

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter presents a brief description and explanation about the theories that support this study. There are several theories that are important to be discussed.

2.1 Pragmatics

In order to express themselves, people can perform their actions via utterances since they communicate more than they say explicitly, and it can be learnt by using Pragmatics theory. According to Levinson (1983, p. 5), Pragmatics is defined as the study of language usage. It deals with the meaning behind an utterance, or in other words, Pragmatics studies about the intended meaning of a speaker's utterances. Moreover, Pragmatics studies about what the speaker implies and what the listener infers in sharing knowledge, assumptions and the context of the utterance (Poole, 1999, p. 34). In addition, Yule (1996, p. 127) stated that pragmatics deals with 'invisible' meaning, or how to recognize what is meant even when it is not actually said or written. Furthermore, Leech (1983, p. 6) asserts that pragmatics is connected to a speaker or user of the language. As the theory of language, pragmatics has several parts: deixis, reference, implicature, speech act, and so forth.

By understanding the definition given above, it is essential to understand the forms of language, which are used in communication. When focusing on the

language function in community related to Pragmatics field, it means that the focus is on people intentions, purposes, beliefs, wants and also people's actions toward the words or utterances in particular situation, which can be studied in speech acts, as the part of Pragmatics study. The study of speech act is a central concern of pragmatics. It can be said that the central concern of pragmatics deals with the language in use in communicating with other people and how the language is used in doing things. Therefore, by applying language in communication, people are performing certain action.

2.2 Speech Act

Speech act, as one of the theories in Pragmatics is widely known. Commonly, speech act is the implementation of two things concurrently, talking and doing something. Therefore, it is essential to learn more about speech acts for this study. In general terms, we can usually recognize the type of 'act' performed by speaker in uttering a sentence. Searle (1969, p. 16) says "The reason for concentrating on the study of speech acts is simply this: all linguistic communication involves linguistic acts". Therefore, speech acts are the minimal unit of linguistic communication. Speech acts can be defined as an action performed via utterances and in English are commonly given more specific labels, such as apology, complain, compliment, invitation, promise, or request (Yule, 1996, p. 47). By looking up to this theory, it can be understood that speech act occurs when the speaker and the hearer, as the one who gives a reaction toward the speaker's utterance, are present there. Thus, if there is no one who acts in

response of the utterance, it cannot be considered as speech acts. For example in Yule (1996, p. 47) is the utterance:

[i] You're fired.

It is not just a statement if it is produced by a boss who has a great deal of power to his subordinate. It can be used to perform an act of ending someone's employment, so, the action of this utterance is the boss is firing one of his employees.

In speech act, we analyze the effect of utterances on the behavior of speaker and hearer, using three distinctions (Crystal, 1987, p. 121). The first is *locutionary act*, in which we recognize the bare fact that a communicative act takes place. The next is *illocutionary act*, in which we look at the act that is performed as a result of the speaker making an utterance, such as betting, promising, welcoming, and warning. The last is *perlocutionary act*, that is the particular effect of the speaker's utterance toward the listener, who may feel amused, persuaded, warned, and so on as a consequence.

2.2.1 Performatives

In saying performative utterance, someone is performing a locutionary act and an illocutionary act, or 'saying and 'doing' something. Both of them, 'saying' and 'doing', are used to distinguish between performative and constative utterances. Performative and constative utterances are two kinds of utterances proposed by Austin and later on, he admits that every utterance is performative. A performative utterance is one that describes the act and simultaneously performs

that act (Hurford, 1988, p. 235). This means that in producing performative utterance, people are not only saying something but also doing something, and the utterance is not reporting the true or false of something, but it is considered as felicitous or not. Opposed to performative utterance is constative utterance that is one which makes an assertion or statement and is often the utterance of a declarative sentence, and it can be evaluated in traditional terms of truth or falsehood.

In producing a performative utterance, besides delivering an illocutionary force, a speaker is also performing an illocutionary act. Illocutionary act is connected with the illocutionary verb. The illocutionary verb is used for recognizing an illocutionary act by finding the illocutionary verbs that may be stated. On the other hand, the illocutionary force is the force to deliver the illocution. The speaker's utterance that can also be identified as a locutionary act will normally give particular consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the hearers. Austin called the respond made by the hearer as perlocutionary act. This is the basic that causes Austin to divide speech act into three categories, locution, illocution, and perlocution.

