Mengutip perkataan Putin,

“We see the rampage of reactionary forces, nationalist and anti-Semitic forces going on... we understand what worries the citizens of Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian, and the Russian-speaking population... Therefore, if we see such uncontrolled crime spreading, and if the people ask us for help, while we already have the official request from the legitimate president, we retain the right to use all available means to protect those people. We believe this would be absolutely legitimate.”⁴³

Pendekatan secara geopolitik memang merupakan salah satu cara yang digunakan Rusia untuk dapat melakukan intervensi.

Perebutan wilayah antara Ukraina dan Rusia tetap berlangsung sepanjang tahun 2014 dan pasukan Ukraina telah berhasil menguasai kembali beberapa wilayah yang sempat dikuasai oleh para kelompok separatis, namun pada tanggal 27 Agustus,⁴⁴ para pemberontak yang dilengkapi oleh persenjataan berat berhasil merebut wilayah baru di perbatasan pantai yaitu kota Novoazovsk dan mengancam kota pelabuhan Mariupol. Hal tersebut terjadi karena

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Dikutip oleh Kathy Lally dan Will Englund, 2014, Putin says he reserves right to protect Russians in Ukraine. Diakses pada situs https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-reserves-the-right-to-use-force-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/92d4ca70-a389-11e3-a5fa-5f5f0c77bf39c_story.html?utm_term=.2cc446e74b2e tanggal 29 September 2017 pukul 12:08

⁴⁴ BBC, op.cit.

pemerintah Rusia melengkapi mereka dengan persenjataan-persenjataan tersebut.

Rusia juga sempat melakukan pertemuan di ibukota Belarus, Minsk, pada tanggal 12 Februari 2015⁴⁵ yang membicarakan mengenai kesepakatan untuk mengakhiri pertempuran. Pertemuan tersebut dihadiri oleh pemimpin negara Ukraina, Jerman, Perancis, dan juga Rusia. Mereka mengumumkan bahwa akan dilakukan gencatan senjata pada tiga hari kedepan yaitu 15 Februari 2015. Kesepakatan ini juga mencakup penarikan senjata, pertukaran tahanan dan harus ada penyelesaian dari isu utama yaitu perebutan wilayah.⁴⁶

Dalam suatu wawancara dengan Presiden Putin ketika kunjungannya ke Krimea, ia mengatakan bahwa hasil referendum merupakan pilihan masyarakat Krimea sendiri yang menjatuhkan kepercayaan akan nasib wilayahnya ke negara Rusia bukan Ukraina, namun salah satu alasan negara barat dan Ukraina tidak mau mengakui hasil referendum adalah adanya kelompok-kelompok bersenjata yang berjaga-jaga di jalan-jalan saat pemilihan berlangsung, dan bagi konstitusi Ukraina hal tersebut sangat menyalahi aturan *voting* dan merupakan bentuk ancaman.⁴⁷

Namun tak dapat dipungkiri bahwa mayoritas masyarakat Krimea merupakan simpatisan Rusia terutama dikarenakan kedekatan wilayah dan persamaan bahasa. Sedangkan bagi Rusia sendiri, merupakan suatu kebanggaan

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Sarah Rainsford, 2015, Ukraine crisis: Putin shows who is boss in Crimea, BBC: Sevastopol. Diakses pada situs <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33985325> tanggal 28 September 2017 pukul 23:57

apabila wilayah Semenanjung Krimea yang ‘hilang’ pada era Uni Soviet dapat kembali menjadi wilayahnya sehingga Rusia mencoba menunjukkan kepeduliannya kepada Krimea dan menarik simpati masyarakat.⁴⁸

Salah satu upaya yang dilakukan oleh Rusia adalah memberikan suntikan dana renovasi ke tempat-tempat wisata yang ada di Krimea, contohnya Artek. Sejak lama Artek merupakan salah satu tempat wisata perkemahan terkenal di Ukraina. lokasinya terbentang di perbukitan dan merupakan tempat wisata perkemahan paling bergensi di zaman Uni Soviet, banyak orang mengatakan Artek adalah impian anak muda. Rusia mengeluarkan cukup banyak uang untuk renovasi kantin utama, ruang olahraga, dan kolam renang namun Rusia yakin uang yang telah mereka keluarkan tidak akan hilang. Banyak dari mantan Artekovi Rusia yang menyambut ‘kepulangan’ tempat wisata favorit mereka dengan nostalgia.⁴⁹

Hal tersebut merupakan upaya-upaya ‘tak terlihat’ dari Rusia dalam melakukan aneksasi Krimea dan akhirnya setelah muncul banyak tekanan dari berbagai pihak, Rusia merespon tekanan-tekanan tersebut melalui Embargo. Pada tanggal 6 Agustus 2014, Presiden Rusia, Vladimir Putin menandatangani sebuah Dekrit Presiden No. 560.⁵⁰ Dekrit tersebut melarang (atau membatasi), untuk jangka waktu satu tahun, impor produk agrikultur seperti bahan baku dan makanan dari negara-negara yang telah memberlakukan sanksi terhadap entitas

⁴⁸ BBC, op.cit.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ *Decree of the president of the Russian Federation on the application of certain special economic Measures to ensure safety Russian Federation*. Dokumen tersebut secara resmi ditandatangani Putin di Kremlin, Moskow

atau individu Rusia. Kemudian pada tanggal 7 Agustus 2014 melalui keputusan Pemerintah Federasi Rusia nomor 778,⁵¹ pemerintah Rusia mengeluarkan daftar produk yang dilarang untuk masuk ke wilayah Rusia, yang meliputi berbagai produk dari beberapa kelompok sebagai berikut: Daging sapi, daging unggas, ikan, seafood, susu, produk-produk dari susu seperti keju, sayur-sayuran, buah-buahan, biji-bijian, *ready-made meals* atau makanan kaleng siap saji kecuali makanan bayi. Adapun sanksi dan dekrit tersebut menyebabkan adanya penurunan pada kerjasama didalam sektor agribisnis antara Uni Eropa dan Rusia. Penurunan kerjasama agribisnis tersebut kemudian berdampak khusus pada beberapa negara anggota Uni Eropa seperti Lithuania, Finlandia, Belanda, Belgia, Hungaria, dan Polandia.⁵²

⁵¹ Pada tanggal 20 Agustus 2014 dikeluarkan Resolusi no. 830 sebagai dokumen lampiran perubahan dari Resolusi no. 778. Diunduh pada situs https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/safety/docs/ia_eu-russia_ru-eu-import-ban_20140820_unoff-trans-en.pdf tanggal 29 September 2017 pukul 12:32

⁵² Scruton, Loc.cit.

BAB V**TUJUAN RUSIA MENJATUHKAN SANKSI EKONOMI KE UNI EROPA
DI TAHUN 2014**

Pada bab ini, penulis akan mengoperasionalkan variabel dan indikator dari konsep Sanksi yang ditulis oleh David W. Hunter untuk menjawab mengenai tujuan Rusia dalam penjatuhan sanksi ekonomi berupa embargo kepada Uni Eropa di tahun 2014. Tujuan tersebut terbagi menjadi tujuan simbolik dan tujuan instrumental. Tujuan simbolik akan terbagi menjadi lima indikator dan instrumental dibagi menjadi tujuh indikator. Tujuan simbolik Rusia adalah tujuan yang tidak harus memberikan dampak langsung karena efeknya sendiri tidak dapat dihitung secara matematis. Tujuan ini menjawab bagaimana Rusia berusaha ‘memuaskan’ keinginan masyarakat Krimea yang ingin bergabung menjadi wilayahnya, adanya upaya untuk membela diri dari tekanan negara barat, dan upaya untuk menunjukkan kekuatannya di regional Uni Eropa.

Tujuan simbolik lebih berkaitan dengan ideologi, keinginan, dan sejarah. Berbeda dengan tujuan instrumental Rusia yang sifatnya lebih terstruktur dan memiliki efek negatif karena bertujuan untuk mengurangi nilai tertentu di negara target. Tujuan Instrumental berkaitan dengan pendapatan negara, sumber daya, dan bagaimana sanksi dapat digunakan sebagai alat kepatuhan suatu negara. Dengan tujuan Instrumental, Rusia memiliki keinginan untuk mengubah kebijakan di Uni Eropa akan penjatuhan sanksi. Sedangkan tujuan simbolik Rusia lebih kearah kebijakan untuk tujuan domestik.

5.1 Tujuan Simbolik Rusia dalam Sanksi Ekonomi Komoditas Pangan ke Uni Eropa tahun 2014

5.1.1 *Deflect from International Criticism*

Dalam indikator ini, sanksi diberlakukan untuk melihat adanya upaya dari negara pemberi sanksi yang ingin mengelak dari kritik internasional. Di tahun 2014 ketika Rusia melakukan aneksasi wilayah Krimea dari Ukraina, Uni Eropa turun tangan dengan menjatuhkan sanksi kepada Rusia atas aksinya melanggar kedaulatan dan teritorial Ukraina. Dewan Uni Eropa mengkritik bahwa aneksasi tersebut merupakan keputusan ilegal karena referendum pada 16 Maret 2014 melanggar konstitusi Ukraina dengan tambahan adanya pasukan militer Rusia yang mendukung kelompok separatis Ukraina.¹ Namun dalam wawancara yang membahas mengenai Krimea, Medvedev mengatakan, *“There’s nothing to hide. We have ALWAYS considered this is (crimea) our land.”*² dari pernyataan tersebut, Rusia ingin menyatakan bahwa tindakan aneksasi tersebut tidak salah karena Krimea memang merupakan bagian dari mereka.

Apabila melihat dari sejarah, sejak 4 abad terakhir, kondisi keamanan di Eropa telah ditandai oleh banyak peperangan atas perebutan wilayah. Konflik terbaru di daratan Eropa yang masih berkaitan dengan

¹ Susanne Kraatz, 2014, European parliament. Diakses pada [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/536291/IPOL_BRI\(2014\)536291_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/536291/IPOL_BRI(2014)536291_EN.pdf) tanggal 7 Oktober 2017 pukul 12:35

² Press release, 2014 <http://government.ru/en/news/16036/> tanggal 7 Oktober 2017 pukul 1:17

sengketa wilayah adalah aneksasi Rusia atas Krimea di tahun 2014.

Melihat sejarah, Semenanjung Krimea adalah wilayah yang telah diperebutkan sejak lama, wilayahnya masing-masing dikuasai oleh orang-orang yang berbeda seperti Yunani, Bulgaria, Scythian, Roma, Goth, Hun, Khazar, Kievan Rus, Kekaisaran Bizantium, Venesia, Genoa, Kipchaks, Golden Horde Mongolia, Kekaisaran Ottoman Utsmani, Kekaisaran Rusia, Soviet Rusia, Uni Soviet, Jerman, dan Ukraina.³

Setelah kehancuran Golden Horde Mongolia oleh Tamerlan, di tahun 1441 orang-orang Krimea Tatar⁴ mendirikan sebuah wilayah independen yang dinamai Krimea Khanate. Wilayah tersebut mencakup sebagian besar Semenanjung Krimea dan wilayah selatan Ukraina saat ini dan bagian selatan Rusia. Ibukota untuk sebagian besar wilayah Khanate berada di Bakhchisaray hingga akhirnya Kekaisaran Ottoman Utsmani berhasil menaklukkan wilayah selatan Krimea tersebut dan mengusir bangsa Genoa, wilayah tersebut resmi dianeksasi oleh kekaisaran pada tahun 1475 setelah bangsa Khanate dipaksa untuk memiliki ketergantungan pada Ottoman.⁵

Sekitar tahun 1700-an, terjadi dua peperangan antara Kekaisaran Rusia dengan Kekaisaran Ottoman Utsmani. Yang pertama terjadi di tahun 1768 dimana saat itu Rusia melakukan intervensi dalam urusan

³ Anton Bebler, 2015, hal. 198, Teorija in Praksa, diakses pada http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/files/dnak/Documents/Publikasjoner/2015/Spb_1-15.pdf tanggal 8 Oktober 2017 pukul 9:16

⁴ Ibid. Krimea Tatar merupakan bangsa Tamerlan yang berhasil menduduki wilayah kekuasaan Mongolia di Krimea

⁵ Ibid. hal 199

dalam negeri Polandia dan kehadiran tentara Rusia yang mendukung Raja Polandia (anak didiknya) yang baru terpilih, Stanislas Poniatowsky. Atas dorongan Perancis, Kekaisaran Ottoman meminta penarikan tentara Rusia dari Polandia yang ditolak oleh Rusia, penolakan tersebut memicu Ottoman memulai perang dengan mengerahkan angkatan darat dan lautnya untuk menyerang Rusia selatan. Perang kedua terjadi di tahun 1774 dan keduanya dimenangkan oleh Kekaisaran Rusia. Atas kekalahan tersebut, Kekaisaran Ottoman dipaksa untuk mengakui kemerdekaan Krimea, walaupun Sultan saat itu berusaha mempertahankan atas nama rakyat Muslim Krimea. Krimea menjadi wilayah Kekaisaran Rusia di tahun 1783 melalui aneksasi.⁶

Setelah runtuhnya Kekaisaran Rusia, revolusi ditahun 1917 dan berakhirnya Perang Sipil Rusia, nama resmi dan status hukum dari wilayah Semenanjung Krimea telah berubah berkali-kali. Bosheviki Rusia pun meluncurkan sebuah kampanye untuk mengubah nama dari semenanjung. Sebagai ungkapan kebijakan kebangsaan yang baru dan *friendly gesture* terhadap Kemal Ataturk (penemu dan pencetus dari Republik Turki), semenanjung pun dinamai dengan nama Turki, Krym. Pada bulan Oktober 1921, Republik Sosialis Soviet Otonomi Krimea menjadi bagian dari SFSR Rusia. Di tahun 1922, Krimea resmi menjadi wilayah Uni Soviet (USSR).⁷

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid. hal 201

Saat itu, USSR dipimpin oleh seorang diktator yang terkejut di masanya, Joseph Stalin, yang bertanggungjawab atas kematian setidaknya lima juta orang Tatar di sekitar tahun 1920-1930an akibat kelaparan karena Stalin menarik semua bahan makanan tanpa alasan yang jelas dari Krimea ke Rusia, mereka juga dideportasi untuk menjadi buruh dan pekerja kasar yang diperlakukan tidak manusiawi di Rusia.⁸

Kurang dari setahun sejak kematian Stalin, bulan Februari 1954, Presidium Soviet tertinggi Uni Soviet mengeluarkan sebuah dekrit untuk memindahkan wilayah Krimea dari Uni Soviet Rusia ke Ukrainian SSR.

Dekrit ini dibuat untuk menandai bentuk persahabatan atas bergabungnya Ukraina ke Kekaisaran Rusia selama 300 tahun.⁹ Namun, status Presidium dari dekrit tersebut diragukan karena tidak sesuai dengan artikel 14 dan artikel 18 dimana dekrit tersebut disepakati dari dua parlemen saja, tidak ada debat, tidak ada *voting*, tidak ada persetujuan yang ditandatangani resmi padahal seharusnya membutuhkan kesepakatan formal negara.¹⁰ Sejak saat itu, Krimea menjadi wilayah semiotonom dari negara Ukraina yang memiliki ikatan politik kuat dengan Ukraina, namun memiliki ikatan budaya yang kuat dengan Rusia.

Sejarah yang panjang mengenai asal usul Krimea sedikit menjelaskan mengenai sengketa aneksasi Krimea dan hubungannya

⁸ Agence France-Presse, 2015, Stalin portraits emerge in heart of Ukraine's rebel-held territory. Diakses pada <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/19/stalin-portraits-ukraine-rebel-territory> tanggal 1 Oktober 2017 pukul 12:46

⁹ Bebler, op.cit

¹⁰ Ibid.

dengan Ukraina dan Rusia sendiri. Sejarah tersebut juga menjadi acuan bagi Uni Eropa dan negara-negara barat seperti Amerika Serikat, Australia, dan Kanada untuk menjatuhkan sanksi kepada Rusia dan mengkritik bahwa Rusia telah secara sengaja mengambil alih wilayah Krimea dari Ukraina. Namun disini, Rusia juga ingin menunjukkan bahwa terdapat kesalahan besar dari pemimpin Uni Soviet di masa lalu terkait penyerahan Semenanjung Krimea ke wilayah Ukraina dengan tidak adanya bukti resmi yang diakui oleh Rusia (maupun Uni Soviet terdahulu), bahkan masyarakat Krimea etnis Rusia di Krimea merasa bahwa mereka lebih memiliki sejarah yang panjang bersama Rusia.

Pengelakan terhadap kritik tersebut seharusnya memiliki dampak pada perubahan sanksi Uni Eropa kepada Rusia namun hingga tahun 2018 ini, sanksi yang dijatuhkan oleh Uni Eropa tidak berubah malah semakin meningkat dimana kedua belah pihak akhirnya saling menjatuhkan sanksi. Rusia sendiri juga tidak terlihat adanya upaya untuk menghindari kritik tersebut karena sejak awal sanksi Uni Eropa dijatuhkan, Rusia tidak melihat adanya kesalahan dari negaranya dalam menerima hasil referendum Krimea apalagi didasari oleh status presidium tahun 1954 yang ilegal.

5.1.2 *Concerned and raising visibility of an issue*

Indikator ini merupakan tujuan sanksi bagi suatu negara untuk memunculkan perhatian akan suatu isu. Ketika Rusia resmi melakukan aneksasi atas Krimea dan menjadi satu-satunya negara yang mengakui kedaulatan Krimea untuk bergabung dengan Rusia, Uni Eropa bersama negara-negara lain langsung menjatuhkan sanksi terkait visa dan pembekuan aset terhadap individu-individu yang terlibat dalam pencaplokan wilayah tersebut. Hingga 2018 nanti, kedua kubu tidak terlihat mencapai keputusan damai dan memberhentikan sanksi yang awalnya diberlakukan selama satu tahun sejak 2014.

Dalam tabel 4¹¹ terlihat bahwa Rusia memiliki ketergantungan yang lebih besar dibandingkan Uni Eropa sendiri, sedangkan Uni Eropa terlihat bahwa walaupun dengan sanksi, perekonomian di Uni Eropa akan baik-baik saja. Melihat dari tabel 4, Uni Eropa memiliki ketergantungan impor dari Rusia hanya dua sektor dari total sepuluh sektor yaitu minyak dan kategori lain-lain, sisanya Rusia lebih banyak melakukan impor dari Uni Eropa. Disamping itu empat bulan pertama ditahun 2014, kerjasama dagang antara Uni Eropa dan Rusia semakin menurun drastis¹² namun Uni Eropa terlihat tidak terganggu dengan hal


¹¹ Sumber TABEL 4

2014, Russia trade ties with Europe, BBC, diakses pada <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26436291> tanggal 7 Oktober 2014 pukul 2:12

¹² Jason Karian, 2014, Trade between Europe and Russia is dwindling, even without more sanctions. Diakses pada <https://qz.com/235724/trade-between-europe-and-russia-is-dwindling-even-without-more-sanctions/> tanggal 8 Oktbber 2017 pukul 12:39

tersebut karena ditahun yang sama Uni Eropa telah meningkatkan kerjasama dagang dengan negara-negara di Asia.¹³

Tabel 4 Ekspor dan Impor Uni Eropa ke Rusia tahun 2013



Source: Eurostat

Dalam wawancara akan sanksi Uni Eropa yang terus berlanjut, Sekretaris Luar Negeri Uni Eropa, Philip Hammond, menyatakan bahwa sanksi tersebut dilakukan *“to hurt Russia more than it hurts us but it would be absurd to suggest we can impose wide-ranging sanctions on the Russian economy without also having impact on ourselves.”*¹⁴ Dalam hal ini ada optimisme dari Uni Eropa sendiri bahwa sanksi-sanksi yang

¹³ Dapat dilihat pada tabel 2 di halaman 52


¹⁴ Dikutip oleh Angela Monaghan dan Jennifer Rankin, 2014, EU and US sanction against Russia: which will they hurt more? Diakses pada situs <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jul/30/eu-us-sanctions-against-russia-hurt> tanggal 1 Oktober 2017 pukul 14:46



mereka jatuhkan tidak akan berdampak besar pada Uni Eropa sehingga sektor-sektor yang dijatuhkan sanksi memang bukan sektor yang penting bagi Uni Eropa.

Namun dari sisi Rusia, penjatuhan sanksi merupakan kesempatan bagi Rusia untuk memunculkan isu ketahanan pangan itu sendiri. Dapat dilihat dari tabel 4 diatas dan juga tabel 5 dibawah bahwa ketergantungan Rusia terhadap produk-produk daging dari Uni Eropa sangat tinggi mencapai 6,7% sedangkan bagi Uni Eropa hanya 0,6%. Hal ini tidak sesuai dengan keinginan Rusia untuk terbebas dari ketergantungan

Tabel 5 Ketahanan Pangan Rusia tahun 1997-2012 (%)



Sources: Ministry of Agriculture; Rosstat.

pangan dari Uni Eropa di tahun 2020 sesuai dengan Resolusi ketahanan pangan yang telah dibentuk di tahun 2010. Sanksi ekonomi menjadi cara yang dilakukan Rusia untuk menunjukkan bahwa negaranya juga mampu memproduksi bahan pangannya sendiri.

5.1.3 *Willingness to take some action*

Pada indikator ini, ada kebutuhan yang ingin dicapai oleh Rusia yaitu mencapai ketahanan pangan. Rusia juga telah memiliki program Ketahanan Pangan untuk mengurangi ketergantungan pangan dengan Uni Eropa secara penuh di tahun 2020. Berdasarkan tabel 5,¹⁵ dari target ketahanan pangan produk daging, susu, gandum, telur, kentang, sayur-sayuran ditahun 2012 hanya produk gandum yang berhasil mencapai ketahanan pangan hingga dapat diekspor. Sedangkan produk pangan terendah adalah yang berbahan baku daging-dagingan baik daging segar dan daging-daging olahan, maka tidak mengherankan apabila nilai impor tertinggi Rusia adalah pada produk yang berbahan baku daging. Dalam tabel tersebut, angka ideal bagi Rusia sendiri adalah 100% atau berada di garis merah, garis tersebut menunjukkan bahwa kebutuhan domestik Rusia telah terpenuhi dan terdapat produksi lebih untuk diekspor.

Di tahun 2011, Rusia pernah memberlakukan pembatasan impor daging dari Brazil karena tidak memenuhi standar kebersihan negaranya.¹⁶ Hal tersebut meningkatkan kesadaran konsumen terutama di negara-negara maju seperti Rusia akan kualitas daging impor tersebut, dari pangan ternak, minum, hingga kesejahteraan dari hewan ternak itu sendiri. Kemudian di awal tahun 2014, Rusia juga menghentikan impor

¹⁵ TABEL 5

Wegren, op.cit, hal 11

¹⁶ Meat Sector Review, 2014, Diakses pada <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3533e.pdf> tanggal 8

Oktober 2017 pukul 13:54

daging babi dari Lithuania dan Polandia dikarenakan ditemukan virus flu babi.¹⁷ Penemuan penyakit dalam produk daging akan sangat berpengaruh terhadap sektor yang lebih luas mulai dari pelanggaran terhadap regulasi hingga kesehatan masyarakat. Negara-negara yang memiliki ketahanan pangan daging yang rendah tidak akan mengambil resiko apabila ditemukan penyakit dalam daging impornya. Terutama bagi Rusia dengan ASF atau Flu babi sebagai ancaman utama dalam impor daging.¹⁸

Dalam empat bulan pertama tahun 2014 tersebut, impor daging Rusia menurun hingga 22%, tidak hanya dikarenakan flu babi saja namun juga pangan ternak yang tidak sesuai standart, harga impor yang meningkat, hingga permintaan daging yang meningkat baik di pasar internal maupun internasional dengan jumlah produksi yang tetap.¹⁹ Disini pemerintah Rusia telah berhasil melakukan upaya mencapai program Ketahanan Pangan 2020 nya dengan sedikit demi sedikit mengurangi impor.

Sanksi ekonomi yang diberlakukan Rusia ke Uni Eropa merupakan upaya atau cara yang dilakukan Rusia sebagai bentuk kemampuannya

¹⁷ *Unknown*, 2014, Russian imports fall due to ban on EU pork <https://pork.ahdb.org.uk/prices-stats/news/2014/may/russian-imports-fall-due-to-ban-on-eu-pork/> tanggal 8 Oktober 2017 pukul 14:11

¹⁸ FAO, *Ibid*. hal 59

¹⁹ Sergey Yushin, 2014, Russian Meat Sector: Time of opportunities or Time of uncertainty?, Barcelona. Diakses pada <http://www.bordbia.ie/industry/events/SpeakerPresentations/2015/MeatProspects2015/Prospects%20for%20the%20Russian%20Meat%20Market%20-%20Alexander%20Stoklitskiy,%20Food%20Corp.pdf> tanggal 8 Oktober 2017 pukul 18:02

dalam mencapai ketahanan pangan. Upaya ini dapat didasari oleh alasan secara ekonomis yaitu adanya kenaikan harga komoditas pangan, keamanan pangan yaitu ditemukan penyakit flu babi dan kesehatan ternak yang tidak sesuai standart, ataupun alasan politik yaitu penjatuhan sanksi dari Uni Eropa akibat kasus Krimea.

Dalam hal ini, pemberlakuan sanksi ekonomi Rusia ke negara-negara Uni Eropa didasari oleh adanya aksi yang ingin dicapai yaitu ketahanan pangan dan upaya yang dilakukan sudah sejalan dengan keinginan tersebut yaitu sanksi ekonomi komoditas pangan. Namun bagaimanapun juga, Rusia telah memiliki rencana kedepan atau ‘cetak biru’ bahwa Rusia tidak lagi akan mengimpor bahan pangan dari Uni Eropa.

5.1.4 *Showing leadership initiative*

Indikator ini dilakukan untuk melihat inisiatif Rusia dalam memperlihatkan kepemimpinannya, terutama dibawah pimpinan Presiden Putin. Sebagai respon terhadap sanksi yang diberikan Uni Eropa terhadap Rusia, pada tanggal 6 Agustus 2014 Vladimir Putin menandatangani sebuah Dekrit yang melarang (atau membatasi) impor produk agrikultur seperti bahan baku dan makanan (Daging sapi, daging unggas, ikan, seafood, susu, produk-produk dari susu seperti keju, sayur-sayuran, buah-buahan, biji-bijian dan *ready-made meals*) dari negara-negara anggota Uni Eropa. Pelarangan dan pembatasan ini berkaitan dengan agrikultur karena Rusia merupakan mitra dagang ketiga terbesar

Uni Eropa dengan total 8,4% kerjasama dagang dalam segala sektor dan importir produk agrikultur Uni Eropa kedua terbesar setelah Amerika Serikat.²⁰ Rusia juga sebelumnya pernah memberlakukan larangan impor daging babi dengan alasan kesehatan yang juga dikecam oleh Uni Eropa.

Sanksi Uni Eropa yang semakin menekan Rusia membuat Putin kembali menandatangani perpanjangan dari surat Dekrit Presiden no. 560 terkait sanksi hingga tanggal 5 Agustus 2015 dengan isi yang tidak berubah.²¹ Bahkan hingga tahun 2016, Rusia tidak memperluas sanksinya hingga tahun 2017. Sanksi kembali diperpanjang dikarenakan Rusia tidak melihat adanya itikat baik dari mitra di Uni Eropa dan untuk menghentikannya diperlukan upaya dari kedua belah pihak. Dalam konferensi pers tersebut,²² Medvedev juga menambahkan bahwa upaya ini dilakukan tidak semata-mata karena faktor politik namun karena adanya permintaan dari petani setempat untuk mempertahankan sanksi selama mungkin.

Sejak awal, sanksi ekonomi berupa pemberhentian impor komoditas pangan merupakan hal yang sulit bagi Rusia karena tingkat impor pangan negaranya sangat tinggi, namun sanksi ini menjadi momentum Rusia untuk fokus pada pengembangan sektor agrikultur.

²⁰ Marcin Szczepanski, 2015, economic impact on the EU of sanctions over Ukrainian conflict. Diakses pada http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS_BRI%282015%29569020_EN.pdf tanggal 1 Oktober 2017 pukul 15:52

²¹ Press release 25 Juni 2015. Diakses pada <http://government.ru/en/news/18616/#> tanggal 1 Oktober 2017 pukul 18:31

²² Ibid.

Dengan penjatuhan sanksi, Rusia melihat bahwa sanksi yang diberikan pada negaranya akan lebih merugikan negara pemberi sanksi sendiri dan Rusia percaya diri bahwa komoditas pangannya akan mencapai titik ketahanan pangan dengan tekanan ini.

Dibawah kepemimpinan Putin, sanksi ini dapat menunjukkan karakter Putin sebagai pemimpin yang dominan dan empati terhadap masyarakatnya. Kepemimpinan yang dominan dapat terlihat bagaimana Putin tidak ingin bahwa kebijakan luar negeri yang dikeluarkan Rusia merupakan pengaruh dari luar sehingga hingga 2018 ini, sanksi masih terus diberlakukan karena tidak ada perubahan perilaku dari Uni Eropa sendiri untuk tidak ikut campur dengan urusan Rusia dan Krimea. Pemberlakuan sanksi ini juga memperlihatkan Putin sebagai tokoh yang memiliki posisi di Eropa, ia juga pemimpin yang tegas dan tidak takut terhadap ancaman dari Uni Eropa.

Dengan sanksi ini juga, terlihat bahwa Putin memiliki empati terhadap masyarakat, dari beberapa pernyataan melalui Medvedev, Rusia mengedepankan kepentingan masyarakat dan memberikan apa yang diminta oleh masyarakat selama masih sejalan dengan kepentingan Rusia. Bahkan upaya-upaya yang dilakukan oleh Putin seperti meningkatkan tunjangan bagi para pensiun dan subsidi bahan pangan menjadikan masyarakatnya percaya kepada pemerintahan Putin bahwa kebijakan ini dilakukan untuk kesejahteraan masyarakat Rusia seluruhnya.

5.1.5 *Assigning moral judgment or responsibility*

Dalam indikator ini, Rusia melakukan aksi balasan dengan sanksi dikarenakan keputusan Uni Eropa untuk memberlakukan sanksi pada negaranya tidak rasional. Sengketa balas-membalas sanksi antara Uni Eropa dan Rusia menjadi isu yang kompleks, Rusia pernah memperingatkan bahwa embargo nya akan dicabut hanya ketika Uni Eropa melakukan hal yang sama. Sejak diberlakukan embargo komoditas pangan oleh Rusia, Putin mengatakan bahwa pemerintahnya akan berhati-hati dalam mengambil langkah balasan agar tidak melukai konsumen Rusia dan juga tetap mendukung produsen domestik, ia juga mengatakan, *“policy instruments aimed at putting pressure on the economy are contrary to all rules and regulation.”*²³ Pemerintah Rusia menyatakan bahwa sanksi yang diberikan oleh Uni Eropa melanggar aturan dan regulasi. Kemudian Menteri Agrikultur Rusia juga mengatakan bahwa sanksi tersebut adalah ancaman ke Rusia, *“we think that we will find civilized way to block all possible threat of violation of the sanction... EU representatives say that sanction imposed by Russia are counterproductive and unjustified, as if their own sanctions are productive and justified.”*²⁴

²³ Berdasarkan pertemuan yang diakses pada situs <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/security-council/46416> namun dikutip dari wartawan Kathrin Hille, 2014, Russia looks to ban EU flights over siberia, diakses pada <https://www.ft.com/content/2ac75a30-1c86-11e4-88c3-00144feabdc0> tanggal 1 Oktober 2017 pukul 20:08

²⁴ Press conference 2014 <http://government.ru/en/news/14199/>

Tanggal 29 Juni 2017, Pemerintah Rusia kembali mengadakan rapat terkait dengan perpanjangan sanksi yang diberlakukan Uni Eropa kepada negaranya. Dalam kesempatan tersebut, Medvedev mengatakan “... *we regret that our European partners continues this short-sighted policy towards Russia. Politics have again taken the upper hand over the economy and, ultimately, over common sense.*”²⁵ Pernyataan tersebut menunjukkan kekecewaan Rusia atas kebijakan Uni Eropa untuk kembali memperpanjang sanksi hingga 31 Januari 2018. Sanksi itu sendiri pertama kali dijatuhkan di tahun 2014 terkait aneksasi Rusia atas Krimea dan masih akan berlangsung hingga tahun 2018.

Seperti pada tujuan-tujuan sanksi Rusia sebelumnya, Rusia ingin menunjukkan bahwa aneksasi yang dilakukannya merupakan bentuk tanggung jawab atas masyarakat Krimea etnis Rusia yang tinggal disana, dimana keselamatan warga negaranya merupakan salah satu kepentingan negara apalagi setelah referendum, terbukti sebagian besar masyarakat Krimea menginginkan untuk kembali menjadi wilayah Federasi Rusia. Sanksi yang dijatuhkan kepada Rusia juga merupakan keputusan yang tidak rasional, dimana dijatuhkan oleh negara barat karena sentimen mereka terhadap pemerintahan Rusia ditambah dengan tuduhan-tuduhan bahwa Rusia akan menganeksasi wilayah-wilayah lain di Ukraina sesuai dengan kekuasaan Uni Soviet di masa lalu.²⁶

²⁵ Press conference, 2017, diakses pada <http://government.ru/en/news/28247/> tanggal 1 Oktober 2017 pukul 19:00

²⁶ Press release, 2014 <http://government.ru/en/news/12509/>

Penjatuhan sanksi yang dilakukan oleh Rusia kepada Uni Eropa merupakan bentuk standar ganda dari Uni Eropa karena sentimennya terhadap Rusia. Namun, tidak terlihat adanya standar ganda yang dilakukan oleh Uni Eropa itu sendiri. Bagi Uni Eropa, sanksi akan dijatuhkan kepada siapa saja yang dianggap telah melanggar peraturan internasional. Sedangkan bagi Rusia, negara nya tidak merasa melanggar peraturan tersebut sehingga seharusnya sanksi Uni Eropa tidak dijatuhkan pada Rusia. Berdasarkan pernyataan dari pemerintah Rusia sendiri, sanksi yang dijatuhkan kepada negara yang tidak melakukan kesalahan merupakan pelanggaran terhadap aturan dan regulasi, serta keputusan yang tidak rasional.

5.2 Tujuan Instrumental Rusia dalam Penjatuhan Sanksi Ekonomi Komoditas

Pangan ke Uni Eropa tahun 2014

5.2.1 *Internal resistance or political reforms*

Pada indikator ini sanksi diberlakukan Rusia atas keinginan untuk mengubah kebijakan sanksi Uni Eropa dengan mendorong hambatan internal atau reformasi politik. Di awal tahun 2010, Rusia mengadopsi Doktrin Ketahanan Pangan yang bertujuan untuk mengurangi tingkat ketergantungan Rusia akan impor komoditas pangan dan agrikultur. Dari doktrin tersebut pun akhirnya dibuat *Agricultural Development Program*

untuk jangka waktu 2013-2020 di bulan Juli 2012.²⁷ Untuk mendukung pencapaian tujuan tersebut, pemerintah Rusia mengeluarkan setidaknya 30,4 Miliar Euro. Maka apabila melihat dari tabel 5²⁸ dalam kurun waktu 2010 hingga 2012, Rusia telah mengalami banyak peningkatan pangan produk susu, telur, gandum, daging, sayur-sayuran, dan kentang. Contohnya kentang yang produksinya sempat surplus di tahun 2011, kemudian produksi daging yang meningkat, dan juga produk-produk susu yang sangat stabil.

Dalam masa pemerintahan Putin, sektor agrikultur Rusia tetap berada pada kondisi yang stabil walaupun masih memiliki ketergantungan impor pangan dari Uni Eropa. Memasuki tahun 2014, Rusia kembali menantang dirinya untuk mencapai ketahanan pangan melalui sanksi yang berlaku hingga saat ini. Dalam proses tersebut, Rusia sempat mengalami perubahan Menteri dimana di tanggal 22 April 2015, Putin sempat menandatangani *Executive Order* untuk secara resmi mengganti Menteri Nikolai menjadi Alexander Tkachev untuk menjalankan tugas sebagai Menteri Agrikultur Rusia.²⁹ Presiden Putin juga melakukan pertemuan untuk membicarakan urgensi dan tugas bagi Menteri baru, Tkachev. Perubahan ini dilakukan untuk mengubah kondisi agrikultur di Rusia setelah sanksi dari Uni Eropa, dimana Putin meminta

²⁷ Jakub Olipra, 2017, diakses pada <https://financialobserver.eu/cse-and-cis/russia/the-embargo-has-transformed-the-russian-food-market/> tanggal 1 Oktober 2017 pukul 19:32

²⁸ Tabel 5 Halaman 65

²⁹ Diakses pada <http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/154/events/49313>

dengan cepat agar komoditas pangan produksi lokal segera berada dalam pasar domestik.³⁰ Tkachev memiliki pengalaman dan reputasi yang sangat baik selama menjadi Gubernur Krasnodar sejak tahun 2001, dimana wilayah yang dipimpinnya memproduksi sebanyak 12 juta ton gandum setiap tahun atau menyumbang lebih dari 10% nilai ekspor gandum Rusia ke negara lain.³¹

Perubahan tersebut dilakukan untuk mengurangi ketergantungan Rusia akan impor komoditas pangan dari Uni Eropa. Dimana perubahan yang akan dilakukan adalah dalam hal mencari alternatif impor, meningkatkan produksi, menurunkan harga bahan pangan, dan menumbuhkan produsen-produsen pangan lokal hingga menjadi perusahaan yang besar.³² Pemerintah menyadari bahwa sanksi ini merupakan kesempatan bagi mereka untuk semaksimal mungkin mencapai ketahanan pangan terutama pada sektor-sektor yang termasuk dalam sanksi.

Dengan penjatuhan sanksi ini, Rusia ingin mendorong hambatan internal negaranya yaitu ketergantungan pangan dengan Uni Eropa agar ia menjadi *self-sufficient* terutama pada komoditas pangan itu sendiri. Masing-masing negara juga mengetahui bahwa mereka memiliki sumber daya yang dapat digunakan untuk memberikan *damage* kepada negara

³⁰ Diakses pada <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49312>

³¹ *Unknown*, 2015, Putin appoints new agriculture minister to boost food production, diakses pada <http://www.dw.com/en/putin-appoints-new-agriculture-minister-to-boost-food-production/a-18399979> tanggal 2 Oktober 2017 jam 14:31

³² *Ibid.* <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49312>

tujuan sanksi. Uni Eropa mengetahui bahwa Rusia memiliki ketergantungan dengan perusahaan senjata dan energi sehingga sektor tersebut yang diserang. Rusia sendiri juga mengetahui seberapa besar nilai ekspor dan impor komoditas pangan ke negaranya sehingga sektor tersebut yang dijatuhkan sanksi. Sanksi ekonomi Rusia menjadi alat bahwa Rusia mampu mencapai ketahanan pangan di tahun 2020 dan juga reformasi politik dengan mengganti menteri agrikulturnya.

5.2.2 *Deterring undesired action or compelling desired action*

Indikator ini merupakan usaha Rusia untuk mengurangi ekspor dan impor bahan baku pangan terutama di Uni Eropa karena telah memberikan kerugian akibat sanksi yang diberikan. Sanksi diberlakukan suatu negara dengan tujuan untuk memberikan *damage* kepada negara tujuan dengan harapan bahwa hal tersebut dapat mengubah kebijakan. Tidak bisa dipungkiri bahwa sanksi yang diberlakukan Uni Eropa cukup menyakiti Rusia terutama sektor yang dituju adalah sektor penyumbang pendapatan terbesar bagi Rusia.

Fiona Clark, seorang reporter yang tinggal di Rusia memberikan laporan bahwa harga pangan di tahun 2015 seperti buah-buahan segar, yogurt, dan produk keju melonjak sangat tinggi. Blueberry misalnya yang mencapai harga 16 euro hingga 20 euro, harga tersebut adalah 10% dari pendapatan mingguan masyarakat di Moskow. Rata-rata bahan pangan yang dijual meningkat hingga mencapai 30% dan untuk produk seperti prosciutto dan keju Perancis menghilang di pasaran sejak awal

bulan.³³ Banyak dari masyarakat Rusia yang bepergian ke luar negeri dan membawa banyak keju-kejuan untuk konsumsi pribadi.

Namun, sanksi ini memberi kesempatan bagi para produsen ‘pengganti’ bahan pangan seperti keju untuk berkembang. Walaupun rasa keju tersebut *artificial* dan terbuat dari minyak kelapa, opsi tersebut dapat dijadikan pilihan bagi masyarakat yang tidak mampu membeli keju yang sangat mahal atau bepergian ke luar negeri. Menurut data dari watchdog Rusia, Rosselkhoznadzor, Rusia telah meningkatkan impor minyak kelapa sebesar 39% dan memproduksi produk lokal pengganti keju hingga 50%.³⁴ Rusia juga mengganti Menteri Agrikultur sebelumnya, Nikolai, menjadi Alexander Tkachev.³⁵

Tabel 6 Ekspor Uni Eropa ke Rusia 2015



Data source: [European Commission, DG Trade, 2015.](#)


³³ Fiona Clark, 2015, sanctions: who’s really hurting in Russia. Diakses pada <http://www.dw.com/en/sanctions-whos-really-hurting-in-russia/a-18480370> tanggal 2 Oktober 2017 jam 13:40

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Press release <http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/154/events/49313>

Dengan penjatuhan sanksi ini, kerugian juga dirasakan oleh negara-negara Uni Eropa yang menggantungkan kegiatan ekspornya ke Rusia terutama karena agrikultur merupakan salah satu sektor terbesar setelah mesin, bahan kimia, obat-obatan, barang elektronik, dan sebagainya. Tabel 6³⁶ menunjukkan grafik ekspor Uni Eropa ke Rusia, dimana pertumbuhannya stabil dari tahun 2010 hingga 2012 kemudian Rusia menjatuhkan sanksi di tahun 2014 yang menyebabkan penurunan impor hingga 13,5% dari 326 miliar euro menjadi 285 miliar euro.

Tabel 7 Nilai ekspor negara member Uni Eropa ke Rusia (Million Euro)



Bagi beberapa negara di Uni Eropa dampaknya lebih besar seperti yang terjadi di Lithuania, Polandia, Belanda, dan Perancis.³⁷ Bahkan Perancis mengalami kerugian hingga mencapai 1,2 miliar Euro dari sektor ekspor militer saja atas pembatalan kontrak penjualan 2 buah

³⁶ TABEL 6
Marcin, op.cit, hal. 2

³⁷ TABEL 7
Ibid. hal 7

pembawa helikopter amfibi. Pemerintah Perancis saat itu harus mengembalikan uang yang telah masuk sebesar 1 milyar Euro kepada pemerintah Rusia dan biaya penalti atas pembatalan kontrak sebesar 250 juta Euro. Untuk menutupi kerugian tersebut, Perancis terpaksa menjualnya kepada Mesir sebesar hanya 950 juta Euro.

Dalam hal ini, sanksi ekonomi ini menjadi cara bahwa Rusia ingin sedikit demi sedikit mengurangi kegiatan ekspor dan impor dengan Uni Eropa yang dapat dilihat dari tabel-tabel sebelumnya, namun harapan untuk mengubah kebijakan Uni Eropa terkait sanksinya kepada Rusia gagal dipenuhi dimana sanksi Uni Eropa tersebut masih akan berlangsung hingga tahun 2018 mendatang.

5.2.3 *Punishing past errors or extracting reprisals*

Indikator ini digunakan untuk melihat apakah ada upaya untuk melakukan pembalasan dendam atau hukuman di masa lalu yang dialami oleh Rusia sehingga negaranya memutuskan untuk menjatuhkan sanksi kepada Uni Eropa. Konflik yang terjadi antara Rusia dan Uni Eropa terjadi ketika Rusia mengeluarkan referendum di bulan Maret 2014 yang mengatakan bahwa masyarakat di Krimea setuju untuk berpisah dari negara Ukraina dan menjadi wilayah yang independen.³⁸ Ketika itu pemimpin kelompok separatis juga menginginkan agar wilayahnya

³⁸ Sevastopol City Council, diakses pada situs <https://web.archive.org/web/20140722133147/http://sevsovet.com.ua/index.php/2011-06-30-23-44-03/12395-na-sessii-gorodskogo-soveta-utverzhdny-rezultaty-obshchekrymskogo-referenduma-16-marta-2014-goda>

menjadi bagian dari Rusia dikarenakan memiliki kedekatan budaya yang lebih baik dengan Rusia.³⁹

Keputusan tersebut disambut dengan baik oleh Rusia apalagi Rusia juga merasa bahwa Krimea merupakan bagian dari negaranya sehingga Rusia juga menunjukkan dukungannya dengan mengirimkan pasukan militer (sukarelawan terlatih) untuk melindungi masyarakat etnis Rusia yang meminta bantuan perlindungan dari Rusia.⁴⁰

Referendum tersebut dikecam baik oleh Ukraina maupun Uni Eropa. Ketika itu, Uni Eropa merasa memiliki tanggung jawab untuk melakukan tindakan atas aneksasi tersebut sehingga secara resmi Uni Eropa menjatuhkan sanksi kepada Rusia di tahun 2014, tahun yang sama dengan Referendum.

