Purwadinata, Subhan (2020) Model Kelembagaan Pengelolaan Dana Desa Berbasis Nilai Lokal Sabalong Desa (Studi Di Desa Kukin Kecamatan Moyo Utara Kabupaten Sumbawa). Doktor thesis, Universitas Brawijaya.
Abstract
Tujuan penelitian ini untuk menemukan model kelembagaan formal-informal dalam pengelolaan dana desa. Pendekatan paradigma interpretif dengan mengadopsi teori principal agent dan ekonomi kelembagaan, menelusuri perilaku informan melalui metode interaksi simbolik, menggunakan pendekatan nilai budaya lokal Sumbawa. Riset kualitatif dan wawancara mendalam dilakukan terhadap narasumber kompeten terkait pengelolaan dana desa dan untuk menjawab persoalan dalam hubungan tersebut. Temuan penelitian menjelaskan bahwa dalam kelembagaan informal ditemukan sintesa bahwa agen (kepala desa) berpersepsi sendiri dalam pengelolaan, cendrung mementingkan diri dan pendukung yang berpeluang memunculkan perilaku legal curang yang penuh dengan pergolakan nurani dan lemahnya pengawasan, pelaporan dan pendamping lokal desa berpotensi melemahkan fungsi kontrak di Musrenbangdes yang memperkuat sintesa bahwa dalam kelembagaan formal dipenuhi persoalan kepentingan, pengawasan dan partisipatif. Proposisi penelitian terkait teori principal-agent yaitu bahwa nilai lokal dapat mereduksi persoalan principal agent yang mungkin muncul seperti moral hazard serta bisa menegakkan kontrak tanpa harus ada sistem insentif dan monitoring secara formal. Proposisi terkait teori ekonomi kelembagaan bahwa Internalisasi nilai lokal dapat dilakukan ketika dana desa itu telah menjadi bagian dari masyarakat sendiri dan bukan sesuatu yang dianggap asing karena tidak hanya sebatas sosialisasi yang diterimanya tapi lebih kepada internalisasi yang diwujudkan melalui lembaga adat dalam kelembagaan pengelolaan dana desa. Proposisi terkait model kelembagaan bahwa model kelembagaan formal-informal dapat menjadi terapan tindak internalisasi nilai lokal dalam mereduksi persoalan principal agent tanpa monitoring formal yang mampu menjadikan dana desa sebagai bagian dari masyarakat sendiri melalui lembaga adat dalam kelembagaan pengelolaan dana desa. Kesimpulan penelitian ini yaitu pertama bentuk keterlibatan para pihak (principal dan agent) dalam kelembagaan pengelolaan dana desa memunculkan persoalan moral hazard seperti persepsi sendiri, kepentingan diri dan pendukung serta kelemahan pengawasan pelaporan dan pendampingan oleh agen yang dapat diatasi dengan nilai lokal sabalong desa melalui reduksi persoalan principal agent tersebut yang hasilnya bisa menegakkan kontrak tanpa harus ada sistem insentif dan monitoring secara formal. Kedua, bentuk internalisasi nilai lokal sabalong desa untuk dapat mereduksi persoalan principal-agent dan memperkuat kelembagaan pengelolaan dana desa melalui lembaga lokal desa yaitu dengan menjadikan dana desa sebagai bagian dari masyarakat desa, tidak asing serta mengetahui dan melaksanakan program dana desa secara partisipatif. Ketiga, melahirkan model kelembagaan formal-informal pengelolaan dana desa sebagai terapan tindak untuk mengurangi perilaku moral hazard oleh agen dengan menginternalisasi nilai lokal melalui reduksi persoalan principal agent sehingga tanpa monitoring formal yang diwujudkan melalui lembaga adat pedesaan.
English Abstract
The objective of this research is to find the formal-informal institutional model in village fund management. This study uses interpretive paradigm by adopting the principal-agent theory and institutional economy theory in observing the behaviors of the informants through symbolical interaction method using Sumbawa local culture value approach. A qualitative research and in-depth interviews were conducted to competent interviewees regarding village fund management to answer problems in the relationship. The findings of this study explain that a synthesis is present in the informal institution that the agent (the head of the village) uses his own perception in managing the fund and tends to prioritize himself and his supporters that lead to corrupt legal behavior with conscience upheavals and weak supervision, village reporting and local village counterparts are potential in hindering the contract function of Musrenbangdes (village development plan forum), which support the synthesis that formal institutions are filled with interest, supervision, and participation problems. This study’s proposition in regards to the principal-agent theory is that local values can reduce problems between principal and agent that may arise, such as moral hazard, and can legitimate contracts without formal incentive and monitoring system. The proposition concerning the institutional economy theory is that the local values can be internalized when the village fund has become parts of the community and not nonnative to the people because the fund is not only socialized but also internalized through the indigenous institutionalization. The proposition concerning the institutional model is that formal-informal institutional model can be applied in the internalization of local values to reduce principal-agent problems without using formal monitoring so that local fund becomes parts of the community through the use of indigenous institution as the fund managing institution. This study concludes that, first, the involvement of the parties, principal and agent, in village fund management institution creates moral hazards such as personal perception, self and supporter’s interest, and poor reporting and counselling. The principal-agent problems can be reduced by applying sabalong desa, a local value, which can legitimate the contract without formal incentive and monitoring system. Second, the internalization of sabalong desa reduces principal-agent problems and strengthens the institutionalization of village fund management through the village’s local institution by making the village fund parts of the community, making it native, and identifying and carrying out participative village fund programs. Third, formal-informal institution model for village fund management is required to reduce moral hazards of agents by internalizing local values through reductions of principal-agent problems so that formal monitoring is not required, but village indigenous institutions are used instead.
Other obstract
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| Item Type: | Thesis (Doktor) |
|---|---|
| Identification Number: | DIS/354.279/PUR/m/2020/062003133 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Principal-Agent, Pengelolaan Dana Desa, Sabalong Desa,-Principal-Agent, Village Fund Management, Sabalong Desa |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 354 Public administration of economy and environment > 354.2 General considerations of public administration > 354.27 General topics of assistance > 354.279 Assistance to urban, suburban, rural areas; to small business |
| Divisions: | S2/S3 > Doktor Ilmu Ekonomi, Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis |
| Depositing User: | Endang Susworini |
| Date Deposited: | 19 May 2022 04:32 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Apr 2023 03:20 |
| URI: | http://repository.ub.ac.id/id/eprint/190624 |
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Text (DALAM MASA EMBARGO)
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