Performative utterance can be performed only if there is a speaker and hearer as the respondent. If the speaker says something without any other person give responses to his utterance, then, it is not an illocution but pure locution only.

Austin (cited in Leech, 1983, p. 176) draws the examples of performative utterances, those are explicit performative, such as:

[ii] *I promise that I shall be there.*

and primary performative (or primary utterance) such as:

[iii] *I shall be there.*

As the Austin's conclusion, all regular utterances like in [ii] and [iii], there are both 'doing' and 'saying' element, whether they have a performative verb or not.

The metalinguistic character of performatives is the key to their nature since they impose a label on themselves. They make clear their illocutionary force and categorize it. Therefore, for instance, *Sit down* could have a variable and partly an undetermined force which might, be called an invitation, a suggestion, an offer, or an order in different conditions; but *I order you to sit down*, by defining itself, as an order allows no such ambivalence (Leech, 1983, p. 182).

In producing performative utterances, by starting a sentence with the words *I hereby...*, we are implementing the informal test to notice whether the sentence contains a performative verb or not, since performative sentences will sound right when they are preceded by those words. Though there is no explicit performative verb, every utterance is some kind of speech act. In the context of this study, understanding performative verbs leads the writer to recognize a performative utterance that furthermore can help the writer to analyze the utterances based on felicity condition.

2.2.2 Illocutionary act

Austin (as cited in Levinson, 1983, p. 236) focuses only on the illocutionary act since it refers to the speech act exclusively. He proposes five general classes of utterances based on their illocutionary forces:

a. Verdictives, which are characterized by the giving of a verdict by an arbitrator, jury, or a president. However, they need not be absolute because they may be a kind of estimation, appraisal, or an approximation. The truth and falsehood of a verdict can be proven through the examples of the saying of 'out' or 'in' by an umpire in a badminton game. The spectator can directly know whether his saying is true or not. Some examples of the verbs are: estimate, calculate, analyze, describe, diagnose, measure, locate, and place.

b. Exercitivities, which is known as the giving of a decision toward or against a particular action or the support of it. It is the affirmation of influence or the implementation of power. Some examples of the verbs are: give, resign, name, beg, direct, recommend, announce, enact, and dedicate.

c. Commissives, which is represented by promising, it assigns people to do something that also functions as declaration or pronouncement of intentions. It is closely related to verdictive and exercitive. Some examples of the verbs are: promise, propose, mean to, plan, engage, oppose, shall, and guarantee.

d. Behabities, which have a close correlation with attitudes and social behavior, so it is known as a very diverse group. The central discussions of behabities are someone's reaction to other people's behaviors, fortunes, and expression of attitudes to other's past or imminent conduct. Some examples of the verbs are: thank, apologize, congratulate, criticize, blame, approve, commend, and sympathize.

e. Expositives, which describe the way in which we fit our utterances into the path of an argument on communication, how to use words, or expository.

Some examples of the verbs are: affirm, state, remark, report, agree, withdraw, answer, and tell.

Meanwhile, Searle (1979, p. viii), states that there are five general categories of illocutionary acts, those are:

1. Assertives, in which we tell people how things are (report, conclude, affirm)
2. Directives, in which we try to get them to do things (ask, command, insist, request)
3. Commissives, in which we commit ourselves to doing things (guarantee, commit, promise, swear, vow)
4. Expressives, in which we express our feelings and attitudes (apologize, deplore, congratulate, thank, welcome), and
5. Declarations, in which we bring about changes in the world through our utterances (e.g. "I resign", "I baptize", "You're fired").

Illocutionary acts are also can be defined by social conventions, acts such as accosting, accusing, admitting, apologizing, challenging, complaining, condoling, congratulating, declining, deploring, giving permission, giving way, greeting, leavetaking, mocking, naming, offering, praising, promising, proposing marriage, protesting, recommending, surrendering, thanking, and toasting

(Hurford, 1988, p. 244). On the other hand, Searle (1969, p. 23) mentions that the English verbs indicating illocutionary acts are state, describe, assert, warn,

remark, comment, command, order, request, criticize, apologize, censure, approve, welcome, promise, object, demand, and argue. Meanwhile, Austin asserted there were thousands expressions in English indicating illocutionary acts.