Pada bulan Agustus 2014, Rusia secara resmi mengeluarkan sanksi balasan (embargo) kepada Uni Eropa atas tekanan yang terus menerus diberikan oleh barat kepada negaranya. Namun dengan keputusan sanksi tersebut, Rusia tidak melakukannya sebagai bentuk pembalasan dendam karena tidak ada bentuk-bentuk kesalahan Uni Eropa di masa lalu kepada Rusia atau sebaliknya, dimana sanksi semata-mata dilakukan karena adanya aneksasi dan tekanan dari barat bahwa

³⁹ *Unknown*, 2013, Ukraine separatists declare independence, Aljazeera. Diakses pada situs <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/05/ukraine-separatists-declare-independence-201451219375613219.html> tanggal 29 September 2017 pukul 11:39

⁴⁰ Press release, 2014 <http://government.ru/en/news/12509/>

Rusia telah melanggar kedaulatan Ukraina,⁴¹ disamping itu juga tidak ada rasa ‘dendam’ diantara kedua belah pihak karena dampaknya pun masih bisa diantisipasi oleh keduanya.

5.2.4 *Encouraging acceptance of international norms*

Indikator ini digunakan untuk melihat usaha Rusia dalam mengangkat norma internasional dalam hal ini sanksi ekonomi. Sanksi ekonomi diterapkan oleh negara sebagai bentuk hukuman atas pelanggaran norma yang dilakukan. Sanksi berkaitan dengan norma dan peraturan, dan penerapannya biasanya membawa efek negatif bagi negara target, baik simbolis maupun nyata serta memiliki dasar hukum yang jelas.⁴² Norma internasional tersebut biasanya telah diatur dalam hukum internasional, dimana hukum internasional merupakan sebuah badan peraturan yang mengatur hubungan antar negara. Hukum ini diciptakan dari adanya kesepakatan dan kebiasaan internasional (*international agreements and international custom*), dan keduanya merupakan cara utama bagi negara untuk menentukan legalitas tindakan antar satu negara dengan yang lain.⁴³

Menurut Henderson, aspek terpenting dalam perilaku antar negara adalah dengan interaksi ekonomi. Biasanya negara-negara akan

⁴¹ Timeline EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/>

⁴² Margaret Doxey, 1983, *International Sanctions in Theory and Practice*, 15 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L., Hal. 274

<http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1806&context=jil>

⁴³ Curtis Henderson, Hal 167

<http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2847&context=wlu>

mencoba memfasilitasi kemakmuran ekonominya sendiri melalui kebijakan perdagangan yang menguntungkan, namun banyak negara-negara lain yang melakukannya melalui pemberlakuan sanksi ekonomi untuk mencapai tujuan politik,⁴⁴ seperti embargo Rusia ke Uni Eropa.

Sanksi ekonomi yang diatur dalam hukum internasional merupakan cara yang dapat dilakukan negara untuk mengubah kebijakan politik dalam negeri maupun luar negeri suatu negara, penerapannya juga terjadi di era pasca Perang Dunia II yang dilakukan oleh Amerika Serikat dimana saat itu merupakan trend bagi negara-negara untuk menekan secara ekonomi tidak militer.⁴⁵

Pemberlakuan sanksi oleh Rusia ke Uni Eropa merupakan suatu bentuk bahwa setiap negara memiliki kemampuan untuk secara independen merumuskan kebijakannya tanpa ada campur tangan dari negara lain, kemampuan tersebut juga merupakan suatu kelebihan negara sebagai aktor yang berdaulat. Ketika suatu negara melakukan perdagangan internasional, secara natural hal tersebut juga akan mempengaruhi negara-negara lain disekitarnya meskipun perdagangan tersebut tidak melibatkan mereka. Status negara sebagai aktor independen yang berdaulat tidak dapat menjamin posisi mereka kebal terhadap hukum internasional dalam menjalankan hubungannya dengan negara lain. Hukum internasional yang ada akan mengikat

⁴⁴ Ibid. hal 168

⁴⁵ Ibid. Hal 175

negara-negara tersebut dan sanksi merupakan kebijakan ekonomi luar negeri suatu negara yang legal dan telah diatur dalam hukum internasional tersebut.⁴⁶

5.2.5 *Managing political parties or alliances*

Indikator ini merupakan usaha Rusia untuk mencari aliansi melalui negara-negara yang akhirnya mendukung Rusia dalam penjatuhan sanksi ekonomi dengan menentang sanksi yang diberikan oleh Uni Eropa kepada Rusia. Ketika Rusia memberlakukan sanksi, hubungan Rusia dengan negara-negara di Uni Eropa mulai memburuk, hal tersebut juga diperparah dengan negara-negara barat lain seperti Amerika Serikat, Kanada, dan Australia yang ikut mengecam Rusia akan tindakannya dalam menganeksasi Krimea. Hal tersebut mendorong Rusia untuk mengelola aliansi-aliansi nya untuk bekerjasama dengan mereka sebagai negara yang bersikap baik pada Rusia.

Dengan hubungan yang merenggang dengan Uni Eropa, Rusia menjalin kerjasama dengan negara-negara di Asia, Amerika Selatan (Amerika Latin), dan beberapa negara di Eropa Tengah dan Timur. Serbia merupakan salah satu negara yang membuat tawaran kerjasama dengan Rusia di tahun 2014.⁴⁷ Hungaria, Slovakia, dan Republik Ceko telah

⁴⁶ Ibid. Hal 179

⁴⁷ Sumber Gambar 4.

Alec Luh, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/17/-sp-russia-relations-europe-guardian-briefing>

Gambar 4 Peta wilayah Rusia dan Eropa Tengah



lebih awal memutuskan untuk menolak menjatuhkan sanksi bersama Uni Eropa ke Rusia. Ketika itu Presiden Rusia, Putin menjadi tamu kehormatan dalam parade militer untuk merayakan 70 tahun kebebasan Belgrade (Ibu Kota Serbia) dari penjajahan Nazi.⁴⁸ Hubungan yang dekat tersebut dipertanyakan karena saat itu Rusia baru saja memberlakukan embargo kepada Uni Eropa, sedangkan Serbia sedang berada dalam proses ingin bergabung dengan Uni Eropa.


Menteri Serbian, Alexander Vulin, mengatakan bahwa Rusia merepresentasikan kesuksesan dari perjuangan Uni Soviet dan Serbia dalam memerangi Nazi, disamping itu Jerman juga menjalin kerjasama dan hubungan yang baik dengan Rusia bahkan membuat saluran pipa

⁴⁸ Guy De Launey, 2014, Serbia's balancing act between Russia and EU
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29656943>

minyak bersama, Serbia juga ingin memiliki hubungan yang semakin erat dengan Rusia terlepas dari kepentingan sanksi Uni Eropa.⁴⁹

Perwakilan dari Serbia percaya bahwa hubungannya dengan Rusia tidak seharusnya mempengaruhi keputusan penerimaan keanggotaan Uni Eropa. Kedua negara sama-sama merupakan bangsa Slavia dengan akar bahasa Cyrillic dan memiliki kepercayaan yang sama yaitu Kristen

Tabel 8 Ekspor Impor antara Hungaria dan Rusia



Ortodox. Secara ekonomis, Rusia juga merupakan investor terbesar bagi Serbia dan adanya akses perdagangan bebas ke Rusia sebagai salah satu pasar terbesar di Eropa.⁵⁰ Sehingga tidak mengherankan apabila Serbia tidak ikut menjatuhkan sanksi kepada Rusia.

Hungaria juga menjadi salah satu negara yang menunjukkan kesetiiaannya pada Rusia bahkan mengecam bahwa keputusan Uni Eropa

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

untuk menekan Rusia tidak rasional.⁵¹ Hungaria merupakan negara yang perekonomiannya sangat bergantung pada kegiatan ekspor dan apabila melihat pada Tabel 8 maka dapat dilihat bahwa terjadi penurunan hingga 50% pada ekspor Hungaria ke Rusia di tahun 2013 hingga 2015.⁵² Dengan sekutu tersebut membuktikan bahwa tidak sepenuhnya negara-negara di Eropa setuju dengan keputusan dari Uni Eropa sebagai Organisasi Regional terbesar dan menunjukkan bahwa posisi Rusia di Eropa memiliki pengaruh yang besar bahkan beberapa negara Uni Eropa memutuskan untuk lebih menjalin kerjasama dengan Rusia.

5.2.6 *Undermining a political regimes*

Indikator ini dilihat dari apabila adanya upaya Rusia untuk menghindari atau mengurangi ancaman suatu rezim. Ancaman rezim ini berasal dari Uni Eropa sebagai rezim regional terbesar di Eropa. Sejak Rusia menerima hasil referendum wilayah Krimea yang ingin bergabung dengan Rusia, Uni Eropa mencoba menjatuhkan sanksi dan menekan Rusia bersama dengan negara barat lainnya agar Rusia menarik pasukan militernya dari Ukraina. Namun sanksi balasan dijatuhkan oleh Rusia untuk menunjukkan bahwa setiap kebijakannya (terkait pemerintah yang mendukung hasil referendum) memiliki alasan dan tidak dapat dipengaruhi oleh Uni Eropa. Sanksi ini berhasil membuat Rusia

⁵¹ TABEL 8

Unknown, last updated 2016, diakses pada

<http://www.euronews.com/2016/02/16/balancing-act-hungary-treads-a-delicate-line-between-russia-and-the-eu>

⁵² *Ibid.*


mencapai tujuannya yaitu ketahanan pangan dan mengurangi dampak-dampak dari ancaman sanksi Uni Eropa.

Sejak memberlakukan sanksi, Rusia secara percaya diri menyatakan bahwa sanksi ini merupakan cara yang unik bagi mereka untuk meningkatkan sektor agrikultural yang selama ini diabaikan.⁵³

Pada tahun 2015, pemerintah Rusia telah berinvestasi di lebih dari 400 perusahaan agrikultur sehingga mengalami peningkatan tahunan sebesar 3%, dengan produksi daging dan keju meningkat mencapai 10%.

Pemerintah juga meningkatkan gaji pokok pensiun untuk mensubsidi harga bahan pangan yang meningkat.⁵⁴ Bahkan menurut *polling* konsumsi masyarakat di tahun 2014 (Tabel 9), sebagian besar masyarakat di Rusia sama sekali tidak merasa terganggu.⁵⁵ Apabila Uni Eropa

Tabel 9 Survey Masyarakat Rusia mengenai sanksi



Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 24–27 October 2014, N = 1,630, <<http://www.levada.ru/11-11-2014/kontrsanktsii-problemy-i-posledstviya>>

⁵³ Somar Wijayadasa, 2016, Sanctions will not cause ‘regime change’ in Russia <http://www.sundaytimes.lk/161009/sunday-times-2/sanctions-will-not-cause-regime-change-in-russia-211706.html>

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Wergen, loc.cit, Hal 12



memiliki tujuan untuk menjatuhkan perekonomian Rusia karena ketika terjadi ketidakstabilan ekonomi di dalam negeri dapat mendorong rezim saat itu, Putin, untuk mematuhi permintaan Uni Eropa,⁵⁶ maka tujuan tersebut tidak begitu berdampak karena antisipasi-antisipasi yang telah dilakukan pemerintah Rusia sendiri.

Dalam hal ini, Rusia terlihat mengurangi ancaman rezim dari Uni Eropa dengan tidak membiarkan sanksi itu sendiri berpengaruh terhadap kepentingan negaranya terbukti dengan bagaimana pemerintah Rusia melakukan upaya-upaya untuk mendapatkan kepercayaan masyarakat Rusia dan menekankan posisinya pada kasus aneksasi Krimea. Rusia juga mampu menunjukkan kepada Uni Eropa bahwa mereka bukan satu-satunya aktor yang dominan di Eropa apalagi dengan ditambah dukungan dari negara-negara aliansi.

5.2.7 *Restoring status quo*

Indikator ini dilihat sebagai upaya Rusia untuk mengembalikan keadaan sebelum dan sesudah sanksi, dimana keadaan yang ingin dikembalikan oleh Rusia adalah berupa status Krimea yang pernah menjadi bagian dari wilayahnya. Apabila melihat dari sejarah Krimea sendiri, krimea merupakan wilayah di Ukraina yang telah terbagi-bagi menjadi beberapa wilayah jajahan. Saat itu Republik Rusia dan Uni

⁵⁶ Mark Kramer, 2015, Exclusive: Sanctions and Regime Survival. Diakses pada <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/sanctions-and-regime-survival> tanggal 9 Oktper pukul 12:50

Soviet masih memiliki wilayah jajahannya masing-masing di Semenanjung Krimea dan belum bergabung menjadi satu kesatuan. Wilayah Krimea sendiri saat itu didominasi oleh bangsa Tamerlan yang menamai dirinya Krimea Tatar sebelum akhirnya berhasil di ambil alih oleh kekaisaran Ottoman.⁵⁷ Ketika kekaisaran Ottoman jatuh di tangan Uni Soviet, sebagian besar wilayah Krimea pun menjadi milik Uni Soviet hingga diserahkan kepada Ukraina sebagai bentuk persahabatan dan bergabungnya Ukraina menjadi wilayah Uni Soviet.⁵⁸

Dari sejarah tersebut, Rusia ingin mempertahankan status quo nya bahwa Krimea adalah bagian dari Rusia yang saat itu merupakan Uni Soviet dimana penyerahan tersebut tidak memiliki dokumen legal yang jelas sehingga referendum atas Krimea bukan merupakan aneksasi melainkan hak Rusia atas wilayah Krimea yang 'diambil alih' oleh Ukraina. Sanksi Rusia ini juga tidak akan terjadi apabila Uni Eropa memang mau mengakui bahwa Krimea adalah wilayah dari Rusia.

Disamping itu, Rusia tidak mungkin mengalah dengan tekanan sanksi dari Uni Eropa karena negara-negara pendukungnya akan mempertanyakan posisi Rusia yang mereka anggap kuat di Eropa apalagi setelah sanksi dari Uni Eropa dijatuhkan kepada Rusia, negara-negara aliansi Rusia banyak berasal dari negara-negara di Eropa Tengah yang merupakan negara bekas jajahan soviet.

⁵⁷ Anton Bebler, 2015, hal. 198, *Teori in Praksa*

⁵⁸ Roberto Savio, 2016, *The Tension between Europe and Russia*, Wall Street International.

BAB VI

PENUTUP

6.1 Kesimpulan

Berdasarkan penelitian yang telah penulis teliti mengenai tujuan Rusia dalam menjatuhkan sanksi ekonomi kepada Uni Eropa di tahun 2014 adalah dapat terbagi menjadi dua tujuan utama menurut David Hunter, yaitu tujuan yang bersifat simbolik dan tujuan yang bersifat instrumental. Tujuan simbolik berisi indikator-indikator seperti upaya untuk menghindari dari kritik Internasional, upaya memunculkan perhatian akan suatu isu, keinginan untuk mengambil tindakan, menunjukkan inisiatif untuk memperlihatkan kepemimpinan, dan upaya untuk mengangkat penghakiman moral dan tanggung jawab. Sedangkan pada tujuan instrumental berisi indikator seperti upaya untuk mendorong hambatan internal atau reformasi politik, upaya untuk mencegah atau mendorong aksi-aksi yang diinginkan, upaya untuk memberikan hukuman dan pembalasan dendam, upaya untuk mendorong penerimaan norma internasional, upaya untuk mengurus aliansi, upaya untuk meruntuhkan rezim politik, dan upaya untuk mengembalikan staus quo.

Pada tujuan yang bersifat simbolik, Rusia melakukan sanksi sebagai upaya untuk menghindari kritik dari Uni Eropa bahwa aneksasi yang

dilakukan krimea telah melanggar kedaulatan dan teritorial di Ukraina sehingga dengan sanksi, Rusia menunjukkan bahwa Krimea adalah kesalahan dari kepemimpinan di masa lalu sehingga secara legal Krimea merupakan wilayah dari Rusia bukan Ukraina, namun pada indikator ini perlu dilihat apakah ada perubahan sanksi dari Uni Eropa sendiri, hingga tahun 2018 Uni Eropa sama sekali tidak mengurangi intensitas sanksinya sehingga indikator untuk menolak ini tidak terbukti. Kemudian adanya tujuan Rusia untuk menumbuhkan dan memunculkan isu yaitu isu ketahanan pangan sendiri di negaranya, sehingga Rusia menjatuhkan sanksi ekonomi agar isu tersebut mulai diperhatikan.


Tujuan simbolik selanjutnya adalah adanya keinginan untuk mengambil suatu tindakan (aksi), dalam hal ini aksi dilakukan karena adanya kebutuhan yang ingin dicapai yaitu ketahanan pangan. Rusia memiliki kelemahan dalam sektor pangan sehingga untuk mencapai kebutuhan tersebut, Rusia memberlakukan sanksi juga di sektor pangan. Kemudian adanya upaya Putin untuk menunjukkan kepemimpinan dengan membuktikkan bahwa kebijakan Rusia tidak dapat dipengaruhi oleh pihak luar dan negaranya tidak bergantung kepada Uni Eropa. Dengan sanksi ini juga Rusia ingin menunjukkan bentuk tanggung jawab Rusia kepada masyarakat etnis Rusia sendiri di Krimea dan sanksi yang diberlakukan oleh Uni Eropa atas tanggung jawab tersebut tidak rasional dan hanya berdasarkan sentimen kepada negaranya.

Pada tujuan yang bersifat instrumental, dalam mengatasi hambatan internal yaitu ketergantungan pangan, Rusia memberlakukan sanksi karena negaranya mengetahui potensi-potensi yang dimiliki bahwa sanksi ini akan membantu mencapai ketahanan pangan sehingga Rusia merasa diuntungkan dengan adanya sanksi dari Uni Eropa, bahkan Putin sempat mengganti Menteri Agrikulturnya sebagai upaya untuk mencapai ketahanan pangan tersebut. Kemudian dengan sanksi, Rusia juga memberikan dampak berupa pengurangan ekspor dan impor yang dirasakan langsung oleh Uni Eropa setelah terkena sanksi (embargo) balasan tersebut.

Tujuan instrumental yang lain adalah adanya upaya Rusia untuk mengelola aliansi bahwa dengan sanksi ini, Rusia dapat menjalin kerjasama dengan negara-negara lain dan juga posisi Rusia yang ternyata dibutuhkan oleh negara-negara di Eropa seperti Serbia, Hungaria, dan sebagainya. Rusia juga melakukan upaya-upaya untuk mengurangi rezim dengan mengeluarkan kebijakan-kebijakan yang dapat meminimalisir dampak sanksi dari Uni Eropa. Dengan sanksi ini juga Rusia ingin mempertahankan status quo nya bahwa Krimea adalah wilayah Rusia. Namun, yang tidak dapat dibuktikan berdasarkan tujuan instrumental dari sanksi Rusia adalah adanya keinginan untuk melakukan hukuman atau pembalasan dendam karena seperti yang sudah dijelaskan sebelumnya bahwa sanksi dilakukan untuk mencapai ketahanan pangan dan cara Rusia dalam bertahan diri dari tekanan Uni Eropa bukan merupakan bentuk dendam atau kesalahan di masa lalu.

6.2 Saran

Saran yang dapat penulis berikan untuk penelitian selanjutnya yang akan menggunakan konsep yang sama terutama dari hunter adalah memastikan untuk membaca contoh-contoh yang diberikan karena Hunter tidak mendefinisikan konsepnya dengan jelas dan mengasumsikan bahwa pembacanya paham dengan tulisan yang ia buat. Sedangkan bagi calon penulis yang akan menggunakan isu yang sama untuk lebih mengelaborasi data-data yang ditemukan karena kasus ini masih berjalan sehingga dapat diperoleh penelitian-penelitian yang berbeda namun dengan isu yang sama.



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OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Government meeting

7 August 2014 12:30 Government House, Moscow

On measures to implement the Presidential Executive Order On Applying Certain Special Economic Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation.

Excerpts from Dmitry Medvedev's introductory remarks

Briefing by Minister of Agriculture Nikolai Fyodorov

Dmitry Medvedev: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Before we start discussing the agenda, I would like to inform you of the following: For a long time, Russia has not responded to the so-called sanctions declared against it by certain countries. Until the last moment, we hoped that our foreign colleagues would realise that sanctions lead to a blind alley, and that no one benefits from them. But they didn't realise this, and now we have been forced to respond.

Yesterday, the President of the Russian Federation signed an Executive Order On Applying Certain Special Economic Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation. This basically means an embargo on importing entire categories of products from those countries which have declared economic sanctions against Russian organisations and individuals. I have signed a Government resolution on enforcing this Executive Order.

Russia has completely banned the importation of beef, pork, fruits and vegetables, poultry, fish, cheese, milk and dairy products from the European Union, the United States, Australia, Canada and the Kingdom of Norway. Of course, this is a serious decision with regard to the distributors of these products from the above countries. At the same time, I would like to emphasise that these measures will not affect baby food imports. And, naturally, they don't apply to products being purchased by individuals in these countries in line with our customs legislation.

Dmitry Medvedev: "Russia has completely banned the importation of beef, pork, fruits and vegetables, poultry, fish, cheese, milk and dairy products from the European Union, the United States, Australia, Canada and the Kingdom of Norway."

These restrictions shall be introduced starting today, and for a period of 12 months. But, if our partners display a constructive approach towards cooperation issues, then the Government would be willing to revise the specific implementation deadlines for these measures.

I hereby instruct the Federal Customs Service to carry out and enforce this directive as quickly as possible. In other words, it shall stop the shipment of the relevant products. The Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Agriculture will start monitoring the commodity markets and price levels on a daily basis, and they shall report their findings to the Government.

I would also like to warn everyone that any attempts to obtain speculative profits from this situation will be stopped and held accountable. The Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service shall enhance their cooperation with retail chain representatives and producers. They shall hold meetings and consultations, and they shall chart a joint action plan in order to compensate for product shortfalls and, of course, to prevent price hikes.

I have repeatedly stated that there is nothing productive about sanctions. We had a hard time deciding on retaliatory measures, and we were forced to make this decision. But I am confident that we'll be able to take advantage of the situation even under these conditions.

While touring the country and meeting with farmers, we have repeatedly heard complaints that Russian retail chains and shops do not allow the sale of Russian foodstuffs. You have also heard and seen this many times. The retaliatory measures that we are introducing will essentially open up shop shelves for domestic producers. Of course, Russian farmers will have to accomplish a lot and work hard, but this opportunity to launch and expand import-substituting production facilities should not be missed. Naturally, our trade partners from other countries will still cooperate with us on the entire range of the above items.

Dmitry Medvedev: "The Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service shall enhance their cooperation with retail chain representatives and producers. They shall hold meetings and consultations, and they shall chart a joint action plan in order to compensate for product shortfalls and, of course, to prevent price hikes."

The Food Security Doctrine that was approved four years ago is being implemented effectively with regard to a considerable number of foodstuffs. For example, grain, sugar, vegetable oil and potato production volumes now exceed the threshold levels being stipulated by the Doctrine. The same is true of poultry and, in principle, pork.

Where we are lagging behind is in certain kinds of meat and milk. We should fill in the gap on our own, and our farmers are ready to do this, especially with our help. Again, I repeat: our trade partners from other countries are still working with us. I am sure that our market will be filled with fresh quality Russian products, which anyway many Russians prefer to the imported ones.

The next thing I'd like to focus on is that we are also developing measures to retaliate against the EU sanctions against Dobrolyot for its service to Simferopol. As you all know, on 4 August our first low-cost carrier was forced to suspend operations as a result of these unfriendly acts. All of its European partners refused to meet their obligations to lease, provide maintenance or insurance for planes or to provide air navigation data. This has brought many problems to our people that we've had to deal with. In this context, the Russian Government is considering a series of responses. I'll name them. This doesn't mean they'll be taken right away, but they are on the table.

First, they include an airspace ban against European and US airlines that fly over our airspace to Eastern Asia, namely, the Asia-Pacific Region. This is a very tough measure indeed. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned.

Second, we are considering changing the so-called Russian airspace entry and exit points for European scheduled and charter flights. This, of course, will affect transportation costs and fare prices for the Western carriers.

Dmitry Medvedev: "We are also developing measures to retaliate against the EU sanctions against Dobrolyot for its service to Simferopol. As you all know, on 4 August our first low-cost carrier was forced to suspend operations as a result of these unfriendly acts."

Third, this country is ready to revise the rules of using the trans-Siberian routes, that is, to denounce the agreed upon modernisation principles of the existing system. This revision will apply in full to the EU countries. We will also discontinue talks with the US air authorities on the use of the trans-Siberian routes.

Fourth, starting this winter, we may revoke the additional rights issued by the Russian air authorities beyond the previous agreements.

Dmitry Medvedev: "We're referring to the suspension of Ukrainian airlines' transit flights through Russian airspace to a number of countries – Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Turkey."

I'd like to emphasise that all these measures are not being introduced yet, but otherwise can be implemented either separately or together. As a result, the expenses of Western airlines will grow significantly. I repeat, we are only considering these steps now, but the Government has already taken one specific decision.

We're referring to the suspension of Ukrainian airlines' transit flights through Russian airspace to a number of countries – Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Turkey.

Finally, we're potentially ready to adopt protective measures for the aircraft, shipbuilding and auto industries as well as other industries, but we'll do these things in a measured manner. The Government realizes the significance of cooperation in these spheres, so naturally we're taking a realistic approach while considering our own opportunities.

I repeat that all I've just said, all the measures I've mentioned are simply responses. We did not want this to happen, and I sincerely hope that our partners' economic pragmatism will prevail over malevolent political considerations, that they will think matters over, rather than intimidate or impose restrictions on Russia, and that mutually profitable trade and economic cooperation will be restored to its former level. We would very much hope for that.

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Briefing by Minister of Agriculture Nikolai Fyodorov following the Government meeting

Transcript:

Question: Yelena Mishina, ITAR-TASS. Mr Fyodorov, I have two questions for you. How much will support for the Russian agricultural industry increase now that it has taken on an additional load? The second question is about the technical enforcement of the sanctions, since Russia is part of the Customs Union, and neither Belarus, nor Kazakhstan, has imposed them.

Nikolai Fyodorov: With regard to providing additional support to the state programme for expanding agriculture, we have our own numbers, which we derived based on the threshold quantities indicated in the Food Security Doctrine, which was approved by a presidential decree back in 2010. We will use these numbers to work with our colleagues in the Government. As the President said and the Prime Minister confirmed today, we, despite all the difficulties and challenges, will have to look for additional resources to support domestic agricultural producers, in line with the doctrine and because of the sanctions.

Such support will also become available, because our industry associations in all major areas of agricultural production... We met with them on several occasions over the past few days, when the unfriendly countries in question tightened their requirements toward Russia. They provided their assessments of their resources that may become available for boosting agricultural production, and told us that by virtue of reduced food imports, Russia may produce an additional 281 billion roubles worth of agricultural products in the next 18 months. These are expert assessments of our industry associations, which require further evaluation by the Government and the Ministry of Agriculture. As is known, if something becomes scarce in one place, it must become plentiful in another. In fact, this decision by the Russian leadership gives us a unique chance to improve our agricultural sector.

To a degree, today's situation (of course, not in form, but in content) seems similar to devaluation of the rouble in 1998, which allowed us to boost the agricultural sector and replace a large portion of substandard imported products, which were swamping the Russian consumer market in the mid-1990s, with domestic agricultural products.

With regard to protecting our interests and complying with the embargo in the Customs Union, we are actively negotiating this issue with our colleagues from Belarus and Kazakhstan. In fact, we do have mechanisms, and we will agree on more of them in order to remain compliant with the decisions that will be taken by Russia as a member of the Customs Union. We think that we will find a civilised way to block all possible threats to violation of the sanctions that Russia was forced to introduce.

Question: Andrei Belyakov, Interfax. Mr Fyodorov, is the list final? Can it be expanded? Could products, such as wine and other spirits, as well as cereals, canned goods, juices, and water, be added to it?

And a second question: how do you think inflation may be affected by the sanctions?

Nikolai Fyodorov: The list may be subject to certain changes, but, the way that I see it and understand our leadership's vision of the situation, it won't change in the near future most likely, at least it won't expand. Certain items could be removed, though. In terms of cereals and the like – this is out of the question. In fact, as you are aware, this does not concern the list, but what the people behind the sanctions against Russia will say. It concerns what they think about our actions. I heard some EU representatives say that the sanctions imposed by Russia are counterproductive and unjustified, as if their own sanctions are productive and justified.

Today, early on into the Government meeting, the Prime Minister stated that the sanctions are a forced measure. We were forced to make these decisions. Russia did not respond after the first volley of sanctions and not even after the second volley. Only when they imposed sectoral sanctions that impacted important lending institutions, such as Sberbank, the Russian Agricultural Bank, and VTB, which are major lenders and investors in the state programme for expanding agriculture and ensuring food security, Russia took actions in response to such sanctions.

Without exaggeration, the sanctions against institutions that are critical to Russia's agricultural sector threaten Russia's food security. Indeed, in his executive order, the President mentions the law on economic and other security of the Russian state because when sanctions against Russia graduated to a level where they could eliminate the development institutions... This would paralyse all investment projects designed to industrialise the

agricultural sector of the Russian economy and is fraught with the annihilation of a competitive Russian agricultural sector.

To put it mildly, these are rather unscrupulous competition methods. I am entitled to this kind of assessment as the Minister of Agriculture. When it came to security threats, both food and state security, the President was forced to make these decisions.

Once again, this might sound not too nice or even cynical, but sometimes they make us say so. Every cloud has a silver lining. The Russian farmers were given a great opportunity through the decisions of the President and the Government.

As I mentioned earlier, we now have the unique chance to improve our agricultural sector and make it more competitive. We will replace imports from the EU, the United States, and Canada with imports from our other partners. And we are going to do it not just for half a year or a year, but I think that we'll be able to find long-term partners elsewhere – in the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America, and so on.

Question: What about inflation?

Nikolai Fyodorov: According to our estimates (surely, this is a sensitive, important and topical subject), we do not see any unfavorable impact on inflation – either in the long-term or the mid-term perspective – in the wake of the decisions that are made today. True, some short-term splashes – psychological, emotional (as is normally the case) or seasonal – are possible in our country, but we do not see a fundamental, strategic threat. The decisions made today are unlikely to provoke a negatively impact on inflationary expectations.

Question: Alexandra Bayazitova from the Izvestia newspaper. I have two questions to ask you. Will, in your opinion, agricultural producers be able to make use of that chance that the Prime Minister and you spoke about at their own expense or they will need credit leverage? And the second question. We know that the Central Bank is drafting its own plan to support agricultural producers. Is the Government also involved in the development of this plan, and what kind of support, credit support in particular, is actually meant?

Nikolai Fyodorov: Today, the Prime Minister specified that during all of his trips to various regions across our country, farmers called for import restrictions. I am returning to this subject. During virtually every meeting, farmers, Russian agrarians, would bring the matter up, directly or indirectly, saying: “Help us! Restrict agricultural imports!” That’s all they wanted. They wouldn’t ask for more money or more loans, etc. It’s true, and you agree with it. These forced import restrictions will help them a lot. There would be less competition on the market. These are favorable conditions helping farmers to develop their own businesses – this is an objective law that works for every branch. As I said, we have already drafted a new national agriculture development programme and submitted it to the Government for approval, and most of my colleagues in the Government have already coordinated it. The draft stipulates that we move more actively towards reaching the targeted levels of our food security doctrine. You’ve probably heard about that, it’s almost common knowledge, and the Prime Minister spoke about that. We have provided ourselves with grain, vegetable oil, sugar and potatoes in sufficient quantities to guarantee our food security. As for fish and water bio-resources, fish products, here the degree of provision approximates the targeted levels. We are making sound progress towards ensuring food security as regards meat and meat products. Poultry and pork production is developing at a very good pace. As for beef, we are ahead of schedule fixed in the state programme. We haven’t reached the targeted levels yet, which we are supposed to do by 2020 or by 2018 for certain products, but we are moving ahead of schedule. Things are slightly worse with milk and dairy products – that’s as far as basic foods are concerned. Considering the challenges that our country faces under volatile conditions, the Ministry of Agriculture has submitted its proposals for expanded Government support. In my opinion, the appearance of the President’s executive order under these new circumstances gives us additional arguments and hope that the proposals and calculations made by the Ministry of Agriculture will win the approval

of our colleagues in the Government and, above all, from the Ministry of Finance, of course. I will tell you a secret. Our leadership (we discussed this subject) has a political and organisational awareness of and supports the need for additional injections of funds into the agrarian sector despite the fact that there will now be more room on the market.

Question: Bloomberg. Olga Tanas. I will ask you a few questions, if I may. Could you specify the share of banned products from countries that imposed sanctions on Russia in the total amount of food products imported by Russia? The second question. Which food products do you expect to be in short supply in the near future until you manage to substitute them with domestic ones and with which countries is Russia planning to expand cooperation and open new markets? What is it planning to import from Latin America, particularly from Brazil?

Nikolai Fyodorov: Our preliminary assessments are as follows. I even have a ready answer to your question (not specifically for you, but that's what the Ministry of Agriculture has been doing under the current circumstances). Let me read our internal document. It is possible to substitute supplies of meat and meat products from the EU, the United States, Canada and Australia with supplies from Brazil (work has already begun; you have probably paid attention to the fact that we accredited 40 new enterprises from Brazil), plus from Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, and Belarus; cheese, butter and powdered milk – with supplies from South American countries and New Zealand; vegetables – with supplies from Turkey, Argentina, Chile, China, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan; apples and pears – with those from Argentina, Chile, China and Serbia; cherries, sweet cherries, apricots, peaches – with those from Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Israel, Turkey, Iran; citrus fruit – with supplies from Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, and South Africa.

The share of our food supply consisting of imports will shrink. But look at our present-day statistics. Russia's beef consumption stands at 2.345 million tonnes [a year], of which the EU, the United States and Canada put together account for a mere 59,000 tonnes. Moreover, Brazil and some other countries have begun beef exports to Russia. Here are the figures for pork: 450,000 tonnes out of the total 3.415 million tonnes – nothing critical; for poultry meat, a negligible 338,000 out of 4.28 million tonnes; and for fish, 457,000 tonnes out of total consumption exceeding 3.44 million tonnes. Indicatively, Russia exports 1.8 million tonnes of fish and derivative products, compared to 700,000 tonnes that it imports. This means that we can settle the problem very quickly, and the end consumers will not even see the difference. Next, the above-mentioned countries account for 459,000 tonnes out of 36 million tonnes of dairy products; 900,000 tonnes out of 16 million tonnes of vegetables; and 1.6 million tonnes of fruit and berries out of the total consumption of 11 million tonnes. So the share is not significant for any item. These are the basic indicators; nothing to worry about, as we are making this decision very responsibly. We will compensate for the decrease with the help of deliveries from other countries.

Question: There was another question: what shortages in foodstuffs can we expect soon?

Nikolai Fyodorov: I posed this question to all my colleagues and our partners, and no one could say for sure what foodstuffs might be undersupplied. We may have certain shortages somewhat later, but we don't think the latest decisions will cause them. I say this on the authority of experts we collaborate with, mainly research institute experts and representatives of industrial unions we rely upon.

Question: Denis Ichyotkin, ITAR-TASS. Mr Fyodorov, the European Union is declaring even now its intention to challenge, according to the WTO procedures, the sanctions announced today. You are a lawyer. What are the prospects of this suit, in your mind? At the same time, Russia intended to challenge the sanctions against it, within the WTO framework, as was announced before. Have proceedings been launched? If so, what stage are they at now?

Nikolai Fyodorov: This is certainly a legal matter, but our partners don't abide by the law closely, either out of sheer habit or as a result of a cynical attitude toward international relations. I think any independent expert will

agree with me on that point.

You are addressing me not only as a minister but also as a lawyer. True, I am a lawyer, born and bred, and hackneyed phrases about double standards cause me pain. Compliance with legal procedures is treated very cynically. This is the opposing party's stance: "When we pursue our partners' interests, we don't need to comply with the legal procedure, but we should insist on closer compliance when it comes to Russia's interests." Everyone knows these double standards and is accustomed to them. Even proceeding from them, the Russian authorities' decisions have a solid legal foundation.

I will not make a detailed comment here on the WTO regulations. You might remember GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), Article XXI. It implies that whatever agreements and pledges the countries joining the WTO might make should not run counter to the interests of food, economic and any other kind of security of the WTO member states. So we can back up our position legally. Clearly, our opponents can also refer to the procedures the WTO envisages. We are ready to take part in relevant consultations and debates, and to substantiate our point.

A third wave of sanctions against Russia's state and national interests has begun. Russia is responding to them adequately and legally, in compliance with the WTO rules and procedures. This is where we are proceeding from.

Question: Maksim Tovkailo, *Vedomosti*. First, let me ask you a few short "yes or no" questions.

If we understood the Prime Minister correctly, the ban does not extend to individuals bringing in goods from countries on Russia's sanctions list (goods that are banned) for personal use, is that correct?

Nikolai Fyodorov: Yes, I can assure you that this is correct. The customs regulations remain the same for goods brought in for personal use.

Question: Salmon from Norway is now banned. I could be mistaken, but as a consumer I believe most of the salmon we see in stores is from Norway. Is that correct? Do we have alternatives to replace Norwegian fish?

Nikolai Fyodorov: I think you are right. The percent of Norwegian fish and fish products is pretty high among imports. But I simply presented general figures. We export almost two million tonnes of aquatic biological resources, including salmon and red caviar. We import about 600,000 to 700,000 tonnes. This means, of course, we'll have to make up for the difference. We did not simply discuss this with retail chains, but we are preparing to sign an agreement on reorganizing the distribution system in the regions that usually get their seafood from Norway. These products could be replaced by Russian fish and seafood or products from other countries that could competitively replace Norwegian products.

Question: Is Switzerland included in sanctions as a member of the European Union?

Nikolai Fyodorov: Switzerland is not a member of the European Union. Yes, we have talked about this. Journalists have been wondering about Switzerland and Japan. The sanctions do not cover them.

Question: You spoke about financial aid for the agriculture industry. Is it true that Rosselkhozbank addressed the Ministry of Agriculture and the Government with a request to increase its capital by 50 billion roubles as soon as possible and place a deposit of 100 billion roubles in the bank? The other question regards the report about the programme. How much more agriculture industry funding does the Ministry of Agriculture propose, at least within this plan, for the next three years?

Nikolai Fyodorov: We're talking about an additional 137 billion roubles for the farming industry within the next three or four years. This figure is based on our estimates, not the latest decisions. Our experts were discussing what

we'll lose and how quickly it can be replaced by Russian products, because products from the five subjects of international law will be temporarily unavailable.

Speaking of Rosselkhozbank, after an extensive discussion with all involved representatives and industrial unions, the Minister of Agriculture presented his proposals regarding the bank's request to increase its capital by 77 billion roubles until 2020. This is not a confidential figure. I think it was mentioned in an expert discussion. Clearly, as usual, Rosselkhozbank is in a situation where it would ask for more, but based on our estimates, the ministry decided on 77 billion roubles.

Question: Do you see risks in the attempts to limit grain exports from Russia in response to the adopted measures, and what are these risks? And in general, what is your prediction for exports, considering the grain harvest may reach 100 million tonnes?

Nikolai Fyodorov: Who is limiting exports?

Remark: The countries against which these measures are directed.

Nikolai Fyodorov: For the most part, we export grain not to Canada, the United States and the European Union, but to the Middle East, Africa and Asia. These countries are friendly to us in this case. We are now in the process of determining our attitude toward unfriendly actions. So our grain market and grain exports are fairly predictable and, strange as it may seem, the situation is even better as a result of these unpleasant circumstances.

We have better prospects when it comes to expanding cooperation with other countries. As a minister, I see these prospects and certain adjustments in international cooperation in the long-term perspective. Everything that is happening today, strange though it may seem, has a positive aspect and will help us diversify our cooperation. Of course, the European Union is more convenient, but for how long can we simply enjoy the convenience of this market because it is good and geographically close? I'm convinced that the Asia-Pacific Region and the Middle East have more prospects for Russia's food market.

Remark: What about your forecast of exports...

Nikolai Fyodorov: We don't yet have grounds to change our forecasts much for the production and export of grain. We'll be able to export 25 million tonnes of grain in this agricultural year. According to today's estimate, the forecast for our grain harvest – let me touch wood – is about 100 million tonnes. If you saw our website, you'll know that we are already ahead of the past year in grain by over 14 million tonnes, and in wheat by more than 10 million tonnes. The past year was not bad, whereas the year before it was difficult.

Question: Alexander Orlov, Gazeta.ru. Mr Fyodorov, do you think that a ban on some foods, for instance, Aberdeen Angus beef, could negatively affect the restaurant business?

Nikolai Fyodorov: I've mentioned the numbers. Consumption of beef, and, in fact, all cattle meat from these countries, is merely 59,000 tonnes. We are already holding talks with other countries and even signing contracts on meat supplies with them, and I'm absolutely sure that consumers of marble meat and high quality beef won't suffer. They won't even notice that anything is happening in Russia's trade with the EU countries, Canada or the United States. I want to reassure you that you won't notice a lack of high quality beef. You are used to eating in good restaurants (judging by your concern about their patrons), and you'll continue doing so. Bon appétit!

Person:

Dmitry Medvedev.

OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Russia's response measures

29 June 2017 13:30 | Government House, Moscow

From Dmitry Medvedev's opening remarks at the Government meeting.

Excerpts from the transcript:

Dmitry Medvedev: Yesterday the European Union decided to extend sanctions against Russia. We regret that our European partners continue this short-sighted policy towards Russia. Politics have again taken the upper hand over the economy and, ultimately, over common sense.

We will have to respond in kind to this situation. Yesterday we discussed this matter with the President, and the Government will now submit a proposal asking him to extend the response measures for one more year, until 31 December 2018.

Our position is public knowledge and it has not changed: the policy of mutual economic restrictions does not have a future, yet we have to respond to protect our national interests and to protect a very important sector of the Russian economy –response measures are designed to protect our agriculture industry. Our farmers have asked us more than once to extend these measures and also to outline the perspective for their activities in the near future. We are doing this now, and I am confident that our farmers will be able to use these favourable opportunities to the full.

Person:

Dmitry Medvedev.



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List of persons and entities under EU restrictive measures over the territorial integrity of Ukraine *

List of Persons

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
1.	Sergey Valeryevich AKSYONOV, Sergei Valerievich AKSENOV (Сергей Валерьевич АКСѐНОВ), Serhiy Valeriyovych AKSYONOV (Сергій Валерійович Аксьонов)	DOB: 26.11.1972. POB: Beltsy (Bălți), now Republic of Moldova	Aksyonov was elected 'Prime Minister of Crimea' in the Crimean Verkhovna Rada on 27 February 2014 in the presence of pro-Russian gunmen. His 'election' was decreed unconstitutional by the acting Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov on 1 March 2014. He actively lobbied for the 'referendum' of 16 March 2014 and was one of the co-signatories of the 'treaty on Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation' of 18 March 2014. On 9 April 2014 he was appointed acting 'Head' of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea' by President Putin. On 9 October 2014, he was formally 'elected' 'Head' of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. Aksyonov subsequently decreed that the offices of 'Head' and 'Prime Minister' be combined. Member of the Russia State Council.	17.3.2014

* - The texts on this document are for information only. They have no official or legal status in the form they are published here. The official publication is available on [EUR-Lex website](http://eur-lex.europa.eu).

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
2.	Vladimir Andreevich KONSTANTINOV (Владимир Андреевич КОНСТАНТИНОВ) Volodymyr Andriyovych KONSTANTINOV (Володимир Андрійович КОНСТАНТИНОВ)	DOB: 19.11.1956 POB: Vladimirovka (a.k.a. Vladimirovca), Slobozia Region, Moldavian SSR (now Republic of Moldova) or Bogomol, Moldavian SSR	As speaker of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Konstantinov played a relevant role in the decisions taken by the 'Supreme Council' concerning the 'referendum' against territorial integrity of Ukraine and called on voters to cast their votes in favour of Crimean independence in the 'referendum' of 16 March 2014. He was one of the co-signatories of the 'treaty on Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation' of 18 March 2014. Since 17 March 2014 'Chairman' of the 'State Council' of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'.	17.3.2014
3.	Rustam Ilmirovich TEMIRGALIEV (Рустам Ильмирович ТЕМИРГАЛИЕВ) Rustam Ilmyrovych TEMIRHALIEV (Рустам Ильмирович ТЕМИРГАЛІЄВ)	DOB: 15.8.1976 POB: Ulan-Ude, Buryat ASSR (Russian SFSR)	As former Deputy Prime Minister of Crimea, Temirgaliev played a relevant role in the decisions taken by the 'Supreme Council' concerning the 'referendum' of 16 March 2014 against the territorial integrity of Ukraine. He lobbied actively for the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. On 11 June 2014 he resigned from his function as 'First Deputy Prime Minister' of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'.	17.3.2014



Council of the European Union

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
4.	Denis Valentinovich BEREZOVSKIY (Денис Валентинович БЕРЕЗОВСКИЙ) Denys Valentynovych BEREZOVSKYY (Денис Валентинович БЕРЕЗОВСЬКИЙ)	DOB: 15.7.1974 POB: Kharkiv, Ukrainian SSR	Berezovskiy was appointed commander of the Ukrainian Navy on 1 March 2014 but thereafter swore an oath to the Crimean armed forces, thereby breaking his oath to the Ukrainian Navy. He was then appointed Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation.	17.3.2014
5.	Aleksei Mikhailovich CHALIY (Алексей Михайлович Чалый) Oleksiy Mukhaylovych CHALYY (Олексій Михайлович ЧАЛИЙ)	DOB: 13.6.1961 POB: Moscow or Sevastopol	Chaliy became 'People's Mayor of Sevastopol' by popular acclamation on 23 February 2014 and accepted this 'vote'. He actively campaigned for Sevastopol to become a separate entity of the Russian Federation following a referendum on 16 March 2014. He was one of the co-signatories of the 'treaty on Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation' of 18 March 2014. He was acting 'governor' of Sevastopol from 1 to 14 April 2014 and is a former 'elected' Chairman of the 'Legislative Assembly' of the City of Sevastopol. Member of the 'Legislative Assembly' of the City of Sevastopol.	17.3.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
6.	Pyotr Anatoliyovych ZIMA (Пётр Анатольевич ЗИМА) Petro Anatoliyovych ZYMA (Петро Анатолійович ЗИМА)	DOB: 18.1.1970 POB: Artemivsk (Артемівск) (2016 renamed back to Bakhmut/Бахмут), Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine	Zima was appointed as the new head of the Crimean Security Service (SBU) on 3 March 2014 by 'Prime Minister' Aksyonov and accepted this appointment. He has given relevant information including a database to the Russian Intelligence Service (FSB). This included information on Euro-Maidan activists and human rights defenders of Crimea. He played a relevant role in preventing Ukraine's authorities from controlling the territory of Crimea. On 11 March 2014 the formation of an independent Security Service of Crimea was proclaimed by former SBU officers of Crimea.	17.3.2014
†				
8.	Sergey Pavlovych TSEKOV (Сергей Павлович ЦЕКОВ) Serhiy Pavlovych TSEKOV (Сергій Павлович ЦЕКОВ)	DOB: 28.9.1953 or 28.8.1953 POB: Simferopol	As Vice Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, Tsekov initiated, together with Sergey Aksyonov, the unlawful dismissal of the government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC). He drew Vladimir Konstantinov into this endeavour, threatening him with dismissal. He publicly recognised that the MPs from Crimea were the initiators of inviting Russian soldiers to take over the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea. He was one of the first Crimean Leaders to ask in public for the annexation of Crimea to Russia. Member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation from the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'.	17.3.2014

† The entry was deleted on 10 March 2016 following a delisting decision.

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
9.	Viktor Alekseevich OZEROV (Виктор Алексеевич Озеров)	DOB: 5.1.1958 POB: Abakan, Khakassia	Chairman of the Security and Defence Committee of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. On 1 March 2014 Ozerov, on behalf of the Security and Defence Committee of the Federation Council, publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.	17.3.2014
10.	Vladimir Michailovich DZHABAROV (Владимир Михайлович Джабаров)	DOB: 29.9.1952	First Deputy-Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. On 1 March 2014 Dzhubarov, on behalf of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council, publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.	17.3.2014
11.	Andrei Aleksandrovich KLISHAS (Андрей Александрович Клишас)	DOB: 9.11.1972 POB: Sverdlovsk	Chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Law of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. On 1 March 2014 Klishas publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. In public statements Klishas sought to justify a Russian military intervention in Ukraine by claiming that 'the Ukrainian President supports the appeal of the Crimean authorities to the President of the Russian Federation on landing an all-encompassing assistance in defence of the citizens of Crimea'.	17.3.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
12.	Nikolai Ivanovich RYZHKOV (Николай Иванович Рыжков)	DOB: 28.9.1929 POB: Dyleevka, Donetsk region, Ukrainian SSR	Member of the Committee for federal issues, regional politics and the North of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. On 1 March 2014 Ryzhkov publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.	17.3.2014
13.	Evgeni Viktorovich BUSHMIN (Евгений Викторович Бушмин)	DOB: 4.10.1958 POB: Lopatino, Sergachiisky region, RSFSR	Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. On 1 March 2014 Bushmin publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.	17.3.2014
14.	Aleksandr Borisovich TOTOONOV (Александр Борисович Тотоонов)	DOB: 3.4.1957 POB: Ordzhonikidze, North Ossetia	Member of the Committee of International Affairs of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. On 1 March 2014 Totoonov publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.	17.3.2014
15.	Oleg Evgenevich PANTELEEV (Олег Евгеньевич Пантелеев)	DOB: 21.7.1952 POB: Zhitnikovskoe, Kurgan region	Former First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Parliamentary Issues of the Federation Council. On 1 March 2014 Panteleev publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. Currently First Deputy Governor of the Kurgan Oblast and Head of the delegation of the Government of Kurgan Oblast to the Government of the Russian Federation.	17.3.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
16.	Sergei Mikhailovich MIRONOV (Сергей Михайлович Миронов)	DOB: 14.2.1953 POB: Pushkin, Leningrad region	Member of the Council of the State Duma; Leader of Fair Russia faction in the Duma of the Russian Federation. Initiator of the bill allowing Russian Federation to admit in its composition, under the pretext of protection of Russian citizens, territories of a foreign country without the consent of that country or an international treaty.	17.3.2014
17.	Sergei Vladimirovich ZHELEZNYAK (Сергей Владимирович ЖЕЛЕЗНЯК)	DOB: 30.7.1970 POB: St. Petersburg (former Leningrad)	Former Deputy Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Actively supported use of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. He led personally the demonstration in support of the use of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. Currently Deputy Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation.	17.3.2014
18.	Leonid Eduardovich SLUTSKI (Леонид Эдуардович СЛУЦКИЙ)	DOB: 4.1.1968 POB: Moscow	Former Chairman of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation (member of the LDPR). Actively supported use of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. Currently Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation.	17.3.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
19.	Aleksandr Viktorovich VITKO (Александр Викторович Витко)	DOB: 13.9.1961 POB: Vitebsk (Belarusian SSR)	Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral. Responsible for commanding Russian forces that have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory.	17.3.2014
20.	Anatoliy Alekseevich SIDOROV (Анатолий Алексеевич Сидоров)	DOB: 2.7.1958 POB: Siva, Perm region, USSR	Former Commander, Russia's Western Military District, units of which are deployed in Crimea. He was responsible for part of the Russian military presence in Crimea which is undermining the sovereignty of the Ukraine and assisted the Crimean authorities in preventing public demonstrations against moves towards a referendum and incorporation into Russia. Since November 2015 Chief of the Joint Staff of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).	17.3.2014
21.	Aleksandr Viktorovich GALKIN (Александр Викторович ГАЛКИН)	DOB: 22.3.1958 POB: Ordzhonikidze, North Ossetian ASSR	Former Commander of Russia's Southern Military District ('SMD'), the forces of which are in Crimea; the Black Sea Fleet comes under Galkin's command; much of the force movement into Crimea has come through the SMD. SMD forces are deployed in Crimea. He is responsible for part of the Russian military presence in Crimea which is undermining the sovereignty of the Ukraine and assisted the Crimean authorities in preventing public demonstrations against moves towards a referendum and incorporation into Russia. Additionally the Black Sea Fleet falls within the District's control. Currently employed by the Central apparatus of the Russian Ministry of Defence.	17.3.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
22.	Dmitry Olegovich ROGOZIN (Дмитрий Олегович Рогозин)	DOB: 21.12.1963 POB: Moscow	Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. Publicly called for the annexation of Crimea.	21.3.2014
23.	Sergey Yurievich GLAZYEV (Сергей Юрьевич Глазьев)	DOB: 1.1.1961 POB: Zaporozhye, (Ukrainian SSR)	Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation. Publicly called for the annexation of Crimea.	21.3.2014
24.	Valentina Ivanova MATVIYENKO (born TYUTINA) (Валентина Ивановна Матвиенко (born Тютина))	DOB: 7.4.1949, POB: Shepetovka, Khmelnitsky (Kamenets-Podolsky) region (Ukrainian SSR)	Speaker of the Federation Council. On 1 March 2014, publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.	21.3.2014
25.	Sergei Evgenevich NARYSHKIN (Сергей Евгеньевич НАРЫШКИН)	DOB: 27.10.1954 POB: St Petersburg (former Leningrad)	Former Speaker of the State Duma. Publicly supported the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. Publicly supported the Russia-Crimea reunification treaty and the related federal constitutional law. Currently Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation as of October 2016. Permanent member and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.	21.3.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
26.	Dmitry Konstantinovich KISELYOV, Dmitrii Konstantinovich KISELEV (Дмитрий Константинович Киселёв)	DOB: 26.4.1954 POB: Moscow	Appointed by Presidential Decree on 9 December 2013 Head of the Russian Federal State news agency 'Rossiya Segodnya'. Central figure of the government propaganda supporting the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.	21.3.2014
27.	Alexander Mihailovich NOSATOV (Александр Михайлович НОСАТОВ)	DOB: 27.3.1963 POB: Sevastopol, (Ukrainian SSR)	Former Deputy-Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear-Admiral. Responsible for commanding Russian forces that have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory. Currently Vice-Admiral, Acting Commander of the Russian Baltic fleet.	21.3.2014
28.	Valery Vladimirovich KULIKOV (Валерий Владимирович Куликов)	DOB: 1.9.1956 POB: Zaporozhye, (Ukrainian SSR)	Deputy-Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral. Responsible for commanding Russian forces that have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory.	21.3.2014
29.	Vladislav Yurievich SURKOV (Владислав Юрьевич Сурков)	DOB: 21.9.1964, POB: Solntsevo, Lipetsk region	Aide to the President of the Russian Federation. He was an organiser of the process in Crimea by which local Crimean communities were mobilised to stage actions undermining the Ukrainian authorities in Crimea.	21.3.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
30.	Mikhail Grigorievich MALYSHEV (Михаил Григорьевич МАЛЫШЕВ) Mykhaylo Hryhorovych MALYSHEV (Михайло Григорович МАЛИШЕВ)	DOB: 10.10.1955 POB: Simferopol, Crimea	Chair of the Crimea Electoral Commission. Responsible for administering the Crimean referendum. Responsible under the Russian system for signing referendum results.	21.3.2014
31.	Valery Kirillovich MEDVEDEV (Валерий Кириллович МЕДВЕДЕВ) Valeriy Kyrylovych MEDVEDIEV (Валерій Кирилович МЕДВЕДЕВ)	DOB: 21.8.1946 POB: Shmakovka, Primorsky region	Chair of Sevastopol Electoral Commission. Responsible for administering the Crimean referendum. Responsible under the Russian system for signing referendum results.	21.3.2014





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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
32.	Lt. Gen. Igor Nikolaevich (Mykolayovich) TURCHENYUK (Игорь Николаевич Турченко)	DOB: 5.12.1959 POB: Osh, Kyrgyz SSR	The de facto Commander of Russian troops deployed on the ground in Crimea (whom Russia continues to refer to officially as 'local self-defence militias'). Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District.	21.3.2014
33.	Elena Borisovna MIZULINA (born DMITRIYEVA) (Елена Борисовна МИЗУЛИНА (born ДМИТРИЕВА))	DOB: 9.12.1954 POB: Bui, Kostroma region	Former Deputy in the State Duma. Originator and co-sponsor of recent legislative proposals in Russia that would have allowed regions of other countries to join Russia without their central authorities' prior agreement. As of September 2015, a Member of the Federation Council from Omsk region.	21.3.2014
34.	Dmitry Nikolayevich KOZAK (Дмитрий Николаевич Козак)	DOB: 7.11.1958 POB: Bandurovo, Kirovograd region, Ukrainian SSR	Deputy Prime Minister. Responsible for overseeing the integration of the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation.	29.4.2014
35.	Oleg Yevgenyevich BELAVENTSEV (Олег Евгеньевич БЕЛАВЕНЦЕВ)	DOB: 15.9.1949 POB: Moscow	Former Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation into the so-called 'Crimean Federal District', Non-permanent member of the Russian Security Council. Responsible for the implementation of the constitutional prerogatives of the Russian Head of State on the territory of the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Currently Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation into the North Caucasus Federal District.	29.4.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
36.	Oleg Genrikhovich SAVELYEV (Олег Генрихович Савельев)	DOB: 27.10.1965 POB: Leningrad	Former Minister for Crimean Affairs. Responsible for the integration of the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation. Currently Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Government, responsible for the organization of the work of the Governmental Commission on the socio-economic development of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'.	29.4.2014
37.	Sergei Ivanovich MENYAILO (Сергей Иванович МЕНЯЙЛО)	DOB: 22.8.1960 POB: Alagir, North- Ossetian Autonomous SSR, RSFSR	Former Governor of the Ukrainian annexed city of Sevastopol. Currently Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation to the Siberian Federal District. Member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.	29.4.2014
38.	Olga Fedorovna KOVITIDI (Ольга Фёдоровна Ковитиди)	DOB: 7.5.1962 POB: Simferopol, Ukrainian SSR	Member of the Russian Federation Council from the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea.	29.4.2014
--‡				
40.	Sergei Ivanovich NEVEROV (Сергей Иванович Неверов)	DOB: 21.12.1961 POB: Tashtagol, USSR	Deputy Chairman of State Duma, United Russia. Responsible for initiating legislation to integrate the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation.	29.4.2014

‡ The entry was deleted on 13 March 2015 following a delisting decision.

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
__§				
42.	Valery Vasilevich GERASIMOV (Валерий Васильевич Герасимов)	DOB: 8.9.1955 POB: Kazan	Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, General of the Army. Responsible for the massive deployment of Russian troops along the border with Ukraine and lack of de-escalation of the situation.	29.4.2014
43.	German PROKOPIV (Герман ПРОКОПИВ) Herman PROKOPIV (Герман ПРОКОПІВ) (a.k.a. Li Van Chol, Ли Ван Чоль)	DOB: 6.7.1993 POB: Prague, Czech Republic	Active member of the 'Lugansk Guard'. Took part in the seizure of the building of the Lugansk regional office of the Security Service. Remains an active military fighter of the LNR.	29.4.2014

§ The entry was deleted on 10 March 2016 following a delisting decision.



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
44.	Valeriy Dmitrievich BOLOTOV (Валерий Дмитриевич БОЛОТОВ) Valeriy Dmytrovych BOLOTOV (Валерій Дмитрович БОЛОТОВ)	DOB: 13.2.1970 POB: Stakhanov, Lugansk	One of the leaders of the separatist group 'Army of the South-East' which occupied the building of the Security Service in the Lugansk region. Retired officer. Before seizing the building he and other accomplices possessed arms apparently supplied illegally from Russia and from local criminal groups.	29.4.2014
45.	Andriy Yevhenovych PURHIN (Андрій Євгенович ПУРГІН), Andrei Evgenevich PURGIN (Андрей Евгеньевич ПУРГИН)	DOB: 26.1.1972 POB: Donetsk	Active participant and organiser of separatist actions, coordinator of actions of the 'Russian tourists' in Donetsk. Co-founder of a 'Civic Initiative of Donbass for the Eurasian Union'. Until 4 September 2015 'Chairman' of the 'People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic', currently 'First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers'.	29.4.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
46.	Denys Volodymyrovych PUSHYLIN (Денис Володимирович Пушилін), Denis Vladimirovich PUSHILIN (Денис Владимирович Пушилин)	DOB: 9.5.1981 or 9.5.1982 POB: Makiivka (Donetsk oblast)	One of the leaders of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Participated in the seizure and occupation of the regional administration. Active spokesperson for the separatists. Until 4 September 2015 so-called Deputy Chairman of the 'People's Council' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Since 4 September 2015 'Chairman' of the 'People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic'.	29.4.2014
47.	Sergey Gennadevich TSYPLAKOV (Сергей Геннадьевич ЦЫПЛАКОВ) Serhiy Hennadiyovych TSYPLAKOV (Сергій Геннадійович ЦИПЛАКОВ)	DOB: 1.5.1983 POB: Khartsyzsk, Donetsk Oblast	One of the leaders of ideologically radical organisation People's Militia of Donbas. He took active part in the seizure of a number of State buildings in Donetsk region.	29.4.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
48.	Igor Vsevolodovich GIRKIN (Игорь Всеволодович ГИРКИН) (a.k.a. Igor STRELKOV Ihor STRIELKOV)	DOB: 17.12.1970 POB: Moscow	Identified as staff of Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). He was involved in incidents in Sloviansk. Head of 'Novorossia' public movement. Former 'Minister of Defence' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Organised, on 4 November 2016, a Russian March in Moscow for Russian nationalists who support the separatists in eastern Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist activity in eastern Ukraine. One of the organisers of the 'Russian March' in November 2016.	29.4.2014
49.	Vyacheslav Viktorovich VOLODIN (Вячеслав Викторович ВОЛОДИН)	DOB: 4.2.1964 POB: Alekseevka, Saratov region	Former First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Responsible for overseeing the political integration of the annexed Ukrainian region of Crimea into the Russian Federation. Currently Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation since 5 October 2016.	12.5.2014
50.	Vladimir Anatolievich SHAMANOV (Владимир Анатольевич ШАМАНОВ)	DOB: 15.2.1957 POB: Barnaul	Former Commander of the Russian Airborne Troops, Colonel-General. In his senior position, holds responsibility for the deployment of Russian airborne forces in Crimea. Currently Chairperson of the Defense Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation.	12.5.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
51.	Vladimir Nikolaevich PLIGIN (Владимир Николаевич ПЛИГИН)	DOB: 19.5.1960 POB: Ignatovo, Vologodsk Oblast, USSR..	Former member of the State Duma and former Chair of the Duma Constitutional Law Committee. Responsible for facilitating the adoption of legislation on the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation.	12.5.2014
52.	Petr Grigorievich JAROSH (Петр Григорьевич ЯРОШ) Petro Hryhorovych YAROSH (IAROSH) (Петро Григорович ЯРОШ)	DOB: 30.1.1971 POB: Skvortsovo village, Simferopol region, Crimea	Former head of the Federal Migration Service office for Crimea. Responsible for the systematic and expedited issuance of Russian passports for the residents of Crimea.	12.5.2014
53.	Oleg Grigorievich KOZYURA (Олег Григорьевич КОЗЮРА) Oleh Hryhorovych KOZYURA (Олег Григорович КОЗЮРА)	DOB: 30.12.1965 POB: Simferopol, Crimea	Former Head of the Federal Migration Service office for Sevastopol. Responsible for the systematic and expedited issuance of Russian passports for the residents of Sevastopol. Currently assistant to Sevastopol Municipal Council Deputy Mikhail Chaly.	12.5.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
54.	Viacheslav PONOMARIOV, Vyacheslav Volodymyrovich PONOMARYOV (В'ячеслав Володимирович Пономар'юв), Viacheslav Vladimirovich PONOMAREV (Вячеслав Владимирович Пономар'єв)	DOB: 2.5.1965 POB: Sloviansk (Donetsk oblast)	Former self-declared 'People's Mayor' of Sloviansk (until 10 June 2014). Ponomariov called on Vladimir Putin to send in Russian troops to protect the city and later asked him to supply weapons. Ponomariov's men were involved in kidnappings (they captured activist Irma Krat and Simon Ostrovsky, a reporter for Vice News, both were later released, they detained military observers under the OSCE Vienna Document). Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.	12.5.2014
55.	Igor Nikolaevich BEZLER (a.k.a. Bes (devil)) (Игорь Николаевич БЕЗЛЕР) Ihor Mykolayovych BEZLER (Ігор Миколайович БЕЗЛЕР)	DOB: 30.12.1965 POB: Simferopol, Crimea	One of the leaders of the self-proclaimed militia of Horlivka. He took control of the Security Service of Ukraine's Office in Donetsk region building and afterwards seized the Ministry of Internal Affairs' district station in the town of Horlivka. He has links to Igor Strelkov/Girkin under whose command he was involved in the murder of the Peoples' Deputy of the Horlivka's Municipal Council Volodymyr Rybak.	12.5.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
56.	Igor Evgenevich KAKIDZYANOV (Игорь Евгеньевич КАКИДЗЯНОВ), Igor Evgegenevich KNAKIMZYANOV (Игорь Евгеньевич ХАКИМЗЯНОВ) Ihor Yevhenovych KNAKIMZIANOV (KAKIDZIANOV) (Igor Євгенович ХАКИМЗЯНОВ (КАКИДЗЯНОВ))	DOB: 25.7.1980 POB: Makiivka (Donetsk oblast)	One of the leaders of armed forces of the self-proclaimed 'Donetsk People's Republic'. The aim of the forces is to 'protect the people of the Donetsk People's Republic and territorial integrity of the republic' according to Pushylin, one of the leaders of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.	12.5.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
57.	Oleg TSARIOV, Oleh Anatoliyovych TSAROV (Олег Анатолійович ЦАРЬОВ), Oleg Anatolevich TSARYOV (Олег Анатольевич ЦАРЁВ)	DOB: 2.6.1970 POB: Dnepropetrovsk	Former Member of the Rada, as such publicly called for the creation of the so-called 'Federal Republic of Novorossiya', composed of south-eastern Ukrainian regions. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Former 'Speaker' of the so-called 'Parliament of the Union of the People's Republics' ('Parliament of Novorossiya'). Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.	12.5.2014
58.	Roman Viktorovich LYAGIN (Роман Вікторович ЛЯГІН) Roman Viktorovich LIAHIN (Роман Вікторович ЛЯГІН)	DOB: 30.5.1980 POB: Donetsk, Ukraine	Former head of the 'Donetsk People's Republic' Central Electoral Commission. Actively organised the referendum on 11 May 2014 on the self-determination of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Former 'Minister of Labour and Social Policy'.	12.5.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
59.	Aleksandr Sergeevich MALYKHIN, Alexander Sergeevich MALYHIN (Александр Сергеевич МАЛЫХИН) Oleksandr Serhiyovych (Sergiyovych) MALYKHIN (Олександр Сергійович МАЛИХІН)	DOB: 12.1.1981	Former head of the 'Lugansk People's Republic' Central Electoral Commission. Actively organised the referendum on 11 May 2014 on the self-determination of the 'Lugansk People's Republic'.	12.5.2014
60.	Natalia Vladimirovna POKLONSKAYA (Наталья Владимировна ПОКЛОНСКАЯ)	DOB: 18.3.1980 POB: Mikhailovka, Voroshilovgrad region, Ukrainian SSR or Yevpatoria, Ukrainian SSR	Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Former Prosecutor of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. Actively implemented Russia's annexation of Crimea. Currently First Deputy Chairperson of the Committee for Security and countering corruption of the State Duma of the Russian Federation.	12.5.2014
61.	Igor Sergeievich SHEVCHENKO (Игорь Сергеевич Шевченко)	POB: Sevastopol, Crimea	Prosecutor of Sevastopol. Actively implementing Russia's annexation of Sevastopol.	12.5.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
62.	Aleksandr Yurevich BORODAI (Александр Юрьевич БОРОДАЙ)	DOB: 25.7.1972 POB: Moscow	Former so-called 'Prime Minister of the Donetsk People's Republic', as such responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Donetsk People's Republic' (e.g. on 8 July 2014 stated 'our military is conducting a special operation against the Ukrainian "fascists"'), signatory of the Memorandum of Understanding on 'Novorossiya union'. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies; heads the 'Union of Donbas volunteers'. Involved actively in recruitment and training of 'volunteers' sent to fight in Donbas.	12.7.2014
63.	Alexander KHODAKOVSKY, Oleksandr Serhiyovych KHODAKOVSKYY (KHODAKOVSKYI) (Олександр Сергійович ХОДАКОВСЬКИЙ), Aleksandr Sergeevich KHODAKOVSKII (Александр Сергеевич ХОДАКОВСКИЙ)	DOB: 18.12.1972 POB: Donetsk	Former so-called 'Minister of Security of the Donetsk People's Republic', as such responsible for the separatist security activities of the so-called 'government of the Donetsk People's Republic'. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.	12.7.2014



Council of the European Union

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
64.	Alexandr Arkadievich KALYUSSKY (Александр Аркадьевич Калюсский) Oleksandr Arkadiyovych KALYUSSKIY (Олександр Аркадійович Калюський)	DOB: 9.10.1975	Former so-called 'de facto Deputy Prime Minister for Social Affairs of the Donetsk People's Republic'. Responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Donetsk People's Republic'.	12.7.2014
65.	Alexander KHRYAKOV, Aleksandr Vitalievich KHRYAKOV (Александр Витальевич ХРЯКОВ), Oleksandr Vitaliyovych KHRYAKOV (Олександр Віталійович ХРЯКОВ)	DOB: 6.11.1958 POB: Donetsk	Former so-called 'Information and Mass Communications Minister' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Currently a member of the so-called 'People's Council' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Responsible for the pro-separatist propaganda activities of the so-called 'government' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Continues active support to the separatist actions in Eastern Ukraine.	12.7.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
66.	Marat Faatovich BASHIROV (Марат Фаатович БАШИРОВ)	DOB: 20.1.1964 POB: Izhevsk, Russian Federation	Former so-called 'Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers of the Lugansk People's Republic', confirmed on 8 July 2014. Responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Lugansk People's Republic'. Continues activities of financing LNR separatist structures.	12.7.2014
67.	Vasyl Oleksandrovych NIKITIN (Василь Олександрович Нікітін), Vasilii Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (Василий Александрович НИКИТИН)	DOB: 25.11.1971 POB: Shargun (Uzbekistan)	Former so-called 'Vice Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers of the Lugansk People's Republic' (used to be the so-called 'Prime Minister of the Lugansk People's Republic', and former spokesman of the 'Army of the South-East'). Responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Lugansk People's Republic'. Responsible for the statement of the Army of the South-East that the Ukrainian presidential elections in the 'Lugansk People's Republic' cannot take place due to the 'new' status of the region. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.	12.7.2014



Council of the European Union

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
68.	Aleksey Vyacheslavovich KARYAKIN (Алексей Вячеславович КАРЯКИН) Oleksiy Vyacheslavovych KARYAKIN (Олексій В'ячеславович КАРЯКІН)	DOB: 7.4.1980 or 7.4.1979 POB: Stakhanov (Lugansk oblast)	Until 25 March 2016 so-called 'Supreme Council Chair of the Lugansk People's Republic'. Former member of the so-called 'People's Council of the Lugansk People's Republic'. Responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the 'Supreme Council', responsible for asking the Russian Federation to recognise the independence of the 'Lugansk People's Republic'. Signatory of the Memorandum of Understanding on the 'Novorossiya union'.	12.7.2014
69.	Yuriy Volodymyrovych IVAKIN (Юрій Володимирович Івакін), Iurii Vladimirovich IVAKIN (Юрий Владимирович Ивакин)	DOB: 13.8.1954 POB: Perevalsk (Lugansk oblast)	Former so-called 'Minister of Internal Affairs of the Lugansk People's Republic', as such responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Lugansk People's Republic'.	12.7.2014



Council of the European Union

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
70.	Igor PLOTNITSKY, Igor Venediktovich PLOTNITSKII (Игорь Венедиктович ПЛОТНИЦКИЙ) Ihor (Igor) Venedyktovych PLOTNYTSKY (Ігор Венедиктович ПЛОТНИЦЬКИЙ)	DOB: 24.6.1964 or 25.6.1964 or 26.6.1964 POB: Lugansk (possibly in Kelmentsi, Chernivtsi oblast)	Former so-called 'Defence Minister' and currently so-called 'Head' of the 'Lugansk People's Republic'. Responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Lugansk People's Republic'.	12.7.2014
71.	Nikolay Ivanovich KOZITSYN (Николай Иванович Козицын)	DOB: 20.6.1956 or 6.10.1956 POB: Djerzjinsk, Donetsk region	Commander of Cossack forces. Responsible for commanding separatists in Eastern Ukraine fighting against the Ukrainian government forces.	12.7.2014
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** The entry was deleted on 14 September 2015 following a delisting decision.



Council of the European Union

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
73.	Mikhail Efimovich FRADKOV (Михаил Ефимович ФРАДКОВ)	DOB: 1.9.1950 POB: Kurumoch, Kuibyshev region	Former permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation; Former Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation. As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.	25.7.2014
74.	Nikolai Platonovich PATRUSHEV (Николай Платонович Патрушев)	DOB 11.7.1951 POB: Leningrad (St Petersburg)	Permanent member and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.	25.7.2014
75.	Aleksandr Vasilievich BORTNIKOV (Александр Васильевич Бортников)	DOB: 15.11.1951 POB: Perm	Permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation; Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB). As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.	25.7.2014
76.	Rashid Gumarovich NURGALIEV (Рашид Гумарович Нурғалиев)	DOB: 8.10.1956 POB: Zhetikara, Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic	Permanent member and Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.	25.7.2014



Council of the European Union

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
77.	Boris Vyacheslavovich GRYZLOV (Борис Вячеславович ГРЫЗЛОВ)	DOB 15.12.1950 POB: Vladivostok	Former permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.	25.7.2014
78.	Sergei Orestovoch BESEDA (Сергей Орестович Беседа)	DOB: 17.5.1954	Commander of the Fifth Service of the FSB, Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. As a senior FSB officer (Colonel-General), he heads a service responsible for overseeing intelligence operations and international activity.	25.7.2014
79.	Mikhail Vladimirovich DEGTYAREV (Михаил Владимирович ДЕГТЯРЁВ)	DOB 10.7.1981 POB: Kuibyshev (Samara)	Member of the State Duma. As a member of the Duma he announced the inauguration of the 'de facto embassy' of the unrecognised, so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic' in Moscow, he contributes to undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Currently Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on Physical Education, Sport and Youth Affairs.	25.7.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
80.	Ramzan Akhmadovitch KADYROV (Рамзан Ахматович Кадыров)	DOB: 5.10.1976 POB: Tsentaroy.	President of the Republic of Chechnya. Kadyrov made statements in support of the illegal annexation of Crimea and in support of the armed insurgency in Ukraine. He stated <i>inter alia</i> on 14 June 2014 that he 'will do anything to help revive Crimea'. In that context, he was awarded the medal for 'the liberation of Crimea' by the Acting Head of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea for the support he provided to the unlawful annexation of Crimea. In addition, on 1 June 2014 he expressed his readiness to send 74 000 Chechen volunteers to Ukraine if requested to do so.	25.7.2014
81.	Alexander Nikolayevich TKACHYOV (Александр Николаевич Ткачѐв)	DOB: 23.12.1960 POB: Vyselki, Krasnodar region	Former Governor of the Krasnodar Krai. He was awarded the medal 'for the liberation of Crimea' by the Acting head of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea for the support he provided to the unlawful annexation of Crimea. On that occasion, the Acting Head of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea said that Tkachyov was one of the first to express his support to the new 'leadership' of Crimea. Currently Minister of Agriculture of the Russian Federation (since 22 April 2015).	25.7.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
82.	<p>Pavel Yurievich GUBAREV (Павел Юрьевич ГУБАРЕВ) Pavlo Yuriyovich GUBARIEV (HUBARIEV) (Павло Юрійович ГУБАРЕВ)</p>	<p>DOB: 10.2.1983 (or 10.3.1983) POB: Sievierodonetsk</p>	<p>One of the self-described leaders of the 'People's Republic of Donetsk'. He requested Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine, including through the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces. He was associated with Igor Strelkov/Girkin who is responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Gubarev was responsible for recruiting people for armed forces of separatists.</p> <p>Responsible for taking over the regional government building in Donetsk with pro-Russian forces and proclaimed himself the 'People's governor'.</p> <p>Despite being arrested for threatening the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and subsequently released, he has continued to play a prominent role in separatist activities, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</p>	25.7.2014
83.	<p>Ekaterina Yurievna GUBAREVA (Екатерина Юрьевна ГУБАРЕВА), Kateryna Yuriyivna GUBARIEVA (HUBARIEVA) (Катерина Юріївна ГУБАРЕВА)</p>	<p>DOB: 5.7.1983 or 10.3.1983 POB: Kakhovka (Kherson oblast)</p>	<p>In her capacity of former so-called 'Minister of Foreign Affairs' she was responsible for defending the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic', thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. In taking on and acting in this capacity she has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.</p> <p>Member of the so-called 'People's Council' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.</p>	25.7.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
84.	Fyodor Dmitrievich BEREZIN (Фёдор Дмитриевич БЕРЕЗИН), Fedir Dmytrovych BEREZIN (Федір Дмитрович БЕРЕЗИН)	DOB: 7.2.1960 POB: Donetsk	Former so-called 'deputy defence minister' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. He is associated with Igor Strelkov/Girkin, who is responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. In taking on and acting in this capacity Berezin has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.	25.7.2014
85.	Valery Vladimirovich KAUROV (Валерий Владимирович КАУРОВ) Valeriy Volodymyrovych KAUROV (Валерій Володимирович КАУРОВ)	DOB: 2.4.1956 POB: Odessa	The self-described 'president' of the so-called 'Republic of Novorossiya' who has called on Russia to deploy troops to Ukraine. In taking on and acting in this capacity he has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.	25.7.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
86.	Serhii Anatoliyovych ZDRILIUK (Сергей Анатольевич ЗДРИЛЮК) (Сергій Анатолійович ЗДРИЛЮК)	DOB: 23.6.1972 (or 23.7.1972) POB: Vinnytsia region	Senior aid to Igor Strelkov/Girkin who is responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. In taking on and acting in this capacity, Zdriliuk has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.	25.7.2014
87.	Vladimir ANTYUFEYEV (a.k.a. Vladimir SHEVTSOV, Vladimir Iurievici ANTIUFEEV, Vladimir Gheorghievici ALEXANDROV, Vadim Gheorghievici SHEVTSOV) (Владимир Антюфеев)	DOB: 19.2. 1951 POB: Novosibirsk	Former 'Minister of State Security' in the separatist region of Transnistria. Former vice-prime minister of the 'Donetsk People's Republic', responsible for security and law enforcement. In his capacity, he was responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Donetsk People's Republic'.	25.7.2014
88.	Alexey Alexeyevich GROMOV (Алексей Алексеевич Громов)	DOB: 31.5.1960 POB: Zagorsk (Sergiev Posad)	As first Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, he is responsible for instructing Russian media outlets to take a line favourable with the separatists in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, therefore supporting the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea.	30.7.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
89.	Oksana TCHIGRINA, Oksana Aleksandrovna CHIGRINA (CHYHRYNA) (Оксана Александровна ЧИГРИНА)	DOB: possibly 23.7.1981	Spokesperson of the so-called 'government' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic' who made declarations justifying, inter alia, the shooting down of a Ukrainian military airplane, the taking of hostages, fighting activities by the illegal armed groups, which have as a consequence undermined the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Ukraine. Remains an active employee of the Press Service of LNR.	30.7.2014
90.	Boris Alekseevich LITVINOV (Борис Алексеевич ЛИТВИНОВ) Borys Oleksiyovych LYTVYNOV (Борис Олексійович ЛИТВИНОВ)	DOB: 13.1.1954 POB: Dzerzhynsk (Donetsk oblast)	Former member of the so-called 'People's Council' and former chairman of the so-called 'Supreme Council' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic' who was at the source of policies and the organisation of the illegal 'referendum' leading to the proclamation of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic', which constituted a breach of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.	30.7.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
91.	Sergey Vadimovich ABISOV (Сергей Вадимович АБИСОВ) Sergiy (Serhiy) Vadymovych ABISOV (Сергій Вадимович АБИСОВ)	DOB 27.11.1967 POB: Simferopol, Crimea	By accepting his appointment as so-called 'Minister of Interior of the Republic of Crimea' by the President of Russia (decree No 301) on 5 May 2014 and by his actions as so-called 'Minister of Interior' he has undermined the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Ukraine	30.7.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
92.	Arkady Romanovich ROTENBERG, Arkadii Romanovich ROTENBERG (Аркадий Романович Ротенберг)	DOB: 15.12.1951 POB: Leningrad (Saint Petersburg).	<p>Mr Rotenberg is a long-time acquaintance of President Putin and his former judo sparring partner.</p> <p>He developed his fortune during President Putin's tenure. His level of economic success is attributable to the influence of key decision makers favouring him, notably in the award of public contracts.</p> <p>He has benefited from his close personal relationship with Russian decision-makers as he was awarded important contracts by the Russian State or by State-owned enterprises. His companies were, notably awarded several highly lucrative contracts for the preparations for the Sochi Olympic Games.</p> <p>He is also the owner of the company Stroygazmontazh which has been awarded a State contract for the construction of a bridge from Russia to the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea, therefore consolidating its integration into the Russian Federation which in turn further undermines the territorial integrity of Ukraine.</p> <p>He is the chairman of the board of directors of publishing house Prosvescheniye, which has notably implemented the project 'To the Children of Russia: Address - Crimea', a public relations campaign that was designed to persuade Crimean children that they are now Russian citizens living in Russia and thereby supporting the Russian Government's policy to integrate Crimea into Russia.</p>	30.7.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
93.	Konstantin Valerevich MALOFEEV (Константин Валерьевич Малофеев)	DOB: 3.7.1974 POB: Puschino	<p>Mr Malofeev is closely linked to Ukrainian separatists in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. He is a former employer of Mr Borodai, former so-called 'Prime Minister' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic' and met with Mr Aksyonov, so-called 'Prime Minister' of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea', during the period of the Crimean annexation process. The Ukrainian Government has opened a criminal investigation into his alleged material and financial support to separatists. In addition, he gave a number of public statements supporting the annexation of Crimea and the incorporation of Ukraine into Russia and notably stated in June 2014 that 'You can't incorporate the whole of Ukraine into Russia. The East (of Ukraine) maybe'.</p> <p>Therefore Mr Malofeev is acting in support of the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine.</p>	30.7.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
94.	Yuriy Valentinovich KOVALCHUK (Юрий Валентинович Ковальчук)	DOB 25.7.1951 POB: Leningrad (St Petersburg)	<p>Mr Kovalchuk is a long-time acquaintance of President Putin. He is a co-founder of the so-called Ozero Dacha, a co-operative society bringing together an influential group of individuals around President Putin.</p> <p>He is benefiting from his links with Russian decision-makers. He is the chairman and largest shareholder of Bank Rossiya, of which he owned around 38 % in 2013, and which is considered the personal bank of Senior Officials of the Russian Federation. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, Bank Rossiya has opened branches across Crimea and Sevastopol, thereby consolidating their integration into the Russian Federation.</p> <p>Furthermore, Bank Rossiya has important stakes in the National Media Group which in turn controls television stations which actively support the Russian government's policies of destabilisation of Ukraine.</p>	30.7.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
95.	Nikolay Terentievich SHAMALOV (Николай Терентьевич Шамалов)	DOB: 24.1.1950 POB: Belarus	<p>Mr Shamalov is a long-time acquaintance of President Putin. He is a co-founder of the so-called Ozero Dacha, a cooperative society bringing together an influential group of individuals around President Putin.</p> <p>He benefits from his links with Russian decision-makers. He is the second largest shareholder of Bank Rossiya, of which he owned around 10 % in 2013, and which is considered the personal bank of Senior Officials of the Russian Federation. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, Bank Rossiya has opened branches across Crimea and Sevastopol, thereby consolidating their integration into the Russian Federation.</p> <p>Furthermore, Bank Rossiya has important stakes in the National Media Group which, in turn, controls television stations which actively support the Russian government's policies of destabilisation of Ukraine.</p>	30.7.2014
96.	Alexander Vladimirovich ZAKHARCHENKO (Александр Владимирович ЗАХАРЧЕНКО) Oleksandr Volodymyrovych ZAKHARCHENKO (Олександр Володимирович ЗАХАРЧЕНКО)	DOB: 26.6.1976 POB: Donetsk	<p>As of 7 August 2014, he replaced Alexander Borodai as the so-called 'Prime Minister' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Currently so-called 'Head' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, Zakharchenko has supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</p>	12.9.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
97.	Vladimir Petrovich KONONOV (a.k.a. 'Tsar') (Владимир Петровнч КОНОНОВ) Volodymyr Petrovych KONONOV (Володимир Петрович КОНОНОВ)	DOB: 14.10.1974 POB: Gorsky	As of 14 August 2014, he replaced Igor Strelkov/Girkin, as the so-called 'Defence minister' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. He has reportedly commanded a division of separatist fighters in Donetsk since April 2014 and has promised to solve the strategic task of repelling Ukraine's military aggression. Kononov has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.	12.9.2014
98.	Miroslav Vladimirovich RUDENKO (Мирослав Владимирович РУДЕНКО) Myroslav Volodymyrovych RUDENKO (Мирослав Володимирович РУДЕНКО)	DOB: 21.1.1983 POB: Debaltsevo	Associated with the 'Donbass People's Militia'. He has, inter alia, stated that they will continue their fighting in the rest of the country. Rudenko has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Member of the so-called 'People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic'.	12.9.2014
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†† The entry was deleted on 13 March 2017 following a delisting decision.