Any types of illocutionary acts may have different or even the same proportional contents. Here are the examples of different illocutionary acts but having the same proportional content proposed by Searle (1969, p. 22):

- [iv]
1. *Sam smokes habitually.*
 2. *Does Sam smoke habitually?*
 3. *Sam, smoke habitually!*
 4. *Would that Sam smoked habitually.*

From those utterances above, the speaker refers to a certain object named Sam, and the speaker also predicates the expression “smokes habitually” of the object referred to. In 1, the speaker is making an assertion, in utterance 2, the speaker is asking a question, in 3, the speaker is giving order, and in 4, the speaker is expressing a wish or desire (in ancient form).

The speaker’s purpose is conveyed by the illocutionary act which is performed by implicit actions in what is said. The actions must be appropriate, sincere, and consistent with the speaker’s general beliefs and conduct, and recognizable as meaningful by the hearer. In order to know the appropriateness of the illocutionary act in speech acts, we have to understand the felicity condition as one of the ways to analyze the speech acts.

The theory of speech act is fundamental to be written here since the writer analyzes the felicity condition of the illocutionary acts found in the utterances

produced by the main characters of *Bee Movie*. One of the specific theories which is included in speech act is felicity condition that studies about the appropriateness of an action toward certain utterances.

2.2.3 Perlocutionary Act

Related to the illocutionary act, there is a consequence or effect of making illocution, called perlocutionary act. The examples proposed by Searle (1969) are, when someone argues, it can be meant that he convinces someone, when he requests, it can be meant that he wants to get someone to do something. Moreover, Austin (1955, p. 109) asserts that perlocutionary act is something we obtain by saying something such as convincing, persuading, deterring, surprising and misleading. In order to simplify the explanation about this theory, Austin (1955, p. 101-102) shows the example in the form of utterances, such as:

Example 1:

Act (A) or Locution

He said to me 'Shoot her!' meaning by 'shoot' shoot and referring by 'her' to her.

Act (B) or Illocution

He urged (or advised, ordered, etc) me to shoot her.

Act (C.a) or Perlocution

He persuaded me to shoot her.

Act (C.b)

He got me to (or made me, etc) shoot her.

Example 2:

Act (A) or Locution

He said to me, "You can't do that".

Act (B) or Illocution

He protested against my doing it.

Act (C.a) or Perlocution

He pulled me up, checked me.

Act (C.b)

He stopped me, he brought me to my senses, etc.

He annoyed me.

2.2.4 Felicity Condition

Speech acts can only be performed successfully if several criteria known as felicity conditions are satisfied. According to Crystal (1987, p. 121), the speaker performing speech act is required to have the authority to do so. There is no problem about the people who utter such verbs as *apologize*, *promise* or *thank*, but it is an important to limit the use of such verbs as *fine*, *baptize*, *arrest*, and *declare war*, since only certain people are qualified to use these verbs.

The other definition of felicity condition of an illocutionary act is the "condition that must be fulfilled in the situation in which the act is carried out if the act is to be said to be carry out properly, or felicitously" (Hurford, 1988, p. 251). For instance, the illocutionary act of ordering, the felicity condition is the speaker has to have authority to do so toward the hearer. In uttering:

[v] *Open the window*

if it is said by a servant to the Queen, it will be infelicitous in the act of ordering.

Yet, if it is uttered by the Queen to the servant, there is no infelicity.

An example of felicity condition proposed by Grundy (2000, p. 52) is from the utterance:

[vi] *Pass.*

It was uttered by the contestants of *Mastermind*, one of TV show. The meaning of the word *Pass*, in this context, is forfeiting the right to give an answer. Therefore, it is only felicitous to say *Pass* in a certain circumstances, such as in *Mastermind* show or in the game of bridge. The other example from Levinson (1983, p. 229) is:

[vii] *I christen this ship the Imperial Flagship Mao*

The utterance above will be infelicitous if, for instance, the ship is already named, or the producer is not the appointed namer, or there are no witnesses, slipways, bottles of champagne, and so on. Austin (as cited in Levinson 1983, p. 229) calls felicity condition for a conditions which performatives have to meet if they are to succeed or be 'happy'.

Moreover, Austin also states that in getting 'felicity' (happy) condition when we produce speech acts, there must be certain conditions or rules as follows:

- A. (i) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect
- (ii) The circumstances and persons must be appropriate, as specified in the procedure
- B. The procedure must be executed (i) correctly and (ii) completely

C. Often, (i) the persons must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions, as specified in the procedure, and (ii) if consequent conduct is specified, and then the relevant parties must so do.

If A or B are violated, the goal of speech act is totally not accomplished. If C is violated, the act is accomplished, but because of the violation of C, there will be a mistake of the procedure, for instance being insincere, such as uttering "I promise", but do not intend to keep the promise.

In uttering of words of performative utterance, there are general rules which can be discovered by classifying the types of case in which something goes wrong and the act is failed to be performed (such as betting, challenging, or marrying). The utterance is not certainly false but in general unhappy. Austin calls this the doctrine of infelicities. As cited in Levinson (1983, p. 230), Austin notes two kinds of violations. Violations of rules A and B that the intended actions simply fail to come off are called *misfires*. Meanwhile, the violations of rule C are called *abuses*, which are not so easy to be detected at the time of the utterance in question, with the consequence that the action is performed infelicitously or insincerely.

There are some rules of felicity conditions for illocutionary acts proposed by several experts. Yet, basically, those rules refer to the theory of Searle and Austin about illocutionary acts. The first is comparison of felicity conditions on request and warnings (Levinson, 1983, p. 240):

Table 2.1 Rules of Felicity Conditions

Conditions	Requests	Warnings
Proportional content	Future act A of H	Future event E
Preparatory	1. S believes H can do A 2. It is not obvious that H would do A without being asked	1. S thinks E will occur and is not in H's interest 2. S thinks it is not obvious to H that E will occur
Sincerity	S wants H to do A	S believes E is not in H's best interest
Essential	Counts as an attempt to get H to do A	Counts as an undertaking that E is not in H's best interest

Cole and Morgan (1975, p. 71) give another similar classification of felicity condition as follows:

Table 2.2 Classification of Felicity Conditions

	Directive (Request)	Commissive (Promise)
Preparatory condition	H is able to perform A	S is able to perform A. H wants S to perform A.
Sincerity condition	S wants H to do A	S intends to do A.
Proportional condition	S predicates a future act A of H	S predicates a future act A of S
Essential condition	Counts as an attempt by S to get H to do A	Counts as the undertaking by S of an obligation to do A

Notes:

S = Speaker

H = Hearer

A = Action

E = Event

In addition, the felicity conditions for an order are (Cook, 1989, p. 36):

1. The speaker believes the action should be done
2. The hearer has the ability to do the action
3. The hearer has the obligation to do the action
4. The speaker has the right to tell the hearer to do the action




Table 2.3 Types of Illocutionary Act (Searle 1969, p. 66-67)

This theory is also developed and simplified by other experts and it closely relates with felicity condition

Types of Rule	Request	Assert, State (that), Affirm	Question	Thank (for)
Propositional content	Future act A of H	Any proposition p	Any proposition or propositional function	Past act A done by H
Preparatory	1. H is able to do A. S believes H is able to do A 2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H will do A in the normal course of events of his own accord	1. S has evidence for the truth of p 2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H knows p	1. S does not know he answer 2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H will provide the information at that time without being asked	A benefits S and S believes A benefits S
Sincerity	S wants H to do A	S believes p	S wants this information	S feels grateful or appreciative for A
Essential	Counts as an attempt to get H to do A	Counts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents an actual state of affairs	Counts as an attempt to elicit this information from H	Counts as an expression of gratitude or appreciation

continues..