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
100.	Andrey Yurevich PINCHUK (Андрей Юрьевич ПИНЧУК) Andriy Yuriyovych PINCHUK (Андрій Юрійович ПИНЧУК)	Possible date of birth: 27.12 1977	Former 'State security minister' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Associated with Vladimir Antyufeyev, who is responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Donetsk People's Republic'. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Head of the 'Union of Donbas volunteers'.	12.9.2014
101.	Oleg Vladimirovich BEREZA (Олег Владимирович Берёза)	DOB: 1.3.1977	Former so-called 'Internal affairs minister' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Associated with Vladimir Antyufeyev, who is responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'Government of the Donetsk People's Republic'. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.	12.9.2014
102.	Andrei Nikolaevich RODKIN (Андрей Николаевич Родкин)	DOB: 23.9.1976 POB: Moscow	Moscow Representative of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In his statements he has, <i>inter alia</i> , talked about the militias' readiness to conduct a guerrilla war and their seizure of weapon systems from the Ukrainian armed forces. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. One of the leaders of the "Union of Donbas volunteers".	12.9.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
103.	Aleksandr Akimovich KARAMAN (Александр Акимович КАРАМАН), Alexandru CARAMAN	DOB: 26.7.1956 POB Cioburciu, Slobozia district, now Republic of Moldova	Former so-called 'Deputy Prime Minister for Social Issues' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Associated with Vladimir Antyufeyev, who was responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'Government of the Donetsk People's Republic'. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Protégé of Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin. Head of the Administration of the Council of Ministers of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.	12.9.2014
104.	Georgiy L'vovich MURADOV (Георгий Львович Мурадов)	DOB: 19.11.1954 POB: Kochmes, Komi ASSR	So-called 'Deputy Prime Minister' of Crimea and Plenipotentiary Representative of Crimea to President Putin. Muradov has played an important role in consolidating Russian institutional control over Crimea since the illegal annexation. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.	12.9.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
105.	Mikhail Sergeyeovich SHEREMET (Михаил Сергеевич ШЕРЕМЕТ) Mykhaylo Serhiyovych SHEREMET (Михайло Сергійович ШЕРЕМЕТ)	DOB 23.5.1971 POB: Dzhankoy	Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Former so-called 'First Deputy Prime Minister' of Crimea. Sheremet played a key role in the organisation and implementation of the 16 March referendum in Crimea on unification with Russia. At the time of the referendum, Sheremet reportedly commanded the pro-Moscow 'self-defence forces' in Crimea. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Elected on 18 September 2016 as a Duma deputy from illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula.	12.9.2014
106.	Yuri Leonidovich VOROBIOV (Юрий Леонидович Воробьев)	DOB 2.2.1948 POB: Krasnoyarsk	Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. On 1 March 2014 Vorobiov publicly supported in the Federation Council the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. He subsequently voted in favour of the related decree.	12.9.2014
107.	Vladimir Volfovich ZHIRINOVSKY (Владимир Вольфович Жириновски)	DOB: 25.4.1946 POB: Alma-Ata, Kazakh SSR	Member of the Council of the State Duma; leader of the LDPR party. He actively supported the use of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. He has actively called for the split of Ukraine. He signed, on behalf of the LDPR party he chairs, an agreement with the so-called, 'Donetsk People's Republic'.	12.9.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
108.	Vladimir Abdualiyevich VASILYEV (Васильев Владимир Абдуалиевич)	DOB: 11.8.1949 POB: Klin	Deputy Speaker of the State Duma. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects - the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.	12.9.2014
109.	Viktor Petrovich VODOLATSKY (Виктор Петрович Водолацкий)	DOB 19.8.1957 POB: Stefanidin Dar, Rostov region	Chairman ('ataman') of the Union of the Russian and Foreign Cossack Forces, and deputy of the State Duma. He supported the annexation of Crimea and admitted that Russian Cossacks were actively engaged in the Ukrainian conflict on the side of the Moscow-backed separatists. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects - the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.	12.9.2014
110.	Leonid Ivanovich KALASHNIKOV (Леонид Иванович КАЛАШНИКОВ)	DOB: 6.8.1960 POB: Stepnoy Dvorets	Former First deputy Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the State Duma. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects — the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'. Currently Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots	12.9.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
111.	Vladimir Stepanovich NIKITIN (Владимир Степанович НИКИТИН)	DOB 5.4.1948 POB: Opochna	Former member of the State Duma and former First Deputy Chairman of the Committee for CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots of the State Duma. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects — the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.	12.9.2014
112.	Oleg Vladimirovich LEBEDEV (Олег Владимирович ЛЕБЕДЕВ)	DOB 21.3.1964 POB: Rudny, Kostanai region, Kazakh SSR	Former member of the State Duma and former First Deputy Chairman of the Committee for CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots of the State Duma. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects — the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.	12.9.2014
113.	Ivan Ivanovich MELNIKOV (Иван Иванович Мельников)	DOB: 7.8.1950 POB: Bogoroditsk	First Deputy Speaker, State Duma. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects - the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.	12.9.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
114.	Igor Vladimirovich LEBEDEV (Игорь Владимирович Лебедев)	DOB: 27.9.1972 POB: Moscow	Deputy Speaker, State Duma. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects - the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.	12.9.2014
115.	Nikolai Vladimirovich LEVICHEV (Николай Владимирович ЛЕВИЧЕВ)	DOB: 28.5.1953 POB: Pushkin	Former member of the State Duma. Former Deputy Speaker, State Duma. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects — the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'. Currently a member of the Central Election Commission.	12.9.2014
116.	Svetlana Sergeevna ZHUROVA (Светлана Сергеевна Журова)	DOB 7.1.1972 POB: Pavlov-on-the-Neva	First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, State Duma. On 20 March 2014 she voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects - the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.	12.9.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
117.	Aleksey Vasilevich NAUMETS (Алексей Васильевич Наумец)	DOB: 11.2.1968	Major-general of the Russian Army. He is the commander of the 76th airborne division which has been involved in the Russian military presence on the territory of Ukraine, notably during the illegal annexation of Crimea.	12.9.2014
118.	Sergey Viktorovich CHEMEZOV (Сергей Викторович Чемезов)	DOB: 20.8.1952 POB: Cheremkhovo	Sergei Chemezov is one of President Putin's known close associates, both were KGB officers posted in Dresden and he is a member of the Supreme Council of 'United Russia'. He is benefiting from his links with the Russian President by being promoted to senior positions in State-controlled firms. He chairs the Rostec conglomerate, the leading Russian state-controlled defence and industrial manufacturing corporation. Further to a decision of the Russian government, Technopromexport, a subsidiary of Rostec, is planning to build energy plants in Crimea thereby supporting its integration into the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Rosoboronexport, a subsidiary of Rostec, has supported the integration of Crimean defence companies into Russia's defence industry, thereby consolidating the illegal annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation.	12.9.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
119.	Alexander Mikhailovich БАБАКОВ (Александр Михайлович БАБАКОВ)	DOB: 8.2.1963 POB: Chisinau	Former member of the State Duma. Former State Duma Deputy, Chair of the State Duma Commission on Legislative Provisions for Development of the Military-Industrial Complex of the Russian Federation. He is a prominent member of 'United Russia' and a businessman with heavy investments in Ukraine and in Crimea. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects — the Republic of Crimea and the City of federal status of Sevastopol'. Currently member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation.	12.9.2014
120.	Sergey Yurievich KOZYAKOV (Сергей Юрьевич КОЗЬЯКОВ) Serhiy Yuriyovych KOZYAKOV (Сергій Юрійович КОЗЬЯКОВ)	DOB: 29.9.1982 or 23.9.1982	In his former capacity as so-called 'Head of the Luhansk Central Election Commission' he was responsible for organising the so-called 'elections' of 2 November 2014 in the 'Luhansk People's Republic'. These 'elections' were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In October 2015 he was appointed as so-called 'Minister of Justice' of the 'Luhansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in these capacities, and in organising the illegal 'elections', he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	29.11.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
121.	<p>Oleg Konstantinovich AKIMOV (a.k.a. Oleh AKIMOV)</p> <p>(Олег Константинович АКИМОВ)</p> <p>Oleh Kostiantynovych AKIMOV</p> <p>(Олег Костянтинович АКИМОВ)</p>	<p>DOB: 15.9.1981</p> <p>POB: Lugansk</p>	<p>Deputy of the 'Lugansk Economic Union' in the 'National Council' of the 'Lugansk People's Republic'. Stood as a candidate in the so-called 'elections' of 2 November 2014 to the post of so-called 'Head' of the 'Lugansk People's Republic'. These 'elections' were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. Since 2014 he is the 'Head' of the so-called 'Federation of Trade Unions' and a member of the so-called 'People's Council' of the 'Lugansk People's Republic'.</p> <p>In taking on and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal 'elections', he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</p> <p>Supports actively actions and policies undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</p>	29.11.2014
122.	<p>Larisa Leonidovna AIRAPETYAN a.k.a. Larysa AYRAPETYAN, Larisa AIRAPETYAN or Larysa AIRAPETYAN</p> <p>(Лариса Леонидовна АЙРАПЕТЯН)</p> <p>(Лариса Леонідівна АЙРАПЕТЯН)</p>	<p>DOB: 21.2.1970</p>	<p>Former so-called 'Health Minister' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. Stood as a candidate in the so-called 'elections' of 2 November 2014 to the post of the 'Head' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'.</p> <p>These 'elections' are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal.</p> <p>In taking on and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal 'elections', she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</p>	29.11.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
123.	Yuriy Viktorovich SIVOKONENKO a.k.a. Yuriy SIVOKONENKO, Yury SIVOKONENKO, Yury SYVOKONENKO (Юрий Викторович СИВОКОНЕНКО)	DOB: 7.8.1957 POB: Stalino city (now Donetsk)	Member of the 'Parliament' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic' and Chairman of the public association Union of Veterans of the Donbass Berkut and a member of the public movement 'Free Donbass'. Stood as a candidate in the so-called 'elections' of 2 November 2014 to the post of the Head of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. These elections were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In taking on and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal 'elections', he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	29.11.2014
124.	Aleksandr Igorevich KOFMAN (a.k.a. Oleksandr KOFMAN) (Александр Игоревич КОФМАН) (Олександр Ігорович КОФМАН)	DOB: 30.8.1977 POB: Makiivka (Donetsk oblast)	Former so-called 'Foreign Minister' and so-called 'First deputy speaker' of the 'Parliament' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Stood as a candidate in the so-called illegal 'elections' of 2 November 2014 to the post of so-called 'Head' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. These elections were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In taking part and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal 'elections', he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.	29.11.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
125.	Ravil Zakariyevich KHALIKOV (Равиль Закариевич ХАЛИКОВ) Ravil Zakariyovych KHALIKOV (Равіль Закарійович ХАЛИКОВ)	DOB: 23.2.1969 POB: Belozernoe village, Romodanovskiy rayon, USSR	Former so-called 'First Deputy Prime Minister' and previous 'Prosecutor-General' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	29.11.2014
126.	Dmitry Aleksandrovich SEMYONOV Dmitrii Aleksandrovich SEMENOV (Дмитрий Александрович СЕМЕНОВ)	DOB: 3.2.1963 POB: Moscow	Former 'Deputy Prime Minister for Finances' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, has actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Remains active in financing LNR separatist structures.	29.11.2014
127.	Oleg Evgenevich BUGROV (Олег Евгеньевич БУГРОВ) Oleh Yevhenovych BUHROV (Олег Євгенович БУГРОВ)	DOB: 29.8.1969	Former 'Defence Minister' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	29.11.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
128.	Lesya Mikhaylovna ЛАПТЕВА (Леся Михайловна ЛАПТЕВА) Lesya Mykhaylivna ЛАРТІЕВА (Леся Михайлівна ЛАПТЕВА)	DOB: 11.3.1976 POB: Dzhambul/Jambul (Kazakhstan), currently known as Taraz	Former 'Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Religion' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	29.11.2014
129.	Yevgeniy Eduardovich МИХАЙЛОВ (a.k.a. Yevhen Eduardovych МУЧАЙЛОВ) (Евгений Эдуардович МИХАЙЛОВ) (Євген Едуардович МИХАЙЛОВ)	DOB: 17.3.1963 POB: Arkhangelsk	Former so-called 'Minister of the Council of Ministers' (head of the administration for governmental affairs) of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	29.11.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
130.	Ihor Vladymyrovych KOSTENOK (a.k.a. Igor Vladimirovich KOSTENOK) (Игорь Владимирович КОСТЕНОК)	DOB: 15.03.1961 POB: Vodyanske, Dobropillia Rayon, Donetsk oblast Водянское, Добропольский район Донецкой области	Former so-called 'Minister of Education' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Currently personal advisor to the PM of DNR.	29.11.2014
131.	Yevgeniy Vyacheslavovich ORLOV (a.k.a. Yevhen Vyacheslavovych ORLOV) (Евгений Вячеславович ОРЛОВ)	DOB: 10.5.1980 or 21.10.1983 POB: Snezhnoye, Donetsk oblast г. Снежное, Донецкой области	Member of the 'National Council' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	29.11.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
132.	Vladyslav Mykolayovych DEYNEGO a.k.a. Vladislav Nikolayevich DEYNEGO (Владислав Миколайович ДЕЙНЕГО) (Владислав Николаевич ДЕЙНЕГО)	DOB: 12.3.1964 POB: Romny, Sumy oblast Ромны, Сумская область	'Deputy Head' of the 'People's Council' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	29.11.2014
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134.	Alexey Yurevich MILCHAKOV (a.k.a. Fritz, Serbian) (Алексей Юрьевич Мильчаков)	DOB: 30.4. 1991 POB: St. Petersburg	Commander of the 'Rusich' unit, an armed separatist group involved in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. In this capacity, he has actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	16.2.2015
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The entry was deleted on 10 March 2016 following a delisting decision.

\$\$ The entry was deleted on 13 March 2017 following a delisting decision.



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
136.	Mikhail Sergeevich TOLSTYKH a.k.a. Givi (Михаил Сергеевич ТОЛСТЫХ) Mykhaylo Serhiyovych TOLSTYKH (Михайло Сергійович ТОЛСТИХ)	DOB: 19.7.1980 POB: Ilovaisk	Commander of the 'Somali' battalion, an armed separatist group involved in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. In this capacity, he has actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Remains an active military commander in so-called 'DNR'.	16.2.2015
137.	Eduard Aleksandrovich BASURIN (Эдуард Александрович БАСУРИН) Eduard Oleksandrovych BASURIN (Едуард Олександрович БАСУРИН)	DOB: 27.6.1966 POB: Donetsk	Spokesperson of the Ministry of Defence of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist activity in Eastern Ukraine.	16.2.2015



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
138.	Alexandr Vasilievich SHUBIN (Александр Васильевич ШУБИН)	DOB: 20.5.1972 or 30.5.1972 POB: Luhansk	Former so-called 'Minister of Justice', of the illegal so-called 'Luhansk People's Republic'. Chairman of the 'Central Election Commission' of the so-called 'Luhansk People's Republic' since October 2015. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Currently Chairman of the so-called 'Central Election Commission' of the so-called 'Luhansk People's Republic'.	16.2.2015
139.	Sergey Anatolievich LITVIN (Сергей Анатольевич ЛИТВИН) Serhiy Anatoliyovych LYTVYN (Сергій Анатолійович ЛИТВИН)	DOB: 2.7.1973 POB: Lysychansk, Luhansk oblast, USSR Лисичанск Луганской области УССР	Former so-called 'Deputy Chairman' of the Council of Ministers of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	16.2.2015



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
140.	Sergey Yurevich IGNATOV (a.k.a. KUZOVLEV) (Сергей Юрьевич ИГНАТОВ (КУЗОВЛЕВ))	DOB: 7.1.1967 POB: Michurinsk, Tambov oblast Мичуринск, Тамбовская область	So-called Commander in Chief of the People's Militia of the 'Luhansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	16.2.2015
141.	Ekaterina FILIPPOVA (Екатерина Владимировна ФИЛИППОВА) Kateryna Volodymyrivna FILIPPOVA (Катерина Володимирівна ФІЛІППОВА)	DOB: 20.1.1988 POB: Krasnoarmëisk	Former so-called 'Minister of Justice' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Currently personal assistant to Alexander Vladimirovich Zakharchenko.	16.2.2015

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
142.	Aleksandr Yurievich TIMOFEEV (Александр Юрьевич ТИМОФЕЕВ) Oleksandr Yuriyovych TYMOFEYEV (Олександр Юрійович ТИМОФЕЄВ)	DOB: 15.05.1971 POB: Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai Невинномысск, Ставропольский край	So-called 'Minister of Finance and Taxes' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	16.2.2015
143.	Evgeny Vladimirovich MANUILOV (Евгений Владимирович МАНУЙЛОВ) Yevhen Volodymyrovych MANUYLOV (Євген Володимирович МАНУЙЛОВ)	DOB: 5.1.1967 POB: Baranykivka, Bilovodsk Raion, Luhansk oblast с. Бараниковка Беловодского района Луганской области	So-called 'Minister of Income and Taxes' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	16.2.2015



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
144.	Viktor Vyacheslavovich YATSENKO (Виктор Вячеславович ЯЦЕНКО) Viktor Viacheslavovych YATSENKO (Віктор В'ячеславович ЯЦЕНКО)	DOB: 22.4.1985 POB: Kherson	So-called 'Minister of Communications' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	16.2.2015
145.	Olga Igoreva BESEDINA (Ольга Игоревна БЕСЕДИНА) Olha Ihorivna BESEDINA (Ольга Ігорівна БЕСЕДИНА)	DOB: 10.12.1976 POB: Lugansk	Former so-called 'Minister of Economic Development and Trade' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	16.2.2015
146.	Zaur Raufovich ISMAILOV (Заур Рауфович ИСМАИЛОВ) Zaur Raufovych ISMAYILOV (Заур Рауфович ІСМАЇЛОВ)	DOB: 25.7.1978 (or 23.3.1975) POB: Krasny Luch, Voroshilovgrad, Lugansk region	So-called 'General Prosecutor' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.	16.2.2015



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
147.	Anatoly Ivanovich ANTONOV (Анатолий Иванович Антонов)	DOB: 15.5.1955 POB: Omsk	Deputy Minister of Defence and, in that capacity, involved in supporting the deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine. According to the present Russian Ministry of Defence structure, in that capacity he participates in shaping and implementing the policy of the Russian Government. These policies threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.	16.2.2015
148.	Arkady Viktorovich BAKHIN (Аркадий Викторович Бахин)	DOB: 8.5.1956 POB: Kaunas, Lithuania	Former First Deputy Minister of Defence (until 17 November 2015) and was, in that capacity, involved in supporting the deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine. According to the present Russian Ministry of Defence structure, in that capacity he participates in shaping and implementing the policy of the Russian Government. These policies threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Currently employed by Rosatom.	16.2.2015



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
149.	Andrei Valeryevich KARTAPOLOV (Андрей Валерьевич Картаполов)	DOB: 9.11.1963 POB: GDR (DDR)	<p>Commander of the Western Military District since 10 November 2015. Former Director of the Main Operations Department and deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Actively involved in shaping and implementing the military campaign of the Russian forces in Ukraine.</p> <p>According to the stated activities of the general staff, by exercising operational control over the armed forces, he is actively involved in shaping and implementing the Russian government policy threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</p>	16.2.2015
150.	Iosif (Joseph) Davydovich KOBZON (Иосиф Давыдович КОБЗОН)	DOB: 11.9.1937 POB: Tchassov Yar, Ukraine	<p>Member of the State Duma.</p> <p>He visited the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and during his visit made statements supporting separatists. He was also appointed Honorary Consul of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic' in the Russian Federation.</p> <p>On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects — the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.</p> <p>Currently First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Culture.</p>	16.2.2015



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
151.	Valery Fedorovich RASHKIN (Валерий Фёдорович Рашкин)	DOB: 14.3.1955 POB: Zhilino, Kaliningrad region	First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Ethnicity issues. He is the founder of the civil movement 'Krassnaya Moskva - Red Moscow - Patriotic Front Aid' which organised public demonstrations supporting separatists, thereby supporting policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects - the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.	16.2.2015
152.	Ruslan Ismailovich BALBEK (Руслан Исмаилович БАЛЬБЕК)	DOB: 28.8.1977 POB: Bekabad, Uzbekistan SSR	Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Deputy Chairperson of the Duma Committee on ethnic affairs. In 2014 Balbek was appointed as a Deputy Chairperson of the Council of Ministers of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea' and worked in this capacity for the integration of the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation, for which he has been awarded with a medal 'For the Defence of Republic of Crimea'. He has supported the annexation of Crimea in public statements, including on his profile on the United Russia (Crimean branch) website and a press article published on NTV website on 3 July 2016.	09.11.2016



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
153.	Konstantin Mikhailovich BAKHAREV (Константин Михайлович БАХАРЕВ)	DOB: 20.10.1972 POB: Simferopol Ukrainian SSR	Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Member of the Duma Committee on Financial Markets. In March 2014 Bakharev was appointed as a Deputy Chairperson of the State Council of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea', and in August 2014 as First Deputy Chairperson of that body. He has admitted his personal involvement in the events of 2014 that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, which he has publicly supported, including in an interview published on gazetacrimea.ru website on 22 March 2016 and c-pravda.ru website on 23 August 2016. He has been awarded with the order 'For loyalty to duty' by the 'authorities' of 'Republic of Crimea'.	09.11.2016

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
154.	Dmitry Anatolievich BELIK (Дмитрий Анатольевич БЕЛИК)	DOB: 17.10.1969 POB: Kular Ust-Yansky District, Yakut Autonomous SSR	Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed city of Sevastopol. Member of the Duma Committee on Taxation. As a member of the Sevastopol municipal administration in February-March 2014 he supported the activities of the so-called 'People's Mayor' Alexei Chaliy. He has publicly admitted his involvement in the events of 2014 that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, which he has publicly defended, including on his personal website and in an interview published on 21 February 2016 on nation-news.ru website. For his involvement in the annexation process he has been awarded with Russian State order 'For duties to the motherland' — II degree.	09.11.2016

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
155.	Andrei Dmitrievich KOZENKO (Андрей Дмитриевич КОЗЕНКО)	DOB: 3.8.1981 POB: Simferopol Ukrainian SSR	Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Member of Duma Committee on Financial Markets. In March 2014 Kozenko was appointed as a Deputy Chairperson of the State Council of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. He has publicly admitted his involvement in the events of 2014 that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, which he has publicly defended, including in an interview published on gazetacrimea.ru website on 12 March 2016. For his involvement in the annexation process he has been awarded with a medal 'For the defence of Republic of Crimea' by the local 'authorities'.	09.11.2016

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
156.	Svetlana Borisovna SAVCHENKO (Светлана Борисовна САВЧЕНКО)	DOB: 24.6.1965 POB: Belogorsk Ukrainian SSR	Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Member of the Duma Committee on Culture. She has been a member of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea since 2012 and as of March 2014 supported the integration of the illegally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation. In September 2014 Savchenko was elected to the State Council of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. She has defended the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol on numerous occasions in public statements, including interviews published on c-pravda.ru website on 2 April 2016 and 20 August 2016. She has been awarded with Russian State order 'For duties to the motherland' — II degree in 2014 and with the order 'For loyalty to duty' by the "authorities" of 'Republic of Crimea' in 2015.	09.11.2016



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
157.	Pavel Valentinovich SHPEROV (Павел Валентинович ШПЕРОВ)	DOB: 4.7.1971 POB: Simferopol Ukrainian SSR	Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Member of the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots. In September 2014 Shperov was elected to the State Council of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. He has publicly admitted, including in an interview published on ldpr-rk.ru website on 3 September 2016, his role in the events of 2014 that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol and in particular his role in the organisation of the illegal referendum on the illegal annexation of the peninsula.	09.11.2016




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List of entities

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
1.	State Unitary Enterprise of the Republic of Crimea "Chernomorneftegaz" (formerly known as PJSC Chernomorneftegaz)		On 17.03.2014 the 'Parliament of Crimea' adopted a resolution declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to Chernomorneftegaz enterprise on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 29.11.2014 as State Unitary Enterprise of the Republic of Crimea "Chernomorneftegaz" (ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ УНИТАРНОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ РЕСПУБЛИКИ КРЫМ «ЧЕРНОМОРНЕФТЕГАЗ»). Founder: The Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Republic of Crimea (МИНИСТЕРСТВО ТОПЛИВА И ЭНЕРГЕТИКИ РЕСПУБЛИКИ КРЫМ).	12.5.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
2.	Limited Liability Company "Port Feodosia" (formerly known as Feodosia)		On 17.03.2014 the 'Parliament of Crimea' adopted a resolution declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to Feodosia enterprise on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered as limited liability company "Port Feodosia" (ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ПОРТ ФЕОДОСИЯ") on 09.02.2015. Founder: Yuri Garyevich Rovinskiy (Юрий Гарьевич Ровинский).	12.5.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
3.	So called 'Lugansk People's Republic' 'Луганская народная республика' 'Luganskaya narodnaya respublika'	Official website: http://lugansk-online.info Phone number +38-099-160-74-14	<p>The so called 'Lugansk People's Republic' was established on 27 April 2014.</p> <p>Responsible for organising the illegal referendum on May 11 2014. Declaration of independence on May 12 2014.</p> <p>On 22 May 2014, the so called 'People's Republics' of Donetsk and Lugansk created the so called 'Federal State of Novorossiya'.</p> <p>This is in breach of Ukrainian constitutional law, and, as a consequence, of international law, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</p> <p>It is also involved in the recruitment to the separatist 'Army of Southeast' and other illegal armed separatist groups, thus undermining the stability or security of Ukraine.</p>	25.7.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
4.	<p>So called 'Donetsk People's Republic'</p> <p>'Донецкая народная республика' 'Donétskaya národnáya respúblika'</p>	<p>Official information, including the Constitution of Donetsk People's Republic and the composition of the Supreme Council</p> <p>http://dnr-news.com/</p> <p>Social media:</p> <p>https://twitter.com/dnrpress</p> <p>http://vk.com/dnrnews</p>	<p>The so called 'Donetsk People's Republic' was declared on 7 April 2014.</p> <p>Responsible for organizing the illegal referendum on May 11 2014. Declaration of independence on May 12 2014. On 24 May 2014, the so called 'People's Republics' of Donetsk and Lugansk signed an agreement on the creation of the so called 'Federal State of Novorossiia'.</p> <p>This is in breach of Ukrainian constitutional law, and, as a consequence, of international law, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</p> <p>It is also involved in the recruitment to illegal armed separatist groups, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine.</p>	25.7.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
5.	So called 'Federal State of Novorossiia' 'Федеративное государство Новороссиа' 'Federativnoye Gosudarstvo Novorossiia'	Official press releases: http://novorossia.su/official	On 24 May 2014, the so called 'People's Republics' of Donetsk and Lugansk signed an agreement on the creation of the unrecognized so called 'Federal State of Novorossiia'. This is in breach of Ukrainian constitutional law, and, as a consequence, of international law, thus threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.	25.7.2014
6.	International Union of Public Associations 'Great Don Army' Международный Союз Общественных Объединений 'Всевеликое Войско Донское'	Official website: http://xn--80aaaajfszdz7a3b0e.xn--p1ai/ Phone number: +7-8-908-178-65-57 Social media: Cossack National Guard http://vk.com/kazak_nac_guard Address: 346465 Russia Rostov Region. October (C) District. St Zaplavskaya. Str Shosseynaya 1	The 'Great Don army' established the 'Cossack National Guard', responsible for fighting against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as threatening the stability or security of Ukraine. Associated with Mr Nikolay KOZITSYN, who is Commander of Cossack forces and responsible for commanding separatists in Eastern Ukraine fighting against the Ukrainian government forces.	25.7.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
7.	'Sobol' 'СОБОЛЬ'	Official web site: http://soboli.net Social media: http://vk.com/sobolipress Phone number: (0652) 60-23-93. Email: SoboliPress@gmail.com Address: Crimea, Simferopol, str. Kiev, 4 (area bus station 'Central').	Radical paramilitary organisation, responsible for openly supporting using force to end Ukraine's control over Crimea, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine Responsible for training separatists to fight against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine.	25.7.2014
8.	So called 'Lugansk Guard' 'Луганская гвардия'	Social media: https://vk.com/luguard http://vk.com/club68692201	Self-defence militia of Lugansk, responsible for training separatists to fight against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine. Associated with Mr, German PROPOKIV, active leader who is responsible for taking part in the seizure of the building of the Lugansk regional office of the Ukrainian Security Service and recorded a video address to President Putin and Russia from the occupied building.	25.7.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
9.	So called 'Army of the Southeast' 'Армии Юго-Востока'	Recruitment: http://lugansk-online.info/statements Social media: http://vk.com/lugansksbu	Illegal armed separatist group which is considered to be one of the most important in Eastern Ukraine. Responsible for occupying the building of the Security Service in the Lugansk region. Retired officer. Associated with Mr. Valeriy BOLOTOV, listed as one of the leaders of the group. Associated with Mr. Vasyi NIKITIN, responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so called 'government of the People' s Republic of Luhansk'	25.7.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
10.	So-called 'Donbas People's Militia' 'Народное ополчение Донбасса'	Social media: http://vk.com/polkdonbassa +38-099-445-63-78; +38-063-688-60-01; +38-067-145-14-99; +38-094-912-96-60; +38-062-213-26-60 Email: voenkom.dnr@mail.ru mobilisation@novorossia.co Telephone volunteers in Russia: +7 (926) 428-99-51 +7 (967) 171-27-09 or email novoross24@mail.ru Address: Donetsk. Prospect Zasyadko.13	Illegal armed separatist group responsible for fighting against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine. Inter alia, the militant group seized control of several government buildings in Eastern Ukraine in early April 2014, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. It is associated with Mr Pavel Gubarev, who is responsible for the taking over of the regional government building in Donetsk with pro-Russian forces and proclaiming himself the 'people's governor'.	25.7.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
11.	'Vostok battalion' 'Батальон Восток'	Social media: http://vk.com/patriotic_forces_of_donbas	<p>Illegal armed separatist group which is considered to be one of the most important in Eastern Ukraine. Responsible for fighting against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine.</p> <p>Actively participated in the military operations resulting in the seizure of Donetsk Airport.</p> <p>Part of the so-called '1st Army Corps' of the Armed Forces of 'Donetsk People's Republic'.</p>	25.7.2014
12.	State ferry enterprise 'Kerch ferry' Государственная судоходная компания 'Керченская паромная переправа' Gosudarstvenoye predpriyatiye Kerchenskaya paromnaya pereprava	16 Tselibernaya Street, 98307 Kerch (Автономная Республика Крым, г. Керчь, ул. Целимберная, 16) code: 14333981	<p>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. The 'Parliament of Crimea' adopted a resolution No. 1757-6/14 on 17.3.2014 On nationalization of some companies belonging to the Ukrainian ministries of infrastructure or agriculture' and the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No. 1802-6/14 on 24.3.2014 On state-owned Ferry Enterprise Kerch Ferry' declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state ferry enterprise 'Kerch Ferry' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'.</p>	25.7.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
13.	<p>State Unitary Enterprise of the City of Sevastopol, "Sevastopol seaport"</p> <p>(formerly known as State enterprise 'Sevastopol commercial seaport'</p> <p>Государственное предприятие 'Севастопольский морской торговый порт'</p> <p>Gosudarstvenoye) predpriyatiye Sevastopolski morskoy torgovy port</p>		<p>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 17.3.2014 the 'Parliament of Crimea' adopted a resolution No. 1757-6/14 'On nationalization of some companies belonging to the Ukrainian ministries of infrastructure or agriculture' declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise 'Sevastopol commercial seaport' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. In terms of volume of trade, it is the biggest commercial seaport in Crimea. Re-registered on 06.06.2014 as State Unitary Enterprise of the City of Sevastopol, "Sevastopol seaport" (ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ УНИТАРНОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ ГОРОДА СЕВАСТОПОЛЯ "СЕВАСТОПОЛЬСКИЙ МОРСКОЙ ПОРТ"). Founder: The Government of Sevastopol (Правительство Севастополя).</p>	25.7.2014




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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
14.	<p>Limited Liability Company "Kerch seaport"/ "Kamysh-Burun"</p> <p>(formerly known as State enterprise 'Kerch commercial sea port' Государственное предприятие 'Керченский морской торговый порт'</p> <p>Gosudarstvenoye predpriyatiye Kerchenski morskoy torgovy port)</p>		<p>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. The 'Parliament of Crimea' adopted a resolution No.1757-6/14 on 17.3.2014 On nationalization of some companies belonging to the Ukrainian ministries of infrastructure or agriculture' and a resolution No. 1865-6/14 on 26.3.2014 On State-Owned Enterprise "Crimean Sea Ports' ('О Государственном предприятии "Крымские морские порты') declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise 'Kerch Commercial Sea Port' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. In terms of volume of trade, it is the second biggest commercial seaport in Crimea. Re-registered on 09.12.2014 as Limited Liability Company "Kerch seaport" "Kamysh-Burun" (ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "КЕРЧЕНСКИЙ МОРСКОЙ ПОРТ "КАМЫШ-БУРУН"). Founders: Limited Liability Company "Vostok-Capital", registered in Donetsk, Ukraine (ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ВОСТОК КЭПИТАЛ"); Limited Liability Company "Vostok", registered in</p>	25.7.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
			Donetsk, Ukraine (ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ВОСТОК"); Limited Liability Company "Altcom Invest-Stroi", registered in Donetsk, Ukraine (ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "АЛТКОМ ИНВЕСТ-СТРОЙ") and Limited Liability Company "Altcom-Beton", registered in Borispol, Ukraine (ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "АЛТКОМ-БЕТОН").	

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
15.	<p>State Unitary Enterprise of the Republic of Crimea "Universal-Avia"</p> <p>(formerly known as State enterprise Universal -Avia Государственное предприятие 'Универсал-Авиа'</p> <p>Gosudarstvenoye predpriyatiye 'Universal-Avia')</p>		<p>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 24.3.2014 the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision 'On State-owned Enterprise "Gosudarstvenoye predpriyatiye Universal- Avia" ('О Государственном предприятии "Универсал-Авиа")' No. 1794-6/14 declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise 'Universal-Avia' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 15.01.2015 as State Unitary Enterprise of the Republic of Crimea "Universal-Avia" (ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ УНИТАРНОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ РЕСПУБЛИКИ КРЫМ "УНИВЕРСАЛ-АВИА"). Founder: The Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Crimea (МИНИСТЕРСТВО ТРАНСПОРТА РЕСПУБЛИКИ КРЫМ).</p>	25.7.2014


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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
16.	<p>Federal State Budgetary Enterprise "Sanatorium Nizhnyaya Oreanda" of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation</p> <p>(formerly known as Resort 'Nizhnyaya Oreanda'</p> <p>Санаторий 'Нижняя Ореанда')</p>		<p>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 21 March the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision 'On the questions of creation of the Association of sanatoria and resorts' No. 1767-6/14 declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the resort 'Nizhnyaya Oreanda' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 09.10.2014 as Federal State Budgetary Enterprise "Sanatorium Nizhnyaya Oreanda" of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ БЮДЖЕТНОЕ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЕ «САНАТОРИЙ «НИЖНЯЯ ОРЕАНДА» УПРАВЛЕНИЯ ДЕЛАМИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ). Founder: The Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (УПРАВЛЕНИЯ ДЕЛАМИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ).</p>	25.7.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
17.	Crimean enterprise 'Azov distillery plant' Крнмское республиканское предприятие 'Азовский ликероводочный Завод' Azovsky likerovodochny zavod	40 Zeleznodorozhnaya str., 96178 town of Azov, Jankovsky district (Джанкойский район, пгт Азовское, ул. Железнодорожная, 40) code: 01271681	The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 9 April the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No 1991-6/14 'On the amendments to the Resolution of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea' of 26 March 26 2014 No. 1836-6/14 'On nationalization of the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations of agro-industrial complex, located in the territory of the Republic of Crimea' declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the 'Azovsky likerovodochny zavod' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'.	25.7.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
18.	<p>Federal State Budgetary Enterprise "Production-Agrarian Union 'Massandra' of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation</p> <p>(formerly known as State concern 'National Association of producers "Massandra" Национальное производственно-аграрное объединение 'Массандра' Nacionalnoye proizvodstvenno agrarnoye obyedinenye Massandra)</p>		<p>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 9 April the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No 1991-6/14 'On the amendments to the Resolution of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea' of 26 March No. 1836-6/14 'On nationalization of the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations of agro-industrial complex, located in the territory of the Republic of Crimea' declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state concern 'National Association of producers "Massandra" on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 01.08.2014 Federal State Budgetary Enterprise "Production-Agrarian Union 'Massandra'" of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ УНИТАРНОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ "ПРОИЗВОДСТВЕННО-АГРАРНОЕ ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЕ "МАССАНДРА" УПРАВЛЕНИЯ ДЕЛАМИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ). Founder: The Administration of the President of the Russian Federation</p>	25.7.2014




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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
			(УПРАВЛЕНИЯ ДЕЛАМИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ).	



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
19.	<p>State Unitary Enterprise of the Republic of Crimea 'National Institute of Wine "Magarach"'</p> <p>(formerly known as 'State enterprise Magarach of the national institute of wine')</p> <p>Государственное предприятие Агрофирма 'Магарач' Национального института винограда и вина 'Магарач'</p> <p>Gosudarstvenoye predpriyatiye 'Agrofirma Magarach' nacionalnogo instituta vinograda i vina 'Magarach')</p>		<p>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 9 April 2014 the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No 1991-6/14 'On the amendments to the Resolution of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea' of 26 March 2014 No. 1836-6/14 'On nationalization of the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations of agro-industrial complex, located in the territory of the Republic of Crimea' declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise 'Gosudarstvenoye predpriyatiye "Agrofirma Magarach" nacionalnogo instituta vinograda i vina "Magarach"' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 15 January 2015 as State Unitary Enterprise of the Republic of Crimea 'National Institute of Wine "Magarach"' (ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ БЮДЖЕТНОЕ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЕ РЕСПУБЛИКИ КРЫМ «НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ НАУЧНО-ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ ИНСТИТУТ ВИНОГРАДА И ВИНА «МАГАРАЧ»). Founder: The Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of</p>	25.7.2014




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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
			Crimea (МИНИСТЕРСТВО СЕЛЬСКОГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА РЕСПУБЛИКИ КРЫМ).	
20.	<p>State Unitary Enterprise of the Republic of Crimea "Factory of sparkling wine 'Novy Svet'"</p> <p>(formerly known as State enterprise 'Factory of sparkling wine Novy Svet'</p> <p>Государственное предприятиеЗавод шампанских вин 'Новый свет'</p> <p>Gosudarstvenoye predpriyatiye 'Zavod shampanskykh vin Novy Svet')</p>		<p>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 9 April the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No. 1991 -6/14 'On the amendments to the Resolution of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea' of 26 March 26 2014 No. 1836-6/14 'On nationalization of the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations of agro-industrial complex, located in the territory of the "Republic of Crimea" declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise "Zavod shampanskykh vin Novy Svet" on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 04.01.2015 as State Unitary Enterprise of the Republic of Crimea "Factory of sparkling wine 'Novy Svet'" (ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ УНИТАРНОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ РЕСПУБЛИКИ КРЫМ "ЗАВОД ШАМΠΑНСКИХ ВИН "НОВЫЙ СВЕТ"). Founder: The Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Crimea (МИНИСТЕРСТВО СЕЛЬСКОГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА РЕСПУБЛИКИ КРЫМ).</p>	25.7.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
21.	<p>JOINT-STOCK COMPANY ALMAZ-ANTEY AIR AND SPACE DEFENCE CORPORATION</p> <p>Акционерное общество «Концерн воздушно-космической обороны «Алмаз – Антей»</p> <p>(a.k.a. CONCERN ALMAZ-ANTEY; ALMAZ-ANTEY CORP; a.k.a. ALMAZ-ANTEY DEFENSE CORPORATION; a.k.a. ALMAZ-ANTEY JSC; Концерн ВКО «Алмаз – Антей»; «Алмаз-Антей»)</p>	<p>41 ul.Vereiskaya, Moscow 121471, Russia;</p> <p>Website: almaz-antey.ru;</p> <p>Email Address antey@almaz-antey.ru</p>	<p>Almaz-Antey is a Russian State-owned company. It manufactures anti-aircraft weaponry including surface-to-air missiles which it supplies to the Russian army. The Russian authorities have been providing heavy weaponry to separatists in Eastern Ukraine, contributing to the destabilisation of Ukraine. These weapons are used by the separatists, including for shooting down airplanes. As a State-owned company, Almaz-Antey therefore contributes to the destabilisation of Ukraine.</p>	30.7.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
22.	DOBROLET aka DOBROLYOT Добролет/Добролёт	Airline code QD International Highway, House 31, building 1, 141411 Moscow 141411, Москва г, Международное ш, дом 31, строение 1 Website: www.dobrolet.com	Dobrolet is a subsidiary of a Russian state-owned airline. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea Dobrolet has so far exclusively operated flights between Moscow and Simferopol. It therefore facilitates the integration of the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and undermines Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.	30.7.2014
23.	RUSSIAN NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK РОССИЙСКИЙ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ КОММЕРЧЕСКИЙ БАНК		After the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russian National Commercial Bank (RNCB) became fully owned by the so- called 'Republic of Crimea'. It has become the dominant player in the market, while it had no presence in Crimea before the annexation. By buying or taking over from branches of retreating banks operating in Crimea, RNCB supported materially and financially the actions of the Russian government to integrate Crimea into the Russian Federation, thus undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity.	30.7.2014

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



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
24.	Donetsk Republic (Public organisation) Донецька республіка		<p>Public "organisation" that presented candidates in the so called "elections" of the so called "Donetsk People's Republic" on 2 November 2014. These "elections" are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal.</p> <p>In participating formally in the illegal "elections" it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. Headed by Alexander ZAKHARCHENKO and founded by Andriy PURGIN.</p>	29.11.2014
25.	Peace to Luhansk Region (Russian: Мир Луганщине)Мир Луганщине		<p>Public "organisation" that presented candidates in the so called "elections" of the so called "Luhansk People's Republic" 2 November 2014. These "elections" are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal.</p> <p>In participating formally in the illegal "elections" it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. Headed by Igor PLOTNITSKY.</p>	29.11.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
26.	Free Donbass (aka 'Free Donbas', 'Svobodny Donbass')Свободный Донбасс		<p>Public "organisation" that presented candidates in the so called "elections" of the so called "Donetsk People's Republic" 2 November 2014. These elections are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal.</p> <p>In participating formally in the illegal "elections" it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.</p>	29.11.2014



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
27.	People's Union (Narodny Soyuz) Народный союз		<p>Public "organisation" that presented candidates in the so called "elections" of the so called "Luhansk People's Republic" 2 November 2014. These elections are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In participating formally in the illegal "elections" it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.</p>	29.11.2014
28.	Luhansk Economic Union (Luganskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz) Луганский Экономический союз		<p>"Social organisation" that presented candidates in the illegal so called "elections" of the so called "Luhansk People's Republic" 2 November 2014. Nominated a candidate, Oleg AKIMOV, to be "Head" of the so called "Luhansk People's Republic". These "elections" are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal.</p> <p>In participating formally in the illegal "elections" it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.</p>	29.11.2014

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
29.	Cossack National Guard Казачья Национальная Гвардия		<p>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine.</p> <p>Commanded by and therefore associated with a listed person Nikolay KOZITSYN.</p> <p>Reportedly part of the so-called '2nd Army Corps' of the 'Lugansk People's Republic'.</p>	16.2.2015
30.	Sparta battalion Батальон 'Спарта'		<p>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine.</p> <p>Commanded by and therefore associated with a listed person Arseny PAVLOV.</p> <p>Part of the so-called '1st Army Corps' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.</p>	16.2.2015



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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
31.	Somali battalion Батальон 'Сомали'		<p>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine.</p> <p>Commanded by and therefore associated with a listed person Mikhail TOLSTYKH (a.k.a. Givi).</p> <p>Part of the so-called '1st Army Corps' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.</p>	16.2.2015
32.	Zarya battalion Батальон 'Заря'		<p>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine.</p> <p>Reportedly part of the so-called '2nd Army Corps' of the 'Lugansk People's Republic'.</p>	16.2.2015
33.	Prizrak brigade Бригада 'Призрак'		<p>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine.</p> <p>Part of the so-called '2nd Army Corps' of the 'Lugansk People's Republic'.</p>	16.2.2015

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
PRESS
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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
34.	Oplot battalion Батальон 'Оплот'	Social media: http://vk.com/oplot_info	Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Reportedly part of the so-called '1 st Army Corps' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.	16.2.2015
35.	Kalmius battalion Батальон 'Кальмиус'		Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Part of the so-called '1st Army Corps' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.	16.2.2015
36.	Death battalion Батальон 'Смерть'		Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Part of the so-called '2nd Army Corps' of the 'Lugansk People's Republic'.	16.2.2015

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	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
37.	Public Movement 'NOVOROSSIYA' Движение Новороссия		<p>The Public Movement 'Novorossiya'/'New Russia' was established in November 2014 in Russia and is headed by Russian officer Igor Strelkov/Girkin (identified as a staff member of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU)).</p> <p>According to its stated objectives, it aims at providing all-round, effective assistance to 'Novorossiya', including by helping militia fighting in Eastern Ukraine, thereby supporting policies undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</p> <p>Associated with a person listed for undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine.</p>	16.2.2015

OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Government meeting

25 June 2015 13:00 | Government House, Moscow

Extending the import ban on a number of goods, signing the Agreement on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Excerpts from Dmitry Medvedev's opening remarks:

Yesterday, the President signed the Executive Order "On Extending Certain Special Economic Measures in the Interest of Ensuring the Security of the Russian Federation". I have issued a Government resolution approving the list of goods subject to the one-year extension of the import ban until 5 August 2016. In fact, the list remains the same, except for certain items related to biomaterials. It still includes animal products, including beef, pork, meat by-products, fish and shellfish, milk and dairy products, vegetables, sausages and so on.

For obvious reasons, we took these decisions a year ago and are extending them in response to recent decisions of the European Union and a number of other states. We didn't start this sanctions standoff, and mutual efforts are needed to put an end to it. Unfortunately, we have not seen any positive changes from these states so far.

But our actions here are based primarily on economic rather than political considerations.

Our farmers asked us to keep the embargo on these types of products in place as long as possible. When we were forced to respond by imposing restrictive measures almost a year ago, the step was quite difficult and painful for us, as we were quite aware of the subsequent surge in food prices. At the same time, it gave momentum to the entire agriculture industry.

Today, agriculture is developing quite rapidly with the help of targeted government support and the import restrictions, among other things. Livestock breeding is steadily growing. With the introduction of import restrictions, Russian producers gained unique opportunities to sell their goods, and their presence in retail chains grew. But we need to rapidly develop other problem areas. The main task remains the same: to support our farmers in the current economic situation and do everything to make sure Russian agriculture can provide food independence for all citizens.

This decision also takes into account the seasonal cycles of agricultural production. I hope that agricultural enterprises will take advantage of these opportunities.

However, this list is not permanent and can be changed for a number of reasons, including progress in relations with our European partners and partners from a number of other countries.

Today, we will also consider the issue of Russia's signing the Agreement on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This bank was established at the initiative of our Chinese partners to finance infrastructure projects in the Asia-Pacific Region. Russia's participation in the infrastructure bank, in one of the leading roles, is completely in our interests. This new financial institution will increase our companies' access to credit. In addition, the Russian Far East may become one of the bank's areas of responsibility. In practice, this means the possibility of securing

low-cost financing and making use of the bank's financial guarantees and technical support. I hope this will contribute to the development of our Far East.

Person:

Dmitry Medvedev.

OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Dmitry Medvedev's interview with Bloomberg TV

20 May 2014 09:00 Gorky, Moscow Region

Dmitry Medvedev spoke with Bloomberg's Ryan Chilcote on natural gas supplies to China, the political situation in Ukraine and US sanctions against Russia.

Transcript:

Ryan Chilcote: Prime Minister, thank you very much for joining us. President Putin has gone to China. One of the contracts that may be signed there concerns gas, and supplying gas to China. How likely is it that a deal can be done?