Types of Rule	Advise	Warn	Greet	Congratulate
Propotional content	Future act A of H	Future events or state, etc., E	None	Some event, act, etc., E related to H
Preparatory	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. S has some reason to believe A will benefit H 2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H will do A in the normal course of events 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. H has reason to believe E will occur and is not in H's interest 2. It is not obvious to both S and H that E will occur 	S has just encountered (or been introduced to, etc.) H	E is in H's interest and S believes E is in H's interest
Sincerity	S believes A will benefit H	S believes E is not in H's best interest	None	S is pleased at E
Essential	Counts as an undertaking to the effect that A is in H's best interest	Counts as an undertaking to the effect that E is not in H's best interest	Counts as courteous recognition of H by S	Counts as an expression of pleasure at E

Note:

S = Speaker

H = Hearer

A = Action

p = proposition

Speech act theory that relates the function of utterances to sets of felicity conditions and the knowledge of participants that these conditions exist, may help us to understand the unity of exchanges in communication. It helps the speaker performing the utterance in appropriate way and the hearer can take the intended meaning properly. Therefore, the clarity of felicity condition can guarantee that the speech act will be performed successfully.

2.2 Movie as a Discourse

In the daily life, movie is one of the audiovisual media for communication which consist of a set of elements. The function of movie itself is primarily as an entertainment, regardless of its content that talks about reality or merely imagination. Furthermore, we should understand the elements of movie, so, as the audience, we can understand what a certain movie is trying to deliver to the audience. One of the elements of movie, such as actors, plot, setting, characters, or story is important to be analyzed since it is made for a specific purpose and specific meaning.

It will be difficult to put every detail element of a movie in the discussion of *Bee Movie*. Therefore, this study will only take one of the elements, that is the story, as the supporting evidence of the phenomena being studied. Corrigan (2004, p.1) asserts, "Talking about film and their stars regularly become part of our daily life and conversation." In fact, we are unaware that we can use movie as part of our daily conversation and also producing a written analysis. He also said the following (p. 3):

If the movies inform many parts of our lives, we should be able to enjoy them in many ways, including the challenging pleasure of trying to think about, explain, and write about our experiences. At the movies...if watching and understanding is one of the pleasures of the movies, writing and explaining can be another exciting pleasure.

It can be concluded that we can get much pleasure by analysing movie since it represents our life so it should be fun to discuss movie in several ways.

In writing about movie, it can be meant that we write about the meaning of the movie based on our interpretation. Corrigan (2004, p. 6) mentioned that there are some functions of writing about movie, those are:

1. to help recognizing the response toward the movie deeply
2. to help persuading others whether they like or dislike the movie based on the interpretation
3. to help explaining or introducing to the readers about something in a movie that they may not know
4. to help understanding the movies better by making comparisons and contrasts between one movie and others
5. to help clarifying the culture and the movies produced, by making connections between a movie and other areas of culture.

Therefore, while watching a movie we must create the meaning of what we are watching through words including our imaginary since our interpretation of the meaning from the same movie might be different from others'. In addition, Jean-Luc Godard, the movie director of *First Name: Carmen* produced in 1984,

writes “Badly seen, badly said” (Corrigan, 2004, p.17), means that to begin writing about movie, the only way is seeing the movie with all of our attention, even though we do not like it.

As a comedy movie, *Bee Movie* is interesting to be discussed since the main characters come from different world, those are animal and human. Yet, the author of *Bee Movie* tries to simplify their conversation by using human language, even though it is produced by bees, in order to deliver the message of the movie about the nature’s balance.

2.4 Previous Studies

There is a previous research using the same theory of a pragmatics study on speech act, done by Erni Anggraini (2008) entitled “An Analysis on the Illocutionary Act Performed by the Main Character in the Movie “Happy Feet””.

The aim of her research are finding out the illocutionary act in *Mumble’s* (the main character) utterances and identifying the meaning types of the illocutionary act in *Mumble’s* utterances, as the main character of *Happy Feet* movie. As the answer of her research problem, there are 20 illocutionary acts occurred in the data, they are denying, asserting, concluding, informing, complaining, stating, requesting, questioning, voting, urging, ordering, advising, warning, recommending, promising, announcement of intention (declaration), welcoming/greeting, commending, challenging, and bid-of farewell/saying goodbye. Erni also found that there are four meaning types of the illocutionary act

performed by *Mumble*'s utterances, they are Expositives, Exercitives, Commisives, and Behabitives.

Similar to the previous study proposed by Erni Anggraini, here, the writer analyzed a movie based on the speech act theory, but focused on felicity condition in the utterances produced by the main characters of *Bee Movie*, and then analyzed the data based on the classification of felicity conditions.