Dmitry Medvedev: Good afternoon. I'm glad for the opportunity to be interviewed by Bloomberg once again. It seems just a short time ago that we met in Switzerland. This time, it's hot in Moscow. It's nice when the warm weather arrives.

As for gas relations between Russia and China, we have been holding talks on supplies from Russian gas fields to China for quite some time now. There are two possible routes: one is called the Eastern route, and the other the Western route. These were not the easiest talks, since one side always wants to sell for a higher price, while the other wants to buy for a lower price. However, I believe it is very likely that there will be a contract, which means long-term agreements. The sides have agreed that it should be robust strategic cooperation designed to last for many years. The wording will be finalised very soon. I believe it's time we reached an agreement with the Chinese on this issue.

Ryan Chilcote: The price that China will pay for the gas that Russia supplies it is less than what the average country in the European Union pays. Why does it make sense for Russia to charge China less than European countries? Is it because Russia wants to diversify its export markets?

Dmitry Medvedev: First, and this is very important – we haven't signed the document yet.

Second, the price is never fixed when it comes to gas cooperation. The price is calculated according to a specific formula, and it depends on the volume of gas sold and the distance it is transported, that is, the pipeline system, that length of pipeline that makes up this transit line. Of course, it depends on the quality of gas, and on other factors, including the replacement of gas with other types of fuel. The calculations are usually based on so-called gasoil, coal or something else. So it is very complicated. This is the second thing.

And finally, third. I am absolutely certain that these prices will be comparable. But clearly, delivering to Europe is one thing and delivering to a new market is another. To attract a new market and to agree on all terms of collaboration, a variety of means is used to stimulate deliveries, including advance payments, bonuses and so on. All these factors are taken into account when establishing rates. I believe that in the long run the price will be fair and totally comparable to the price of European supplies.

Ryan Chilcote: But it's very important for Russia to have China as an export market.

Dmitry Medvedev: Of course, without a doubt. We value our European partners very much. We have worked with them for decades. It is a very important and very valuable market. I want everybody to understand that. On the other hand, we cannot supply our gas to the European market alone, because we have enough for the Asian market, which is the most rapidly developing market, including China, a major economy.

Ryan Chilcote: Especially if Western Europe, the European Union, is constantly saying that they want to diversify away from Russian gas, right?

Dmitry Medvedev: No.

Ryan Chilcote: This is a way of handling your problem with western European threats to diversify from Russian gas.

Dmitry Medvedev: It's not because we attach much importance to statements of this kind. First, each country or group of countries, including the European Union, has the right to diversify their supply sources. This is true. But we don't attach much importance to this simply because, so far, there is no viable alternative in sight to Russian supplies. We just happen to think that we, as a major energy-supplying power, must have an opportunity to deliver gas not only to Europe but also to Asia. We are benefitting from this. Today, I wouldn't look for politics behind this, but I have no doubt that supplying energy to the Asia Pacific Region holds out a great promise in future. More than that, we have enough capacities and enough gas to send supplies via both the eastern and the western routes. But even if we look at the worst prospect – purely theoretically – any undelivered European gas supplies can be sent to China by the eastern route. But that, let me stress this point again, is so far an absolutely theoretical possibility.

Ryan Chilcote: If western Europe was to move away from Russian supplies...

Dmitry Medvedev: You know, all this talk is absolutely abstract or politicised in nature. Some of our partners, including in the United States of America, say: "We'll heap you guys in Europe with LNG." OK. Let them give us the calculations. As far as I understand, even if this is done on a very balanced basis, the price of LNG to be supplied from the United States of America will be 40% more expensive than the Russian pipeline gas.

Ryan Chilcote: What do you think about the idea of selling Rosneft stock to a Chinese company?

Dmitry Medvedev: To begin with, Rosneft is one of our biggest free-float companies, so some of its stock already belongs to foreign shareholders.

Ryan Chilcote: BP has a 20% stake, it's the world's largest crude oil producer that is publicly traded.

Dmitry Medvedev: Absolutely. So BP has some stock to begin with. Second, every deal should bring benefits primarily to the company itself. We are trying to make steady our energy market. In the final count, Rosneft should decide for itself what development sources to use. If Chinese investors make an interesting proposal, we don't rule anything out. In any event, the Government is planning to privatise a considerable amount of Rosneft stock.

Ryan Chilcote: In this year? You want to sell a stake in 2014?

Dmitry Medvedev: For the time being, we spoke about next year and even 2016 but we may return to the issue this year.

Ryan Chilcote: What would be the point in selling a stake in Rosneft this year? Because when it comes to privatisation, so far everything has been pushed back, and now you are talking about moving privatization of Russia's largest oil producer forward. It's a bit surprising. Markets aren't very nice...

Dmitry Medvedev: Yes, you're right, so before making a decision on privatisation, we must weigh all factors before taking any decision regarding privatisation, primarily the stock price, which is to say how much privatisation will fetch. Our goal is to maximise revenue. That said, you can't keep putting off privatisation because you think prices will be higher in 2015 than in 2014, or in 2016 rather than in 2015. Research needs to be done, and this kind of analysis and research is being carried out.

Ryan Chilcote: What do you think about opening up the Russian economy – and Russia in general – more to China?

Dmitry Medvedev: China is already a major trade partner of Russia, second only to the European Union.

Ryan Chilcote: But you have very big plans to increase China's role in the Russian economy.

Dmitry Medvedev: That said, just recently – a week ago in fact – I held a special meeting with ministers and corporate leaders on promoting cooperation with the Asia-Pacific Region, which to a large extent means cooperation with the People's Republic of China. We view this cooperation as critically important for Russia, and we believe it has great prospects in terms of expanding trade and attracting investment. These are issues that will be on the agenda of the Russian President's talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Ryan Chilcote: For many years, Russia was very concerned about opening up its economy more to China. In the Far East, there aren't that many Russian there; China is nearby.

Dmitry Medvedev: We always try to analyse what would happen if we enter a certain market, just like all countries do. There are commissions that issue permits for foreign investment in the United States, Europe and Russia. By the way, as prime minister, I chair the government commission on foreign investment. This doesn't mean that we don't deny permission, but we should understand where we can invite investors, including our Chinese partners. Again, we view China as our strategic partner and a very promising market.

Ryan Chilcote: Are there some parts of the Russian economy – “Red Zones”, if you will – where Russia would prefer China is not?

Dmitry Medvedev: I wouldn't phrase it like this. The issue doesn't concern Chinese investment alone. I'd put it as follows: Will there be some red lines beyond which we won't allow foreign investors, like the majority of countries do? Yes, these are sensitive technologies, primarily weaponry. I think we have the right to keep some sectors under government control, but the number of such sectors keeps decreasing, and the commission I have mentioned takes decisions to expand the opportunities for foreign investment at almost every meeting.

Ryan Chilcote: Do you think that China could actually replace, let's say, the European Union as a trading partner?

Dmitry Medvedev: But why? We are doing just fine as it is. We want to have a good relationship with Europe. Our sales turnover is over 400 billion. We also want strong collaboration with China, India, Japan and other countries. The idea of any politically motivated scenario is simply conjecture. The fact is, we want to trade in both the west and the east. Do you remember what the Russian coat of arms looks like? The eagle is looking in both directions.

Ryan Chilcote: You've threatened to cut off Ukraine's gas supply if they don't pay by the beginning of June. What exactly would you like to see Ukraine do?

Dmitry Medvedev: When you lend money to someone what do you expect to get from them? Kisses, promises, something else? I think any creditor is entitled to get their debt repaid. Therefore, we expect to receive the repayment of the debt that has accumulated over this time from Ukraine and the respective company.

Ryan Chilcote: And that is?

Dmitry Medvedev: It is more than \$3.5 billion.

Ryan Chilcote: So you want them to pay the 3.5 billion?

Dmitry Medvedev: I spoke about this recently – we are realists. We are aware of the current state of the Ukrainian economy. We aren't saying they have to pay 3.5 billion in a day, but give us a time-table for paying off these debts, especially since Ukraine has just received an IMF tranche, and both the Americans and Europeans have promised it loans. Let all countries that sympathise with Ukraine help it to pay off these debts. Allow me to recall how the situation has unfolded. As of 1 January of this year we have received practically nothing from them, even despite the preferential price. They pay us nothing, even with discounts. Now we've stopped giving them discounts and have said the following: "We're ready to discuss different terms, but you have to pay your debts", which now constitute a huge amount.

Ryan Chilcote: Ukraine was paying \$268 per 1,000 cubic metres, correct?

Dmitry Medvedev: Only for three months.

Ryan Chilcote: The Ukrainians were paying \$268 per 1,000 cubic metres. Now you're asking them to pay \$485. That's a bit tough, isn't it?

Dmitry Medvedev: No, it's not tough simply.

Ryan Chilcote: That's more than any other country pays, with the exception of Macedonia, I think.

Dmitry Medvedev: We've already discussed the pricing formula. This is the price that was fixed in the contract signed in 2009, and it determines the cost of all supplies. This price is comparable with other formulas that are used for supplies to the European market – sometimes it's more, sometimes less, but all of them are in line with the trend. As for \$268.50, it is absolutely a discounted price, and so when we hear, "We are prepared to pay a discounted price," our reaction is, why should we agree? Why do other countries, all the EU countries, pay a different price?

Ryan Chilcote: The European Union doesn't pay \$485 on average. The European Union pays \$385. So you'd be charging the Ukrainians more than all of Western Europe.

Dmitry Medvedev: No, you have to consider how much each country pays. Some countries pay nearly as much. It is indeed a high price, I agree, but some countries pay this price, while other countries pay less. But again, it is an absolutely fair price that was agreed at the talks in 2009. We didn't force anyone to accept it; they signed the schedule and the contract voluntarily. I'd like to remind you that it was Yulia Tymoshenko, who is currently running for president, who signed it.

Ryan Chilcote: The question is: Is the price for Ukraine negotiable? Will you demand \$485 – more than most of the countries in Western Europe pay – of Ukraine?

Dmitry Medvedev: This is our position: There is a contract in place, but we understand that Ukraine is in a difficult situation. What should the de facto Ukrainian authorities do? They should present a debt repayment schedule and pay a reasonable part of the sum, which means repay part of the debt...

Ryan Chilcote: How much?

Dmitry Medvedev: That we can discuss, but it can't be 3%. It should be a substantial sum that would clearly indicate their intention to pay their debts. After that, we could sit down to discuss gas cooperation going forward.

Frankly, we, including the Russian Government, have no intention to help the Ukrainian officials because we do not consider the current authorities to be legitimate and because they have not proved themselves as honest and sincere partners. But our hearts are bleeding over what is happening in Ukraine and what is occurring with the people residing in the country. So, we are prepared to discuss any collaboration as a humanitarian act. What we expect in return is an intention for serious collaboration and an intention to pay.

Ryan Chilcote: Can Western Europe count on getting all of the Russian gas that they're expecting to get this year?

Dmitry Medvedev: If the Ukrainian market is stable and if Ukrainians fulfill all of their obligations, Europe will receive what it is entitled to in full. But we can't ignore the fact that Ukraine stands between Europe, the European Union, and Russia. Our task now is to settle the situation around Ukraine. This task includes agreeing on gas supplies to Ukraine. If we succeed, everything will be fine. I would like to note, though, that Nord Stream is a guarantee that – for Europe – everything will remain as before. If we are able to commission South Stream in the next few years, then strictly speaking we won't need to ship gas through Ukraine, although we realise that Ukraine might well need it. But if we get this done, the Europeans will have guaranteed access to gas at all times regardless of who's in power in Kiev. There have been many different people in charge in Kiev lately, and I'm not at all sure that we can predict, with any degree of certainty, who will be running Ukraine even six months from now.

Ryan Chilcote: President Putin has ordered Russian troops back to their bases now that these so-called "springtime exercises" near the Ukrainian border are over. Considering that the last time that he made that announcement, the US and Germany couldn't confirm that there was any pullback, why should anyone take this as anything more than a bluff from Russia?

Dmitry Medvedev: I don't think we should worry about the reaction of Western countries to such statements.

What do Western countries have to do with our relocating troops within the territory of the Russian Federation, if we do so within the established rules?

Ryan Chilcote: Because Russia says it is interested in deescalating the situation in Ukraine. That's why.

Dmitry Medvedev: If you put the question that way, then this is an issue that should be analysed by those responsible for addressing it. It is President Putin who takes the decision to end exercises as Commander-in-Chief. Such a decision falls within the authority of the Russian state and its President.

Those monitoring troop movements can go ahead and request the relevant information. When I was in charge of these issues as Commander-in-Chief we naturally shared such information, and I'm confident that the current Commander-in-Chief will do the same. However, make no mistake, when and where to hold military exercises is, in the end, Russia's internal affair.

Ryan Chilcote: Will Russia annex any more parts of Ukraine?

Dmitry Medvedev: First, we did not annex any part of Ukraine. This is the Russian position. If you're referring to Crimea, the situation is radically different. The population of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea held a referendum and voted for self-determination and for joining Russia in accordance with the existing procedure. And that's what they did. They started by proclaiming independence and after that, they asked to join Russia. We satisfied their request. The Russian Constitution was amended so that Crimea could join Russia as the result of a popular vote. Crimea is a special and unique story.

Any conjectures about Russia wanting to annex some territories are mere propaganda. I don't even wish to comment on that. It is essential to calm tensions in Ukraine. We all see what's happening there: the situation is nothing short of a civil war, as a matter of fact. This is what we should all be thinking about.

Ryan Chilcote: Can you guarantee that any other parts of Ukraine – in the east or in the south, where some separatists have asked for their territories to become part of Russia – that none of these territories, no more territories, will actually be joined to Russia?

Dmitry Medvedev: Let me repeat once again that first and foremost, we (I'm referring to all those who sympathise with Ukraine – European countries and as far as I understand, the United States and, of course, Russia, which is the closest to Ukraine) should do all we can to de-escalate tensions – a measure that everyone is talking about now. In other words, we should do everything to stop the spread of civil war on Ukrainian territory.

As for the positions of people in Lugansk, Donetsk and other parts of Ukraine, our stance is simple – their positions deserve respect. If they hold some referendums, we should understand what they want and why they express such views. So in the future, the main point is to make sure that Ukraine's central, de facto authorities and those who live in these parts of Ukraine establish a fully-fledged dialogue based on mutual respect and understanding, a dialogue that takes into account the position of eastern Ukraine. This would ease tensions; otherwise the conflict will continue, and we will most likely hear the same appeals that were discussed at the referendums.

Ryan Chilcote: I'm asking a really simple question. Can you guarantee that the Lugansk Region, the Donetsk Region, won't become part of Russia, and will remain part of the territorial integrity of Ukraine?

Dmitry Medvedev: First, we don't have to guarantee anything to anyone, because we never took on any commitments concerning this. But we believe that...

Ryan Chilcote: Would you like to take this opportunity to say, "No, Lugansk and Donetsk will never be part of Russia"?

Dmitry Medvedev: We believe the priority is to ease tensions in Ukraine. Not to guarantee something to someone, but to ease tensions. Let our partners in the dialogue, namely the EU and the United States, guarantee us something, for example, that they won't interfere in Ukraine's internal affairs. Let our Western partners guarantee us that they won't lure Ukraine into NATO, that the Russian language won't be prohibited in eastern Ukraine, and that some senseless movement such as the Right Sector won't start killing people there. Let our partners guarantee this.

However, this is not the way to talk, in terms of who should guarantee what. The conversation should be different, and this is what Geneva was all about. It must be willing to reassure people so that the de facto authorities in Ukraine actually must guarantee – not Russia – but the Ukrainian authorities must guarantee to their people that the crisis in the east will be resolved and that they will not use heavy weapons, including tanks, planes, and helicopters, against their own people. This is what they must guarantee. They should sit down and talk about the future – how the authorities in Kiev see it, and how it is seen by people in the east.

Obviously, there is considerable discord on this point. What does Kiev say? Kiev says, "We are a unitary state, and we must remain one for all time." What do people in the east say? "We cannot exercise our rights in a unitary state. We want to speak Russian. We want to be more independent, including economic independence. We want guarantees that we won't be wiped out by crazy nationalists, that they won't come force us to take up weapons again."

There needs to be a dialogue that results in a new constitution, but we are not imposing anything, because this is an internal process that must play out in Ukraine. However, we can see that the existing legal framework is not sufficient to solve this problem. As I understand, even some people in Kiev have started saying this. I hope it's a good sign.

Ryan Chilcote: Will you recognise the presidential election in Ukraine?

Dmitry Medvedev: This is a complicated subject. On the one hand, from a legal standpoint, judicial terms, these elections are the result of an anti-constitutional change of power. You know Russia's position – nobody has deprived Yanukovich of power. He hasn't been impeached and he hasn't resigned on his own free will. He's alive, so he is the president and this is why we don't recognise the legitimacy of some of the current authorities, at any rate the government and the acting president. However, we do realise that Ukraine has a legitimate parliament. On the one hand, elections are a direct consequence of these events, but, on the other hand, they may lead to a way out of the predicament. If an elected leader enjoyed the support of all of the regions in Ukraine, this would be good. But there is one more problem in addition to the low legitimacy of the elections. The problem is that some regions simply don't want to participate in them. This may create a very complex situation where some regions take part in the elections and others won't take part or will have a very low voter turnout. In this case, the value, the legitimacy of the elections, will indeed be called into doubt.

Ryan Chilcote: But it's a very small part of Ukraine that wouldn't take part in the election, right? There is 45-46 million people in Ukraine. You're talking about two or three million.

Dmitry Medvedev: I don't know how many people will attend these elections and how active they will be but I assume that the turnout in Kiev will be higher than somewhere in Lugansk, Mariupol, Kharkov and Donetsk. Some people will simply ignore the elections, because they believe they are not legitimate.

Ryan Chilcote: You recognised when the separatists held their elections in Donetsk and Lugansk, despite the fact that there was fighting, Russia said it respected the result of those referendums. Does that mean that you can respect the result of the national elections?

Dmitry Medvedev: There's no contradiction at all. You are experienced in dealing with these issues and are good at analysing what is being said. Recognising results is one thing, respecting the expression of will is quite another. During the May elections, people in Ukraine will vote for different candidates. Of course, this position warrants respect. Is that an act of recognition? No, it's not. However, such a decision constitutes an act of recognition, when the authorities of a foreign state say they believe these results clearly demonstrate the expression of will of the overwhelming majority of the citizens of a particular state. The Russian Federation has monitored elections many times in many places. Unfortunately, given the current situation in Ukraine, we can't be sure that these elections will be held in a proper manner.

Ryan Chilcote: Can you imagine a situation in which the presence of Russian peacekeepers would be necessary, although, as far as I understand, Ukraine would not view them as peacekeepers. Could such a need arise in the future?

Dmitry Medvedev: You know, what I can say is that this is not a question of where peacekeepers come from. The question is about effectively separating conflicting parties in order to put an end to a situation where the army is being used against its own people.

What is the Kiev government, the so-called de facto authorities, speaking about? They are pretending to be fighting against terrorists. However, they are actually fighting against their own people in eastern Ukraine. The question is not what forces are being used and what mandate the peacekeepers have, but whether such forces actually make a difference.

Ryan Chilcote: What effect have the sanctions that have been introduced against Russia thus far had on the economy?

Dmitry Medvedev: You know, to put it simply, no one is happy about sanctions, since they are always a sign of tense relations. We don't support the sanctions. Moreover, you've probably noticed that we have not commented on them a great deal or responded to them harshly, although we probably could cause some unpleasantness for the countries that are imposing these sanctions. But it's bad for international economic relations, for our relations with Europe and the United States.

As for their direct impact, contrary to what the media and some Western analysts say, the sanctions have not had a significant effect on us. That doesn't mean that we are happy about them. Again, sanctions are a dead-end, and, in fact, everyone understands this – everyone, including businesses in Europe and America.

Let's be honest, these sanctions are a sharp knife for European business, and American business doesn't need them either. The only ones who want sanctions are politicians, who use them to reinforce their convictions and to demonstrate their power. For example, our American colleagues and President Obama need to show the Congress that America doesn't fear the Russians, that if anything happens they can hurt us. They need to show that the US President can take tough decisions, or rather that he is doing everything the Senate accuses him of not doing. This is what the Americans are doing.

The situation is somewhat different for Europe.

Ryan Chilcote: Speaking about President Obama, because you are the author, the architect, with President Obama, of the reset in relations. Are you disappointed by how President Obama has handled this crisis?

Dmitry Medvedev: Yes, I believe that President Obama could be more tactful politically when discussing these issues. Some decisions taken by the US Administration are disappointing. We have indeed done a lot for Russian-US relations. I believe doing so was right. The agreements that we reached with America were useful. And I'm very sorry that everything that has been achieved is now being eliminated by these decisions. Basically, we are slowly but surely approaching a new cold war that nobody needs. Why am I saying this? Because a competent politician knows how to make reserved, careful, subtle, wise and intelligent decisions, which, I believe, Mr Obama succeeded at for a while. But what is being done now, unfortunately, proves that the US Administration has run out of these resources. And the United States is one of the parties to suffer from this.

Ryan Chilcote: Do you recognise that economic sanctions, if they are introduced against Russia – we don't have them yet – could lead to a very prolonged period of recession in Russia?

Dmitry Medvedev: Russia is obviously a part of the global economy. It was our goal to become one. The Russian economy has its own problems, mainly in terms of its structure. This has nothing to do with the United States or the position of the US Administration. These are our own problems and we have to deal with them. For instance, there's the large role that commodities play in our economy. This is a fact. So we have enough problems in our economy. To be sure, sanctions don't help, but if something is happening, it is first and foremost because our economy is not yet ready for a whole series of tests, and the task of the Government and the Russian authorities in general is to make this economy more effective and substantial.

Ryan Chilcote: Is Russia prepared for economic sanctions?

Dmitry Medvedev: Considering all the talk of sanctions, we're reviewing different scenarios. None of them is disastrous for our economy, although some restrictions could be rather painful. There is no doubt that a country like Russia will be able to cope with any sanctions, or so-called sanctions. The question is what the United States

or the world, for that matter, stands to gain. We have just recovered from the economic crisis that hit us all in 2008, the source of which traces back to the United States.

Ryan Chilcote: So what would the response be? If there are economic sanctions against Russia, how would you respond?

Dmitry Medvedev: I don't want to speculate at this point about what our response might be. I can tell you only one thing: we certainly have a plan for what actions to take depending on how the situation develops, but in the event of a bad scenario, even though I said that we are opposed to any sanctions, our set of responses includes not only measures to improve our economy in general, but also measures that can be directed toward the countries in question.

Ryan Chilcote: So there could be retaliatory measures?

Dmitry Medvedev: This could be a variety of measures. I do not want to discuss them, simply because we do not believe this to be the right path. It's a dead end.

Ryan Chilcote: Just in terms of supporting Russia's own economy, if there are economic sanctions, would you do things like consider capital controls?

Dmitry Medvedev: You keep trying to elicit from me decisions that are as of yet unfounded. I'll say it again: we are looking at different scenarios and we will act according to the circumstances. But I wouldn't want to do this, even though, I reiterate, the Russian economy will hold up no matter what, and we will not let any country or group of countries deflect our forward progress. All I can say is that we will honour all our social commitments to the Russian people, no matter what sanctions are taken against us. There's no doubt about it: Russia is a rich country, and we are able to control the situation.

Ryan Chilcote: Here's the last question. I won't keep you on this issue for long. MasterCard, Visa and threats from SWIFT... Do you believe they are a problem for you at all? This might be a long discussion, but MasterCard and Visa, as you are aware, have already suspended the provision of some of their services for a short time. How concerned are you about SWIFT, Visa, MasterCard...these financial instruments being used as part of sanctions against Russia?

Dmitry Medvedev: This is a question I would like to talk about for a little longer, if you don't mind. In fact, a great number of our people are used to using foreign payment systems, mainly Visa and MasterCard, but also American Express. Other electronic payment systems are also widely used.

Now let me speculate over what happened. I will not be focusing on the sanctions and political decisions, which are considered an act of Parliament or an act of God in Anglo-Saxon law. Let's look at this issue from another perspective. I am an ordinary holder of an international bank card – to be more precise, a Russian card issued by a foreign payment system. By the way, there are around 200 million cards of this type in this country – more than the population count. I would like to stress that I do not have a relationship with a foreign state. I have a relationship with the bank that issued my card. And it never occurred to me that my payments depend on the political stance of a foreign state. Therefore, I would like to note that in the context of our law – and, I'm sure, also US and EU law – what Visa and MasterCard did was a direct violation of their contract with Russian clients – not a bank, but concrete individuals who trusted these payment systems. If I were a lawyer, which I'm unfortunately not at the moment, I would have gladly spent my time and effort to take these payment systems to court. I think that this is a gross violation of effective contracts and agreements. As far as I can see, our partners at Visa and MasterCard are aware of the weakness of their position, but they had to take this decision upon the recommendation of the Treasury Department and the State Department.

I'd like to remind you that the world is monitoring this conflict because if I were a Chinese or Brazilian, I'd think: Why should I carry cards that largely depend on the stance of the US administration? Better choose the Chinese way. As you know, our Chinese partners are developing a national payment system, which, considering the global nature of the Chinese economy, is already influencing global payment systems.

In other words, this is a very bad precedent, but not for Russia, although Russians were not pleased when they had to transfer their accounts to other banks. It is bad for these companies, for MasterCard, Eurocard, and Visa.

So, we don't want to break off any ties. We want MasterCard and Visa to stay and work in Russia. That said, they must honour their obligations, not in relation to Russia, but towards individual clients who use their cards.

Ryan Chilcote: Russia has already taken measures that some analysts say will cost MasterCard and Visa more money than it's worth to be in Russia. Aren't you concerned that Visa and MasterCard – which, as you said yourself, were just following orders, in a sense, from the Treasury in the United States – could leave the Russian market?

Dmitry Medvedev: I would like to reiterate that we do not want Visa or MasterCard to leave Russia. Overall, our cooperation with them has been quite productive. However, I believe that before taking such decisions, these companies should have thought about the fact that such actions – responding in such an awkward manner to official requests – undermine trust in them. They should have explained to their government that it should not act in this manner, since such acts by the government of the United States of America disrupts the business of Visa and MasterCard, as well as its own business.

Regarding the price they have to pay. It is true that amendments to the law on the payment system have been enacted in Russia stipulating certain deposits, which are specific amounts of money that must be placed in Russia. The Central Bank, our commercial banks, Visa and Mastercard are currently discussing this. I don't want to dramatise the situation, but you will agree that after what our respected partners did in relation to some Russian banks there must be some response.

Ryan Chilcote: What do you think about the US telling many CEOs who were planning to go to the St Petersburg forum that they shouldn't go, and that many of them won't go? And not just US CEOs, but European CEOs as well won't be going to the forum. What do you think about that?

Dmitry Medvedev: I think this is bad. It reminds me of the decisions made in this country during the Leonid Brezhnev period. Business interests suffer because of ideology. You should ask these CEOs themselves – I have actually met some of them – from the US and Europe if they are happy about these decisions. Why do they have to sacrifice their business interests for the sake of some strange sense of solidarity?

Ryan Chilcote: That puts them in a difficult position because they want to make money, on the one hand, but they don't want to go against their government's wishes, on the other hand.

Dmitry Medvedev: Exactly. So, this is bringing ideology to market relations and the economy, which is exactly what the Soviet Union did in the past, when it adopted bans on trade with particular countries because their ideology didn't suit the government. This is exactly what the US administration is doing now. This is a path to a dead end. It is destroying international economic ties and will affect the interests of US and European business. We are not dramatising the situation. Some businesspeople will attend the forum anyway; deputy CEOs, if not their bosses, will come. We will continue our dialogue, and there will be no hysterics on our part.

But this is very bad, and this is a very short-sighted stance that strongly reminds me of the Soviet government's stance. It's as if we had exchanged places, which is very bad.

There is one more thing I'd like to say, since you keep talking about sanctions. I'd like to remind you that no sanctions were introduced against MPs even in the most difficult periods of US-Soviet relations, like during the Cuban missile crisis or when the decision to deploy troops in Afghanistan was taken. We maintained contacts at the top political level. By enacting such sanctions, our US and European partners are destroying the very fabric of international relations. Are they trying to scare us? This will lead nowhere. Once a new administration comes to power in the United States and a new president takes office after Obama, these sanctions will be forgotten. In the end, nobody stands to win.

Ryan Chilcote: I have to ask you about the Internet, and I have to start with a slightly provocative question. Do you agree with President Putin that the Internet is a CIA project?

Dmitry Medvedev: My answer is yes and no. It is true that the Internet was born within defence-related structures. As far as I know, it was DARPA, not the CIA. What this means is that, at the outset, this network served a defence purpose. But afterwards, it grew into what is called the World Wide Web, serving as a universal phenomenon, bringing together huge numbers of people. I have never made an ideal out of the Internet, but I do believe that there is no other thing in the world with such a great unifying potential, since it creates communication opportunities, and it should be properly appreciated.

Ryan Chilcote: You say that it has to be valued, but can you guarantee that Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, will be working in Russia in a year's time? Because, as you are well aware, a Russian official not too long ago said that they may have to be closed.

Dmitry Medvedev: This was just a poor choice of words by an executive from an oversight department. Perhaps, he should have considered his words more carefully before speaking. The issue is fairly simple: everyone who works in the Russian segment of the Internet must comply with Russian regulations. That's not debatable. It doesn't mean they have to be part of the Russian Internet, but they do have to comply with Russian regulations. This applies to Twitter and Facebook as well. By the way, my colleagues told me today that they always maintain productive cooperation with the Russian authorities if we point to a violation of Russian law.

Again, it's part of the worldwide history of communications. Millions of Russians use social media. I use it as well, I believe that it's a good and useful thing; therefore, on the one hand, there must be compliance with Russian laws, but on the other hand, there should be freedom of access to information that is not at odds with the law. Consider that we have our own social media as well, which are also quite popular, such as VKontakte, which has tens of millions of users in Russia, Ukraine and other countries.

Ryan Chilcote: You mentioned VKontakte. Pavel Durov – the Zuckerberg, many say, of Russia, the founder of VKontakte – said that Russia is no longer a place that is conducive to doing business in the Internet; that this is not a free place for innovation in the Internet, and he has left Russia. What do you think about that?

Dmitry Medvedev: It's difficult for me to discuss Mr Durov's motives. I've met him only once, in this very room, where we discussed development prospects. He is very talented, but like every talented person he has many illusions. As far as I know, he had an argument with the company's shareholders and his business partners and, as a result, sold his shares. As it often happens, he cited political circumstances to explain his actions and started another project. It was his decision, but VKontakte will continue to exist. It is a completely open platform. Your Russian is excellent, so you can see for yourself what it's like. There is no censorship; everything is just the same as on Facebook because these two media are similar. The only thing is I think it is important for people using any social media to be a little more polite so that social media is a more civilised environment. This is true for both VKontakte and Facebook as well as for some others.

Ryan Chilcote: It's interesting you bring up that point, because CalPERS, the California pension system, which manages just over a quarter trillion dollars, decided that they would no longer invest in VKontakte because of

concerns that VKontakte continued to show attacks on gays. You know the story, right?

Dmitry Medvedev: To be honest, I was not familiar with this story. You brought it to my attention.

Ryan Chilcote: Do you recognise that a lot of the political and social decisions that are made in Russia are having big impacts on business and investment – not just Ukraine, but the law on so-called untraditional values in Russia – and is that okay?

Dmitry Medvedev: Any political decision in some way or another influences the investment climate and business. It's senseless to argue that Russia's decisions regarding Ukraine or Crimea did not have any impact on the business environment. The same is true for laws that are being enacted. I don't think that such decisions are destroying the business environment, but we have to analyse their consequences. By the same token, our friends and partners in other countries should be mindful of decisions they take regarding their businesses when they introduce various sanctions against Russia. Thus, it's a question of rationality. I agree that there are certain things we can also be reproached for, but I'd like our partners to keep this in mind as well.

Ryan Chilcote: Prime Minister Medvedev, thank you very much for your time.

Dmitry Medvedev: Thank you so much. Good luck.

Person:

Dmitry Medvedev.

21997A1128(01)**Agreement on partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part - Protocol 1 on the establishment of a coal and steel contact group - Protocol 2 on mutual administrative assistance for the correct application of customs legislation - Final Act - Exchanges of letters - Minutes of signing***Official Journal L 327 , 28/11/1997 P. 0003 - 0069*

AGREEMENT ON PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part

The KINGDOM OF BELGIUM,

the KINGDOM OF DENMARK,

the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,

the HELLENIC REPUBLIC,

the KINGDOM OF SPAIN,

the FRENCH REPUBLIC,

IRELAND,

the ITALIAN REPUBLIC,

the GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG,

the KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS,

the PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC,

the UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

Contracting Parties to the Treaty establishing the European Community, the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

hereinafter referred to as 'Member States` , and

the EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, the EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY and the EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY,

hereinafter referred to as 'the Community` ,

of the one part, and

the RUSSIAN FEDERATION,

hereinafter referred to as 'Russia` ,

of the other part,

CONSIDERING the importance of the historical links existing between the Community, its Member States and Russia and the common values that they share,

RECOGNIZING that the Community and Russia wish to strengthen these links and to establish partnership and cooperation which would deepen and widen the relations established between them in the past in particular by the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Trade and

Commercial and Economic Cooperation, signed on 18 December 1989, hereinafter referred to as the '1989 Agreement` ,

CONSIDERING the commitment of the Community and its Member States acting in the framework of the European Union by the Treaty on European Union of 7 February 1992 and of Russia to strengthening the political and economic freedoms which constitute the very basis of the partnership,

CONSIDERING the commitment of the Parties to promote international peace and security as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes and to cooperate to this end in the framework of the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other fora,

CONSIDERING the firm commitment of the Community and its Member States and of Russia to the full implementation of all principles and provisions contained in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the concluding documents of the Madrid and Vienna follow-up meetings, the document of the CSCE Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the CSCE Helsinki document 1992, 'the challenges of change` ,

CONFIRMING the attachment of the Community and its Member States and of Russia to the aims and principles set out in the European Energy Charter of 17 December 1991 and in the declaration of the Lucerne Conference of April 1993,

CONVINCED of the paramount importance of the rule of law and respect for human rights, particularly those of minorities, the establishment of a multi-party system with free and democratic elections and economic liberalization aimed at setting up a market economy,

BELIEVING that the full implementation of partnership presupposes the continuation and accomplishment of Russia's political and economic reforms,

DESIROUS of encouraging the process of regional cooperation in the areas covered by this Agreement between the countries of the former USSR in order to promote the prosperity and stability of the region,

DESIROUS of establishing and developing regular political dialogue on bilateral and international issues of mutual interest,

TAKING ACCOUNT of the Community's willingness to provide technical assistance, as appropriate, for the implementation of economic reform in Russia and for the development of economic cooperation,

BEARING IN MIND the utility of the Agreement in favouring a gradual rapprochement between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe and neighbouring regions and Russia's progressive integration into the open international trading system,

CONSIDERING the commitment of the Parties to liberalize trade, based on the principles contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade hereinafter referred to as 'GATT` , as amended by the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, and taking into account the establishment of the World Trade Organization, hereinafter referred to as 'WTO` ,

RECOGNIZING that Russia is no longer a state trading country, that it is now a country with an economy in transition and that continued progress towards a market economy will be fostered by cooperation between the Parties in the forms set out in this Agreement,

CONSCIOUS of the need to improve conditions affecting business and investment, and conditions in areas such as establishment of companies, labour, provision of services and capital movements,

CONVINCED that this Agreement will create a new climate for economic relations between the Parties and in particular for the development of trade and investment, which are essential to economic restructuring and technological modernization,

DESIROUS of establishing close cooperation in the area of environmental protection taking into account the interdependence existing between the Parties in this field,

BEARING in mind the intention of the Parties to develop their cooperation in the space field in view of the complementary of their activities in this area,

DESIROUS of promoting cultural cooperation and improving the flow of information,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

A Partnership is hereby established between the Community and its Member States, of the one part, and Russia, of the other part. The objectives of this Partnership are:

- to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the Parties allowing the development of close relations between them in this field,
- to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between the Parties based on the principles of market economy and so to foster sustainable development in the Parties,
- to strengthen political and economic freedoms,
- to support Russian efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy and to complete the transition into a market economy,
- to provide a basis for economic, social, financial and cultural cooperation founded on the principles of mutual advantage, mutual responsibility and mutual support,
- to promote activities of joint interest,
- to provide an appropriate framework for the gradual integration between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe,
- to create the necessary conditions for the future establishment of a free trade area between the Community and Russia covering substantially all trade in goods between them, as well as conditions for bringing about freedom of establishment of companies, of cross-border trade in services and of capital movements.

TITLE I GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Article 2

Respect for democratic principles and human rights as defined in particular in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe, underpins the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitutes an essential element of partnership and of this Agreement.

Article 3

The Parties undertake to consider development of the relevant titles of this Agreement, in particular Title III and Article 53, as circumstances allow, with a view to the establishment of a free trade area between them. The Cooperation Council may make recommendations on such development to the Parties. Such development shall only be put into effect by virtue of an agreement between the Parties in accordance with their respective procedures. The Parties shall examine together in the year 1998 whether circumstances allow the beginning of negotiations on the establishment of a free trade area.

Article 4

The Parties undertake to examine together, by mutual consent, amendments which it may be appropriate to make to any part of the Agreement in view of changes in circumstances, and in particular of the situation arising from Russia's accession to the GATT/WTO. The first examination shall take place three years after the entry into force of the Agreement or when Russia accedes to the GATT/WTO, whichever is earlier.

Article 5

1. The most-favoured-nation treatment granted by Russia under this Agreement shall not apply during a transitional period expiring five years after the entry into force of this Agreement in relation to advantages defined in Annex 1 granted by Russia to other countries of the former USSR. This period may be extended where appropriate for specific sectors by mutual consent between the Parties.

2. In the case of the most-favoured-nation treatment granted under Title III the transitional period referred to in paragraph 1 shall expire three years after the entry into force of the Agreement or when Russia accedes to the GATT/WTO, whichever is earlier.

TITLE II POLITICAL DIALOGUE

Article 6

A regular political dialogue shall be established between the Parties which they intend to develop and intensify. It shall accompany and consolidate the rapprochement between the European Union and Russia, support the political and economic changes underway in Russia and contribute to the establishment of new forms of cooperation. The political dialogue:

- shall strengthen the links between Russia and the European Union. The economic convergence achieved through this Agreement will lead to more intense political relations,
- shall bring about an increasing convergence of positions on international issues of mutual concern thus increasing security and stability,
- shall foresee that the Parties endeavour to cooperate on matters pertaining to the observance of the principles of democracy and human rights, and hold consultations, if necessary, on matters related to their due implementation.

Article 7

1. Meetings shall take place in principle twice a year between the President of the Council of the European Union and the President of the Commission of the European Communities on one side and the President of Russia on the other.

2. At ministerial level, political dialogue shall take place within the Cooperation Council established in Article 90 and on other occasions, including with the European Union troika, by mutual agreement.

Article 8

Other procedures and mechanisms for political dialogue shall be set up by the Parties and in particular in the following forms:

- biannual meetings at senior official level between the European Union troika on the one hand, and officials of Russia on the other
- taking full advantage of diplomatic channels,
- any other means, including the possibility of expert meetings, which would contribute to consolidating and developing this dialogue.

Article 9

Political dialogue at parliamentary level shall take place within the framework of the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee established in Article 95.

TITLE III TRADE IN GOODS

Article 10

1. The Parties shall accord to one another the general most-favoured-nation treatment described in Article I, paragraph 1 of the GATT.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to:

- (a) advantages accorded to adjacent countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic;
- (b) advantages granted with the aim of creating a customs union or a free-trade area or pursuant to the creation of such a union or area; the terms 'customs union' and 'free trade area' shall have the same meaning as those described in paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of the GATT or created through the procedure indicated in paragraph 10 of the same GATT article;

(c) advantages granted to particular countries in accordance with the GATT and with other international arrangements in favour of developing countries.

Article 11

1. The products of the territory of one Party imported into the territory of the other Party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.

2. Moreover, these products shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provision of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.

3. Article III, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the GATT shall be applicable mutatis mutandis between the Parties.

Article 12

1. The Parties agree that the principle of freedom of transit is an essential condition of attaining the objectives of this Agreement.

In this connection each Party shall provide for freedom of transit through its territory of goods originating in the customs territory or destined for the customs territory of the other Party.

2. The rules described in Article V, paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the GATT shall be applicable between the Parties.

Article 13

The following Articles of the GATT shall be applicable mutatis mutandis between the Parties:

1. Article VII, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 (a), (b) and (d), 5;
2. Article VIII;
3. Article IX;
4. Article X.

Article 14

Without prejudice to the rights and obligations stemming from international conventions on the temporary admission of goods which bind both Parties, each Party shall furthermore grant the other Party exemption from import charges and duties on goods admitted temporarily, in the instances and according to the procedures stipulated by any other international convention on this matter binding upon it, in conformity with its legislation. Such legislation shall be applied on a most-favoured-nation basis and thus subject to the exceptions listed in Article 10 (2) of this Agreement. Account shall be taken of the conditions under which the obligations stemming from such a convention have been accepted by the Party in question.

Article 15

1. Goods originating in Russia shall be imported into the Community free of quantitative restrictions without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 17, 20 and 21 of this Agreement and to the provisions of Articles 77, 81, 244, 249 and 280 of the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal to the Community.

2. Goods originating in the Community shall be imported into Russia free of quantitative restrictions without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 17, 20 and 21 and Annex 2 to this Agreement.

Article 16

Until Russia accedes to the GATT/WTO, the Parties shall hold consultations in the Cooperation Committee on their import tariff policies, including changes in tariff protection. In particular, such consultations shall be offered prior to the increase of tariff protection.

Article 17

1. Where any product is being imported into the territory of one of the Parties in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause substantial injury to domestic producers of like or direct competitive products, the Community or Russia, whichever is concerned, may take appropriate measures in accordance with the following procedures and conditions.
2. Before taking any measures, or in cases to which paragraph 4 applies as soon as possible thereafter, the Community or Russia, as the case may be, shall supply the Cooperation Committee with all relevant information with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to both Parties. The Parties shall commence consultations promptly within the Cooperation Committee.
3. If, as a result of the consultations, the Parties do not reach agreement within 30 days of referral to the Cooperation Committee on actions to avoid the situation, the Party which requested consultations shall be free to restrict imports of the products concerned or to adapt other appropriate measures to the extent and for such time as is necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.
4. In critical circumstances where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, the Parties may take the measures before the consultations, on the condition that consultations shall be offered immediately after taking such action.
5. In the selection of measures pursuant to this Article, the Parties shall give priority to those which cause least disturbance to the achievement of the aims of this Agreement.
6. Where a safeguard measure is taken by one Party in accordance with the provisions of this Article, the other Party shall be free to deviate from its obligations under this Title towards the first Party in respect of substantially equivalent trade.

Such action shall not be taken before consultations have been offered by such other Party nor if agreement has been reached within 45 days following the date these consultations were offered.

7. The right of deviation from the obligations referred to in paragraph 6 shall not be exercised for the first three years that a safeguard measure is in effect, provided that the safeguard measure has been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports, for the maximum period of four years, and in conformity with the provisions of this Agreement.

Article 18

Nothing in this Title, and in Article 17 in particular, shall prejudice or affect in any way the taking, by either Party, of anti-dumping or countervailing measures in accordance with Article VI of the GATT, the Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the GATT, the Agreement on interpretation and application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT or related internal legislation.

In respect of anti-dumping or subsidy investigations, each Party agrees to examine submissions by the other Party and to inform the interested parties concerned of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which a final decision is to be made. Before definitive anti-dumping and countervailing duties are imposed, the Parties shall do their utmost to bring about a constructive solution to the problem.

Article 19

The Agreement shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection on health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of natural resources; the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value or the protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property or rules relating to gold and silver. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties.

Article 20

This Title shall not affect the provisions of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Russian Federation on trade in textile products initialled on 12 June 1993 and applied with retroactive effect as from 1 January 1993. Furthermore, Article 15 of this Agreement shall not apply to trade in textile products falling within Chapters 50 to 63 of the combined nomenclature.

Article 21

1. Trade in products covered by the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community shall be governed by:

- the provisions of this Title, with the exception of Article 15, and
- upon its entry into force, by the provisions of the agreement on quantitative arrangements concerning exchanges of ECSC steel products.

2. The establishment of a contact group on coal and steel matters is governed by Protocol 1 annexed to this Agreement.

Article 22 Trade in nuclear materials

1. Trade in nuclear materials shall be covered by:

- the provisions of this Agreement with the exception of Articles 15 and 17 (1) to (5) and (7),
- the provisions of Articles 6, 7, 14 and 15 (1), (2), and (3), first sentence, and (4) and (5) of the 1989 Agreement,
- the attached exchange of letters.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties agree to take all necessary steps to arrive at an arrangement covering trade in nuclear materials by 1 January 1997.

3. Until such an arrangement is reached, the provisions of this Article will continue to apply.

4. Steps will be taken to conclude an agreement regarding nuclear safeguards, physical protection and administrative cooperation in transfers of nuclear materials. Until such an agreement is in force, the respective legislation and international non-proliferation obligations of the Parties will be applicable as regards the transfer of nuclear materials.

5. For the purpose of the application of the regime provided for in paragraph 1:

- the reference in Articles 6 and 15 (5) of the 1989 Agreement to 'this Agreement' shall be read as meaning the regime established by paragraph 1 of this Article,
- the reference in Article 17 (6) of this Agreement to 'this Article' shall be read as meaning Article 15 of the 1989 Agreement,
- the reference in Articles 6, 7, 14 and 15 of the 1989 Agreement to the 'Contracting Parties' shall be read as meaning the Parties to this Agreement,
- the reference to the 'Joint Committee' in Article 15 of the 1989 Agreement shall mean the Cooperation Committee provided for pursuant to Article 92 of this Agreement.

TITLE IV PROVISIONS ON BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT

CHAPTER I LABOUR CONDITIONS

Article 23

1. Subject to the laws, conditions and procedures applicable in each Member State, the Community and its Member States shall ensure that the treatment accorded to Russian nationals, legally employed in the territory of a Member State shall be free from any discrimination based on

nationality, as regards working conditions, remuneration or dismissal, as compared to its own nationals.

2. Russia shall, subject to the conditions and modalities applicable in Russia, accord the treatment referred to in paragraph 1 to nationals of a Member State who are legally employed in its territory.

Article 24 Coordination of social security

The Parties shall conclude agreements in order:

1. to adopt, subject to the conditions and modalities applicable in each Member State, the provisions necessary for the coordination of social security systems for workers of Russian nationality, legally employed in the territory of a Member State and where applicable for the members of their family, legally resident there. These provisions will in particular ensure that:

- all periods of insurance, employment or residence completed by such workers in the various Member States shall be added together for the purpose of pensions in respect of old age, invalidity and death and for the purpose of medical care for such workers and where applicable for such family members,
- any pensions in respect of old age, death, industrial accident or occupational disease, or of invalidity resulting therefrom, with the exception of the special non-contributory benefits, shall be freely transferable at the rate applied by virtue of the law of the debtor Member State or States,
- the workers in question shall where applicable receive family allowances for the abovementioned members of their family.

2. to adopt, subject to the conditions and modalities applicable in Russia, the provisions necessary to accord to workers who are nationals of a Member State and legally employed in Russia, and to members of their families legally resident there, treatment similar to that specified in the second and third indents of paragraph 1.

Article 25

The measures to be taken in accordance with Article 24 of this Agreement shall not affect any rights or obligations arising from bilateral agreements linking the Member States and Russia where those agreements provide for more favourable treatment of nationals of the Member States or of Russia.

Article 26

The Cooperation Council shall examine which improvements can be made in working conditions for businessmen consistent with the international commitments of the Parties, including those set out in the document of the CSCE Bonn Conference.

Article 27

The Cooperation Council shall make recommendations for the implementation of Articles 23 and 26 of this Agreement.

CHAPTER II CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF COMPANIES

Article 28

1. The Community and its Member States of the one part and Russia of the other part, shall grant to each other treatment no less favourable than that accorded to any third country, with regard to conditions affecting the establishment of companies in their territories and this in conformity with the legislation and regulations applicable in each Party.

2. Without prejudice to the reservations listed in Annex 3, the Community and its Member States shall grant to Community subsidiaries of Russian companies a treatment no less favourable than that granted to other Community companies or to Community companies which are subsidiaries of any third country companies whichever is the better, in respect of their operation and this in conformity with their legislation and regulations.

3. Without prejudice to the reservations listed in Annex 4, Russia shall grant to Russian subsidiaries of Community companies a treatment no less favourable than that granted to other Russian companies or to Russian companies which are subsidiaries of any third country companies whichever is the better, in respect of their operation and this in conformity with its legislation and regulations.

4. The Community and its Member States of the one part and Russia of the other part shall grant to branches of Russian and Community companies respectively a treatment no less favourable than that accorded to branches of companies of any third country, in respect of their operation and this in conformity with their legislation and regulations.

5. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 cannot be used so as to circumvent a Party's legislation and regulations applicable to access to specific sectors or activities by subsidiaries of companies of the other Party established in the territory of such first Party.

The treatment referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall benefit companies established in the Community and Russia respectively at the date of entry into force of this Agreement and companies established after that date once they are established.

Article 29

The provisions of Article 28 of this Agreement together with the following provisions shall apply in respect of banking and insurance services referred to in Annex 6.

1. In respect of banking services referred to in Annex 6, Part B, the nature of the treatment accorded by Russia pursuant to Article 28 (1), with regard to establishment by means of the setting up of subsidiaries only and pursuant to Article 28 (3), is set out in Annex 7, Part A.

In respect of insurance services referred to in Annex 6, Part A (1) and (2), the nature of the treatment accorded by Russia pursuant to Article 28 (1) is set out in Annex 7, Part B.

2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Agreement, a Party shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. Such measures shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Party's obligations under the Agreement.

Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to require a Party to disclose information relating to the affairs and accounts of individual customers or any confidential or proprietary information in the possession of public entities.

3. Without prejudice to the provisions of Part A (1) (d) and (e) of Annex 7, the Community and the Member States of the one part and Russia of the other part shall not adopt any new regulations or measures which would introduce or worsen discrimination as compared to the situation existing on the date of the signature of the Agreement as regards conditions affecting the establishment of the other Party's companies in their respective territories in comparison to their own companies.

The parties agree that the terms 'worsen discrimination' include the aggravation of discriminatory conditions or their extension or reintroduction after the current period of application.

4. For the purposes of this Agreement, as regards banking activities a company shall be regarded as a Russian subsidiary of a Community company when more than fifty percent (50 %) of its share capital is held by the Community company.

Article 30

For the purpose of this Agreement:

(a) 'establishment' shall mean the right of Community or Russian companies as referred to in paragraph (h) of this Article to take up economic activities by means of the setting up of subsidiaries and branches in Russia or in the Community respectively.

In respect of financial services mentioned in Article 29, 'establishment' shall mean the right of Community or Russian companies as referred to in paragraph (h) of this Article to take up economic activities by means of the setting up of subsidiaries and branches in Russia or in the Community

respectively after receiving a licence from the competent authorities in conformity with the legislation and regulations applicable in each Party;

(b) 'subsidiary' of a company shall mean a company which is controlled by the first company;

(c) 'economic activities' shall mean activities of an industrial, commercial or professional character, including financial services;

(d) 'branch' of a company shall mean a place of business not having legal personality which has the appearance of permanency, such as the extension of a parent body, has a management and is materially equipped to negotiate business with third parties so that the latter, although knowing that there will if necessary be a legal link with the parent body, the head office of which is abroad, do not have to deal directly with such parent body but may transact business at the place of business constituting the extension;

(e) 'Community subsidiary' or 'Russian subsidiary' respectively shall mean a 'Community company' or a 'Russian company' respectively, as hereafter defined, which is also a subsidiary of a 'Russian company' or a 'Community company' respectively;

(f) a national of a Member State or of Russia respectively shall mean a natural person who is a national of one of the Member States or of Russia respectively in accordance with their respective legislation;

(g) 'operation' shall mean the pursuit of economic activities;

In respect of financial services mentioned in Article 29, 'operation' shall mean the pursuit of all the economic activities authorized by the licence granted to the company by the competent authorities in conformity with the laws and regulations applicable in each Party;

(h) a 'Community company' or a 'Russian company' respectively shall mean a company set up in accordance with the laws of a Member State or of Russia respectively and having its registered office or central administration, or principal place of business in the territory of the Community or Russia respectively. However, should the company, set up in accordance with the laws of a Member State or Russia respectively, have only its registered office in the territory of the Community or Russia respectively, the company shall be considered a Community or Russian company respectively if its operations possess a real and continuous link with the economy of one of the Member States or Russia respectively.

With regard to international maritime transport, shall also be beneficiaries of the provisions of this chapter and Chapter III, shipping companies established outside the Community or Russia and controlled by nationals of a Member State or of Russia respectively, if their vessels are registered in that Member State or in Russia in accordance with their respective legislation.

For the purposes of this provision, international maritime transport shall be considered to include intermodal transport operations involving a sea leg without prejudice to applicable nationality restrictions concerning the carriage of goods and passengers by other transport modes;

(i) For the purpose of Article 29 and Annex 7, with regard to banking services referred to in Annex 6, Part B, 'Russian subsidiary' or 'Community subsidiary' as defined in paragraph (e), shall refer to such a subsidiary which is a bank in accordance with the laws of Russia or a Member State respectively.

For the purpose of Article 29 and Annex 7, with regard to banking services referred to in Annex 6, Part B, 'Community company' or 'Russian company' as defined in paragraph (h), shall refer to such a company which is a bank in accordance with the laws of a Member State or Russia respectively.

Article 31

Notwithstanding Article 100, the provisions of this Title shall not prejudice the application by each Party of any measure necessary to prevent the circumvention, through the provisions of this Agreement, of its measures concerning third country access to its market.

Article 32

1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter I of this Title, a Community company and a Russian company established in the territory of Russia or the Community respectively shall be entitled to employ, or have employed by one of its subsidiaries, branches or joint ventures, in accordance with the legislation in force in the host country of establishment, in the territory of Russia and the Community respectively, employees who are nationals of Member States and Russia respectively, provided that such employees are key personnel as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, and that they are employed exclusively by companies, subsidiaries, branches or joint ventures. The residence and work permits of such employees shall only cover the period of such employment.

2. Key personnel of the abovementioned companies herein referred to as 'organizations' are 'intra-corporate transferees' as defined in paragraph (c) in the following categories, provided that the organization is a legal person and that the persons concerned have been employed by it or have been partners in it (other than as majority shareholders), for at least the year immediately preceding such movement:

(a) persons working in a senior position with an organization, who primarily direct the management of the establishment (branch, subsidiary or joint venture), receiving general supervision or direction principally from the board of directors or stockholders of the business or their equivalent, including:

- directing the establishment or a department or subdivision of the establishment,
- supervising and controlling the work of other supervisory, professional or managerial employees,
- having the authority personally to engage and dismiss or recommend engaging, dismissing or other personnel actions;

(b) persons working within an organization who possess uncommon knowledge essential to the establishment's service, research equipment, techniques or management. The assessment of such knowledge may reflect, apart from knowledge specific to the establishment, a high level of qualification referring to a type of work or trade requiring specific technical knowledge, including membership of an accredited profession;

(c) an 'intra-corporate transferee' is defined as a natural person working within an organization in the territory of a Party, and being temporarily transferred in the context of pursuit of economic activities in the territory of the other Party; the organization concerned must have its principal place of business in the territory of a Party and the transfer must be to an establishment of that organization, effectively pursuing like economic activities in the territory of the other Party.

Article 33

The Parties recognize the importance of granting each other national treatment with regard to the establishment and, where not so foreseen herein, operation of each other's companies in their territories and agree to consider the possibility of movement towards this end on a mutually satisfactory basis, and in the light of any recommendations by the Cooperation Council.

Article 34

1. The Parties shall use their best endeavours to avoid taking any measures or actions which render the conditions for the establishment and operation of each other's companies more restrictive than the situation existing on the day preceding the date of signature of the Agreement.

2. By the end of the third year after signature of the Agreement at the latest, and thereafter at annual intervals the Parties shall examine within the Cooperation Council:

- measures introduced by either Party since the signature of the Agreement which affect the establishment or operation of companies of one Party in the territory of the other Party, and which are the subject of commitments assumed in Article 28, and
- whether it is possible for the Parties to assume:
- the obligation not to take any measures or actions which may render the conditions for the establishment and operation of each other's companies more restrictive than the situation existing at the time of such examination, where not already foreseen herein, or

- other obligations affecting their freedom of action

in areas agreed between the Parties in respect of the commitments assumed in Article 28.

If after such examination one Party is of the view that measures introduced by the other Party since the signature of the Agreement result in a situation which is significantly more restrictive in respect of establishment or operation of companies of the first Party in the territory of the other Party as compared with the situation existing at the date of signature of the Agreement, such Party may request the other Party to enter into consultations. In such case the provisions of Part A of Annex 8 shall apply.

3. In furtherance of the aims of this Article, measures shall be taken as indicated in Part B of Annex 8.

4. The provisions of this Article are without prejudice to those of Article 51. The situations covered by such Article 51 shall be solely governed by its provisions to the exclusion of any other.

Article 35

1. Article 28 shall not apply to air transport, inland waterways transport and maritime transport.

2. However, in respect of activities, as indicated below, undertaken by shipping agencies for the provision of services to international maritime transport, including intermodal transport operations involving a sea-leg, each Party shall permit the companies of the other Party to have a commercial presence in its territory in the form of subsidiaries or branches, under conditions of establishment and operation no less favourable than those accorded to its own companies or to subsidiaries or branches of companies of any third country, whichever are the better, and this in conformity with the legislation and regulations applicable in each Party.

3. Such activities include:

(a) marketing and sales of maritime transport and related services through direct contact with customers, from quotation to invoicing;

(b) purchase and resale of any transport and related services, including transport services by any inland mode, necessary for the supply of an intermodal service;

(c) preparation of documentation concerning transport documents, customs documents, or other documents related to the origin and character of the goods transported;

(d) provision of business information by any means, including computerized information systems and electronic data interchange (subject to any non-discriminatory restrictions concerning telecommunications);

(e) setting up of any business arrangement with other shipping agencies;

(f) acting on behalf of the companies, inter alia in organizing the call of the vessel or taking over cargoes when required.

CHAPTER III CROSS-BORDER SUPPLY OF SERVICES

Article 36

For the sectors listed in Annex 5 to this Agreement, the Parties shall grant each other treatment no less favourable than that accorded to any third country with regard to the conditions affecting the cross-border supply of services, by Community or Russian companies into the territory of Russia or the Community respectively, pursuant to the legislation and regulations applicable in each Party.

Article 37

Subject to the provisions of Article 48 of this Agreement, the Parties shall permit for the sectors list in Annex 5 to this Agreement the temporary movement of natural persons, who are representatives of a Community or a Russian company and are seeking temporary entry for the purpose of negotiating for the sales of cross-border services or entering into agreements to sell cross-border services for that

company, where those representatives will not be engaged in making direct sales to the general public or in supplying services themselves.

Article 38

1. For the sectors listed in Annex 5, each Party may regulate the conditions of cross-border supply of services into its territory. In so far as these regulations are of general application they shall be administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner.

2. Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 36 and 50.

3. By the end of the third year after signature of the Agreement and the latest, the Parties shall examine within the Cooperation Council:

- measures introduced by either Party since the signature of the Agreement which affect the cross-border supply of services covered by Article 36, and
- whether it is possible for the Parties to assume:
 - the obligation not to take any measures or actions which may render the conditions for the cross-border supply of services covered by Article 36 more restrictive than the situation existing at the time of such examination, or
 - other obligations affecting their freedom of action

in areas agreed between the Parties in respect of the commitments assumed in Article 36.

If after such examination one Party is of the view that measures introduced by the other Party since the signature of the Agreement result in a situation which is significantly more restrictive in respect of cross-border supply of services covered by Article 36 as compared with the situation existing at the date of signature of the Agreement, such first Party may request the other Party to enter into consultations. In such case the provisions of Part A of Annex 8 shall apply.

4. In furtherance of the aims of this Article, measures shall be taken as indicated in Part B of Annex 8.

5. The provisions of this Article are without prejudice to those of Article 51. The situations covered by such Article 51 shall be solely governed by its provisions to the exclusion of any other.

Article 39

1. With regard to maritime transport, the Parties undertake to apply effectively the principle of unrestricted access to the international market and traffic on a commercial basis.

(a) The above provision does not prejudice the rights and obligations arising under the United Nations Convention on a code of conduct for liner conferences, as applicable to the Parties to this Agreement. Non-conference lines shall be free to operate in competition with a conference as long as they adhere to the principle of fair competition on a commercial basis.

(b) The Parties affirm their commitment to a freely competitive environment as being an essential feature of the dry and liquid bulk trade.

2. In applying the principles of paragraph 1, the Parties shall:

(a) not apply, in their mutual trade, as from entry into force of this Agreement, any cargo sharing provisions of bilateral agreements between any Member State and the former USSR;

(b) not introduce cargo sharing arrangements in future bilateral agreements with third countries concerning dry and liquid bulk and liner trade. However, this does not exclude the possibility of such arrangements concerning liner cargo in those exceptional circumstances where liner shipping companies from one or other Party to this Agreement would not otherwise have an effective opportunity to ply for trade to and from the third country concerned;

(c) abolish, upon entry into force of this Agreement, all unilateral measures, administrative, technical and other obstacles which could constitute a disguised restriction or have discriminatory effects on the free supply of services in international maritime transport.

Each Party shall grant, inter alia, a treatment no less favourable than that accorded to a Party's own vessels, for vessels used for the transport of goods, passengers or both, and flying the flag of the other Party, with respect to access to ports open to foreign vessels, the use of infrastructure and auxiliary maritime services of those ports, as well as related fees and charges, customs facilities and the assignment of berths and facilities for loading and unloading.

3. The Parties agree that, following the entry into force of this Agreement and not later than 31 December 1996, they will conduct negotiations on the stage-by-stage opening of the inland waterways of each Party to the nationals and shipping companies of the other Party, in respect of the freedom to provide international sea-river services.

Article 40

For the purpose of establishing favourable conditions for rail transport between the Parties, it is agreed that both Parties will, in the framework of this Agreement and through appropriate bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, promote:

- the facilitation of customs and other border clearance procedures for freight and for rolling stock,
- cooperation in the creation of suitable rolling stock meeting the requirements of international traffic,
- the approximation of regulations and procedures which govern international transport,
- the safeguarding and development of international passenger traffic between the Member States and Russia.

Article 41

Cooperation shall ensure fair, balanced and competitive conditions for the space launching and transportation market based on sound economic factors and, in particular, steps will be taken to promote the negotiation and implementation of multilateral rules regarding international trade in space launching and transportation services.

During the transnational period to the year 2000, conditions for the supply of space launch services shall be agreed upon.

Article 42

The Parties shall endeavour to provide each other every assistance possible as regards measures promoting cross-border trade in mobile satellite communications on their respective territories, in conformity with their respective legislation, practices and conditions. In 1996, the Parties will meet to consider the possibilities of granting to each other most-favoured-nation treatment for mobile satellite services.

Article 43

With a view to assuring a coordinated development of transport between the Parties, adapted to their commercial needs, the Parties may, after the entry into force of this Agreement, conclude specific Agreements regarding the conditions of mutual market access and of provision of services in the transport sector, to the extent that these conditions are not already addressed by this Agreement. Such Agreements may apply to more than one or to a single mode of transport.

CHAPTER IV GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 44

For the purposes of Chapters II, III and of Title V, no account shall be taken of treatment accorded by the Community, its Member States or Russia pursuant to commitments entered into in economic integration agreements.

Article 45

Companies which are controlled and exclusively owned by Community companies and Russian companies jointly shall also be beneficiaries of the provisions of Chapters II and III of this Title and those of Title V.

Article 46

1. The provisions of this Title shall be applied subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.
2. They shall not apply to activities which in the territory of either Party are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority.

Article 47

The Cooperation Council shall make recommendations for the further liberalization of trade in services, taking into account the development of the services sectors in the Parties and the other international commitments entered into by the Parties, in particular in the light of the final results of the negotiations of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, hereinafter referred to as 'GATS'.

Article 48

For the purpose of this Title, nothing in the Agreement shall prevent the Parties from applying their laws and regulations regarding entry and stay, work, labour conditions and establishment of natural persons and supply of services, provided that, in so doing, they do not apply them in a manner as to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any Party under the terms of a specific provision of the Agreement. The above provision does not prejudice the application of Article 46.

Article 49

1. The most-favoured-nation treatment granted in accordance with the provisions of this Title or of Title V shall not apply to the tax advantages which the Parties are providing or will provide in the future on the basis of agreements to avoid double taxation, or other tax arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Title or in Title V shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by the Parties of any measure aimed at preventing the avoidance or evasion of taxes pursuant to the tax provisions of agreements to avoid double taxation and other tax arrangements, or domestic fiscal legislation.
3. Nothing in this Title or in Title V shall be construed to prevent Member States or Russia from distinguishing, in the application of the relevant provisions of their fiscal legislation, between taxpayers who are not in identical situations, in particular as regards their place of residence.

Article 50

Without prejudice to Articles 32 and 37, no provision of Chapters II, III and IV hereof shall be interpreted as giving the right to:

- nationals of the Member States or of Russia respectively to enter, or stay in, the territory of Russia or the Community respectively in any capacity whatsoever, and in particular as a shareholder or partner in a company or manager or employed thereof or supplier or recipient of services,
- Community subsidiaries or branches of Russian companies to employ or have employed in the territory of the Community nationals of Russia,
- Russian subsidiaries or branches of Community companies to employ or have employed in the territory of Russia nationals of the Member States,
- Russian companies or Community subsidiaries or branches of Russian companies to supply workers who are Russian nationals to act for and under the control of other persons by temporary employment contracts,
- Community companies or Russian subsidiaries or branches of Community companies to supply workers who are nationals of the Member States to act for and under the control of other persons by temporary employment contracts.

Article 51

1. Treatment granted by either Party to the other hereunder shall, has from the day one month prior to the date of entry into force of the relevant obligations of the GATS, in respect of sectors or measures covered by the GATS, in no case be more favourable than that accorded by such first Party under the provisions of the GATS, and this, in respect of each service sector, sub-sector and mode of supply.

2. Without prejudice to the automatic nature of the provisions of paragraph 1, the Party which has assumed obligations under the GATS shall inform the other of the appropriate provisions and the adaptations resulting therefrom for this Agreement.

3. Within one month of receipt from the Party, which has assumed obligations under the GATS, of the information referred to in paragraph 2, the other Party may notify the first Party of its intention to make adjustments to its obligations under this Title, and make those adjustments as follows:

- where a service sector, sub-sector or mode of supply of a service has been excluded from the Agreement, its scope reduced or made subject to the fulfilment of conditions pursuant to paragraph 1, the identical sector, sub-sector or mode of supply may be excluded or its scope reduced in the same way or made subject to the fulfilment of identical or similar conditions.

4. These adjustments made by the second Party should lead to the re-establishment of a balance of obligations between the Parties.

5. In the case that a Party considers that the adjustments made under paragraph 3 have not led to the re-establishment of the balance of obligations between the Parties, such Party may request the other Party, to enter into consultations within 30 days in order to find a satisfactory solution by means of any other appropriate adjustment of its obligations under this Title.

6. If within 30 days of the opening of such consultations no satisfactory solution has been found, the procedures of Article 101 will be applicable at the request of either Party.

TITLE V PAYMENTS AND CAPITAL

Article 52

1. The Parties undertake to authorize, in freely convertible currency, any current payments between residents of the Community and of Russia connected with the movement of goods, services or persons made in accordance with the provisions of the present Agreement.

2. The free movement of capital between residents of the Community and of Russia in the form of direct investment made in companies formed in accordance with the laws of the host country and investments made in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of Title IV, and the transfer abroad of this investment, including any compensation payments arising from measures such as expropriation, nationalization or measures of equivalent effect, and of any profit stemming therefrom shall be ensured.

3. The provisions of Part 2 shall not prevent Russia from applying restrictions on outward direct investment by Russian residents. Five years after the entry into force of this Agreement the Parties agree to consult over the maintenance of these restrictions, taking into account all the relevant monetary, fiscal and financial considerations.

4. Transfers in respect of capital movements covered under paragraph 2 shall be made on the same exchange rate conditions as those relating to current transactions.

5. Without prejudice to paragraphs 6 and 7, after a transitional period of five years as from entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall not introduce any new restrictions on the movement of capital and current payments connected therewith between resident of the Community and Russia and shall not make the existing arrangements more restrictive. However, the introduction of restrictions during the transitional period referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 9 of this Article.

6. After the prohibition in paragraph 5 has come into effect and without prejudice to paragraphs 1 and 2, where, in exceptional circumstances, movements of capital between the Community and Russia cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of exchange rate policy or monetary policy in the Community or Russia, the Community and Russia, respectively, may take safeguard measures with regard to movements of capital between the Community and Russia for a period not exceeding six months if such measures are strictly necessary.

7. With reference to the provisions of this Article, until a full convertibility of the Russian currency within the meaning of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is introduced, Russia may apply exchange restrictions connected with the granting or taking up of short and medium-term financial credits to the extent that such restrictions are imposed on Russia for the granting of such credits and are permitted according to Russia's status under the IMF.

Russia shall apply these restrictions in a non-discriminatory manner. They shall be applied in such a manner as to cause the least possible disruption to this Agreement. Russia shall inform the Cooperation Council promptly of the introduction of such measures and of any changes therein.

8. The Parties shall consult each other with a view to facilitating the movement of capital between the Community and Russia in order to promote the objectives of the present Agreement. The Parties shall particularly endeavour to further liberalize movements of capital related to portfolio investment and commercial credits, and movements of capital related to financial loans and credits granted by Community residents to Russian residents. The Cooperation Council shall make appropriate recommendations within the first five years after entry into force of this Agreement.

9. The Parties shall accord to one another most-favoured-nation treatment in respect of freedom of current payments and capital movements and in respect of methods of payment.

TITLE VI COMPETITION; INTELLECTUAL, INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTY PROTECTION; LEGISLATIVE COOPERATION

Article 53 Competition

1. The Parties agree to work to remedy or remove through the application of their competition laws or otherwise, restrictions on competition by enterprises or caused by State intervention in so far as they may affect trade between the Community and Russia.

2. In order to attain the objectives mentioned in paragraph 1:

2.1. The Parties shall ensure that they have and enforce laws addressing restrictions on competition by enterprises within their jurisdiction.

2.2. The Parties shall refrain from granting export aids favouring certain undertakings or the production of products other than primary products. The Parties also declare their readiness, as from the third year from the date of entry into force of this Agreement, to establish for other aids which distort or threaten to distort competition in so far as they affect trade between the Community and Russia, strict disciplines, including the outright prohibition of certain aids. These categories of aids and the disciplines applicable to each shall be defined jointly within a period of three years after entry into force of this Agreement.

Upon request by one Party, the other Party shall provide information on its aid schemes or in particular individual cases of State aid.

2.3. During a transitional period expiring five years after the entry into force of the Agreement, Russia may take measures inconsistent with paragraph 2.2, second sentence, provided that these measures are introduced and applied in the circumstances referred to in Annex 9.

2.4. In the case of State monopolies of a commercial character, the Parties declare their readiness, as from the third year from the date of entry into force of this Agreement, to ensure that there is no discrimination between nationals and companies of the Parties regarding the conditions under which goods are procured or marketed.

In the case of public undertakings or undertakings to which Member States or Russia grant exclusive rights, the Parties declare their readiness, as from the third year from the date of entry into force of

this Agreement, to ensure that there is neither enacted nor maintained any measure distorting trade between the Community and Russia to an extent contrary to the Parties' respective interests. This provision shall not obstruct the performance, in law or fact, of the particular tasks assigned to such undertakings.

2.5. The period defined in paragraphs 2.2 and 2.4 may be extended by agreement of the Parties.

3. Consultations may take place within the Cooperation Committee at the request of the Community or Russia on the restrictions or distortions of competition referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 and on the enforcement of their competition rules, subject to limitations imposed by laws regarding disclosure of information, confidentiality and business secrecy. Consultations may also comprise questions on the interpretation of paragraphs 1 and 2.

4. The Party with experience in applying competition rules shall give full consideration to providing the other Party, upon request and within available resources, technical assistance for the development and implementation of competition rules.

5. The above provisions in no way affect a Party's rights to apply adequate measures, notably those referred to in Article 18, in order to address distortions of trade.

Article 54 Intellectual, industrial and commercial property protection

1. Pursuant to the provisions of this Article and Annex 10, the Parties confirm the importance they attach to ensure adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights.

2. The Parties confirm the importance they attach to the obligations arising from the following multilateral conventions:

- Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property (Stockholm Act, 1967 and amended in 1979),
- Madrid Agreement concerning the international registration of marks (Stockholm Act, 1967, and amended in 1979),
- Nice Agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks (Geneva, 1977, and amended in 1979),
- Budapest Treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure (1977, modified in 1980),
- Patent Cooperation Treaty (Washington 1970, amended and modified in 1979 and 1984),
- Protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement concerning the international registration of marks (Madrid, 1989).

3. The implementation of the provisions of this Article and Annex 10 shall be regularly reviewed by the Parties in accordance with Article 90. If problems in the area of intellectual, industrial and commercial property affecting trading conditions were to occur, urgent consultations shall be undertaken, at the request of either Party, with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory solutions.

Article 55 Legislative cooperation

1. The Parties recognize that an important condition for strengthening the economic links between Russia and the Community is the approximation of legislation. Russia shall endeavour to ensure that its legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community.

2. The approximation of laws shall extend to the following areas in particular: company law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, protection of workers at the workplace, financial services, rules on competition, public procurement, protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants, the environment, consumer protection, indirect taxation, customs law, technical rules and standards, nuclear laws and regulations, transport.

TITLE VII ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Article 56

1. The Community and Russia shall foster economic cooperation of wide scope in order to contribute to the expansion of their respective economies, to the creation of a supportive international economic environment and to the integration between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe. Such cooperation shall strengthen and develop economic links to the benefit of both Parties.
2. Policies and other measures of the Parties related to this Title shall in particular be designed to bring about economic and social reforms and restructuring in Russia and shall be guided by the requirements of sustainability and harmonious social development; they shall also fully incorporate environmental considerations.
3. The cooperation shall, inter alia, cover:
 - development of their respective industries and transport,
 - exploration of new sources of supply and of new markets,
 - encouragement of technological and scientific progress,
 - encouragement of a stable social and human resources development and of local employment development,
 - promotion of the regional cooperation with the aim of its harmonious and sustainable development.
4. The Parties consider it essential that, alongside with establishing a relationship of partnership and cooperation with each other, they maintain and develop cooperation with other European States and with the other countries of the former USSR with a view to a harmonious development of the region and shall make every effort to encourage this process.
5. As far as applicable economic and other forms of cooperation provided for in this Agreement may be supported by the Community on the basis of the relevant Council Regulations on technical assistance to the countries of the former USSR, taking into account the priorities agreed upon by the Parties. Support may also be provided through such other relevant Community instruments as may be available.

Special attention shall be devoted by the Parties to measures capable of fostering cooperation with the other countries of the former USSR.

6. The provisions of this Title shall not affect the enforcement of the Parties' competition rules and of the specific competition provisions of this Agreement applicable to undertakings.

Article 57 Industrial cooperation

1. Cooperation shall aim at promoting the following in particular:
 - the development of business links between economic operators, including small and medium-size enterprises,
 - the improvement of management on enterprise level,
 - the process of privatization in the context of economic restructuring, and the strengthening of the private sector,
 - efforts in both public and private sector, to restructure and modernize the industry, during the transition period leading towards a market economy and under conditions ensuring environment protection and sustainable development,
 - the conversion of defence industries,
 - the development of appropriate market-based commercial rules and practices as well as transfer of know-how.
2. Industrial cooperation initiatives shall take into account priorities determined by the Community and by Russia. The initiatives should seek in particular to establish a suitable framework for

undertakings, to improve management know-how and to promote transparency as regards markets and conditions for undertakings.

Article 58 Investment promotion and protection

1. Bearing in mind the respective powers and competences of the Community and the Member States, cooperation shall aim to establish a favourable climate for investment, both domestic and foreign, especially through better conditions for investment protection, the transfer of capital and the exchange of information on investment opportunities.

2. The aims of this cooperation shall be in particular:

- the conclusion, where appropriate, between the Member States and Russia of agreements for the promotion and protection of investment,
- the conclusion, where appropriate, between the Member States and Russia of agreements to avoid double taxation,
- to exchange information on investment opportunities in the form of inter alia trade fairs, exhibitions, trade weeks and other events,
- to exchange information on laws, regulations and administrative practices in the field of investment.

Article 59 Public procurement

The Parties shall cooperate to develop conditions for open and competitive award of public procurement contracts in particular through calls for tenders.

Article 60 Standards and conformity assessment; consumer protection

1. Within the limits of their competence, and in accordance with their legislation the Parties shall take measures with a view to reducing the differences which exist between the Parties in the fields of metrology, standardization and certification by encouraging the use of internationally agreed instruments in those fields.

The Parties shall closely cooperate in the abovementioned areas with the relevant European and other international organizations.

The Parties shall, in particular, encourage practical interaction of their respective organizations, with the aim of starting to negotiate mutual recognition agreements in the field of conformity assessment activities.

2. The Parties shall enter into close cooperation with a view to achieving compatibility between their systems of consumer protection.

This cooperation shall be aimed in particular at establishment of permanent systems of mutual information on dangerous products, the improvement of information provided to consumers especially on prices, characteristics of products and services offered, the development of exchanges between the consumer interest representatives, and increasing the compatibility of consumer protection policies.

Article 61 Mining and raw materials

1. The Parties shall cooperate with a view to fostering the development of the sectors of mining and raw materials. Special attention shall be paid to cooperation in the sector of non-ferrous metals.

2. The cooperation shall focus in particular on the following areas:

- exchange of information on all matters of interest to the Parties concerning the mining and raw materials sectors, including trade matters,
- the adoption and implementation of environmental legislation,
- training.

3. Such cooperation shall be regularly reviewed by the Parties in a special committee or body to be set up in accordance with the provisions of Article 93.

4. This Article is without prejudice to Articles dealing more specifically with raw materials, in particular Articles 21, 65 and 66.

Article 62 Science and technology

1. The Parties shall promote bilateral cooperation in civil scientific research and technological development (RTD) on the basis of mutual benefit and, taking into account the availability of resources, adequate access to their respective programmes and subject to appropriate levels of effective protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights (IPR).

2. Science and technology cooperation shall cover:

- the exchange of scientific and technical information,
- joint RTD activities,
- training activities and mobility programmes for scientists, researchers and technicians engaged in RTD in both sides.

Where such cooperation takes the form of activities involving education and/or training, it should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.

In carrying out such cooperation activities, special attention shall be devoted to the redeployment of scientists, engineers, researchers and technicians who are or have been engaged in research on/and production of weapons of mass destruction.

3. Such cooperation shall be implemented according to specific arrangements to be negotiated and concluded in accordance with the procedures adopted by each Party, and which shall set out, inter alia, appropriate IPR provisions.

Article 63 Education and training

1. The Parties shall cooperate with the aim of raising the level of general education and professional qualifications, both in the public and private sectors.

2. The cooperation shall focus in particular on the following areas:

- updating higher education and training systems in Russia,
- the training of public and private sector executives and senior civil servants in priority areas to be determined,
- cooperation between universities, cooperation between universities and firms,
- mobility for teachers, graduates, young scientists and researchers, administrators and young people,
- promoting teaching in the field of European Studies within the appropriate institutions,
- teaching languages of the Community and of Russia,
- post-graduate training of conference interpreters,
- training of journalists,
- exchange of methods of training and promotion of use of modern training programmes and technical facilities,
- development of distant education and new training technologies,
- training of trainers.

3. The participation of one Party in the respective programmes in the field of education and training of the other Party could be considered in accordance with their respective procedures and, where

appropriate, institutional frameworks and plans of cooperation could then be established building on participation of Russia in the Community's Tempus programme.

Article 64 Agriculture and the agro-industrial sector

Cooperation shall aim at the modernization, restructuring and privatization of agriculture and the agro-industrial sector in Russia in conditions which ensure that the environment is respected. This cooperation shall be through, inter alia, developing private farms and distribution channels, methods of storage, marketing and management, modernizing the rural infrastructure and improvement of agricultural land-use planning, improving productivity, quality and efficiency, and the transfer of technology and know-how. The Parties shall aim at achieving compatibility between their sanitary and phytosanitary standards.

Article 65 Energy

1. Cooperation shall take place within the principles of the market economy and the European Energy Charter, against a background of the progressive integration of the energy markets in Europe.

2. The cooperation shall include among others the followings areas:

- improvement of the quality and security of energy supply, in an economic and environmentally sound manner,
- formulation of energy policy,
- improvement in management and regulation of the energy sector in line with a market economy,
- the introduction of a range of institutional, legal, fiscal and other conditions necessary to encourage increased energy trade and investment,
- promotion of energy saving and energy efficiency,
- modernization of energy infrastructure including interconnection of gas supply and electricity networks,
- the environmental impact of energy production, supply and consumption, in order to prevent or minimize the environmental damage resulting from these activities,
- improvement of energy technologies in supply and end use across the range of energy types,
- management and technical training in the energy sector.

Article 66 Nuclear sector

Bearing in mind the respective powers and competences of the Community and its Member States, civil cooperation in the nuclear sector shall take place, inter alia, through the implementation of two agreements on thermonuclear fusion and on nuclear safety to be agreed upon between the Parties.

Article 67 Space

Without prejudice to Article 41, the Parties shall promote long term cooperation as appropriate in the areas of civil space research, development and commercial application. They shall pay particular attention to initiatives making on a mutual beneficial basis full use of the complementarity of their respective activities.

Article 68 Construction

The Parties shall cooperate in the field of construction industry, particularly in the areas covered by Articles 55, 57, 60, 62, 63 and 77 of this Agreement.

This cooperation shall, inter alia, aim at modernizing and restructuring the construction sector in Russia in line with the principles of a market economy and duly taking into account related health, safety and environmental aspects.

Article 69 Environment

1. Bearing in mind the European Energy Charter and the Declaration of the Lucerne Conference of 1993, the Parties shall develop and strengthen their cooperation on environment and human health.
2. Cooperation shall aim at combating the deterioration of the environment and in particular:
 - effective monitoring of pollution levels and assessment of environment; system of information on the state of the environment,
 - combating local, regional and transboundary air and water pollution,
 - ecological restoration,
 - sustainable, efficient and environmentally effective production and use of energy; safety of industrial plants,
 - classification and safe handling of chemicals,
 - water quality,
 - waste reduction, recycling and safe disposal, implementation of the Basle Convention,
 - the environmental impact of agriculture, soil erosion, and chemical pollution,
 - the protection of forests,
 - the conservation of biodiversity, protected areas and sustainable use and management of biological resources,
 - land-use planning, including construction and urban planning,
 - use of economic and fiscal instruments,
 - global climate change,
 - environmental education and awareness,
 - implementation of the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a transboundary context.
3. Cooperation shall take place particularly through:
 - disaster planning and other emergency situations,
 - exchange of information and experts, including information and experts dealing with the transfer of clean technologies and the safe and environmentally sound use of biotechnologies,
 - joint research activities,
 - improvement of laws towards Community standards,
 - cooperation at regional level, including cooperation within the framework of the European Environment Agency, established by the Community and at international level,
 - development of strategies, particularly with regard to global and climatic issues and also in view of achieving sustainable development,
 - environmental impact studies.

Article 70 Transport

The Parties shall develop and strengthen their cooperation in the field of transport.

This cooperation shall, inter alia, aim at restructuring and modernizing transport systems and networks in Russia and developing and ensuring, where appropriate, compatibility of transportation systems in the context of achieving a more global transportation system.

The cooperation shall include, inter alia:

- the modernizing of management and operations of road transport, railways, ports and airports,
- modernization and development of railways, waterways, road, port, airport and air navigation infrastructure including the modernization of major routes of common interest and the trans-European links for the above modes,
- promotion and development of multi-modal transport,
- the promotion of joint research and development programmes,
- preparation of the legislative and institutional framework for policy development and implementation including privatization of the transport sector.

Article 71 Postal services and telecommunications

1. The Parties shall expand and strengthen cooperation in this area with the aim of gradual integration at the technical level of their respective telecommunications and postal networks. To this end they shall initiate notably the following actions:

- exchange information on telecommunications and postal services and TV and broadcasting policies,
- exchange technical and other information, conduct training and advisory operations,
- carry out transfer of technology and know-how,
- have the appropriate bodies from both Parties elaborate and carry out joint projects,
- promote new communication facilities first of all for the needs of commercial and public institutions,
- promote European technical standards, systems of certification and regulatory approaches,
- cooperate in securing the communication in critical circumstances, consult each other on elaboration of guidelines for operator cooperation in conditions of catastrophes, etc.

2. These activities shall focus, inter alia, on the following priority areas:

- development and modernization of an integrated telecommunications sector in Russia in the framework of market reforms and creation of an appropriate regulatory basis,
- modernization of Russia's telecommunications network and its integration at the technical level into European and world networks,
- cooperation in development of systems of information exchange and data transmission between organizations of the Community and Russia,
- integration at the technical level of trans-European telecommunication networks,
- modernization of Russia's postal and broadcasting services, including legal and regulatory aspects,
- the management of telecommunications, postal, TV and broadcasting services in the changing economic environments of both Parties, including inter alia, organizational structures, strategy and planning, tariff policy and purchasing principles.

Article 72 Financial services

The Parties shall cooperate with the aim of establishing and developing a suitable framework for the banking, insurance and other financial services sector in Russia adapted to the needs of a market economy.

The cooperation shall focus on:

- developing accounting standards which are suitable for a free market economy and which are compatible with the standards adopted by Member States,
- restructuring of the banking, insurance and financial system,
- improvement of monitoring and regulation of the banking, insurance and financial services sector,

- developing compatible auditing systems,
- exchange of information on the respective laws in force or under preparation,
- modernizing the infrastructure of commercial and private banks.

Article 73 Regional development

The Parties shall strengthen cooperation between them on regional development and land-use planning.

They shall encourage exchange of information by national, regional and local authorities on regional and land-use planning policy and on methods of formulation of regional policies with special emphasis on the development of disadvantaged areas.

They shall also encourage direct contacts between the respective regions and public organizations responsible for regional development planning with the aim, inter alia, to exchange methods and ways of fostering regional development.

Article 74 Social cooperation

1. With regard to health and safety, the Parties shall develop cooperation between them with the aim of improving the level of protection of the health and safety of workers.

The cooperation shall include notably:

- education and training on health and safety issues with specific attention to high risk sectors of activity,
- development and promotion of preventive measures to combat work related diseases and other work related ailments,
- prevention of major accident hazards and the management of toxic chemicals,
- research to develop the knowledge base in relation to working environment and the health and safety of workers.

2. With regard to employment, the cooperation shall include notably technical assistance relating to:

- optimization of the labour market,
- modernization of the job-finding and consulting services,
- planning and management of the restructuring programmes,
- encouragement of local employment development,
- exchange of information on the programmes of flexible employment, including those stimulating self-employment and promoting entrepreneurship.

3. The Parties shall pay special attention to cooperation in the sphere of social protection which, inter alia, shall include cooperation in planning and implementing social protection reforms in Russia.

These reforms shall aim to develop in Russia methods of protection intrinsic to market economies and shall comprise all directions of social security activities.

The cooperation shall also include technical assistance to the development of social insurance institutions with the aim of promoting gradual transition to a system consisting of a combination of contributory and social assistance forms of protection, as well as respective non-governmental organizations providing social services.

Article 75 Tourism

The Parties shall increase and develop cooperation between them, which shall include:

- facilitating the tourist trade,

- cooperation between official tourism bodies,
- increasing the flow of information,
- transferring know-how,
- studying the opportunities for joint operations.

Article 76 Small and medium-sized enterprises

1. The Parties shall aim to develop and strengthen small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and promote cooperation between SMEs of the Community and Russia.

2. The Parties shall encourage the exchange of information and know-how, inter alia, in areas such as:

- legal, administrative, technical, tax, financial and other conditions necessary for setting up and expansion of SMEs and for cross-border cooperation,
- the provision of the specialized services required by SMEs, like management and marketing training, accounting, quality control and creation and strengthening of agencies providing such services,
- establishment of continuous and stable links between the Community and Russian operators in order to improve the flow of information to SMEs and promoting cross-border cooperation, inter alia, through access to and operation of Business Cooperation Network and Euro-Info-Correspondence Centres provided the necessary conditions are met for any of these networks.

The Parties shall closely cooperate with a view to ensuring that the necessary conditions for access to the networks are met.

Article 77 Communication, informatics and information infrastructure

1. The Parties shall support the development of modern methods of information handling, including the media. They shall take appropriate steps to stimulate the effective mutual exchange of information. Priority shall be given to programmes aimed at providing the general public with basic information about the Community and professional, inter alia, business circles with specialized information.

2. The Parties shall make the necessary efforts to expand and strengthen cooperation in order to establish the appropriate information infrastructure. To this end they shall initiate notably the following actions:

- the exchange of information on policies for the establishment of information infrastructures including regulatory policies,
- exploration of the possibility for joint projects on research and development in information and communication technologies, and on the establishment of an information infrastructure adapted to the needs of a market economy, taking into account the conversion potential of Russian enterprises and Russian interests for informatization and allowing for inter-operability with Community information infrastructures,
- development of joint programmes concerning the training of specialists in information technologies and information services,
- promotion of European technical standards, systems of certification and regulatory approaches.

Article 78 Customs

1. The aim of cooperation shall be to achieve compatibility of the customs systems of the Parties.

2. Cooperation shall include the following in particular:

- the exchange of information,
- the improvement of working methods,

- the harmonization and simplification of customs procedures regarding the goods traded between the Parties,
- the interconnection between the transit systems of the Community and Russia,
- the support in the introduction and management of modern customs information systems, including computer-based systems on the customs check points,
- mutual assistance and joint actions with respect to 'dual-use' goods and goods subject to non-tariff limitations,
- the organization of seminars and training periods.

Technical assistance shall be provided where necessary.

3. Without prejudice to further cooperation foreseen in this Agreement and in particular Articles 82 and 84, the mutual assistance between administrative authorities in customs matters of the Parties shall take place in accordance with the provisions of Protocol 2.

Article 79 Statistical cooperation

1. The cooperation shall aim at further development of efficient statistical systems, informational and programme-technological compatibility of statistical data, to provide, in time, reliable statistics needed to support and monitor economic cooperation between the Parties and the process of economic reform in Russia, and also to contribute to the development of private enterprise in Russia.

2. The Parties shall cooperate in particular:

- to enhance the development of an efficient statistical system in Russia, in particular to elaborate an appropriate institutional framework,
- to improve the standards of training and the professional level of the statistical personnel,
- to bring about harmonization with international, and in particular, Community methods, standards and classifications,
- to provide private and public sector economic operators with the appropriate macro- and microeconomic data,
- to guarantee the confidentiality of data,
- to exchange statistical information and to this end to build up and/or to make appropriate use of databases.

Article 80 Economics

The Parties shall facilitate the process of economic reform and the coordination of economic policies by cooperating to improve understanding of the fundamentals of their respective economies and the design and implementation of economic policy in market economies.

The Parties shall:

- exchange information on macroeconomic performance and prospects and on development strategies,
- analyse economic issues of mutual interest, including the framing of economic policies and implementation instruments,
- encourage extensive cooperation among economists and senior officials in order to expedite the transfer of information and know-how for the drafting of economic policies, and provide for wide dissemination of the results of policy-relevant research.

Article 81 Money laundering

1. The Parties agree on the necessity of making efforts and cooperating in order to prevent the use of their financial systems for laundering of proceeds from criminal activities in general and drug offences in particular.

2. Cooperation in this area shall include administrative and technical assistance with the purpose of establishing suitable standards against money laundering equivalent to those adopted by the Community and international fora in this field, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Article 82 Drugs

The Parties shall cooperate in increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of policies and measures to counter the illicit production, supply and traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including the prevention of diversion of precursor chemicals, as well as in promoting drug demand prevention and reduction. The cooperation in this area shall be based on mutual consultation and close coordination between the Parties over the objectives and measures in the various drug-related fields, and shall, inter alia, provide for exchange of training programmes and include, where available, technical assistance from the Community.

Article 83 Cooperation in the field of regulation of capital movements and payments in Russia

Without prejudice to Article 52, the Parties, recognizing the necessity of a stable functioning and development of the Russian domestic currency market shall cooperate in the field of creation of an effective system of regulation of capital movements and payments in Russia.

Bearing in mind the experience, competence and respective possibilities of the Member States and the Community, cooperation in this field supported by technical assistance from the Community shall cover inter alia:

- establishing links between competent authorities of the Community and its Member States and of Russia,
- exchanging information on a regular basis,
- helping in the development of appropriate regulations.

In order to permit an optimal use of the resources available the Parties shall ensure close coordination with the measures undertaken by other countries and international organizations.

TITLE VIII COOPERATION ON PREVENTION OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES

Article 84

The Parties shall establish cooperation aimed at preventing illegal activities such as:

- illegal immigration and illegal presence of physical persons of their nationality on their respective territories, taking into account the principle and practice of readmission,
- illegal activities in the sphere of economics, including corruption,
- illegal transactions of various goods, including industrial waste,
- counterfeiting,
- the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

The cooperation in the abovementioned areas will be based on mutual consultations and close interactions and will provide technical and administrative assistance including:

- drafting of national legislation in the sphere of preventing illegal activities,
- creation of information centres,
- increasing the efficiency of institutions engaged in preventing illegal activities,
- training of personnel and development of research infrastructures,
- elaboration of mutually acceptable measures impeding illegal activities.

TITLE IX CULTURAL COOPERATION

Article 85

1. The Parties undertake to promote cultural cooperation with the aim of reinforcing the existing links between their peoples and to encourage the mutual knowledge of their respective languages and cultures while respecting creative freedom and reciprocal access to cultural values.

2. Cooperation shall cover in particular the following areas:

- exchange of information and experience in the field of conservation and protection of monuments and sites (architectural heritage),
- cultural exchanges between institutions, artists and other persons working in the area of culture,
- translation of literary works.

3. The Cooperation Council may make recommendations for the implementation of this Article.

TITLE X FINANCIAL COOPERATION

Article 86

In order to achieve the objectives of this Agreement, in particular Titles VI and VII thereof, and in accordance with Articles 87, 88 and 89, Russia shall benefit from temporary financial assistance from the Community by way of technical assistance in the form of grants to accelerate the economic transformation of Russia.

Article 87

This financial assistance shall be covered within the framework of the Tacis programme foreseen in the Community's relevant Council Regulation.

Article 88

The objectives and the areas of the Community's financial assistance shall be laid down in an indicative programme reflecting established priorities to be agreed between the Parties taking into account Russia's needs, sectoral absorption capacities and progress with reform. The Parties shall inform the Cooperation Council thereof.

Article 89

In order to permit optimum use of the resources available, the Parties shall ensure that Community technical assistance contributions are made in close coordination with those from other sources such as the Member States, other countries, and international organizations such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

TITLE XI INSTITUTIONAL, GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 90

A Cooperation Council is hereby established which shall monitor the implementation of this Agreement. It shall meet at ministerial level once a year and when circumstances require. It shall examine any major issues arising within the framework of the Agreement and any other bilateral or international issues of mutual interest for the purpose of attaining the objectives of this Agreement. The Cooperation Council may also make appropriate recommendations, by agreement between the representatives within the Cooperation Council of the Parties.

Article 91

1. The Cooperation Council shall consist of the members of the Council of the European Union and members of the Commission of the European Communities, on the one hand, and of members of the Government of the Russian Federation, on the other.

2. The Cooperation Council shall establish its rules of procedure.

3. The office of President of the Cooperation Council shall be held alternately by a representative of the Community and by a member of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Article 92

1. The Cooperation Council shall be assisted in the performance of its duties by a Cooperation Committee composed of representatives of the members of the Council of the European Union and of representatives of the Commission of the European Communities on the one hand and of representatives of the Government of the Russian Federation on the other, normally at senior civil servant level. The office of President of the Cooperation Committee shall be held alternately by a representative of the Community and by a representative of the Government of the Russian Federation.

In its rules of procedure the Cooperation Council shall determine the duties of the Cooperation Committee, which shall include the preparation of meetings of the Cooperation Council, and such duties as are provided for in Articles 16, 17 and 53 and in Annex 2, and how the Committee shall function.

2. The Cooperation Council may delegate any of its powers to the Cooperation Committee, which will ensure continuity between meetings of the Cooperation Council.

Article 93

The Cooperation Council may decide to set up any other special committees or body that can assist it in carrying out its duties and shall determine the composition and duties of such committees or bodies and how they shall function.

Article 94

When examining any issue arising within the framework of this Agreement in relation to a provision referring to an Article of the GATT, the Cooperation Council shall take into account to the greatest extent possible the interpretation that is generally given to the Article of the GATT in question by the Contracting Parties to the GATT.

Article 95

A Parliamentary Cooperation Committee is hereby established. It shall meet at intervals which it shall itself determine.

Article 96

1. The Parliamentary Cooperation Committee shall consist of members of the European Parliament, on the one hand, and of members of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, on the other.

2. The Parliamentary Cooperation Committee shall establish its rules of procedure.

3. The Parliamentary Cooperation Committee shall be presided over in turn by a member of the European Parliament and a member of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation respectively, in accordance with the provisions to be laid down in its rules of procedure.

Article 97

The Parliamentary Cooperation Committee may request relevant information regarding the implementation of this Agreement from the Cooperation Council, which shall then supply the Committee with the requested information.

The Parliamentary Cooperation Committee shall be informed of the recommendations of the Cooperation Council.

The Parliamentary Cooperation Committee may make recommendations to the Cooperation Council.

Article 98

1. Within the scope of this Agreement, each Party undertakes to ensure that natural and legal persons of the other Party have access free of discrimination in relation to its own nationals to the

competent courts and administrative organs of the Parties to defend their individual rights and their property rights, including those concerning intellectual, industrial and commercial property.

2. Within the limits of their respective powers, the Parties:

- shall encourage the adoption of arbitration for the settlement of disputes arising out of commercial and cooperation transactions concluded by economic operators of the Community and those of Russia,
- agree that where a dispute is submitted to arbitration, each Party to the dispute may, except where the rules of the arbitration centre chosen by the Parties provide otherwise, choose its own arbitrator, irrespective of his nationality, and that the presiding third arbitrator or the sole arbitrator may be a citizen of a third State,
- will recommend their economic operators to choose by mutual consent the law applicable to their contracts,
- shall encourage recourse to the arbitration rules elaborated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (Uncitral) and to arbitration by any centre of a State signatory to the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards done at New York on 10 June 1958.

Article 99

Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent a Party from taking any measures:

1. which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests:

- (a) to prevent the disclosure of information contrary to its essential security interests;
- (b) which relate to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
- (c) which relate to the production of, or trade in arms, munitions or war materials or to research, development or production indispensable for defence purposes, provided that such measures do not impair the conditions of competition in respect of products not intended for specifically military purposes;
- (d) in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in time of war or serious international tension constituting threat of war or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security; or

2. which it considers necessary to respect its international obligations and commitments or autonomous measures taken in line with such generally accepted international obligations and commitments on the control of dual use industrial goods and technology.

Article 100

1. In the fields covered by this Agreement and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein:

- the arrangements applied by Russia in respect of the Community shall not give rise to any discrimination between the Member States, their nationals or their companies or firms,
- the arrangements applied by the Community in respect of Russia shall not give rise to any discrimination between Russian nationals, or its companies or firms.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 are without prejudice to the right of the Parties to apply the relevant provisions of their fiscal legislation to taxpayers who are not in identical situations in particular as regards their place of residence.

Article 101

1. Each of the Parties may refer to the Cooperation Council any dispute relating to the application or interpretation of this Agreement.

2. The Cooperation Council may settle the dispute by means of a recommendation.

3. In the event of it not being possible to settle the dispute in accordance with paragraph 2, either Party may notify the other of the appointment of a conciliator; the other Party must then appoint a second conciliator within two months. For the application of this procedure, the Community and its Member States shall be deemed to be one Party to the dispute.

The Cooperation Council shall appoint a third conciliator.

The conciliators' recommendations shall be taken by majority vote. Such recommendations shall not be binding upon the Parties.

4. The Cooperation Council may establish rules of procedure for dispute settlement.

Article 102

The Parties agree to consult promptly through appropriate channels at the request of either Party to discuss any matter concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement and other relevant aspects of the relations between the Parties.

The provisions of this Article shall in no way affect and are without prejudice to Articles 17, 18, 101 and 107.

Article 103

Treatment granted to Russia hereunder shall in no case be more favourable than that granted by the Member States to each other.

Article 104

For the purposes of this Agreement, the term 'Parties' shall mean the Community, or its Member States, or the Community and its Member States, in accordance with their respective powers, of the one part, and Russia, of the other part.

Article 105

In so far as matters covered by this Agreement are covered by the Energy Charter Treaty and Protocols thereto, such Treaty and Protocols shall upon entry into force apply to such matters but only to the extent that such application is provided for therein.

Article 106

This Agreement is concluded for an initial period of 10 years. The Agreement shall be automatically renewed year by year provided that neither Party gives the other Party written notice of denunciation of the Agreement at least six months before it expires.

Article 107

1. The Parties shall take any general or specific measures required to fulfil their obligations under the Agreement. They shall see to it that the objectives set out in the Agreement are attained.

2. If either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Agreement, it may take appropriate measures. Before so doing, except in cases of special urgency, it shall supply the Cooperation Council with all relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties.

In the selection of these measures, priority must be given to those which least disturb the functioning of the Agreement. These measures shall be notified immediately to the Cooperation Council if the other Party so requests.

Article 108

Annexes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 together with Protocols 1 and 2 shall form an integral part of this Agreement.

Article 109

This Agreement shall not, until equivalent rights for individuals and economic operators have been achieved hereunder, affect rights assured to them through agreements binding one or more Member States, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, except in areas falling within Community competence and without prejudice to the obligations of Member States resulting from this Agreement in areas falling within their competence.

Article 110

This Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territories in which the Treaties establishing the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community are applied and under the conditions laid down in those Treaties and, on the other hand, to the territory of Russia.

Article 111

This Agreement is drawn up in duplicate in the Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Russian languages, each of these text being equally authentic.

Article 112

This Agreement will be approved by the Parties in accordance with their own procedures.

This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the second month following the date on which the Parties notify each other that the procedures referred to in the first paragraph have been completed.

Upon its entry into force, and as far as relations between the Community and Russia are concerned, this Agreement shall replace, without prejudice to Article 22 (1), (3) and (5), the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on trade and economic and commercial cooperation signed in Brussels on 18 December 1989.

Hecho en Corfú, el veinticuatro de junio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro.

Udfærdiget i Corfu den fireogtyvende juni nitten hundrede og fireoghalvfems.

Geschehen zu Korfu am vierundzwanzigsten Juni neunzehnhundertvierundneunzig.

ἔγείρα ὀογί ἘΎνῆσῆνά, ὀόεὸ ἀβῆιόε ὀΎόόσῆνὲ Ἐίῶίβιῶ ÷βῆέα ἀίίέαέυῶέα ἀίίίβίῶά ὀΎόόσῆνά.

Done at Corfu on the twenty-fourth day of June in the year one thousand nine hundred and ninety-four.

Fait à Corfou, le vingt-quatre juin mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-quatorze.

Fatto a Corfù, addì ventiquattro giugno millenovecentonovantaquattro.

Gedaan te Korfoe, de vierentwintigste juni negentienhonderd vierennegentig.

Feito em Corfu, em vinte e quatro de Junho de mil novecentos e noventa e quatro.

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Pour le Royaume de Belgique

Voor het Koninkrijk België

Für das Königreich Belgien

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

På Kongeriget Danmarks vegne

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

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>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Por el Reino de España

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Pour la République française

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Thar cheann Na hÉireann

For Ireland

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Per la Repubblica italiana

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Pour le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Pela República Portuguesa

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Por las Comunidades Europeas

For De Europæiske Fællesskaber

Für die Europäischen Gemeinschaften

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For the European Communities

Pour les Communautés européennes

Per le Comunità europee

Voor de Europese Gemeenschappen

Pelas Comunidades Europeias


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>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

ANNEX 1

INDICATIVE LIST OF ADVANTAGES GRANTED BY RUSSIA TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER USSR IN AREAS COVERED BY THIS AGREEMENT (as of January 1994)

Advantages are granted bilaterally by respective agreements or by established practice. They provide for, inter alia:



1. Import/export taxation

No import duties are applied.

No export duties are applied with respect to goods delivered under annual bilateral interstate trade and cooperation arrangements within the nomenclature and volumes, stipulated therein, considered as 'exportation for Federal State needs` as defined by corresponding Russian law.

No VAT is applied on import.

No excise duties are applied on import.

2. Allocation of quotas and licensing procedures

Export quotas for deliveries of Russian products under annual bilateral interstate trade and cooperation agreements are opened in the same way as for 'deliveries for State needs`.

3. Special conditions for all kinds of activities in banking and the financial sector (including establishment, operation), movement of special and current payments, access to securities, etc.

4. Price system regarding Russian export of some kinds of raw materials and semi-finished products (coal, crude oil, natural gas, refined oil products)

Prices are determined on the basis of corresponding average world prices converted in roubles or respective national currency at a rate quoted by the Central Bank of Russia as of the 15th day of the month previous to the month of exportation.

5. Conditions of transportation and transit

As regards countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, that are Parties to the Multilateral Agreement 'on the principles and conditions of relations in the field of transport` and/or on the basis of bilateral arrangements on transportation and transit, no taxes or fees are applied on a reciprocal basis for the transportation and customs clearing of goods (including goods in transit) and transit of vehicles.

6. Communications services, including postal, courier, telecommunications, audiovisual and other services

7. Access to information systems and databases

ANNEX 2

DEROGATIONS FROM ARTICLE 15 (QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS)

1. Exceptional measures which derogate from the provisions of Article 15 may be taken by Russia in the form of quantitative restrictions on a non-discriminatory basis as provided for in Article XIII of the GATT. Such measures can only be taken after the end of the first calendar year following signature of the Agreement.

2. These measures may only be taken in the circumstances mentioned in Annex 9.

3. The total value of imports of goods which are subject to these measures may not exceed the following proportions of total imports of goods originating in the Community:

- 10 % during the second and third calendar years following signature of the Agreement,

- 5 % during the fourth and fifth calendar years following signature of the Agreement,

- 3 % afterwards, until Russia's accession to the GATT/WTO.

The abovementioned proportions will be determined by reference to the value of imports by Russia of goods originating in the Community during the last year prior to the introduction of quantitative restrictions for which statistics are available.

These provisions shall not be circumvented by increased tariff protection on the imported goods concerned.

4. These measures shall not be applied after Russia's accession to the GATT/WTO unless otherwise provided for in Russia's accession protocol to the GATT/WTO.

5. Russia shall inform the Cooperation Committee of any measures it intends to take under the terms of the present Annex, and consultations shall be held in the Cooperation Committee if so requested by the Community on such measures before they are taken, and on the sectors to which they apply.

ANNEX 3

COMMUNITY RESERVATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 28 (2)

Mining

In some Member States, a concession may be required for mining and mineral rights for non-Community controlled companies.

Fishing

Access to and use of the biological resources and fishing grounds situated in the maritime waters coming under the sovereignty or within the jurisdiction of Member States is restricted to fishing vessels flying the flag of a Member State and registered in Community territory unless otherwise provided for.

Real estate purchase

In some Member States, the purchase of real estate is subject to limitations.

Audiovisual services including radio

National treatment concerning production and distribution, including broadcasting and other forms of transmission to the public, may be reserved to audiovisual works meeting certain origin criteria.

Telecommunications services including mobile and satellite services

Reserved services

In some Member States market access concerning complementary services and infrastructures is restricted.

Professional services

Services reserved to natural persons nationals of Members States. Under certain conditions those persons may create companies.

Agriculture

In some Member States national treatment is not applicable to non-Community controlled companies which wish to undertake an agricultural enterprise. The acquisition of vineyards by non-Community controlled companies is subject to notification, or, as necessary, authorization.

News agency services

In some Member States limitations of foreign participation in publishing companies and broadcasting companies.

ANNEX 4

RUSSIAN RESERVATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 28 (3)

Use of subsoil and natural resources including mining

1. A concession may be required for mining some ores and metals for non-Russian controlled companies.

2. Some special auctions for the use of subsoil and natural resources for small enterprises or defence enterprises undergoing military conversion may be closed to non-Russian controlled companies.

Fishing

Authorization from the respective governmental body is necessary for fishing.

Real estate (immovable property) purchase and brokerage

(a) Non-Russian controlled companies are not allowed to acquire plots of land. Those companies, however, can lease plots of land for a period of no more than 49 years.

(b) As an exception to paragraph (a), non-Russian controlled companies can acquire plots of land in the cases when such companies are recognized as buyers in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation on the privatization of state and municipal enterprises in the Russian Federation and other respective legislation and regulations, including the requirements of programmes of privatization:

- within the framework of the privatization of state and municipal enterprises in the form of commercial investment tender and auction,
- within the framework of the expansion and additional construction of enterprises in the form of commercial investment tender and auction.

Telecommunications

Telecommunication services including mobile and satellite services, construction, installation, operation and maintenance of communication devices are restricted.

Mass media services

Some limitations of foreign participation in mass media companies.

Professional activities

Some activities closed, limited or subject to special requirements for natural persons who are non-Russian nationals.

Lease of Federal property

The lease of Federal property whose value exceeds 100 million roubles to companies with foreign participation is effected with the permission of the state authority empowered to manage such property. This maximum is to be raised and will be expressed in convertible currency.

ANNEX 5**CROSS-BORDER SUPPLY OF SERVICES LIST OF SERVICES FOR WHICH THE PARTIES SHALL GRANT MOST-FAVOURED-NATION (MFN) TREATMENT**

(a) Sectors to be covered, according to the provisional Central Product Classification (CPC) of the United Nations Organization:

Consultancy services relating to accounting review services: part of CPC 86212 other than 'auditing services'

Consultancy services relating to bookkeeping services CPC 86220

Engineering services CPC 8672

Integrated engineering services CPC 8673

Advisory and pre-design architectural services CPC 86711

Architectural design services CPC 86712

Urban planning and landscape architectural services CPC 8674

Computer and related services:

Consultancy services related to the installation of computer hardware CPC 841

Software implementation services CPC 842

Database services CPC 844

Advertising CPC 871

Market research and opinion polling CPC 864

Management consulting services CPC 866

Technical testing and analysis services CPC 8676

Advisory and consulting services relating to agriculture, hunting and forestry

Advisory and consulting services relating to fishing

Advisory and consulting services relating to mining

Printing and publishing CPC 88442

Convention services

Translation services CPC 87905

Interior design services CPC 87907

Telecommunications:

Value-added services including (but not limited to) electronic mail, voice mail, on-line information and database retrieval, data processing, EDI, code and protocol conversion

Packet and circuit switched data services

Construction and related engineering services: site investigation work CPC 5111

Franchising CPC 8929

Adult education services by correspondence part of CPC 924

News and press agency services CPC 962

Rental/leasing services without operators related to other transport equipment (CPC 83101 private cars, 83102 goods transport vehicles, 83105) and relating to other machinery and equipment (CPC 83106, 83107, 83108, 83109)

Commission agents services and wholesale trade services related to import-export trade (part of CPC 621 and 622)

Research and development in software

Reinsurance and retrocession and the services auxiliary to insurance, such as consultancy, actuarial, risk assessment and claim settlement services

Insurance of risks relating to:

(i) maritime shipping and commercial aviation and space launching and freight (including satellites), with such insurance to cover any or all of the following: persons being transported, the goods being exported from or imported to, the same vehicle transporting the goods and any liability arising therefrom;

(ii) goods in international transit; and

(iii) accident and health insurance; and personal motor liability insurance in the case of cross-border movement.

(b) Data processing services CPC 843

Provision and transfer of financial information and financial data processing (see paragraphs B.11 and B.12 of Annex 6):

For the services listed under paragraph (b) MFN subject to Article 38 will be applied, without paragraph A of Annex 8.

ANNEX 6

DEFINITIONS IN RELATION TO FINANCIAL SERVICES

A financial service is any service of a financial nature offered by a financial service supplier of one of the Parties. Financial services include the following activities:

A. All insurance and insurance-related services

1. Direct insurance (including co-insurance)

(i) life;

(ii) non-life.

2. Reinsurance and retrocession.

3. Insurance intermediation, such as brokerage and agency.

4. Services auxiliary to insurance, such as consultancy, actuarial, risk assessment and claim settlement services.

B. Banking and other financial services (excluding insurance)

1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public.

2. Lending of all types, including consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring and financing of commercial transactions.

3. Financial leasing.

4. All payment and money transmission services, including credit charge and debit cards, travellers cheques and bankers drafts.

5. Guarantees and commitments.

6. Trading for own account or for the account of customers, whether on an exchange, in an over the counter market or otherwise, the following:

(a) money market instruments (including cheques, bills, certificates of deposits, etc.);

(b) foreign exchange;

(c) derivative products including, but not limited to, futures and options;

(d) exchange rates and interest rate instruments, including products such as swaps, forward rate agreements, etc.;

(e) transferable securities;

(f) other negotiable instruments and financial assets, including bullion.

7. Participation in issues of all kinds of securities, including underwriting and placement as agent (whether publicly or privately) and provision of services related to such issues.

8. Money broking.

9. Asset management, such as cash or portfolio management, all forms of collective investment management, pension fund management, custodial depository and trust services.

10. Settlement and clearing services for financial assets, including securities, derivative products, and other negotiable instruments.

11. Provision and transfer of financial information, and financial data processing and related software by suppliers of other financial services.

12. Advisory intermediation and other auxiliary financial services on all the activities listed in points 1 to 11 above, including credit reference and analysis, investment and portfolio research and advice, advice on acquisitions and on corporate restructuring and strategy.

The following activities are excluded from the definition of financial services:

- (a) activities carried out by central banks or by any other public institution in pursuit of monetary and exchange rate policies;
- (b) activities conducted by central banks, government agencies or departments, or public institutions, for the account or with the guarantee of the government, except when those activities may be carried out by financial service suppliers in competition with such public entities;
- (c) activities forming part of a statutory system of social security or public retirement plans, except when those activities may be carried out by financial service suppliers in competition with public entities or private institutions.

ANNEX 7

FINANCIAL SERVICES

A. In respect of banking services referred to in Annex 6, Part B, the most-favoured-nation treatment granted pursuant to Article 28 (1), with regard to establishment by means of the setting up of a subsidiary only (excluding therefore establishment by means of the setting up of a branch), and the national treatment granted pursuant to Article 28 (3), by Russia means treatment no less favourable than the treatment granted by Russia to its own companies with the following exceptions:

1. Russia reserves the right:

- (a) to continue to apply to Russian subsidiaries and branches of Community companies the ceiling limiting the overall share of foreign capital in the Russian banking system which is in operation on the date of signature of the Agreement;
- (b) to apply to Russian subsidiaries of Community companies a minimum capital requirement higher than that applied to its own companies provided that this minimum capital requirement is not raised as compared with the one in force on the date of signature of the Agreement before national treatment is applied in respect of the minimum capital requirement;
- (c) to restrict the number of branches of Russian subsidiaries of Community companies;
- (d) to set a minimum level not higher than ECU 55 000 for balances on accounts of each physical person with Russian subsidiaries of Community companies;
- (e) to prohibit Russian subsidiaries of Community companies from carrying out transactions with shares and instruments convertible into shares of Russian joint stock companies;
- (f) to prohibit Russian subsidiaries of Community companies from carrying out transactions with Russian residents.

2. The exceptions in paragraph 1 may only apply under the following conditions:

- (i) provided that they are applied to subsidiaries of companies of every country; and
- (ii) for the exceptions mentioned in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (c), (d) and (e):
 - (a) until the expiry of five years from signature of the Agreement at the latest for the exceptions mentioned in subparagraphs (c) and (d) and three years for the exception mentioned in subparagraph (e); and
 - (b) where the proportion of the share capital of the Russian subsidiary of the Community company held by Russian nationals or companies does not exceed fifty percent (50 %); and
 - (c) to Russian subsidiaries of Community companies established after the entry into force of these exceptions;

(iii) for the exception mentioned in paragraph 1, subparagraph (f), until 1 January 1996 and only to Russian subsidiaries of Community companies established after 15 November 1993 or which have not commenced their operations with Russian residents before 15 November 1993.

3. (a) After the expiry of five years from the date of signature of the Agreement, Russia will consider the possibility of:

(i) increasing the ceiling limiting the overall share of foreign capital in the Russian banking system which is in operation on the date of the signature of this Agreement, mentioned in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1, taking into consideration all the relevant monetary, fiscal, financial and balance of payments considerations and the state of the banking system of Russia;

(ii) reducing the minimum capital requirement, mentioned in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1, taking into consideration all the relevant monetary, fiscal, financial and balance of payments considerations and the state of the banking system of Russia.

(b) After the expiry of three years from the signature of this Agreement, Russia will consider the softening of restrictions mentioned in subparagraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 1, taking into consideration all the relevant monetary, fiscal, financial and balance of payments considerations and the state of the banking system of Russia.

B. In respect of insurance services referred to in Annex 6, Part A, paragraphs 1 and 2 the most-favoured-nation treatment granted pursuant to Article 28 (1) with regard to establishment by means of the setting up of a subsidiary only authorized for the insurance operations is set out in the legislation and regulations applicable in Russia on the day of establishment taking into account the following conditions:

1. upon the expiry of five years from signature of the Agreement at the latest, Russia shall abolish the maximum foreign shareholding limit of 49 % in company capital;

2. during the transitional period of five years the abolition of the maximum foreign shareholding limit does not prevent Russia from introducing measures for granting licences to Community companies in some classes of insurance. These measures could be taken only in the field of compulsory insurance schemes in the social security, or for public procurement, or for the reasons described in Article 29 (2), and shall not nullify or substantially impair the effects of the abolition of the maximum foreign shareholding limit of 49 %.

ANNEX 8

PROVISIONS IN RELATION TO ARTICLES 34 AND 38

Part A

The consultations shall begin within 30 days of the request therefor by the first Party. They shall be held with a view to reaching agreement either on:

- withdrawal by the other Party of the measures which have resulted in the significantly more restrictive situation, or
- adjustments of the obligations of both Parties, or
- adjustments to be made by the first Party to compensate for the more restrictive situation created by the other Party.

If agreement is not reached within 60 days of the request for consultations made by the first Party, such first Party may make appropriate compensatory adjustments to its obligations. Such adjustments shall be made to the extent and for such time as is necessary to take account of the significantly more restrictive situation created by the other Party. Priority must be given to those measures which least disturb the functioning of the Agreement. The rights which economic operators have acquired under the Agreement at the time such adjustments are made shall not be affected by the said adjustments.

Part B

1. Acting in the spirit of partnership and cooperation the Government of Russia shall inform the Community, during a transitional period of three years following the signature of the Agreement, of its intentions to submit new legislation or adopt new regulations which may render the conditions for the establishment or operation of Russian subsidiaries and branches of Community companies more restrictive than the situation existing on the day preceding the date of signature of the Agreement. The Community may request Russia to communicate the drafts of such legislation or regulations and to enter into consultations about those drafts.

2. Where new legislation or regulations introduced in Russia within the transitional period mentioned in paragraph 1 would result in rendering the conditions for operation of Russian subsidiaries and branches of Community companies more restrictive than the situation existing on the day of signature of the Agreement, such respective legislation or regulations shall not apply to those subsidiaries and branches already established in Russia at the time of entry into force of the relevant act, until the expiry of a period of three years from such entry into force.

ANNEX 9

TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FOR PROVISIONS ON COMPETITION AND FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS

The circumstances mentioned in Article 53 paragraph 2.3 and in Annex 2, paragraph 2 are understood in respect of sectors of the Russian economy which:

- are undergoing restructuring, or
- are facing serious difficulties, particularly where these entail serious social problems in Russia, or
- face the elimination or a drastic reduction of the total market share held by Russian companies or nationals in a given sector or industry in Russia, or
- are newly emerging industries in Russia.

ANNEX 10

PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL, INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTY REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 54

1. Russia shall continue to improve the protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights in order to provide, by the end of the fifth year after the entry into force of the Agreement, for a level of protection similar to that existing in the Community, including effective means of enforcing such rights.

2. By the end of the fifth year following entry into force of the Agreement, Russia shall accede to the multilateral conventions on intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights to which Member States are parties or which are de facto applied by Member States, according to the relevant provisions contained in these conventions:

- Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971),
- International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome, 1961),
- International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) (Geneva Act, 1978).

3. The Cooperation Council may recommend that paragraph 2 of this Annex shall apply to other multilateral conventions.

4. From the entry into force of this Agreement, Russia shall grant to Community companies and nationals, in respect of the recognition and protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property, treatment no less favourable than that granted by it to any third country under bilateral agreements.

5. The provisions of paragraph 4 shall not apply to advantages granted by Russia to any third country on an effective reciprocal basis and to advantages granted by Russia to another country of the former USSR.

PROTOCOL 1 on the establishment of a coal and steel contact group

1. A contact group is established between the Parties. The group is composed of representatives of the Community and of Russia.

2. The contact group exchanges information on the situation of the coal and steel industries in both territories and on trade between them, particularly with the purpose of identifying such problems as might arise.

3. The contact group also examines the situation of the coal and steel industries at world level, including developments in international trade.

4. The contact group exchanges all useful information on the structure of the industries concerned, the development of their production capacities, the science and research progress in the relevant fields, and the evolution of employment. The group also examines pollution and environmental problems.

5. The contact group also examines the progress made in the framework of technical assistance between the Parties, including assistance to financial, commercial and technical management.

6. The contact group exchanges all relevant information as to attitudes taken, or to be taken, in the appropriate international organizations or fora.

7. As and when both Parties agree that the presence and/or participation of representatives of the industries is appropriate, the contact group is enlarged to include them.

8. The contact group meets twice a year, alternately on the territories of each Party.

9. The chairmanship of the contact group is held alternately by a representative of the Commission of the European Communities and a representative of the Government of the Russian Federation.

PROTOCOL 2 on mutual administrative assistance for the correct application of customs legislation

Article 1 Definitions

For the purposes of this Protocol:

(a) 'customs legislation' shall mean provisions applicable in the territories of the Parties and governing the import, export, transit of goods and their placing under any customs procedure, including measures of prohibition, restriction and control and adopted by the said Parties;

(b) 'customs duties' shall mean all duties, taxes, fees or any other charges which are levied and collected in the territories of the Parties, in application of customs legislation, but not including fees and charges which are limited in amount to the approximate costs of services rendered;

(c) 'applicant authority', shall mean a competent administrative authority which has been appointed by a Party for this purpose and which makes a request for assistance in customs matters;

(d) 'requested authority', shall mean a competent administrative authority which has been appointed by a Party for this purpose and which receives a request for assistance in customs matters;

(e) 'contravention', shall mean any violation of the customs legislation as well as any attempted violation of such legislation.

Article 2 Scope

1. The Parties shall assist each other, within their competences, in the manner and under the conditions laid down in this Protocol, in ensuring that customs legislation is correctly applied, in particular by the prevention, detection and investigation of contraventions of this legislation.

2. Assistance, in customs matters, as provided for in this Protocol, applies to any administrative authority of the Parties which is competent for the application of this Protocol. It shall not prejudice the rules governing mutual assistance in criminal matters. Nor shall it cover information, including documents obtained under powers exercised at the request of the judicial authority, unless those authorities so agree.

Article 3 Assistance on request

1. At the request of the applicant authority, the requested authority shall furnish it with all relevant information to enable it to ensure that customs legislation is correctly applied, including information regarding operations detected or planned which are, appear or would be in contravention of such legislation.

2. At the request of the applicant authority, the requested authority shall inform it whether goods exported from the territory of one of the Parties have been properly imported into the territory of the other Party, specifying, where appropriate, the customs procedure applied to the goods.

3. At the request of the applicant authority, the requested authority shall take the necessary steps to ensure that a surveillance is kept on:

- (a) natural or legal persons of whom there are reasonable grounds for believing that they are contravening or have contravened customs legislation;
- (b) places where stocks of goods have been assembled in such a way that there are reasonable grounds for supposing that they are intended as supplies for operations contrary to the customs legislation of the other Party;
- (c) movements of goods notified as possibly giving rise to contraventions of customs legislation;
- (d) means of transport for which there are reasonable grounds for believing that they have been, or are or may be used in the contravening of customs legislation.

Article 4 Spontaneous assistance

The Parties shall within their competences provide each other with assistance without prior request where they consider that to be necessary for the correct application of customs legislation, particularly when they obtain information pertaining to:

- operations detected or planned, which are, appear or would be in contravention of such legislation,
- new means or methods employed in realizing such operations,
- goods known to be subject to substantial contravention of customs legislation on import, export, transit or any other customs procedure.

Article 5 Form and substance of requests for assistance

1. Requests pursuant to this Protocol shall be made in writing. Documents necessary for the execution of such requests shall accompany the request. When required because of the urgency of the situation, oral requests may be accepted, but must be confirmed in writing immediately.

2. Requests pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall include the following information:

- (a) the applicant authority making the request;
- (b) the measure requested;
- (c) the object of and the reason for the request;
- (d) the laws, rules and other legal elements involved;
- (e) indications as exact and comprehensive as possible on the natural or legal persons being the target of the investigations;
- (f) a summary of the relevant facts.

3. Requests shall be submitted in an official language of the requested authority or in a language acceptable to such authority.

4. If a request does not meet the formal requirements, its correction or completion may be demanded; the ordering of precautionary measures may, however, take place.

Article 6 Execution of requests

1. Requests for assistance will be executed in accordance with the laws, rules and other legal instruments of the requested Party.

2. In order to comply with a request for assistance, the requested authority shall proceed, within its competence and available resources, as though it were acting on its own account or at the request of other authorities of that same Party, by supplying information already possessed, by carrying out appropriate enquiries or by arranging for them to be carried out.

3. Duly authorized officials of a Party may, with the agreement of the other Party involved and within the conditions laid down by the latter, obtain from the offices of the requested authority or other authority for which the requested authority is responsible, information relating to the contravention of customs legislation which the applicant authority needs for the purposes of this Protocol.

4. Officials of a Party may, in particular cases with the agreement of the other Party involved and within the conditions laid down by the latter, be present at enquiries carried out in the latter's territory.

5. When, in the circumstances provided for under this Protocol, officials of one Party are present at enquiries carried out in the territory of the other Party, they must, at all times, be able to furnish proof of their official capacity. They must not wear uniform nor carry arms.

Article 7 Form in which information is to be communicated

1. Under the conditions and within the limits laid down in this Protocol, the Parties shall communicate each other information in the form of documents, certified copies of documents, reports and the like.

2. Original files and documents may be transmitted on request only in cases where certified copies would be insufficient. Those files and documents shall be returned at the earliest opportunity.

3. The documents provided for in paragraph 1 may be replaced by computerized information produced in any form for the same purpose. All relevant information for the utilization of the material shall be supplied on request.

Article 8 Exceptions to the obligation to provide assistance

1. The Parties may refuse to give assistance as provided for in this Protocol, provide it partially or provide it subject to certain conditions or requirements, where to do so would:

(a) be likely to prejudice sovereignty, public policy, security or other essential interests;

or

(b) violate an industrial, commercial or professional secret.

2. Where the applicant authority asks for assistance which it would itself be unable to provide if asked so by another party, it shall draw attention to that fact in its request. It shall then be left to the requested authority to decide how to respond to such a request.

3. If assistance is withheld or denied, the decision and the reasons therefore must be notified in written form to the applicant authority without delay.

Article 9 Obligation to observe confidentiality

1. Any information communicated in whatsoever form pursuant to this Protocol shall be of a confidential nature. It shall be covered by the obligation of official secrecy and shall enjoy the protection extended to like information under the relevant legislation applicable in the Party which received it and the corresponding provisions applying to the Community institutions.

2. Nominative data shall not be transmitted whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that the transfer or the use made of the data transmitted would be contrary to the basic legal principles of one of the Parties, and, in particular, if the person concerned would suffer a prejudice to fundamental human rights. Upon request, the receiving Party shall inform the furnishing Party of the use made of the information supplied and of the results achieved.

3. Nominative data may only be transmitted to customs authorities and, in the case of need for prosecution purposes, to public prosecution and judicial authorities. Other persons or authorities may obtain such information only upon previous authorization by the furnishing authority.

4. The furnishing Party shall verify the accuracy of the information to be transferred. Whenever it appears that the information supplied was inaccurate or to be deleted, the receiving Party shall be notified without delay. The latter shall be obliged to carry out the correction or deletion.

5. Without prejudice to cases of prevailing public interest, the person concerned may obtain, upon request, information on the data stores and the purpose of this storage.

Article 10 Use of information

1. Information obtained shall be used solely for the purposes of this Protocol and may be used within each Party for other purposes only with the prior written consent of the administrative authority which furnished the information and shall be subject to any restrictions laid down by that authority.

2. Paragraph 1 shall not impede the use of information in any judicial or administrative proceedings subsequently instituted for failure to comply with customs legislation.

3. The Parties may, in their records of evidence, reports and testimonies and in proceedings and charges brought before the courts, use as evidence information obtained and documents consulted in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol.

Article 11 Experts and witnesses

An official of a requested authority may be authorized to appear, within the limitations of the authorization granted, as expert or witness in judicial or administrative proceedings regarding the matters covered by this Protocol in the jurisdiction of another Party, and produce such objects, documents or authenticated copies thereof, as may be needed for the proceedings. The request for an appearance must indicate specifically on what matters and by virtue of what title or qualification the official will be questioned.

Article 12 Assistance expenses

The Parties shall waive all claims on each other for the reimbursement of expenses incurred pursuant to this Protocol, except, as appropriate, for expenses to experts and witnesses and to interpreters and translators who are not dependent upon public services.

Article 13 Implementation

1. The management of this Protocol shall be entrusted to the competent services of the Commission of the European Communities and, where appropriate, the customs authorities of the Member States on the one hand and the central customs authorities of Russia on the other. They shall decide on all practical measures and arrangements necessary for its application, taking into consideration rules in the field of data protection. They may recommend to the Cooperation Council amendments which they consider should be made to this Protocol.

2. The Parties shall consult each other and subsequently keep each other informed of the detailed rules of implementation which are adopted in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol.

Article 14 Complementarity

1. This Protocol shall complement and not impede the application of any agreements on mutual assistance which have been concluded between individual or several Member States and Russia. Nor shall it preclude more extensive mutual assistance granted under such agreements concluded or to be concluded.

2. Without prejudice to Article 10, these agreements do not prejudice Community provisions governing the communication between the competent services of the Commission and the customs authorities of the Member States of any information obtained in customs matters which could be of Community interest.

FINAL ACT

The plenipotentiaries of:

the KINGDOM OF BELGIUM,

the KINGDOM OF DENMARK,

the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,

the HELLENIC REPUBLIC,

the KINGDOM OF SPAIN,

the FRENCH REPUBLIC,

IRELAND,

the ITALIAN REPUBLIC,

the GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG,

the KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS,

the PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC,

the UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

Contracting Parties to the Treaty establishing the EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, the Treaty establishing the EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, and the Treaty establishing the EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY,

hereinafter referred to as the 'Member States', and of

the EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, the EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY and the EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, hereinafter referred to as 'the Community',

of the one part, and

the plenipotentiary of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, hereinafter referred to as 'Russia',

of the other part,

meeting at Corfu this twenty-fourth day of June in the year one thousand nine hundred and ninety-four for the signature of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part, hereinafter referred to as the 'Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation', have adopted the following texts:

The Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation including its Annexes and the following Protocols:

Protocol 1 on the establishment of a coal and steel contact group,

Protocol 2 on mutual administrative assistance for the correct application of customs legislation.

The plenipotentiaries of the Member States and of the Community and the plenipotentiary of Russia have adopted the texts of the Joint Declarations listed below and annexed to this Final Act:

Joint Declaration in relation to Title III and Article 94 of the Agreement

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 10 of the Agreement

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 12 of the Agreement

- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 17 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 18 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 22 (1), second indent of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 24 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Articles 26, 32 and 37 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 28 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 29 (3) of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 30 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 30 (a) and (g) of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to the notion of 'control' in Article 30 (b) and Article 45 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 30 (h), third subparagraph of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 31 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 34 (1) of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Articles 34 and 38 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 35 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 39 (2) (c), second subparagraph of the Agreement on opening ports
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 39 (2) (c), second subparagraph of the Agreement on vessels under a third flag
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 44 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 46 (2) of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 48 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 52 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 53 paragraph 2.2 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 54 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 99 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 101 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 107 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 107 (2) of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Articles 2 and 107 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 112 of the Agreement
- Joint Declaration in relation to Article 6 of Protocol 2.

The plenipotentiaries of the Member States and of the Community and the plenipotentiary of Russia have also taken note of the following exchanges of letters annexed to this Final Act:

- Exchange of letters in relation to Article 22 of the Agreement
- Exchange of letters in relation to Article 52 of the Agreement.

The plenipotentiary of Russia has taken note of the Declarations listed below and annexed to this Final Act:

Community Declaration in relation to Article 36 of the Agreement

Community Declaration in relation to Article 54 of the Agreement.

The plenipotentiaries of the Member States and of the Community have taken note of the Declaration listed below and annexed to this Final Act:

Declaration by Russia in relation to Article 36 of the Agreement.

Hecho en Corfú, el veinticuatro de junio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro.

Udfærdiget i Corfu den fireogtyvende juni nitten hundrede og fireoghalvfems.

Geschehen zu Korfu am vierundzwanzigsten Juni neunzehnhundertvierundneunzig.

Ἐγένετο ἐν Κορίνθῳ τὸν ἑξήκοντον ἑβδόμητον ἡμέραν τοῦ μηνὸς Ἰουνίου ἑξακισχίλιον ἑξακόσια ἑξήκοντα ἑπτὰ ἔτη ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιπέρας τοῦ ἑξακισχίλιου ἑξακόσιον ἑξήκοντα ἑπτὰ ἔτους.

Done at Corfu on the twenty-fourth day of June in the year one thousand nine hundred and ninety-four.

Fait à Corfou, le vingt-quatre juin mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-quatorze.

Fatto a Corfù, addì ventiquattro giugno millenovecentonovantaquattro.

Gedaan te Korfoe, de vierentwintigste juni negentienhonderd vierennegentig.

Feito em Corfu, em vinte e quatro de Junho de mil novecentos e noventa e quatro.

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Pour le Royaume de Belgique

Voor het Koninkrijk België

Für das Königreich Belgien

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

På Kongeriget Danmarks vegne

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Ἀέα ὁγί Ἀέεγέεεβ Ἀγίεἠάὀβά

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Por el Reino de España

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Pour la République française

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Thar cheann Na hÉireann

For Ireland

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Per la Repubblica italiana

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<



Pour le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Pela República Portuguesa

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Por las Comunidades Europeas

For De Europæiske Fællesskaber

Für die Europäischen Gemeinschaften

Άέά όέò ΆõñüάάúέΎò Είέíúòçòðò

For the European Communities

Pour les Communautés européennes

Per le Comunità europee

Voor de Europese Gemeenschappen

Pelas Comunidades Europeias

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC<

Joint Declaration in relation to Title III and Article 94

For the purpose of Title III and Article 94, the GATT is understood to be the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade signed in Geneva in 1947 as amended, as applied at the date of signature of the present Agreement, if the Parties do not agree otherwise within the framework of the Cooperation Council established under Article 90.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 10

The Parties agree that the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 10 shall not apply to conditions of import of products to the territory of Russia under financial loans and credits granted for development and humanitarian purposes, technical and humanitarian assistance and other similar arrangements, concluded between Russia and third States or international organizations in so far as such States or international organizations require special treatment for such imports.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 12

Article 12, within Title III on trade in goods, deals with the question of transit. It is the understanding of the Parties that Article 12 deals exclusively with the freedom of transit of goods. This is according to normal GATT practice. The issue of transit may be taken up in the future negotiations on transport agreements as indicated in Article 43.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 17

The Community and Russia declare that the text of the safeguard clause (Article 17) does not grant GATT safeguard treatment.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 18

It is understood that the provisions of Article 18 and those of the following paragraph are neither intended to, nor shall, slow down, hinder or impede the procedure provided for in the respective legislation of the Parties regarding antidumping and subsidies investigations.

The Parties agree that, without prejudice to their legislation and practice, when establishing normal value due account shall be taken overall, in each case on its merits, when natural comparative advantages can be shown by the manufacturers involved to be held with regard to factors such as access to raw materials, production process, proximity of production to customers and special characteristics of the product.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 22 (1), second indent

With respect to the Community the legislation and regulations, referred to in Article 6 of the 1989 Agreement, include, inter alia, the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and implementing regulations thereof, in particular the provisions of those texts, which specify the rights, powers and responsibilities of the Euratom Supply Agency and of the Commission of the European Communities.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 24

It is understood that the notion 'members of their family' is defined in accordance with the national legislation of the host country concerned.

Joint Declaration in relation to Articles 26, 32 and 37

The Parties shall ensure that the issuing of visas and residents' permits in conformity with the laws and regulations of the Member States and Russia respectively is conducted in a manner consistent with the principles of the concluding document of the CSCE Bonn Conference, in particular with a view to facilitating the prompt entry, stay and movement of businessmen in the Member States and in Russia. Such efforts shall apply in particular to key personnel referred to in Article 32 and to the sellers of cross-border services referred to in Article 37, and ensure that the administrative procedures do not nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any Party under these Articles of the Agreement.

The Parties agree that an important element in this context is the timely conclusion of re-admission agreements between the Member States and Russia.

The Cooperation Council shall regularly review the evolution of the situation in these areas.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 28

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 50 and 51, the Parties agree that the words 'in conformity with . . . legislation and regulations' mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 28 mean that each Party may regulate the establishment of companies, by means of setting up subsidiaries and branches, as defined in Article 30 and the operation of branches provided that this legislation and regulations do not create reservations resulting in a less favourable treatment than that accorded to companies or branches of any third country respectively.

Without prejudice to the reservations listed in Annexes 3 and 4 and to the provisions of Articles 50 and 51, the Parties agree that the words 'in conformity with . . . legislation and regulations' mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 28 mean that each Party may regulate the operation of companies on its territory, provided that this legislation and regulations do not create for the operations of companies of the other Party any new reservations resulting in a less favourable treatment than that accorded to their own companies or to subsidiaries of companies of any third country whichever is the better.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 29 (3)

The Parties confirm that nothing in Article 29 (3) prevents Russia from adopting any new regulations or measures which would introduce or worsen discrimination as compared to the situation existing on the date of the signature of the Agreement as regards conditions affecting the establishment of non-Community companies in its territory in comparison to its own companies.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 30

The Parties confirm the importance of ensuring that the granting of licences referred to in Article 30 (a) and (g):

- shall be based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the service,
- shall not be more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service,
- shall not in itself constitute a restriction on the supply of the service.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 30 (a) and (g)

Article 30 (a), second subparagraph and (g), second subparagraph, take into account the specificity of access to financial services as it is agreed in the framework of this Agreement, and do not affect the definitions of 'establishment' and 'operation' as they apply to financial services for other purposes than the purpose of this Agreement.

Joint Declaration in relation to the notion of 'control' in Articles 30 (b) and 45

1. The Parties confirm their mutual understanding that the question of control shall depend on the factual circumstances of the particular case.
2. A company shall, for example, be considered as being 'controlled' by another company, and thus a subsidiary of such other company if:
 - the other company holds directly or indirectly a majority of the voting rights, or
 - the other company has the right to appoint or dismiss a majority of the administrative organ, of the management organ or of the supervisory organ and is at the same time a shareholder or member of the subsidiary.
3. Both Parties consider the criteria in paragraph 2 to be non-exhaustive.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 30 (h), third subparagraph

Taking into account the restrictions existing at present concerning the carriage of goods and passengers by inland transport modes, the Parties agree that until such restrictions are lifted, the expression 'intermodal transport operations involving a sea-leg' is understood to mean the organization of such operations.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 31

The provisions of Article 31 permit the Parties to apply any measure intended to prevent circumvention by a company of a third country of the measures of the Parties concerning establishment of companies of that third country in their respective territories by means of any possibility provided for in this Agreement.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 34 (1)

Taking into account the explanations given by Russia to the Community that in certain respects and for certain sectors the treatment granted to Russian subsidiaries and branches of Community companies is better than the treatment offered to Russian companies in general, namely national treatment, the Parties agree that if measures were introduced by Russia to align the treatment of Russian subsidiaries and branches of foreign companies down to national treatment, this cannot be considered to violate the obligation on Russia to use its best endeavours contained in Article 34 (1).

Joint Declaration in relation to Articles 34 and 38

The Parties agree that if either Party were to be of the view that the other had not correctly interpreted the terms 'significantly more restrictive' in Articles 34 (2) or 38 (3), such Party may have to resort to the procedures set out in Article 101.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 35

The Parties agree that the activities referred to in Article 35 (3), subparagraphs (a) and (b) do not include acting as a carrier.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 39 (2) (c), second subparagraph on opening ports

On the basis of the information provided by the Russian side concerning their ports open to foreign vessels, the Community takes note that Russia intends to continue its effort to increase the number of ports open to foreign vessels. The Russian side also notes the Community's policy of maintaining open to foreign vessels all ports open to international trade. The Parties consider that the degree of openness of ports to foreign vessels is an essential feature of an assessment of the conditions necessary for the free supply of services in international maritime transport. They therefore undertake to review the situation regarding ports open to foreign vessels at least every two years through consultations to be held in the framework of the Cooperation Council. If serious difficulties arise in maintaining a port open to foreign vessels, the Party in whose territory the port concerned is situated shall inform the other Party; at the request of the latter, consultations shall be held so as to ensure that any action taken affects as little as possible the free supply of international maritime services.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 39 (2) (c), second subparagraph on vessels under a third flag

The Parties agree after the expiry of five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement to consider the possibility of application of the provisions of Article 39 (2) (c), second subparagraph to vessels under a third flag operated by shipping companies or nationals of a Member State or Russia respectively.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 44

For the purposes of this Agreement, an economic integration agreement shall be an agreement in accordance with the principles set out in Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services. In respect of any aspect of this Agreement covering areas other than service activities an economic integration agreement shall be an agreement in accordance with the principles set out in Article XXIV of the GATT on the creation of free trade areas or customs unions.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 46 (2)

The Parties confirm their mutual understanding that the question of whether activities are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority in their respective territories, depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. An examination, in each particular case, whether such activities are connected with:

- the right to use physical constraint, or
- the exercise of judicial functions, or
- the right unilaterally to enact binding regulations,

will help to determine the answer to such questions.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 48

The sole fact of requiring a visa for natural persons of certain Parties and not for those of others shall not be regarded as nullifying or impairing benefits under a specific commitment.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 52 (definitions)

'Current payments'

'Current payments' are payments connected with the movement of goods, services or persons made in accordance with normal international business practice and do not cover arrangements which materially constitute a combination of a current payment and a capital transaction, such as deferrals of payments and advances which is meant to circumvent respective legislation of the Parties in this field.

This definition does not preclude Russia from applying or enacting legislation which lays down that such payments must be carried out through those Russian banks which have received the respective licences from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation to carry out such operations in freely convertible currencies.

'Direct investment`

'Direct investment` is an investment for the purpose of establishing lasting economic relations with an enterprise such as investments which give the possibility of exercising an effective influence on the management thereof, in the country concerned by non-residents or abroad by residents, by means of:

1. creation or extension of a wholly owned enterprise, a subsidiary or a branch, acquisition of full ownership of an existing enterprise;
2. participation in a new or existing enterprise;
3. a loan of five years or longer.

'Freely convertible currency`

'A freely convertible currency` is any currency considered as such by the International Monetary Fund.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 53, paragraph 2.2

'Primary products` are those defined as such in the GATT.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 54

The Parties agree that for the purpose of the Agreement, intellectual, industrial and commercial property includes in particular copyright, including the copyright of computer programs, and neighbouring rights, patents, industrial designs, geographical indications, including appellations of origin, trade marks and service marks, topographies of integrated circuits as well as protection against unfair competition as referred to in Article 10a of the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property and protection of undisclosed information on know-how.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 99

The Parties agree that the measures provided for in Article 99 shall not be taken with the aim to distort conditions of competition in relevant markets and thus to afford protection to domestic production.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 101

The Parties invite the Cooperation Council to examine forthwith the rules of procedure that may be useful for dispute settlement under this Agreement.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 107

The Parties agree, by common consent, for the purpose of its correct interpretation and its practical application that the terms 'cases of special urgency` included in Article 107 of the Agreement mean cases of material breach of the Agreement by one of the Parties. A material breach of the Agreement consists in:

- (a) repudiation of the Agreement not sanctioned by the general rules of international law; or
- (b) violation of the essential element of the Agreement set out in Article 2.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 107 (2)

The Parties agree that 'appropriate measures` referred to in Article 107 (2) are measures taken in accordance with international law.

If a Party takes a measure in a case of 'special urgency` as provided for pursuant to Article 107 (2), the other Party may avail itself of the procedures provided for in Article 101.

Joint Declaration in relation to Articles 2 and 107

The Parties declare that the inclusion in the Agreement of the reference to the respect for human rights constituting an essential element of the Agreement and to cases of special urgency flows from:

- the Community's policy in the area of human rights, in conformity with the Declaration of the Council of 11 May 1992 which provides for the inclusion of this reference in cooperation or association agreements between the Community and its CSCE partners, as well as
- Russia's policy in this field, and
- the attachment of both Parties to the relevant obligations, arising in particular from the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 112

The Parties confirm that although the present Agreement replaces the Agreement of 18 December 1989 regarding relations between the Parties, the Agreement shall not prejudice or otherwise affect any measures taken before the entry into force of this Agreement or agreements made between them before that date in conformity with the 1989 Agreement and this upon the conditions and for the period of application contained in such measures or agreements.

Joint Declaration in relation to Article 6 of Protocol 2

1. The Parties agree to take the necessary measures in order to assist each other, as provided for in this Protocol and without delay, for the following movements of goods:

- (a) movement of arms, ammunition, explosives and explosive devices;
- (b) movement of objects of art and antiquity, which present significant historical, cultural or archaeological value for one of the Parties;
- (c) movement of poisonous goods as well as the substances dangerous for the environment and the public health;
- (d) movement of sensitive and strategic goods subject to non-tariff limitations in accordance with the lists agreed upon by the Parties.

2. The Parties agree, if permitted by the basic principles of their respective legal systems, to take the necessary measures to allow the appropriate use of the controlled delivery technique on the basis of mutually agreed implementing provisions adopted by them in accordance with the procedures of this Protocol.

3. The Parties agree to take all necessary measures, in accordance with their respective legislation, in order:

- to deliver all documents,
- to notify all decisions,

falling within the scope of this Protocol to an addressee, residing or established in their respective territories on the basis of mutually agreed implementing provisions adopted by them in accordance with the procedures of this Protocol. In such a case Article 5 (3) is applicable.

4. The Parties agree that when the requested authority cannot act on its own, the administrative department to which the request has been addressed by this authority shall proceed under the same conditions applicable to the requested authority.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS in relation to Article 22

A. Letter from Russia

Sir,

The purpose of this letter is to confirm that with regard to trade in nuclear materials as covered by Article 22 of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation signed today, we have reached the following understanding:

Russia intends to act as a stable, reliable and long-term supplier of nuclear materials to the Community and the Community recognizes that intention. The Russian Government takes note that the Community considers Russia, in particular for the purposes of its supply policy in the nuclear field, as a source of supply which is separate and distinct from other suppliers.

In order to avoid any difficulties in trade, consultations shall be held regularly or on request on developments in the trade of nuclear materials between Russia and the Community. These consultations could include a continuous and regular dialogue on market developments and forecasts.

The consultations shall be held within the framework of Article 92.

As provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation the regulations referred to in Article 6 of the 1989 Agreement will be implemented in a uniform, impartial and equitable manner.

I refer to our common desire to facilitate by all practicable means the process of nuclear disarmament underway. We have agreed to take all necessary steps to conduct consultations with all countries concerned, if it appears that the implementation of respective bi- and multilateral agreements causes or threatens to cause substantial injury to the facilities of the Parties.

I propose that this letter and your reply will establish a formal agreement between us.

Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

For the Government of the Russian Federation

B. Letter from the Community

Sir,

Thank you for your letter of today's date which reads as follows:

The purpose of this letter is to confirm that with regard to trade in nuclear materials as covered by Article 22 of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation signed today, we have reached the following understanding:

Russia intends to act as a stable, reliable and long-term supplier of nuclear materials to the Community and the Community recognizes that intention. The Russian Government takes note that the Community considers Russia, in particular for the purposes of its supply policy in the nuclear field, as a source of supply which is separate and distinct from other suppliers.

In order to avoid any difficulties in trade, consultations shall be held regularly or on request on developments in the trade of nuclear materials between Russia and the Community. These consultations could include a continuous and regular dialogue on market developments and forecasts.

The consultations shall be held within the framework of Article 92.

As provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation the regulations referred to in Article 6 of the 1989 Agreement will be implemented in a uniform, impartial and equitable manner.

I refer to our common desire to facilitate by all practicable means the process of nuclear disarmament underway. We have agreed to take all necessary steps to conduct consultations with all countries concerned, if it appears that the implementation of respective bi- and multilateral agreements causes or threatens to cause substantial injury to the facilities of the Parties.

I propose that this letter and your reply will establish a formal agreement between us.

I confirm that your letter and my reply establish a formal agreement between us.

Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

On behalf of the European Communities

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS in relation to Article 52

A. Letter from Russia

Sir,

With reference to Article 52 of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, I confirm that nothing in this Article shall be construed as restricting the transfer abroad by Community residents of investments made in Russia by Community residents, including any compensation payments arising from measures such as expropriation, nationalization or measures of equivalent effect and of any profit stemming therefrom.

I propose that this letter and your reply will establish a formal agreement between us.

Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

For the Government of the Russian Federation

B. Letter from the Community

Sir,

Thank you for your letter of today's date which reads as follows:

With reference to Article 52 of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, I confirm that nothing in this Article shall be construed as restricting the transfer abroad by Community residents of investments made in Russia by Community residents, including any compensation payments arising from measures such as expropriation, nationalization or measures of equivalent effect and of any profit stemming therefrom.

I propose that this letter and your reply will establish a formal agreement between us.

I confirm that your letter and my reply establish a formal agreement between us.

Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

On behalf of the European Communities

Community Declaration in relation to Article 36

The Community declares that the cross-border supply of services as referred to in Article 36 does not imply the movement of the service supplier into the territory of the country where the service is destined, nor the movement of the recipient of the service into the territory of the country from which the service comes.

Community Declaration in relation to Article 54

The provisions of the Agreement are without prejudice to the competences of the European Community and its Member States in matters of intellectual, industrial and commercial property.

Declaration by Russia in relation to Article 36

Russia declares that the suppliers in the Community Declaration in relation to Article 36 could not be considered as natural persons, who are representatives of a Community or Russian company and are seeking temporary entry for the purpose of negotiating the sales of cross-border services or entering into agreements to sell cross-border services for that company.

Minutes of signing of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part

The plenipotentiaries of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese

Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, and the plenipotentiaries of the Russian Federation signed the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part, on 24 June 1994 in Corfu.

On that occasion, the French Republic made the following Declaration:

'The French Republic notes that the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the Russian Federation does not apply to the overseas countries and territories associated with the European Community pursuant to the Treaty establishing the European Community.'

This Declaration has been brought to the attention of the Russian Federation, which raised no objections.

These Minutes will be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities



GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

RESOLUTION

Of 20 August 2014 No.830

Moscow


On the introduction of changes in the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 7 August 2014 No.778

The Government of the Russian Federation decrees as follows:

To approve the enclosed changes which are introduced in the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 7 August 2014 No.778 "On measures for implementation of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated August 6, 2014 № 560 "On the application of certain special economic measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation" (Official internet-portal of legal information (www.pravo.gov.ru), 7 August 2014, No. 00012014080070021).

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

D.Medvedev



APPROVED

By the Resolution of the Government
Of the Russian Federation
Of 20 August 2014 No.830

CHANGES

Which are introduced in the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 7 August
2014 No.778

To put the list of agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs originating from the United States, countries of the European Union, Canada, Australia and the Kingdom of Norway, and that are banned for imports to the Russian Federation for a period of one year, foreseen by the indicated Resolution, as follows:

ANNEX

To the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 7 August 2014 No.778
(in edition of the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation
of 20 August 2014 No.830)

List of agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs originating from the United States, countries of the European Union, Canada, Australia and the Kingdom of Norway, and that are banned for imports to the Russian Federation for a period of one year

CN CODE	List of products *) ***)
0201	Meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled
0202	Meat of bovine animals, frozen
0203	Pork, fresh, chilled or frozen
0207	Meat and edible offal of the poultry indicated in line 0105,
	fresh, chilled or frozen
Out of 0210 **	Meat salted, in brine, dried or smoked
Out of 0301**	Live fish (excluding hatchlings of salmon (<i>Salmo salar</i>) and
	trout (<i>Salmo trutta</i>)
0302,	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic
0303, 0304,	invertebrates
0305, 0306,	
0307, 0308	
Out of 0401**, out of 0402**, Out of 0403**, out of 0404**, Out of 0405**, out of 0406**	Milk and dairy products (excluding lactose-free milk and lactose-free milk products)
0701 (excluding 0701 10 000 0),	Vegetables, edible roots and tubers (excluding seed potatoes,
0702 00 000,	seed onion, sugar maize hybrid for planting, peas for
0703 (excluding 0703 10 110 0),	planting)
0704,	
0705, 0706,	



0707 00,
 0708, 0709,
 0710, 0711,
 0712 (excluding 0712 90 110 0),
 0713 (excluding 0713 10 100 0),
 0714

Fruit and nuts

0801, 0802,
 0803, 0804,
 0805, 0806,
 0807, 0808,
 0809, 0810,
 0811, 0813
 1601 00

Sausages and similar products of meat, meat offal or blood;
 final food products based thereon

Out of 1901 90 110 0**,
 Out of 1901 90 910 0**

Food or finished products (excluding biologically active
 supplements; vitamin-mineral complexes; flavour additives;
 protein concentrates (of animal and plant origin) and their
 mixtures; food fibers; food additives (including complex ones)

Out of 2106 90 920 0**,
 Out of 2106 90 980 4**,
 Out of 2106 90 980 5**,
 Out of 2106 90 980 9**

* For the purposes of the application of this list, one should be guided solely by the CN CODE, name
 of product is shown for convenience.

** For the purposes of the application of this position, one should be guided both by a CN CODE, and
 the name of the product.

*** Except for goods destined for baby food.



DECREE

OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

On the application of certain special economic
Measures to ensure safety
Russian Federation

(As amended by the decrees of the President of the Russian
Federation

From 24.06.2015 N 320; From 29.06.2016 N 305)

In order to protect the national interests of the Russian Federation
and

Accordance with federal laws of December 30, 2006 N 281-FZ

"On special economic measures" and dated December 28, 2010.

N 390-FZ "On Security" on the basis of:

1. The bodies of state power of the Russian Federation,
Federal state bodies, local authorities

Self-government, legal entities formed in accordance with

Legislation of the Russian Federation, organizations and physical

Persons under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation in their

Activities proceed from the fact that within one year from the day

The entry into force of this Decree is prohibited or restricted

Implementation of foreign economic transactions involving imports

On the territory of the Russian Federation of certain species

Agricultural products, raw materials and food, the country

Origin of which is the state that made the decision on

Economic sanctions against Russian legal entities and

(Or) individuals or who has joined such a decision.

(The action was extended for one year from August 6, 2015 - Decree

President of the Russian Federation No. 320 of June 24, 2015; act

Measures extended from 6 August 2016 to 31 December 2017 - Decree

President of the Russian Federation of June 29, 2016 No. 305)

2. To the Government of the Russian Federation:

A) determine the list of agricultural products,

Raw materials and foodstuffs, named in paragraph 1 of this Decree,

Providing for the possibility of its adjustment taking into account the
provisions of

Subparagraph "c" of this paragraph;

B) establish a list of specific actions required for

Implementation of this Decree;

C) take measures to ensure the balance of commodity

Markets and avoiding accelerated growth in agricultural prices.

And food products;

D) organize jointly with the supreme executive bodies

Authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation, operational
monitoring

Commodity markets and control over their condition;

E) ensure, together with associations of commodity producers,

Trading networks and organizations development and implementation of the
complex

Activities aimed at increasing the supply of domestic Goods;

F) ensure, in accordance with its competence Implementation of other measures necessary to implement this Decrees;

G) if necessary, make proposals on changing the term The prohibition provided for in paragraph 1 of this Decree.

3. This Decree comes into force from the date of its signing.

President of the Russian Federation V.Putin

Moscow Kremlin

August 6, 2014

N 560



II

(Non-legislative acts)

REGULATIONS

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 833/2014

of 31 July 2014

concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 215 thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine ⁽¹⁾,

Having regard to the joint proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of the European Commission,

Whereas:

- (1) Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 ⁽²⁾ gives effect to certain measures provided for in Decision 2014/145/CFSP ⁽³⁾. Those measures comprise the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain natural and legal persons, entities and bodies and restrictions on certain investments, as a response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol.
- (2) On 22 July 2014, the Council concluded that should Russia fail to respond to the demands formulated in the European Council conclusions of 27 June 2014 and in its own conclusions of 22 July, it would be ready to introduce without delay a package of further significant restrictive measures. It is therefore considered appropriate to apply additional restrictive measures with a view to increasing the costs of Russia's actions to undermine Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and to promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis. These measures will be kept under review and may be suspended or withdrawn, or be supplemented by other restrictive measures, in light of developments on the ground.
- (3) It is appropriate to apply restrictions on exports of certain dual-use goods and technology, as laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 ⁽⁴⁾, and on the provision of related services and to apply restrictions on certain services related to the supply of arms and military equipment, if an embargo on such goods is applied by the Member States. This prohibition should not affect the exports of dual-use goods and technology, including for aeronautics and for the space industry, for non-military use or for a non-military end-user.
- (4) It is also appropriate to apply restrictions on the sale, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, of certain technologies for the oil industry in Russia in the form of a prior authorisation requirement.
- (5) It is also appropriate to apply restrictions on access to the capital market for certain financial institutions, excluding Russia-based institutions with international status established by intergovernmental agreements with Russia as one of the shareholders. Other financial services such as deposit business, payment services and loans to or from the institutions covered by this Regulation, other than those referred to in Article 5, are not covered by this Regulation.

⁽¹⁾ See page 13 of this Official Journal.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 6.

⁽³⁾ Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 16).

⁽⁴⁾ Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (OJ L 134, 29.5.2009, p. 1).

- (6) These measures fall within the scope of the Treaty and, therefore, in particular with a view to ensuring their uniform application in all Member States, regulatory action at the level of the Union is necessary.
- (7) In order to ensure that the measures provided for in this Regulation are effective, it should enter into force immediately,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

- (a) 'dual-use goods and technology' means the items listed in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 428/2009;
- (b) 'competent authorities' means the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in Annex I;
- (c) 'technical assistance' means any technical support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, maintenance, or any other technical service, and may take forms such as instruction, advice, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting services; including verbal forms of assistance;
- (d) 'brokering services' means:
- (i) the negotiation or arrangement of transactions for the purchase, sale or supply of goods and technology or of financial and technical services, including from a third country to any other third country, or
 - (ii) the selling or buying of goods and technology or of financial and technical services, including where they are located in third countries for their transfer to another third country;
- (e) 'brokering' means the following services and activities:
- (i) reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments,
 - (ii) execution of orders on behalf of clients,
 - (iii) dealing on own account,
 - (iv) portfolio management,
 - (v) investment advice,
 - (vi) underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis,
 - (vii) placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis,
 - (viii) any service in relation to the admission to trading on a regulated market or trading on a multilateral trading facility;
- (f) 'transferable securities' means those classes of securities which are negotiable on the capital market, with the exception of instruments of payment, such as:
- (i) shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in companies, partnerships or other entities, and depositary receipts in respect of shares,
 - (ii) bonds or other forms of securitised debt, including depositary receipts in respect of such securities,
 - (iii) any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such transferable securities or giving rise to a cash settlement;
- (g) 'money-market instruments' means those classes of instruments which are normally dealt in on the money market, such as treasury bills, certificates of deposit and commercial papers and excluding instruments of payment;

- (h) 'credit institution' means an undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credit for its own account;
- (i) 'territory of the Union' means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace.

Article 2

1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, dual-use goods and technology, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia, if those items are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for military use or for a military end-user.

Where the end-user is the Russian military, any dual-use goods and technology procured by it shall be deemed to be for military use.

2. When deciding on requests for authorisations in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, the competent authorities shall not grant an authorisation for exports to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia, if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the end-user might be a military end-user or that the goods might have a military end-use.

The competent authorities may, however, grant an authorisation where the export concerns the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August 2014.

Exporters shall supply the competent authorities with all relevant information required for their application for an export authorisation.

Article 3

1. A prior authorisation shall be required for the sale, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, of technologies as listed in Annex II, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or in any other country, if such equipment or technology is for use in Russia.

2. For all sales, supplies, transfers or exports for which an authorisation is required under this Article, such authorisation shall be granted by the competent authorities of the Member State where the exporter is established and shall be in accordance with the detailed rules laid down in Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. The authorisation shall be valid throughout the Union.

3. Annex II shall include certain technologies suited to the oil industry for use in deep water oil exploration and production, Arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects in Russia.

4. Exporters shall supply the competent authorities with all relevant information required for their application for an export authorisation.

5. The competent authorities shall not grant any authorisation for any sale, supply, transfer or export of the technologies included in Annex II, if they have reasonable grounds to determine that the sale, supply, transfer or export of the technologies is for projects pertaining to deep water oil exploration and production, Arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects in Russia.

The competent authorities may, however, grant an authorisation where the export concerns the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August 2014.

6. Under the conditions set out in paragraph 5, the competent authorities may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an export authorisation which they have granted.

7. Where a competent authority refuses to grant an authorisation, or annuls, suspends, substantially limits or revokes an authorisation in accordance with paragraphs 5 or 6, the Member State concerned shall notify the other Member States and the Commission thereof and share the relevant information with them, while complying with the provisions concerning the confidentiality of such information in Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters (OJ L 82, 22.3.1997, p. 1).

8. Before a Member State grants an authorisation in accordance with paragraph 5 for a transaction which is essentially identical to a transaction which is the subject of a still valid denial issued by another Member State or by other Member States under paragraphs 6 and 7, it shall first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial. If, following such consultations, the Member State concerned decides to grant an authorisation, it shall inform the other Member States and the Commission thereof, providing all relevant information to explain the decision.

Article 4

1. It shall be prohibited:

- (a) to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List ⁽¹⁾, or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of goods included in that list, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia;
- (b) to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance or guarantee, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for any provision of related technical assistance to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia;
- (c) to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance or brokering services related to dual-use goods and technology, or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of such goods or technology, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia, if the items are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for military use or for a military end-user;
- (d) to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the dual-use goods and technology, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for any provision of related technical assistance to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia, if the items are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for military use or for a military end-user.

2. The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August 2014, and to the provision of assistance necessary to the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the EU.

3. The provision of the following shall be subject to an authorisation from the competent authority concerned:

- (a) technical assistance or brokering services related to technologies listed in Annex II and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those items, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or, if such assistance concerns technologies for use in Russia, to any person, entity or body in any other country;
- (b) financing or financial assistance related to technologies referred to in Annex II, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those items, or for any provision of related technical assistance, directly or indirectly, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or, if such assistance concerns technologies for use in Russia, to any person, entity or body in any other country.

4. Where authorisations are requested pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, Article 3, and in particular paragraphs 2 and 5 thereof, shall apply *mutatis mutandis*.

Article 5

It shall be prohibited to directly or indirectly purchase, sell, provide brokering or assistance in the issuance of, or otherwise deal with transferable securities and money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding 90 days, issued after 1 August 2014 by:

- (a) a major credit institution or other major institution having an explicit mandate to promote competitiveness of the Russian economy, its diversification and encouragement of investment, established in Russia with over 50 % public ownership or control as of 1 August 2014, as listed in Annex III; or
- (b) a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union whose proprietary rights are owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex III; or
- (c) a legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of an entity referred to in point (b) of this paragraph or listed in Annex III.

⁽¹⁾ Latest version published in OJ C 107, 9.4.2014, p. 1.

Article 6

1. The Member States and the Commission shall inform each other of the measures taken under this Regulation and share any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation, in particular information:
 - (a) in respect of authorisations granted under Article 3;
 - (b) in respect of violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.
2. The Member States shall immediately inform each other and the Commission of any other relevant information at their disposal which might affect the effective implementation of this Regulation.

Article 7

The Commission shall be empowered to amend Annex I on the basis of information supplied by Member States.

Article 8

1. Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
2. Member States shall notify the rules referred to in paragraph 1 to the Commission without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.

Article 9

1. Member States shall designate the competent authorities referred to in this Regulation and identify them on the websites listed in Annex I. Member States shall notify the Commission of any changes in the addresses of their websites listed in Annex I.
2. Member States shall notify the Commission of their competent authorities, including the contact details of those competent authorities, without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation, and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.
3. Where this Regulation sets out a requirement to notify, inform or otherwise communicate with the Commission, the address and other contact details to be used for such communication shall be those indicated in Annex I.

Article 10

Actions by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies shall not give rise to liability of any kind on their part, if they did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe the measures set out in this Regulation.

Article 11

1. No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:
 - (a) entities referred to in points (b) or (c) of Article 5, or listed in Annex III;
 - (b) any other Russian person, entity or body;
 - (c) any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a) or (b) of this paragraph.



2. In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the person seeking the enforcement of that claim.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the right of the persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.

Article 12

It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in Articles 2, 4 and 5, including by acting as a substitute for the entities referred to in Article 5.

Article 13

This Regulation shall apply:

- (a) within the territory of the Union;
- (b) on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State;
- (c) to any person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State;
- (d) to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State;
- (e) to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.

Article 14

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 31 July 2014.

For the Council
The President
S. GOZI



ANNEX I

Websites for information on the competent authorities and address for notification to the European Commission

1. Information on competent authorities of the Member States

BELGIUM

<http://www.diplomatie.be/eusanctions>

BULGARIA

<http://www.mfa.bg/en/pages/135/index.html>

CZECH REPUBLIC

<http://www.mfcr.cz/mezinarodnisankce>

DENMARK

<http://um.dk/da/politik-og-diplomati/retsorden/sanktioner/>

GERMANY

<http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Aussenwirtschaft/aussenwirtschaftsrecht,did=404888.html>

ESTONIA

<http://vm.ee/et/estonian-competent-authorities-implementation-eu-restrictive-measures>

IRELAND

<http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=28519>

GREECE

<http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html>

SPAIN

<http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/GlobalizacionOportunidadesRiesgos/Documents/ORGANISMOS%20COMPETENTES%20SANCIONES%20INTERNACIONALES.pdf>

FRANCE

<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/autorites-sanctions/>

CROATIA

<http://www.mvep.hr/sankcije>

ITALY

http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Politica_Europea/Deroghe.htm

CYPRUS

<http://www.mfa.gov.cy/sanctions>

LATVIA

<http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4539>

LITHUANIA

<http://www.urm.lt/sanctions>

LUXEMBOURG

<http://www.mae.lu/sanctions>

HUNGARY

<http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/b/3b/70000/ENSZBT-ET-szankcios-tajekoztato.pdf>

MALTA

<https://www.gov.mt/en/Government/Government%20of%20Malta/Ministries%20and%20Entities/Officially%20Appointed%20Bodies/Pages/Boards/Sanctions-Monitoring-Board.aspx>

NETHERLANDS

www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-vrede-en-veiligheid/sancties

AUSTRIA

http://www.bmeia.gv.at/view.php?f_id=12750&LNG=en&version=

POLAND

<http://www.msz.gov.pl>

PORTUGAL

<http://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/os-ministerios/ministerio-dos-negocios-estrangeiros/quero-saber-mais/sobre-o-ministerio/medidas-restritivas/medidas-restritivas.aspx>

ROMANIA

<http://www.mae.ro/node/1548>

SLOVENIA

http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/zunanja_politika_in_mednarodno_pravo/zunanja_politika/mednarodna_varnost/omejevalni_ukrepi/

SLOVAKIA

http://www.mzv.sk/sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu

FINLAND

<http://formin.finland.fi/kvyhteisty/pakotteet>

SWEDEN

<http://www.ud.se/sanktioner>

UNITED KINGDOM

<https://www.gov.uk/sanctions-embargoes-and-restrictions>

2. Address for notifications to the European Commission:

European Commission

Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI)

EEAS 02/309

B-1049 Brussels

Belgium

E-mail: relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu

ANNEX II

List of technologies referred to in Article 3

CN code	Description
7304 11 00	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, seamless, of stainless steel
7304 19 10	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter not exceeding 168,3 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7304 19 30	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter exceeding 168,3 mm but not exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7304 19 90	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7304 22 00	Drill pipe, seamless, of stainless steel, of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas
7304 23 00	Drill pipe, seamless, of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, of iron or steel (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7304 29 10	Casing and tubing of a kind used for drilling for oil or gas, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter not exceeding 168,3 mm (excl. products of cast iron)
7304 29 30	Casing and tubing of a kind used for drilling for oil or gas, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter exceeding 168,3 mm, but not exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of cast iron)
7304 29 90	Casing and tubing of a kind used for drilling for oil or gas, seamless, of iron or steel, of an external diameter exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of cast iron)
7305 11 00	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, having circular cross-sections and an external diameter of exceeding 406,4 mm, of iron or steel, longitudinally submerged arc welded
7305 12 00	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, having circular cross-sections and an external diameter of exceeding 406,4 mm, of iron or steel, longitudinally arc welded (excl. products longitudinally submerged arc welded)
7305 19 00	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, having circular cross-sections and an external diameter of exceeding 406,4 mm, of flat-rolled products of iron or steel (excl. products longitudinally arc welded)
7305 20 00	Casing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, having circular cross-sections and an external diameter of exceeding 406,4 mm, of flat-rolled products of iron or steel
7306 11	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, welded, of flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of an external diameter of not exceeding 406,4 mm
7306 19	Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, welded, of flat-rolled products of iron or steel, of an external diameter of not exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
7306 21 00	Casing and tubing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, welded, of flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of an external diameter of not exceeding 406,4 mm

CN code	Description
7306 29 00	Casing and tubing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, welded, of flat-rolled products of iron or steel, of an external diameter of not exceeding 406,4 mm (excl. products of stainless steel or of cast iron)
8207 13 00	Rock-drilling or earth-boring tools, interchangeable, with working parts of sintered metal carbides or cermets
8207 19 10	Rock-drilling or earth-boring tools, interchangeable, with working parts of diamond or agglomerated diamond
8413 50	Reciprocating positive displacement pumps for liquids, power-driven (excl. those of subheading 8413 11 and 8413 19, fuel, lubricating or cooling medium pumps for internal combustion piston engine and concrete pumps)
8413 60	Rotary positive displacement pumps for liquids, power-driven (excl. those of subheading 8413 11 and 8413 19 and fuel, lubricating or cooling medium pumps for internal combustion piston engine)
8413 82 00	Liquid elevators (excl. pumps)
8413 92 00	Parts of liquid elevators, n.e.s.
8430 49 00	Boring or sinking machinery for boring earth or extracting minerals or ores, not self-propelled and not hydraulic (excl. tunnelling machinery and hand-operated tools)
ex 8431 39 00	Parts of machinery of heading 8428, n.e.s.
ex 8431 43 00	parts for boring or sinking machinery of subheading 8430 41 or 8430 49, n.e.s.
ex 8431 49	Parts of machinery of heading 8426, 8429 and 8430, n.e.s.
8705 20 00	Mobile drilling derricks
8905 20 00	Floating or submersible drilling or production platforms
8905 90 10	Sea-going light vessels, fire-floats, floating cranes and other vessels, the navigability of which is subsidiary to their main function (excl. dredgers, floating or submersible drilling or production platforms; fishing vessels and warships)



ANNEX III

List of institutions referred to in Article 5(a)

1. SBERBANK
2. VTB BANK
3. GAZPROMBANK
4. VNESHECONOMBANK (VEB)
5. ROSSELKHOZBANK





FACTSHEET

Brussels, 29 April 2014

EU restrictive measures

Sanctions are one of the EU's tools to promote the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): peace, democracy and the respect for the rule of law, human rights and international law. They are always part of a comprehensive policy approach involving political dialogue and complementary efforts.

EU sanctions are not punitive, but designed to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country, entities or individuals. Measures are therefore always targeted at such policies or activities, the means to conduct them and those responsible for them. At the same time, the EU makes every effort to minimise adverse consequences for the civilian population or for legitimate activities.

The EU implements all sanctions imposed by the UN. In addition, the EU may reinforce UN sanctions by applying stricter and additional measures. Finally, where the EU deems it necessary, it may decide to impose autonomous sanctions.

Adoption and entry into force

The Council imposes EU restrictive measures through a CFSP Council decision adopted at unanimity. While this decision contains all measures imposed, additional legislation may be needed to give full legal effect to the sanctions.

Certain sanctions, such as arms embargoes and travel bans, are implemented directly by member states. Such measures only require a decision by the Council. This decision is directly binding on EU member states.

Economic measures, for instance asset freezes and export bans, fall under the competence of the Union and therefore require separate implementing legislation in the form of a Council regulation, which is directly binding on EU citizens and businesses. The regulation, adopted on the basis of a joint proposal from the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, contains the details on the precise scope of the measures decided upon by the Council and their implementation. The regulation usually enters into force on the day following its publication in the EU Official Journal.

P R E S S



Frequent measures

- Arms embargo

An arms embargo normally covers sale, supply, transport of the goods included in the EU common military list (see the latest [common military list](#)). Related technical and financial assistance is normally also included in the ban.

In addition, the export of equipment used for internal repression may be prohibited, i.e. police equipment not covered by the EU common military list. Some examples: vehicles equipped with water canons, vehicles for the transport of prisoners, barbed wire and anti-riot helmets and shields.

The Council might also ban the export of dual use goods to targeted countries, i.e. those that can be used for both civil and military purposes, as set out on the EU list of dual use goods (see [annex I of regulation 428/2009](#)).

- Asset freeze

An asset freeze concerns funds and economic resources owned or controlled by targeted individuals or entities. It means that funds, such as cash, cheques, bank deposits, stocks, shares etc., may not be accessed, moved or sold. All other tangible or intangible assets, including real estate, cannot be sold or rented, either.

An asset freeze also includes a ban on providing resources to the targeted entities and persons. This means that EU citizens and companies must not make payments or supply goods and other assets to them. In effect, business transactions with designated companies and persons cannot legally be carried out.

In certain cases, national competent authorities can permit derogations from the asset freeze under specific exemptions, for instance to cover basic needs (such as foodstuffs, rent, medicines or taxes) or reasonable legal fees.

- Visa or travel ban

Persons targeted by a travel ban will be denied entry to the EU at the external borders. If visas are required for entering the EU, they will not be granted to persons subject to such restrictions on admissions.

EU sanctions never oblige a member state to refuse entry to its own nationals. If an EU citizen is subject to a travel ban, his home country must, subject to national legal provisions, admit that person.

In addition, member states may grant exemptions to travel bans when they host an international intergovernmental organisation, a UN conference or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Where do EU sanctions apply?

By their very nature, sanctions are designed to have political effects in third countries. Nevertheless, EU restrictive measures only apply within the jurisdiction of the EU, that is:

- within EU territory, including its airspace;
- to EU nationals, whether or not they are in the EU;
- to companies and organisations incorporated under the law of a member state, whether or not they are in the EU. This also includes branches of EU companies in third countries;
- to any business done in whole or in part within the European Union;
- on board of aircrafts or vessels under the jurisdiction of a member state.

The EU does not adopt legislation with extra-territorial application in breach of international law. EU candidate countries are systematically invited to align themselves with EU restrictive measures.

Legal remedies

The Council notifies persons and entities targeted by an asset freeze or travel ban of the measures taken against them. At the same time, it brings the available legal remedies to their attention: They can ask the Council to reconsider its decision, by providing observations on the listing. They can also challenge the measures before the General Court of the EU.





УКАЗ

ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

О применении отдельных специальных экономических мер в целях обеспечения безопасности Российской Федерации

В целях защиты национальных интересов Российской Федерации и в соответствии с федеральными законами от 30 декабря 2006 г. № 281-ФЗ «О специальных экономических мерах» и от 28 декабря 2010 г. № 390-ФЗ «О безопасности» **п о с т а н о в л я ю:**

1. Органам государственной власти Российской Федерации, федеральным государственным органам, органам местного самоуправления, юридическим лицам, образованным в соответствии с законодательством Российской Федерации, организациям и физическим лицам, находящимся под юрисдикцией Российской Федерации, в своей деятельности исходить из того, что в течение одного года со дня вступления в силу настоящего Указа запрещается либо ограничивается осуществление внешнеэкономических операций, предусматривающих ввоз на территорию Российской Федерации отдельных видов сельскохозяйственной продукции, сырья и продовольствия, страной происхождения которых является государство, принявшее решение о введении экономических санкций в отношении российских юридических и (или) физических лиц или присоединившееся к такому решению.

2. Правительству Российской Федерации:

а) определить перечень видов сельскохозяйственной продукции, сырья и продовольствия, названных в пункте 1 настоящего Указа,



предусмотрев возможность его корректировки с учетом положений подпункта «в» настоящего пункта;

б) установить перечень конкретных действий, необходимых для реализации настоящего Указа;

в) принять меры по обеспечению сбалансированности товарных рынков и недопущению ускоренного роста цен на сельскохозяйственную и продовольственную продукцию;

г) организовать совместно с высшими органами исполнительной власти субъектов Российской Федерации оперативный мониторинг товарных рынков и контроль за их состоянием;

д) обеспечить совместно с объединениями товаропроизводителей, торговых сетей и организаций разработку и реализацию комплекса мероприятий, направленных на увеличение предложения отечественных товаров;

е) обеспечить в соответствии со своей компетенцией осуществление иных мер, необходимых для реализации настоящего Указа;

ж) при необходимости вносить предложения об изменении срока действия запрета, предусмотренного пунктом 1 настоящего Указа.

3. Настоящий Указ вступает в силу со дня его подписания.



Президент
Российской Федерации В.Путин

Москва, Кремль
6 августа 2014 года
№ 560